dgaad
Posts: 864
Joined: 7/25/2001
From: Hockeytown
Status: offline
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Words like "turning point" always lead to battles about the meaning of words : semantics or sophistry.
The assessment of Japanese fortunes was most presciently given by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy himself, Admiral Yamamoto, who said that in the first six months he would bring victory after victory, after that, if the United States has not been forced to the peace table, there would be nothing but defeat.
The Battle of the Coral Sea occurred exactly 6 months to the day after Pearl Harbor, on May 7th, 1942. In this battle, for the first time, a strategic offensive by the IJN and IJA was stymied by US naval forces. Having defeated fleet after fleet and army after army all across the Pacific, here for the first time the Japanese were turned back. The irony and significance of this was apparent to Yamamoto and several of his advisors.
But, in truth, the "turning point" if we want to call it that, came much earlier. It came with the very victories the Japanese had gained. For in these triumphs of arms, the Japanese, almost to a man, believed that fighting spirit could overcome material superiority, they believed that whatever they decided to do, within reason, could be accomplished simply because the Japanese navy could not be defeated, and the Japanese army had defeated time and again vastly superior forces. It has been called "Victory Disease".
These assumptions were false, of course. The string of Japanese victories had as much to do with Allied unpreparedness, the treachery of a surprise attack, and the years of combat experience the Japanese had had over the preceeding 4 plus years in China, as it did with anything else. Once the Allies recovered from the surprise attack, brought their material resources to bear, and channeled the fury of vengeance brought about by the "dastardly" nature of their war, these advantages would wither and fade. That's exactly what happened. At Guadalcanal, for example, and other battles after that, US forces killed or wounded far more soldiers and pilots than they themselves lost. And the Japanese had less to spare.
But, all told, it was not the material superiority of the Americans that defeated the Japanese at Guadalcanal. It was the false assumptions held by so many Japanese officers. In the early days of the Guadalcanal campaign, the Japanese could have easily landed several divsions and wiped out the Marine beachead. Instead, time and again, officers claimed they would only need a regiment or a battalion to do the job when a division or brigade was ready and able to go. They disdained the fighting ability of "the white man" (their words, not mine), and the democracies in particular. Their battalions were wiped out in Banzai charges, and American air and material superiority led to a situation, eventually, where there were 30,000 Japanese soldiers on Guadalcanal, nearly all of them starving.
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Last time I checked, the forums were messed up. ;)
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