Matrix Games Forums

Forums  Register  Login  Photo Gallery  Member List  Search  Calendars  FAQ 

My Profile  Inbox  Address Book  My Subscription  My Forums  Log Out

Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu

 
View related threads: (in this forum | in all forums)

Logged in as: Guest
Users viewing this topic: none
  Printable Version
All Forums >> [New Releases from Matrix Games] >> War in the Pacific: Admiral's Edition >> The War Room >> Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu Page: [1]
Login
Message << Older Topic   Newer Topic >>
Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/6/2010 8:04:28 AM   
HexHead

 

Posts: 464
Joined: 2/9/2010
From: I'm from New Hampshire; I only work in cyberspace
Status: offline
"The acme of success is not winning battles - it is he who compels the enemy to surrender without loosing a single arrow."

IRL, the Empire could not possibly defeat the US in a slugging match. The Cabinet decided that war was necessary and anticipated a decisive battle that would compel negotiations. A host of other reasons were responsible for Japan's defeat, but, in AE, one could regard certain situations, positions if you will, as an analog to checkmate in chess.

I speak as a novice to the game who has only played the Allies vs. the AI and not very deeply, at that - only up to late Jan42 in my games.

I speak solely from an historical viewpoint, a "what if" generated from other threads on Japanese concerns.

Production
* Stop all SS production.
* Build priorities are the Navy, AF, and Army.
* Tac bombers, carrier planes, fighters.
* Carriers, light cruisers, DDs, and merchants.
* Infantry and artillery.

Objectives:
* Calcutta
* Staus quo/stalemate in China - minimal investment
* SE Asia, DEI, Port Moresby, Fiji
* Ceylon, if possible

Continue to isolate Australia and NZ. Take Darwin and hold NT as long as possible, if Australian conquest impossible. Maybe NZ? Take Canton, Palmyra. Isolate Pearl. All the AKs in the sea don't matter if there's nowhere to ship to.

If Japan can have a dozen carriers and supporting cast available, a decisive battle might be possible as late as 43. In general though, I would try to win a Midway as early as possible - Yamamoto wasn't wrong to force round three - sink Spruance & Co and it's a different ballgame in Jun42. Occupying everything from Calcutta to Johnson Island should provoke something. If it doesn't, Japan must defend a perimeter (with static defenders in the Pacific) and let the Allies choose the point of penetration. That movement must be crushed and could still probably obtain until mid43.

"Flow like the river, fill every crevice."
"Appear weak when you are strong, near when you are far, unready when poised to strike."

< Message edited by HexHead -- 4/6/2010 8:16:41 AM >


_____________________________

"Goddamn it, they're gittin' away!!"
- unknown tincan sailor near the end of Leyte Gulf, when Kurita retired
Post #: 1
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/6/2010 10:31:43 AM   
Swenslim

 

Posts: 437
Joined: 4/15/2005
From: Odessa, Ukraine
Status: offline
Ceylon and India and Aleutians and Noumea and beyond are absolutly useless, do not spread your forces too much.

Build in DEI and Solomons airbases so they can cover each others with LBA range 6-8 hex max one from another.

Build submurines, they are very good.


(in reply to HexHead)
Post #: 2
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/6/2010 10:49:21 AM   
HexHead

 

Posts: 464
Joined: 2/9/2010
From: I'm from New Hampshire; I only work in cyberspace
Status: offline
Submarines can either scout, patrol for naval targets, or sink merchants. I assume a guerre de course is not the best for Japan. That leaves scouting or naval interdiction. A limited number of subs may be useful, but interdiction? That's why I have the scourge of the Pacific on my team, no?

Coral Sea - check. Midway - lost your queen. Guadalcanal - the start of a 60 move mate. Japan is going to face a tsunami of steel from the East. She must neutralize British Asia, pinch pennies in China, and turn every effort to isolating Australasia and forcing the US to commence ops from the harbor entrance to Pearl. The payoff is a half dozen USN flattops rusting 3000 feet down and the promise of more bloody noses to come.

With no secret weapons, a Japanese checkmate is possible, although historically, most probably quite implausible.

< Message edited by HexHead -- 4/6/2010 11:54:15 AM >


_____________________________

"Goddamn it, they're gittin' away!!"
- unknown tincan sailor near the end of Leyte Gulf, when Kurita retired

(in reply to Swenslim)
Post #: 3
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/6/2010 11:33:07 AM   
mike scholl 1

 

Posts: 1265
Joined: 2/17/2010
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Swenslim

Build submurines, they are very good.




