Anachro
Posts: 2506
Joined: 11/23/2015 From: The Coastal Elite Status: offline
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Thank you for all the replies, guys. They really help. quote:
ORIGINAL: geofflambert Let me say another thing. I don't know why people want to play with PDU off. I'm all for historicity, and that's why I'm only interested at this time in playing DBB-C. But why should you tie one arm behind your back to do something stupid the Japanese did historically but weren't compelled to by the facts in play? If you go to the trouble of playing the J against a competent opponent, you are going to lose in the end. If anyone needs to tie their arm behind their back it is the Allied player, (but don't do that either). Now, I'm not taking issue with this opinion, but I want to present some food-for-thought. Regarding your first question as to why somebody would want to play with PDU off. I would argue that there is a very valid reason why you might "tie one arm behind your back;" and that is to see how much better or worse you could do than the actual Japanese did given the same aircraft models, etc. This is not pointless, but can be a rather interesting and fun exercise. Of course, much can depend on your opponent's performance too. Additionally, PDU off also means that the allied player must also follow historical upgrade paths. I believe some have stated before that the net benefit for the Allied player with PDU off is minimal at best when this is taken into account. Second, I don't know if I can agree with your idea that it was stupid what the Japanese did historically. Rather, I think this opinion displays a bias that comes about through the benefits of hindsight regaridng what we know of what worked and didn't work. Indeed, it might be said that PDU on is an exploitation given this hindsight that allows the Japanese player to establish unrealistic streamlining of research and production that could not be recreated in the vacuum of reality even if the Japanese planners had might the "right" decisions. That is to say, even had the Japanese decided to not quite be so erratic in their production, the constraints of their existing technological and productive capabilities, the fog of the future and any requirements or hurdles it might bring, the lack of clarity on just what is optimal or best for a fighter plane, etc. - all these make it harder to decide what is really needed. I guess what I'm trying to say is that because we know what worked and what did not, we can shoot for the 100% best planes, whereas in reality even given the "right" productive decisions, you might only achieve 20-50%. I hope that makes sense, because I was thinking as I was typing; and we all know how dangerous that can be.
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