Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

I see you've responded while I posted myself.

Ok, this weekend I'll work up some semi-detailed taskings for us to begin discussions around.

REPLY: Excellent.


P.s. If the IJA has 21 changes to make in-game... I would like to reserve about 10 of these for changing the preparation targets of my units to fit in with my invasion plan.

REPLY: These are changes in LOCATION of land or air units. You may also request a change in location of a task group under your control WITHOUT counting against that limit. The preparation is supposed to reflect the pre war planning of the scenario - and changes to that should be done in game time. However - IF you have proposals that involve things of GENERAL interest (units that operate in respect to the SRA one should expect all players to tend to like) I will put them in. When we finish - we have a general scenario release - not a special one for this one game. Anyway - anything not "Nemoesque" (likely to be unique to Nemo's thinking) can be incorporated into the standard EOS game start. Send me your list. There is NO limit whatever on this - in the sense of count. Just the principle it must be part of the scenario start. If it is a good EOS start for a general SRA offensive - it can be part of the pre war planning without a problem - nor a limit.


E.g. most divisions would have Kuala Lumpur or Singapore set as their invasion target. Also, I've done an analysis of the IJA pilot requirements and comparing them to the IJN pilot requirements giving the IJA 150 versus the IJNs 216 leaves the IJA with too few pilots graduating relative to the IJN.


REPLY: Presumably you mean JAAF and JNAF. I am not sure the sort of analysis you refer to - but these are not things that are made of dreams, air, or what someone felt like. The general RHS numbers (non-EOS scenarios are 150 vs 108). ONLY EOS has the larger number for JNAF - and that ONLY because we cut training time (and reduced training output skill levels) to those of JAAF. JNAF is in fact larger - so its schools can produce more graduates IF they operate on a similar training sillibus. [It was more complex than that IRL. JNAF has TWO ENTIRELY DIFFERENT training school systems: a float one and a land plane one. They are combined here because that is required to work with WITP] Anyway - since the JNAF starts out bigger - and becomes much bigger - your analysis either involves some strange operational assumptions (JAAF loses more?) or it is flawed. The RELATIVE proportion of pilots is almost perfect! JNAF gets about 60% of the slots for pilots - and it gets 59% of the pilots. How to get it closer than that is a mystery to me. Nevertheless - go ahead and explain what you have in mind?

IOW the number of graduating pilots per plane is lower for the IJA than IJN.


REPLY: What is an IOW? Do you mean IRL? The numbers are explained above.

Are you willing to discuss this as I think it is reasonable to believe that the IJA would have formed a more reasonable appreciation of its training needs and bumped up graduation to achieve at least the same ratio as the IJN.

REPLY: This is confusing. What does "at least the same ratio" mean? It got a bigger number before due to its training program length. The Navy has adopted the same standard - at the cost of losing replacement skill points. You want to NOT be at the same skill level? Seems odd. Anyway - I need to evaluate this carefully worked out set of numbers and skill levels - in human play - before considering changes. But I can explain how you can make changes on your own if you want? The problem is that we are forced to make some awful compromises here: a real program is dynamic - subject to change - and we are frozen as it were. But the basic principle is that you cannot get more pilots quickly UNLESS you drop the output quality level. The reverse is also the case: IF you will accept half the present number of replacements, you can add a full 10 points to your rating. But it is a diminsing returns function - going the other way - you won't double your numbers for a drop in 10 points. [IJN did that because it was at the flat end of the training curve - took twice as long to get the extra 10 points. Very inefficient at that part of the curve.] We also probably are at the limit of effectiveness: that drop in 10 points is costing the navy dramatically in losses in AI vs AI tests.

For the other 10-11 available "changes" do you have any ideas as to what would and wouldn't be fair game? I am thinking of asking for things like the movement of certain units to different bases so that they can load onto APs immediately instead of being stranded inland.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Well Sid, those are IJA divisions. That means the IJA has operational control of them and if the IJN wants them it has to make a case for getting operational control.

REPLY: Not so. IF I am responsible for invading the PI, I am responsible for doing so with ALL the COMBINED forces assigned. This is similar to the Malaya invasion. You are not expected to go there without ships - all sorts of ships. We can horse trade things - if you like. But the starting position is the plan as it is.

Anyway - to make it simple - I HAVE requested operational control of all such units. I see no alternative option.
If you do see an alternative option - please tell me what it might be?

