osiris_slith
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Hi All
I have spent the past few months doing some research on the German army. I hope this provides some inspiration for LCGS and scenarions :)
From 1938-1945 a philosophical debate raged in the German army regarding the organization of the German army divisions. One thing is clear, the disorganization and the creation of 3 different departments fielding ground units in the German armed forces is probably the most overlooked cause of the German defeat in World War 2. If you look for the evidence there exists a wealth of information that conclusively proves that had the German Armed forces coordinated their resources and manpower more effectively through standardization of equipment and TOES it is very conceivable that the German army even in 1944 might been able to force a stalemate on the Eastern Front.
There were from 1941-through 1945 essentially 3 arguments running in the German army:
General Guderian: Less panzer divisions and bigger Panzer divisions. Guderian recognized the critical weakness of the German army. Logistics. The German army simply was not capable of providing the necessary logistics for the war on the eastern front. The Russian army won at a terrible price, but one wonders why was it so difficult for the Russian army to defeat an army that was constantly running the logistics systems to the breaking point, not to mention poorly coordinating its equipment and resources.
General Balck: Smaller is better. The argument from his side was for bigger divisions but smaller units at the Battalion level and company level. In fact the 1944 Panzer Division was created from General Balcks 1943 concept panzer division. The major components of General Balcks 1943-Panzer division was as follows:
1x Panzer Brigade:
3x Panzer Battalion, 1x Panzer Grenadier Battalion (SPW), 1x Flak Battalion, 1x Artillery Battalion, 1x Engineer Company, 1x Recon Company, 1x Assault Gun/Tank Destroyer Company
2x Panzer Grenadier Brigades
1x Assault Gun Battalion, 3x Panzer Grenadier Battalion (mot), 1x Flak Battalion, 1x Artillery Battalion, 1x Engineer Company, 1x Recon Company, 1x Anti-Tank Company
Adolf Hitler: Like it or not. Hitler’s move in 1940 to increase the number of Panzer Divisions was the correct move in terms of TOE (the modern US marine division for all practical purposes is an exact copy of the 1944 Panzer Division). It created by accident the ideal balance of infantry and armor. Unfortunately it also created a logistical nightmare for which the German army was not prepared for and would never recover from. It was beyond the capacity of the German armed forces to provide the necessary logistical lift to ensure a quick victory in 1941. Adolf Hitler’s bet was to win the war in the east before December –1941, he lost the bet and as such after that it was a matter of time before the German army committed a fatal error. That came at Stalingrad. If you look at the underlying reasons for the German defeat at Stalingrad it was quite simple: Logistics.
In 1943 Balck and Guderian were arguing for less and larger Panzers divisions for different reasons. There were some other issues that came up with the Panzer divisions. The Recon battalion was seen to be successful by Rommel however others saw it robbing the Panzer and Grenadier regiments of their own integral recon capability. The anti-tank battalion was overstaffed and not useful unless it paired up with other infantry units. Finally the Panzer battalions were never designed for independent operations mostly because of the limited logistics capability.
The German army may not have been impressed with the US tactical performance in Africa however they were very impressed with the standardization of equipment, which finally convinced the German army to get its house in order. The US Combat commands for all practical purposes closely mirrored the Kampfgruppes of the Panzer Divisions except with a more formalized structure. The CCA and CCB were useful however the CCR was next to useless as it was to small. Its no wonder in 1944 US army commanders were aruguing for 3 combat commands.
One of the issues with the Kampfgruppe concept was that there was no permanent HQ staff so command staff would have to be pulled together from various units who have never worked together. The result must of been total chaos. The lack of officers and NCOs in the German Army was already a serious problem AFTER THE POLISH CAMPAIGN in 1939. The division of German Panzer divisions in 1941 created a serious shortfall of qualified staff and NCOs to run the organizations. With the manpower losses from 1941-1943 once can easily see why the quality of the German army declined so rapidly in 1944.
