Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: el cid again

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I would simply reply to you that Japan may have had plans for ANYTHING, but their ability to carry through and deliver said plans and inflict their will on the enemy was totally LACKING...otherwise Japan (in the life and death struggle she was in) would have carried through and delivered on her plans..

The official US high school version of the war:

It was never in doubt - on economic grounds alone - the Allies simply had to win. Comforting I guess. But, if you are interested in history, the truth is much more complicated. The outcome was in considerable doubt.

Key to this was the USSR. Stalin made a deal with both Germany and Japan - and he made other deals with us - none of which were ultimately honored completely - all of which were honored to a degree. To be certain what Stalin would or would not do - well that is an act of faith - but not knowledge. To be certain what the fate of the USSR must be - with both Germany and Japan plotting its end - again that is an act of faith, not knowledge. The seemingly obvious solution of a coordinated effort is not what occurred - but surely it could have. And the USSR was an empire - a place full of unhappy ruled peoples - willing to cooperate in exchange for some autonomy (willing even to fight, as the Ukranian National Army shows). IF the USSR fell, the economic situation changes, and the Allies are on the wrong end of the situation: the conclusion of Luftwaffe Over Amerika is that, with Soviet resources, Germany COULD HAVE mounted out a strategic bomber force.

There are other possibilities: Japan's late offensive in China could have run sooner. A rail connection all the way to Saigon matters - and you cannot torpedo trains! Build a tiny rail link from Saigon's western spur to Phnom Penh and you conntct to the Thai/Malay rail system - of the same gage! Then you run all the way to Singapore - Singaport to Pusan. No ships at risk. And India could have been neutralized.

Finally, you make a fundamental error if you believe no one ever makes a mistake. A capability is not always going to be used - even if it "should" be. Or the reason it was not might be different than that it would not work. We have several Japanese wmd programs, all stopped by different officials, for ostensably different reasons. Yet WE BELIEVED these were so valuable as capabilities we cut deals: for example Ichii and ALL his people went free (except those the Russians got) - in exchange for the technical stuff to give US that capability that "could not matter" in your view.

Real life is not always simple. Sometimes there are possibilities. History is not the story of what inevitably had to happen. It is the story of what did happen, even if it was unlikely at times, likely but not required at others.

The key characteristic about Japanese civilization - and you might say a weakness - something we almost always assume wrongly about - is that it is an extraordinairily divided society. It is anything but unified in purpose, on any subject, at any time. The form of government, and the drive for consensus, fools us often: the extent to which Japanese and Japanese institutions failed to cooperate and coordinate is amazing by our standards. But they remain essentially human, susceptable to the same forces that have always driven all societies - and different leadership could have provided a different set of drivers for what was acceptable conduct. Many things indeed changed in the direction of more effective institutions - but thank goodness for us too late to be decisive. The Grand Escort Command was created only mid-war, and never given enough resources. But it was CONCIEVED in the 1930s, and plans to build for it were also fully worked out - just not implemented (in favor of things like Musashi and Kii - each worth 150 escorts in terms of steel).
THIS is why Yamamoto said

"There are three great fallicies in history: the Great Wall of China, the Pyramids of Egypt, and the battleship Musashi." Clearly SOME Japanese leaders knew better that what others did.


Japan has an essential strategic advantage = position. Adm King felt he needed 2 ships to every Japanese one to be EVEN because of it. Japan had another strategic advantage it failed to fully capitalize on: hatred of colonial empires. What happened in Malaya and Indonesia might have happened many times - with better policy. And Japan finally got it right - just too late to affect anything but the Cold War. Good for us. The truth is it is harder to defeat the enemy than yourself - nations that lose usually defeat themselves. The other guys just win because of the screw ups.

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ORIGINAL: el cid again

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One other key point. Strategic Air warfare was the most expensive (in terms of cost per man involved) type of warfare any of the participants in the Second World War engaged in. Japan was a poor country with limited resources. They needed to get maximum return on their limited investment.