This seems to go back to our confusion when talking about areas of control. You kept saying "I do not want control of your stuff." Now I see you meant "you don't get control of my stuff." That is a contradiction of your earlier principle: each player controls operations in his area. An agreement to do an area means that EVERYTHING in that area is yours (or mine) to control. You want it back? You have to ask for it back. Further - it means EVERYTHING in Home Islands (or China, or Manchuria, or Korea) tasked for a command (or even a mission) is STILL so tasked. Now that is just being logical in my humble way of thinking. If there is an easier way - I am all ears to hear what it might be?
The idea of detail listing of THOUSANDS of units - and then negotiating over each one seems to be a bit too complex.
If 48 Division or 65 Brigade or 16 Division - or the Brigade on Palau - or associated tank, artillery, base, air units -
are not to do the PI - just who is? Does not the fact these units are planned - in some cases even loaded - matter to us?




This case must include how long the unit is wanted for ( either in terms of time... which can be indefinite.... or in terms of a given objective being achieved)... Does this raise the spectre of the IJN drive into the South pacific being understrength as the Army refuses to commit divisions? Yes.


REPLY: OK - keep it simple: You allocate a divison to IJA - count it gone forever.

1) It may be lost.

2) It is not economic to return it over thousands of miles in war conditions.

3) There are bound to be strategic imperatives in each theater. Theater commanders in most countries cutomarily will even disregard orders from higher if a unit is critically required. Japanese forces in general are much more prone to this sort of thing than Western ones: there is a word that does not translate that means "If you disobey an order for patriotic motives - because in your judgement it is in the best interests of the nation - you are not only justified - you are required to disobey it." Now we DO have a similar concept - but it is much more negative - you are more or less "justified" if events proove you were right. In Japan - the idea is honorable in a postive sense - and you are justified even if you lose the battle.

The concept that units sent to a THEATER are somehow NOT theater assets is revolutionary for me.

EOS is supposed to be a game in which IJA and IJA go JOINT. This sounds a lot like the old service rivalry stuff.
I will confess to you I am a combined arms theorist and a joint theorist - I don't believe in you fighting without naval assets and I cannot fight without army assets. I don't think the idea I have to withdraw a unit at a certain time - in the context of operational events I cannot predict or control - is good strategy. Do you?

In terms of service prefix, IJA has 90% of the land units in the game. In terms of areas of operations, IJA faces a great deal less airpower - and a great deal less technical airpowre - than IJN faces. The great stratetic asset of Japan is its Army (and army air) forces. This was NOT committed in anything like its real strength historically. To the extent that isn't true, what was committed went TOO LATE to matter. IF I am to take the vastly larger area than history we planned - including Hawaii and New Caledonia - I not only need the same starting forces (plus the Hawaii corps) -
I will need a great deal more a great deal sooner than was historically sent.

I do not propose to fight over every last unit - now or ever. This is the time to settle this matter: are we a team or not? Do you want me to do my missions - or not?

It is very disturbing to hear that "the navy drive to the south may be stalled for lack of IJA units" - and if that is the case - then we need a new plan. I am not going to Hawaii and New Caledonia and Java only to give all the troops back and not contest these areas. In my view - agreeing to a mission is to agree to the units to execute it - not just initially - but on an ongoing basis. If I have a surplus of anything - and I plan to have reserve assets - I will advise you of what - and where - and they will be available to release to your control. Presumably you will do the same.


On the other hand I am known to be in favour of invading Noumea and New Zealand as well as Fiji... not to mention Hawaii which I am obviously in favour of taking.

REPLY: New Zealand? Surely you are jesting! [I suppose I know you well enough to realize you are not. But remember - I am one of those logisticians you referred to above. So it is a jest in fact.] Aside from the tiny fact I don't think you would give me the troops - such an expedition would require ships I have no intention of risking (big long range merchants that NEVER are to be risked in range of enemy bombers or places their subs might get to unharassed by our patrol planes) - AND it would require covering - and last I heard you want to go to Ceylon. I cannot go in every direction at once - and I need time to repair up and replace planes in the vital squadrons. It really is a silly idea. Worse than silly - but you will feel insulted if I explain why. Finally - it is gamey. NZ is on the map edge - and the scenario does not work UNLESS the Allies CONTROL the map edges. They need places to come at us from - functionally.

So, if you make plans for the capture of these areas I'm sure you can expect the IJA to offer all the support it can...

REPLY: Interesting. What about the SRA? Have we forgotten about WHY we are going south? Something about oil?
In case you missed it - I believe that you should control Northern and Western Borneo. That gives you some oil ports in the North - and eventually you also will have Palembang. To the extent you care about this - fueling your directly controlled ships - it may be worth noting. I will attempt to move oil from all major centers (re Grand Escort Command) to industry points - INCLUDING those on the mainland as well as home islands. But still - you may want to move some of it on own assets. And anyway know these bases are going to be available. Aside from military operations, it is pretty necessary that all the South China Sea be patrolled by as many bombers as are able to do it.