I agree. These over-sized, shallow-diving, unmanueverable, pieces of junk perform like one-boat "wolf packs" of German U-Boats in AE. The Japanese should probably build all they can.

(in reply to Swenslim)
Post #: 4
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/6/2010 11:53:41 AM   
HexHead

 

Posts: 464
Joined: 2/9/2010
From: I'm from New Hampshire; I only work in cyberspace
Status: offline
Well, if they're that effective for Japan...

hey, do what you want. Historically, the IJN had no concepts or doctrine in place about merchant hunting. It is recorded that one boat hung off Panama for two weeks and claimed to see no targets. Right. I guess you can't see what you don't wish to look for.

I think the IJN got only one US CV outright, i. e., not crippled, etc. The IJN submarine service didn't seriously impede US ops. OTOH, the USN got to the point where it prioritized IJN DDs!

Sounds like IJN subs are a bit too effective, if ya know what I mean...

Also, I'm assuming that a JFB has to watch his wallet, no? That's a major concern for JFBs, right? Subs aren't going to win the war. Two TFs with four flattops apiece might.

< Message edited by HexHead -- 4/6/2010 11:57:35 AM >


_____________________________

"Goddamn it, they're gittin' away!!"
- unknown tincan sailor near the end of Leyte Gulf, when Kurita retired

(in reply to mike scholl 1)
Post #: 5
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/14/2010 6:35:21 PM   
topeverest


Posts: 3376
Joined: 10/17/2007
From: Houston, TX - USA
Status: offline
Stay on the offensive until forced to give it up.

Adak is the logical defenisive position to thwart any northern attack. It is worth taking. Noumea is an excellent defensive base cluster that anchors the entire region.

remember the Americans are your primary enemy! you cant win the war in india...

_____________________________

Andy M

(in reply to HexHead)
Post #: 6
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/15/2010 3:50:09 AM   
Xxzard

 

Posts: 440
Joined: 9/28/2008
From: Arizona
Status: offline
I would have to agree that India can't be won, especially in AE. But then again, where can Japan "win" the war?

In examining many AARs, the idea of remaining on the offensive until forced out of it seems to work well. In part it could be that the best players are more aggressive, but who knows, maybe that is why they are better. On the other hand though, when you're aggressive, it only takes one screw up to end up on the defensive. I believe it was Napoleon or some such who said that the transition from offense to defense is one of the hardest and most delicate operations in warfare.

_____________________________


(in reply to topeverest)
Post #: 7
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/15/2010 3:53:59 AM   
Q-Ball


Posts: 7336
Joined: 6/25/2002
From: Chicago, Illinois
Status: offline
It's not easy in AE, there are no "knockout" blows you can deliver, like you could in WITP. India is not conquerable, and I don't think China is either. Pretty tough.

RE: Subs, build the Type-A/B/C (the floatplane ones), and all the KDB-types as well (the fast attack boats). Don't build the RO-Boats.

_____________________________


(in reply to Xxzard)
Post #: 8
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/15/2010 4:27:38 AM   
JeffroK


Posts: 6391
Joined: 1/26/2005
Status: offline
IMHO, the only place the japanese can take which would see a "checkmate" would be the Hawaiian Islands, and against a reasonable defence they shouldnt be able to achieve this.

I think their position is "Not lose by too much"

Back to Sun Tzu, would this doctrine lead to an isolation of both Singapore & the Phillipines and let them wither on the vine? 

_____________________________

Interdum feror cupidine partium magnarum Europae vincendarum

(in reply to Q-Ball)
Post #: 9
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/15/2010 4:57:16 AM   
CarnageINC


Posts: 2208
Joined: 2/28/2005
From: Rapid City SD
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Q-Ball

Don't build the RO-Boats.



I've seen you say this before QBall, why is that? The range, the armament, the time?

_____________________________


(in reply to Q-Ball)
Post #: 10
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/15/2010 7:52:02 AM   
LoBaron


Posts: 4776
Joined: 1/26/2003
From: Vienna, Austria
Status: offline
In fact I like the RO´s for confined water duties...

_____________________________


(in reply to CarnageINC)
Post #: 11
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/15/2010 10:45:07 AM   
xj900uk

 

Posts: 1340
Joined: 3/22/2007
Status: offline
Think you're ignoring the major dictum of the Pacific War 41-45 :
Attacking Pearl Harbour may have been a might Japanese tactical victory, but it was a strategic blunder of the worst possible sort. It p*ssed off the Americans so much they were in no mood to compromise, not ever, after 7/12/41, and they were determined to keep coming no matter how long it took and no matter what the cost in blood (althogh the front line troops, particularly after the kamikaze's started coming, may have disputed the last point).