A better point might be that strategic air warfare does not work. See Weapons and Hope by Freeman Dyson - the statistical analyst for Bomber Command - the only person who knew all the data real time. He is caustic: "I knew how much we were failing to achieve our objectives. I knew how much the enemy was hurt less than the cost to us." [paraphrase - shortened up] Every strategic air campaign in history generated support for the bombed regime. This is not exactly bright. Germany needed 1/3 the resources to rebuild what was destroyed it cost us to destroy it. The production in target industries - Uboats and aircraft - increased through Feb 1945. Not very effective. The entire concept of high altitude bombing failed utterly against Japan, for technical reasons. We ended up using bombers entirely different than the way they were designed for.

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

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ORIGINAL: el cid again

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One other key point. Strategic Air warfare was the most expensive (in terms of cost per man involved) type of warfare any of the participants in the Second World War engaged in. Japan was a poor country with limited resources. They needed to get maximum return on their limited investment.

A better point might be that strategic air warfare does not work. See Weapons and Hope by Freeman Dyson - the statistical analyst for Bomber Command - the only person who knew all the data real time. He is caustic: "I knew how much we were failing to achieve our objectives. I knew how much the enemy was hurt less than the cost to us." [paraphrase - shortened up] Every strategic air campaign in history generated support for the bombed regime. This is not exactly bright. Germany needed 1/3 the resources to rebuild what was destroyed it cost us to destroy it. The production in target industries - Uboats and aircraft - increased through Feb 1945. Not very effective. The entire concept of high altitude bombing failed utterly against Japan, for technical reasons. We ended up using bombers entirely different than the way they were designed for.

A spurious argument CID. Nobody knew that in 1940. Only after the Strategic Bombing Surveys AFTER the war could anyone say for certainty that with the armaments available the true goals of Strategic Bombing could not be realized. It wasn't possible to win a war from the air by destroying the enemies means of production. Bombing with the means available wasn't that accurate.

However, it wasn't a total waste of effort. Your quote is accurate for the early British efforts at night bombing..., they were missing by 100 miles and more on occasion. But they got a lot better as airborne radar and pathfinder marking were gradually perfected. US efforts at achieving better accuracy by day suffered many problems as well, but eventually led to the winning of air superiority when escorts became available in large numbers. The Western Allies were trying to learn "on the fly" how to conduct a totally new form of warfare, and it took virtually the entire war to get to where they THOUGHT they were in 1940.

And you are right that Axis Production peaked in 1944 in spite of strategic bombing. But read Spear again. He himself says that just about the time he got the German economy organized to permit increased and rationally organized production he also had to start breaking it down and dispersing and hiding it due to the Bomber Offensives. The Axis powers never got close to the kind of production figures per man hour that the US did..., because they couldn't afford the kind of massive and effecient production plants the US could and did build. Why? Because they would have been "bomb magnets" impossible to hide or defend. Strategic bombing put an upper limit on what the Axis COULD achieve. Not the result the bombing proponants had promised..., but a significant achievement nontheless.

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ORIGINAL: herwin

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

One other key point. Strategic Air warfare was the most expensive (in terms of cost per man involved) type of warfare any of the participants in the Second World War engaged in. Japan was a poor country with limited resources. They needed to get maximum return on their limited investment.

Strategic bombing was extremely expensive in fuel.

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In short, it (the bombing campaign) very much produced a finality to the war that allowed peace to proceed and victory to become complete (albeit at horrific cost in human terms).

The very lack of this kind of onslaught is what gave the Vietnamese (for example) the fortitude and confidence to continue their struggle.

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Strat bombing DID NOT achieve anything MEANINGFUL in the war effort except untold suffering for the civilians, but you are right it was unveiled only after the war.

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The very lack of this kind of onslaught is what gave the Vietnamese (for example) the fortitude and confidence to continue their struggle.

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ORIGINAL: treespider

I may be ignorant of this but wasn't the strategic bombing of Germany's oil refining industry in 1944 partly responsible for the collapse of the Luftwaffe and the fuel shortages at the end of the war?