The US Army assement of the German Army in 1944 was that it was better equipped in 1944 than it was in 1943-1942. This is true equipment wise and manpower wise, however it was also really the last breath of the German army as well. That being said the modern US army seems to have taken a few lessons from the 1944 Panzer Division
Lets put the armor and infantry units of a modern US Heavy Brigade combat team side by side with a typical German Panzer Kampfgruppe
1942 German Panzer Kampfgruppe vs US Heavy Brigade Combat Team 2010
4x Panzer Company-US BCT-2010-4x Armored Company
3x Panzer Grenadier Company+ Heavy Company- US BCT-2010-4x Mechanized Company
1x Engineer Company- US BCT-2010-2x Engineer Company
1x Artillery Battalion- US BCT-2010-1x Fires Support Battalion
1x Recon Company- US BCT-2010-1x Cavalry Squadron
1x Assault Gun Company
1x Flak Company
Who says people dont learn from history!!
In summary the German army would have been better off maintaining fewer larger Panzer Division by increasing their infantry component and ensuring the formations in the field get priority on replacement and equipment to maintain their strength. General Guderian and Balck were correct in their push for larger divisions, except Guderian got it right on both counts; he realized the serious shortfall of officers and NCO, General Balck did not.
Lets assume had the plan been executed it needs to follow 3 basic concepts:
Every 3rd Panzer Division is eliminated:
Surplus personnel and equipment is used to equip 2 panzer divisions. This would bring them to about 160-200 tanks + 30 tank destroyers each. Also Panzer Grenadier Battalions get 5 companies instead 4. The regiments now get a light recon battalion with a full command staff which can be rapidly expanded to a KG Panzer or PG battalion. The Panzer division now has ability to hold ground (10 extra infantry companies) and operate independently. In addition an officer and NCO reserve is created and trucks are made available for logistics from the disbanded panzer division
Elimination of all Panzer Grenadier divisions
Some surplus personnel and equipment is handed over to the panzer divisions however most personnel would go to the infantry divisions. The assault gun battalion is handed over to the panzer division as well. This would add about 30-40 assault guns per panzer division hence now we have a combat formation with 160-200 tanks and 40-80 assault guns. In addition an officer and NCO reserve is created and LARGE AMOUNT OF trucks are made available for logistics or to create a truck reserve which can than be used to provide the necessary lift to infantry divisions that operate with Panzer Divisions.
Large Battalions: The 1st 2 steps would not have solved the German army’s NCO and officer shortfall after 1939. General Balck was wrong to argue for small battalions, the officer and NCO problem would have remained, hence the solution for the German army was large battalions.
This concept panzer division would have looked something like this:
1x Panzer Regiment with
1 Panzer Battalion (PzV): 4x Pz Company (17-22 tanks each)
1 Panzer Battalion (PzIV): 4x Pz Company (17-22 tanks each)
1 Assault Gun Battalion (SG-III): 3x Assault Gun Company (11-14 each)
1 Recon Battalion (Reserve KG Staff): : 1x Scout Car Company, 1-2 Light Recon Company, 1x Heavy Company
1 Engineer Company, 1 Flak Company, 1 Artillery Battery
2x Panzer Grenadier Regiments with
1 Panzer Grenadier Battalion (SPW): 4x PG Company, 1x Heavy Company
1 Panzer Grenadier Battalion: (Mot): 4x PG Company, 1x Heavy Company
1 Light Recon Battalion (Reserve KG Staff): 1x Scout Car Company, 1-2 Light Recon Company, 1x Heavy Company
1 Engineer Company, 1 Flak Company, 1 Artillery Battery
The light recon battalion in the Panzer and Panzer Grenadier regiment improves on the US CCA, CCB and CCR concept. Most German Kampgruppes were of battalions size, hence it would make sense for the German army to have a KG Reseve that would be a dual purpose Recon battalion with a full command staff so that it could be expanded into a Panzer or Panzer Grenadier Kampfgruppe.
1 Artillery Regiment with:
1 Panzer Artillery Battalion- Intrestingly enough General Balck and others really did not like SP artillery
2 Motorized Artillery Battalion,
1 Heavy Artillery Battalion (150mm-170mm),
1 Rocket Battalion (150-300mm)
Divisional assets:
1 Mobile Recon Battalion (Standardized with Kublewagens and with really small PG companies of 3 rifle platoons)
Anti-tank Battalion
HQ staff (Admin purposes only, not for tactical employment)
3 Mobile companies ideally with a mix of 75mm and 88mm SP platforms to be parceled out to the regiments
1 towed company (75mm)
1 Engineer battalion
1 Flak Battalion
1 Tiger Company (from all the disbanded Tiger battalions)
Rene (osiris)
< Message edited by osiris -- 10/5/2010 12:20:27 AM >
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