Anyway, it is my firm intention to attempt to take PI, DEI, Hawaii, the important islands of the Central Pacific, British New Guinea, Darwin and nearby points, and Thursday Island. IF this works out well - and IF I can coordinate with a naval move into the Indian Ocean fitting your plans - I will then go on to Noumea, Fiji and probably other islands of the South Pacific. My intention is to cut the SLOC from USA and Panama to Australia - and to focus enemy operations at predictable points - Hawaii - Australia - etc. I intend to create a set of mobile air forces - one land based and one sea based - which may be able to come over to the Indian Ocean on occasion - to frustrate an offensive on Ceylon.
How long we can keep this up remains to be seen - but it might take a long time before enemy units can threaten Java (etc) - and we may be able to stockpile a LOT of oil by then - and resources. Ideally we keep them off balance forever.




< Message edited by el cid again -- 11/17/2006 2:10:04 PM >

(in reply to Nemo121)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121


My initial thought on this is that with 2 to 3 divisions you should be handily able to take Port Moresby and Noumea IF you move quickly once the Phillipines are taken ( I'm assuming you use some of the forces from the invasion of the Philipines in these invasions) .


REPLY: You are forgetting these units already have a second stage mission: DEI. The SAME units that take PI take Java. Further - SOME units from Malaya ALSO hit Java - at the same time.

My general strategy is to start moving south immediately - in December - not waiting months as IRL. But that is frustrated by the Hawaii op - can I send South Seas Regiment to Rabaul - IF I have to take and hold the Central Pacific? AND IF I cannot depend on IJA to support me as I expand twenty fold the area I start with? When US forces encountered Japanese forces in the Solomans - the first raid was by Sally's. It was here that Ki-61 made its debut - and many other planes of JAAF. Now I do NOT intend to fight for the Solomans - I intend to take them BEFORE they can be contested effectively. But SOMEWHERE I must encounter a fight. And just as I expect to come running - send planes - maybe Kiddo Butai - if you say "threat coming from the West" or "threat coming from Alaska" - I need to have some sense that a major problem reported will get me some troops and squadrons headed South.



Add in the Naval landing forces and another 2 or 3 divisions from Hawaii and I think you can gather about 8 division-equivalents with which to take New Zealand from the divisions assigned to previous IJN offensives in the Pacific.

REPLY: I cannot add to a zero force. I have ONE regiment of IJA headed South - and your attitude has me worried it may have to go to - say - Johnston Island vice Rabaul. [South Seas Detachment FYI] PI forces must go to DEI.
And I don't expect to get much more than a division back from Hawaii. I have NO major unit defending Truk or Saipan - both of which probably need major units (meaning division). Kwajalein probably rates a brigade. Just for early war security - so a raid dies in its tracks and major units don't get hurt for lack of ground defense. If we go to Noumea - probably a brigade must be stationed there. Surely Rabaul needs a brigade right away - and more later in the war. What is the point of taking Port Moresby and not defending it? Or Darwin? How can I take it? What defends it if I do? These ops are going to require some units - a few to start and a steady stream thereafter. By 1943 I expect to have a dozen divisions as such, an equal amount in small units (only a third of these latter being Navy because - that is all there is - and probably some of those will be in your areas farther west and in the north).
By then you should have over a hundred divisons as such and an equal force of non-divisional units - so we are talking about 1/8 of the force at most. [IJA ends up at 150 divisions and 150 more in small units - so it may be actually larger by 1943 - this is a conservative estimate]. The real problem is not land units - it is air units. The area we are talking about is FOUR TIMES bigger than Japan controlled - and we need to be very creative about moving air power - or we will be way too thin. [If we went to NZ, it would be much worse].




< Message edited by el cid again -- 11/17/2006 2:26:40 PM >

(in reply to Nemo121)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Still though, we have the problem that you haven't given ANY indication of a timeline of operations for 1941 to 1942 around which we can begin discussing force allocations, phasing etc and what sort of perimeter we want to have established by the end of 1942. It is my opinion that this is where our discussions should focus. After all this is the sort of stuff the IJA and IJN disagreed with during the war.

quote:

But the starting position is the plan as it is.

quote:

REPLY: OK - keep it simple: You allocate a divison to IJA - count it gone forever.

quote:

I don't think the idea I have to withdraw a unit at a certain time - in the context of operational events I cannot predict or control - is good strategy. Do you?

quote:

Aside from the tiny fact I don't think you would give me the troops

quote:

In case you missed it - I believe that you should control Northern and Western Borneo.

quote:

REPLY: You are forgetting these units already have a second stage mission: DEI. The SAME units that take PI take Java. Further - SOME units from Malaya ALSO hit Java - at the same time.

quote:

By 1943 I expect to have a dozen divisions as such, an equal amount in small units (only a third of these latter being Navy because - that is all there is - and probably some of those will be in your areas farther west and in the north).

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

quote:

But the starting position is the plan as it is.