After PH, has Yamamoto himself mused in his diaries, the only way that the Imperial High Command would have been able to dictate any kind of peace or armistice to the US would be when the Japanese troops were marching up the steps of the White House, and even then he doubted the Americans would ever listen...

However, an more interesting hypothetical 'what if', is if the Japanese ignored PH and instead concentrated purely on the British in Burma and Malaysia, + the DEI. Rooseveldt would have had an insurmountable mountain to climb trying to sell a Pacific war to both Congress and the American public purely to shore up European colonial interests far, far away from US soil and to which America had no real interest. You could also argue that an attack on the PI may only have precipitated 'limited' US intervention, as the White House had already privately agreed that Plan Orange was unworkable and that the PI could not be defended indefinitely from Japanese attack (no matter what MacArthur thought or said) and again Rooseveldt would have had trouble getting the necessary funds for all out unlimited war purely to protect an admittedly large US interest that was far away across the other side of the Pacific which hardly anyone had ever heard of or even knew where it was...

< Message edited by xj900uk -- 4/15/2010 10:46:12 AM >

(in reply to LoBaron)
Post #: 12
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/15/2010 12:39:42 PM   
AW1Steve


Posts: 14507
Joined: 3/10/2007
From: Mordor Illlinois
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Think you're ignoring the major dictum of the Pacific War 41-45 :
Attacking Pearl Harbour may have been a might Japanese tactical victory, but it was a strategic blunder of the worst possible sort. It p*ssed off the Americans so much they were in no mood to compromise, not ever, after 7/12/41, and they were determined to keep coming no matter how long it took and no matter what the cost in blood (althogh the front line troops, particularly after the kamikaze's started coming, may have disputed the last point).

After PH, has Yamamoto himself mused in his diaries, the only way that the Imperial High Command would have been able to dictate any kind of peace or armistice to the US would be when the Japanese troops were marching up the steps of the White House, and even then he doubted the Americans would ever listen...

However, an more interesting hypothetical 'what if', is if the Japanese ignored PH and instead concentrated purely on the British in Burma and Malaysia, + the DEI. Rooseveldt would have had an insurmountable mountain to climb trying to sell a Pacific war to both Congress and the American public purely to shore up European colonial interests far, far away from US soil and to which America had no real interest. You could also argue that an attack on the PI may only have precipitated 'limited' US intervention, as the White House had already privately agreed that Plan Orange was unworkable and that the PI could not be defended indefinitely from Japanese attack (no matter what MacArthur thought or said) and again Rooseveldt would have had trouble getting the necessary funds for all out unlimited war purely to protect an admittedly large US interest that was far away across the other side of the Pacific which hardly anyone had ever heard of or even knew where it was...


And the capture of 100,000+ Americans in the PI wpold not have angered the US public? The death march surely would have. And the Japanese army was not being controlled by the Government, the Army WAS controlling the government. I don't see Japan able to fight a "nice" war with the attitudes of the time.

_____________________________


(in reply to xj900uk)
Post #: 13
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/15/2010 12:49:56 PM   
traskott


Posts: 1546
Joined: 6/23/2008
From: Valladolid, Spain
Status: offline
I think China is conquerable. I'm pretty sure. I'm about to lose it 

(in reply to xj900uk)
Post #: 14
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/15/2010 3:04:20 PM   
xj900uk

 

Posts: 1340
Joined: 3/22/2007
Status: offline
quote:

And the capture of 100,000+ Americans in the PI wpold not have angered the US public? The death march surely would have

But my point is that the Japanese could have expanded W & SW without attacking US possessions in the PI if they'd wanted to, and not drawn the uS fully into the conflict. Also a lot of the attrocities in the PI (like the Bataan Death March) didn't come out until a lot later on. And I still believe that Rooseveldt could not have got much past Congress & the US public if they thought that they were going to war soley to shore up Dutch and British colonial possessions

(in reply to traskott)
Post #: 15
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/15/2010 3:07:40 PM   
Q-Ball


Posts: 7336
Joined: 6/25/2002
From: Chicago, Illinois
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: CarnageINC


quote:

ORIGINAL: Q-Ball

Don't build the RO-Boats.



I've seen you say this before QBall, why is that? The range, the armament, the time?


