janh
Posts: 1216
Joined: 6/12/2007 Status: offline
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quote:
ORIGINAL: RCH Since Glantz is discussed a lot around here I was wondering what he has written on the Battle of Kursk? For a long time it was considered a complete Soviet victory. From my understanding it is now looked at not so clear cut. Model in the north of the salient was stopped cold, but in the south Manstein had some success. The great tanks battle around Perestroika was actually a partial German victory. The support given was that the Soviet suffered a lot of tank losses while the German suffered few. Manstein wanted to commit his reserves, but Hitler baulked and ended the whole advance. The units that had supposedly lost so many tanks remained combat effective for a long time after the battle of Kursk indicating that they hadn't suffered the losses that the Soviets said they had. In the end the Battle of Kursk caused losses that the Reich couldn't afford speeding up the end of the war. http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-kursk-germanys-lost-victory-in-world-war-ii.htm Good question. Although Glantz needs to be considered with a grain of salt just as all the other historical studies, I consider him one of the most actual on the topics and his studies seem to be well researched as far I can tell. Doesn't mean he is necessary right, or the state of understanding wouldn't change in the future, but he certainly cannot be ignored. As to the question of Kursk, my opinion is that had it been launched earlier as desired by Mannstein, it may have produced some fruits. But even then, would a few divisions more captured have made any difference at the strategic scale? Not so much, perhaps at best it may have caused the Soviets to be more cautions and delay their late summer offensives, offering a longer pause for the Wehrmacht to refit, entrench and prepare. Perhaps even offering the chance for a gambit, moving some Panzers to Italy in the nick of time. Kursk as it happened does seem more like a draw at the operational level, and a German defeat at the strategic level. It depleted many of the remaining high-quality formations, and the losses in experienced personnel appear to have turned out afterwards particularly detrimental. In the bigger picture, the Germans might have done better to go on the strategic defense after Kharkov II, and should perhaps have used these formations as firebrigades in the coming months and year. Perhaps if detached to Italy for the summer they might have at least made a difference there. But as it stands, Kursk seems to me a big waste of resources.
< Message edited by janh -- 5/12/2012 3:09:30 PM >
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