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ORIGINAL: Speedy

Hi,

Yes SB of Oil and the 'Transportation Plan' were the most effective strands of the 8/15th AF bombing.

Bombing of the Aircraft and Armaments Industry did not curtail Axis production greatly if at all for example.

I think it's fair to say that the strategic bombing of Nazi Europe did NOT win the war on it's own but did contribute in the war's end by reducing the production (in it's broadest sense) of certain industries. Coupled with this was the HUGE effort applied by the LW and the deployment of AA assets to counter this aerial assault.

Steven

Art by the amazing Dixie

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ORIGINAL: Speedy

I think it's fair to say that the strategic bombing of Nazi Europe did NOT win the war on it's own but did contribute in the war's end by reducing the production (in it's broadest sense) of certain industries. Coupled with this was the HUGE effort applied by the LW and the deployment of AA assets to counter this aerial assault.

Steven

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ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Strategic bombing in it's pre-war pure concept failed completely. The modified strategic-operational bombing campaign that replaced it succeeded completely. (A grinding, punishing attrition war which chewed up Germany's remaining experienced fighter cadres giving the Allies total air dominance.

Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!

A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE

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But El Cid - WTF does any of that below have to do with the fact that Japan couldn't/didn't build heavy bombers???!!!

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ORIGINAL: el cid again

This ship was intended either to duplicate the role of other Japanese bombers (attack ships at sea; attack critical air bases - like the raids on the B-29 bases which caused so much grief we kept it secret for decades).

Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!

A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE

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A spurious argument CID. Nobody knew that in 1940. Only after the Strategic Bombing Surveys AFTER the war could anyone say for certainty that with the armaments available the true goals of Strategic Bombing could not be realized. It wasn't possible to win a war from the air by destroying the enemies means of production. Bombing with the means available wasn't that accurate.

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Very true... but one has to wonder what would happen if this modified campaign started earlier...

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However, it wasn't a total waste of effort. Your quote is accurate for the early British efforts at night bombing..., they were missing by 100 miles and more on occasion. But they got a lot better as airborne radar and pathfinder marking were gradually perfected. US efforts at achieving better accuracy by day suffered many problems as well, but eventually led to the winning of air superiority when escorts became available in large numbers. The Western Allies were trying to learn "on the fly" how to conduct a totally new form of warfare, and it took virtually the entire war to get to where they THOUGHT they were in 1940.

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There may have been 2 times, 10 times, 100 times, 1000 times as many bombs dropped in the Vietnam War as was dropped in all of WWII combined - take the figure you like best - it dosen't matter.

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The Axis powers never got close to the kind of production figures per man hour that the US did..., because they couldn't afford the kind of massive and effecient production plants the US could and did build.

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ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

There's some information at the hyperwar site, chapter 19 on Iwo Jima.

Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!

A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE

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The absolute destruction wrought upon Japan and Germany left their civil populations in no mood for continued hostilities, nor did the idea escape them that they had been utterly defeated - unlike the First World War. In short, it (the bombing campaign) very much produced a finality to the war that allowed peace to proceed and victory to become complete (albeit at horrific cost in human terms).

The very lack of this kind of onslaught is what gave the Vietnamese (for example) the fortitude and confidence to continue their struggle.

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It was NOT the bombing that brought the nazis to their knees but the land forces. The huge losses of men and territory in the east, and then the much feared two front war.

On Vietnam something like the quadruple of all WWII's bombs was dropped without any REAL success, also in the terms of war efforts. It also has to be said that the vietnamese did not have to produce themselves the equipment they were fighting with (it was supplied by the russian and the chinese), but their will to fight was not broken by the strat bombingg or the unproportionally high losses.

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I may be ignorant of this but wasn't the strategic bombing of Germany's oil refining industry in 1944 partly responsible for the collapse of the Luftwaffe and the fuel shortages at the end of the war?

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I think it's fair to say that the strategic bombing of Nazi Europe did NOT win the war on it's own but did contribute in the war's end by reducing the production (in it's broadest sense) of certain industries. Coupled with this was the HUGE effort applied by the LW and the deployment of AA assets to counter this aerial assault.