They cost 33 points a day to build, just about as much as the Type A/B/C or KDB boats, but are much less capable. They have shorter range, are slower, and many have only 2 front tubes, which means that you hardly ever get more than 1 torp hit in a successful attack.

You can save a couple hundred points by halting them, which is better spent accelerating a CV in IMO, like Taiho or a couple Unryus.

Once 1944 rolls around, you might go back and build them, because by then anything above the surface is more vulnerable to attack. But I would halt them in 1942, when you have alot of other building priorities.



_____________________________


(in reply to CarnageINC)
Post #: 16
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/15/2010 3:12:02 PM   
xj900uk

 

Posts: 1340
Joined: 3/22/2007
Status: offline
I've been operating my RO's from Truk south down into the Solomons, New Caledonia & also SW to the Australian East Coast. Range isn't too far for them and also they've managed to do a fair bit of damage to local shipping - sunk at least one AO & hit several other cargo ships in the last few days. I have at least one permanently moored off-shore at Noumea, Cairns, Brisbane, Sydney and also Melbourne (the last one there has been attacked several times by ASW flottila's that have so far failed to score a single hit - think the Aussie's are tossing beer-cans at it rather than depth-charges...)
Agreed though that RO's have limited range & armament but are very useful for short/medium range ops like S/SW from Truk

(in reply to Q-Ball)
Post #: 17
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/15/2010 3:25:41 PM   
Grit


Posts: 142
Joined: 4/7/2010
Status: offline
My first post. I just got the game April 7, waiting until I get the printed manual to start the full campaign scenario. I've been playing Guadalcanal to learn mechanics and love it.

I think the attack on PH was a complete mistake. It's exactly what Roosevelt and Churchill wanted. With the added benefit of Germany and Italy declaring war a few days later the die was cast. The U.S. went on a complete war footing and nothing was going to stop them.

As far as Japan's tactics. I wonder how things might have changed if after PH they went directly to Panama and took out the Canal? Either occupy it as long as they could or maybe better damage it so repairs would have taken a year or longer. I haven't played AE enough to know if it would help in our little war. But in IRL I think it would have had quite an impact.

(in reply to xj900uk)
Post #: 18
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/15/2010 4:35:25 PM   
Marcus_Antonius

 

Posts: 79
Joined: 8/20/2007
Status: offline

America was already "in the war" before PH, the US navy had been quietly fighting U-Boats in the Atlantic for some time.

PH made the propaganda end easy, but I don't think a reasonable RL Japanese strategist could ever believe that they could start a Pacific war without involving the US.


quote:

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

quote:

And the capture of 100,000+ Americans in the PI wpold not have angered the US public? The death march surely would have

But my point is that the Japanese could have expanded W & SW without attacking US possessions in the PI if they'd wanted to, and not drawn the uS fully into the conflict. Also a lot of the attrocities in the PI (like the Bataan Death March) didn't come out until a lot later on. And I still believe that Rooseveldt could not have got much past Congress & the US public if they thought that they were going to war soley to shore up Dutch and British colonial possessions


(in reply to xj900uk)
Post #: 19
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/15/2010 5:48:41 PM   
AcePylut


Posts: 1494
Joined: 3/19/2004
Status: offline
I think this game can simulate the "no Panama Canal" pretty well.

Instead of shipping stuff to the Panama Canal then to the East Coast (or whever) - ship it all to Port Stanley.

_____________________________


(in reply to Marcus_Antonius)
Post #: 20
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/15/2010 7:07:00 PM   
SqzMyLemon


Posts: 4239
Joined: 10/30/2009
From: Alberta, Canada
Status: offline
I just wrote a paper on Japan's militarism in World War Two. I think a lot of people are forgetting the United State's intransigence towards the Japanese and their efforts at expansion, especially in China. The United State's raw material and oil embargo really left Japan no choice. People mention the "wither on the vine" strategy, that's exactly what the Japanese felt was going to happen to their country at the instigation of the United States. It was either strike now while we can, or wait two years for their strategic reserves of oil to be used up and never have the opportunity to attack again. They always knew, and accepted, any expansion in the Pacific would bring them into conflict against the Americans. The hope was that a decisive defeat of the United State's Pacific Fleet might just bring the Americans to the negotiating table. However, I totally agree that the surprise attack sealed their fate. It wasn't the attack itself, but the fact that it occurred prior to that all important declaration of war. The urge for revenge was completely unforeseen, and never fully understood by the Japanese.

There was an incredible lack of understanding of each side that I believe contributed to the way the war was initiated, pursued and ulitmately ended. The West really had no clue about the Far East and an understanding of the Asian way of doing things. Japan could be said to have completely underestimated the reaction of the United States to the way the attack on Pearl Harbor was carried out. Japan, to my understanding wanted out of China, but they needed to save face in order to do so. The Americans denied them that opportunity by the unilateral declaration that Japan must remove all her troops from China before any reconsideration of the resource and oil embargos. To Japan that was completely unacceptable, as was the later "unconditional surrender" demands of the United States, which threatened the continuation of the Japanese Imperial tradition. This was a huge factor in Japan fighting well beyond her means, any nation would do so if they felt their entire way of life was threatened. Japan reaped the whirlwind by the decision to attack America as she did, and rightfully so. On the other hand, the United States did nothing to prevent the conflict from happening either, in fact it could be arged they did much to guarantee a conflict would arise, and then settled for nothing less than the complete destruction of the Japanese. I'm not trying to point blame on either side, just a mutual lack of understanding and unwillingness by either side to compromise that really made a showdown inevitable.

Just some thoughts, but I think it is naive (no offense intended) to think that Japan could have expanded anywhere in the Pacific without an eventual war against the United States.

(in reply to Marcus_Antonius)
Post #: 21
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/15/2010 10:33:11 PM   
AW1Steve


Posts: 14507
Joined: 3/10/2007
From: Mordor Illlinois
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: SqzMyLemon

I just wrote a paper on Japan's militarism in World War Two. I think a lot of people are forgetting the United State's intransigence towards the Japanese and their efforts at expansion, especially in China. The United State's raw material and oil embargo really left Japan no choice. People mention the "wither on the vine" strategy, that's exactly what the Japanese felt was going to happen to their country at the instigation of the United States. It was either strike now while we can, or wait two years for their strategic reserves of oil to be used up and never have the opportunity to attack again. They always knew, and accepted, any expansion in the Pacific would bring them into conflict against the Americans. The hope was that a decisive defeat of the United State's Pacific Fleet might just bring the Americans to the negotiating table. However, I totally agree that the surprise attack sealed their fate. It wasn't the attack itself, but the fact that it occurred prior to that all important declaration of war. The urge for revenge was completely unforeseen, and never fully understood by the Japanese.

There was an incredible lack of understanding of each side that I believe contributed to the way the war was initiated, pursued and ulitmately ended. The West really had no clue about the Far East and an understanding of the Asian way of doing things. Japan could be said to have completely underestimated the reaction of the United States to the way the attack on Pearl Harbor was carried out. Japan, to my understanding wanted out of China, but they needed to save face in order to do so. The Americans denied them that opportunity by the unilateral declaration that Japan must remove all her troops from China before any reconsideration of the resource and oil embargos. To Japan that was completely unacceptable, as was the later "unconditional surrender" demands of the United States, which threatened the continuation of the Japanese Imperial tradition. This was a huge factor in Japan fighting well beyond her means, any nation would do so if they felt their entire way of life was threatened. Japan reaped the whirlwind by the decision to attack America as she did, and rightfully so. On the other hand, the United States did nothing to prevent the conflict from happening either, in fact it could be arged they did much to guarantee a conflict would arise, and then settled for nothing less than the complete destruction of the Japanese. I'm not trying to point blame on either side, just a mutual lack of understanding and unwillingness by either side to compromise that really made a showdown inevitable.

Just some thoughts, but I think it is naive (no offense intended) to think that Japan could have expanded anywhere in the Pacific without an eventual war against the United States.


I have got to concur with your conclusions. The more I study this period (1900-1941) I have to say that both sides didn't wonder IF they would go to war , only WHEN. (At least among the military & naval professionals.

_____________________________


(in reply to SqzMyLemon)
Post #: 22
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/16/2010 10:22:45 AM   
xj900uk

 

Posts: 1340
Joined: 3/22/2007
Status: offline
Thanks for posting your thoughts, interestnig reading. Agreed that the US had their Orange War Plan since the start of the 20th century, which always anticipated fighting Japan for control of the Pacific (OK, I know they also had other colour plans for potential conflicts elsewhere in other theatres) and it was the one that had probably given teh planners/strategists the most vexation. Not because of PH, a lthough that was already a big base before WWI and was substantially improved inter-war simply because of its unique location and sheltered harbour, but rather what do do about the PI - that was the main problem in US eyes as they knew there was no real way it could be defended or even supplied long-term once Japan started hostilities and turned the screws. {Any attack on PH was beyond the strategists and planners immagination, it was just so unthinkable as it was so well defended from any kind of land or sea attack, and the IJ naval air arm had been written off by observers as recently as January '41 as 'bespectacled, short-sighted pilots flying quaint old biplanes'}.
IJ also seemed to view a conflict with teh US as inevitable, as were their battle-ship theorists who wanted a 'decisive battle' with the US to destroy its Pacific Fleet and beat it to the negotiating table. Limited attacks SW into Malaysia, Singapore and also the DEI to sieze all the rubber, magnesium and oil that it needed and ignoring the US as only capable of a 'limited war response' never ever entered their minds, either. THey wanted to clear the US out of the way int eh Pacific as a potential threat before they started on SE Asia. Which, quite frankly, was ridiculous, as other than the PI the US would never ever have gotten fully involved to prop up European colonial interests in SE Asia.
Interestingly, when the US moved its Pacific Fleet to Hawaii for a spot of 'sabre-rattling' (an interesting move, as it had neither the workshop facilities, the tankers or even the screening escorts to support the lumbering battlewagons properly) and put pressure on Japan to back down in China and stop terrorising the French into over handing over military rights in French Indo-China, the move was acutally welcolmed in Tokyo as not a problem but an opportunity to destroy the US Pacific Fleet in one go
On the subject of the surpirse attack on PH, oddly enough as we all know the Japanese did intend to present their 14-part declaration of war to Stimpson (think he was the US Secretary of State for War) simultaneously, but because of translation problems and typing the thing up it was not actually handed over until 40 minutes after the attack (and even then Stimpson never ever bothered to read it fully). I think the Japanese Ambassador Admiral Noumoura committed suicide afterwards for his failure to present it on time.

< Message edited by xj900uk -- 4/16/2010 10:25:23 AM >

(in reply to AW1Steve)
Post #: 23
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/19/2010 12:08:45 AM   
henri51


Posts: 1151
Joined: 1/16/2009
Status: offline
The biggest advantage that the US had over Japan was breaking the Japanese codes, which allowed the US to know in advance what the Japanese were going to do.This along with a bit of luck was the dominating factor in the Battles of Midway and Leyte Gulf.

About the Japanese plan, we know today exactly what they were, and did not include an invasion of the USA.

I am looking at a map from the excellent "West Point Atlas of the Second World War: Asia and the Pacific". The Japanese objectives were to neutralize the US Pacific fleet, cut US access to the Philippines, secure the Southern resources area, win the war in China, watch the USSR border and establish a defense perimeter in the Pacific along a line Eastward roughly from New Guinea to the Marshall Islands, and from there Northward to to the Kamchatka Peninsula. It is interesting to note that this perimeter did not include Guadalcanal nor Port Moresby nor the Aleutians.But Yamamoto did not believe that even these limited objectives could be held for more than a few years unless the US agreed to negotiate.

An important US weakness that the Japanese failed to exploit and that could have meant defeat under more balanced conditions was the Megalomania, incompetence and political machinations of key US military leaders that in effect divided the US military in the Pacific into two competing quasi-independent forces.The latter is well described in "The Pacific Campaign", by Dan van der Vat (Simon and Shuster 1991).

Henri

(in reply to xj900uk)
Post #: 24
RE: Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu - 4/19/2010 11:50:11 AM   
xj900uk

 

Posts: 1340
Joined: 3/22/2007
Status: offline
But on the other hand the US could probably have defeated Japan far quicker (or, at least, built up forces far faster particularly decent fighters like the P38) if it didn't have to compete for resources for the European Theatre. General Arnold deliberately blocked any decent fighters going out and it was the 'Germany first' policy which rather hamstrung a lot of the generals and admirals in the Pacific theatre. And yes, on top of that you had MacArthur and King who weren't exactly the best of pals...

(in reply to henri51)
Post #: 25
Page:   [1]
All Forums >> [New Releases from Matrix Games] >> War in the Pacific: Admiral's Edition >> The War Room >> Japan's Goals and Sun Tzu Page: [1]
Jump to:





New Messages No New Messages
Hot Topic w/ New Messages Hot Topic w/o New Messages
Locked w/ New Messages Locked w/o New Messages
 Post New Thread
 Reply to Message
 Post New Poll
 Submit Vote
 Delete My Own Post
 Delete My Own Thread
 Rate Posts


Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI

0.953