LOL!!! Which means that you get huge portions of the IJA while I don't get access to new ships since those aren't assigned to new areas... No Sid. You don't get your cake and get to eat it too.

REPLY: Actually - as usual - I disagree - and you have it wrong. It is prefectly obvious that ships are assigned to certain operations. And I cannot responsibly say "you cannot have them." Same for air units. In spite of the gigantic risk involved in moving to take the Central Pacific - I am not taking the Navy with me!


It is really simple... I am prepared to be quite generous as regarding assigning units to your forces BUT I will not surrender the principle that Army units assigned to the Southern Area Army are under MY control unles specifically stated otherwise.

REPLY: Nor did I ask you to. But note that Southern Area Army is a vast area - and we HAVE stated otherwise with respect to forces related to PI and DEI. You once objected to a need to "renegotiate." I now raise the same objection in reverse. The PI ops mean I control Formosa, Palau, and a number of other points and units, where the forces involved happen to be - and basically need to be - in order to do the op. And these units are neither available for Southeast Fleet (as you suggested above) nor return to you - they have ANOTHER mission in the plan already - DEI. Unless you propose to give me entirely different units for that mission. But why? it is more efficient for units forward on a vector to keep moving on that vector.


I'm quite happy for units in the 4th Fleet to be yours but the Southern Area Army is an IJA institution and that means if you want the units from it then you must bargain for them. You cannot just say "Well historically they went to place X and place X is in my area of operations which means that unit is mine." We're playing a wargame in which the warplan on Day ONE is different from history so your argument is internally consistent.

REPLY: Generous! 4th Fleet is the smallest of all Japanese commands in everything but area. I don't think it has a single Army unit. And it is the force that is going to face the main American offensive - assuming they cannot get going in the South Pacific or Australia any time soon. Anyway - as usual - you are about 90% wrong. Southern Area Army is not really an IJA institution. It is the greatest of the Japanese combined arms institutions. Yamashita has a Navy Captain assigned that his radical chief of staff - Tsuji - has nothing but praise for. Because it IS a joint staff and a joint institution - properly integrated - almost the only example of this in Japan. If that is not enough - WE have split the command - East and West - and it is split - because - as you like to say - your word is your bond. Do don't try to unsplit it now.


Have a little faith that I'm not going to cripple your offensive by leaving you with too few ground combat formations and quit trying to have irrevocable control over army units through clever stipulation of pre-game positions.

REPLY: OK - IF you have a little faith I am not trying to play games with my team mate. I am truly a fan of Yamashita - and I will designate any unneeded unit as available to transfer - and otherwise strategic reserve - from day one.
I don't want to feed anything I don't need forward - and I will leave as much in Japan as I dare - even of second and third echelon forces. I don't want to draw down my stocks forward, and I want my naval units repaired up. Planes won't upgrade distant from supply or HQ either. And our great advantage is interior lines. So I will stay as central as possible with as much as possible - so it is in good shape - requires minimal supply shipping - and is able to rapidly move in ANY direction - including YOURs.



I don't view that as being, at all, within the ethos of dividing the Japanese into an Army CO and Navy CO who MUST work together if they are to get anything done. You are trying to create a situation in which you have access to sufficient army units due to clever pre-game manouevring that you don't actually need my OK to do much.

REPLY: I thought it was YOUR doctrine "each commands his theater with minimal involvement of the other." And indeed- we hardly can negotiate over - what - 13,000 units? Line by line? It seems logical to me that the units assigned are the starting point - unless there is a clear reason to change them. And it won't be efficient in our planning time, game political points, time to move, or logistic costs, if we make major changes to that plan. I am trying to be reasonable - simple - logical - all at one time. You appear to be paranoid - or a control freak. I am not seeking control of what isn't mine: EVERYTHING needed for my ops IS mine already. To the extent that isn't so - I will say something. And vice versa. The big place things get ambiguos is Japan - and also reinforcements.
EOS (and PPO) have NO theater assignment for most units - we must spend pp - and have them to spend. But you cannot tell by looking "this is 4th fleet" - even if it is. And those places will take a lot of thinking. I think reinforcements are better decided at the time - we don't know the situation now.

(in reply to Nemo121)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121


It is fine if you want to do that but you will do that without me. I've learnt that I can argue all I want about things but only the reality that I am quite happy to walk away rather than commit to a multi-year game I won't enjoy ( and let you bring in another player) ever seems to effect change. It is unfortunate but there you go.

REPLY: This seems to be a negative attitude. Our problem appears mainly to be one of mis communication.
Why should it be different now? I feel exactly the same way you do: that you have sprung an outrageous surprise - having agreed to a division of theaters "with control to the commander" now suddenly I am left with nothing but a few battalions of naval units I can count on. And months of negotiation for the minority of units that have IJA or JAAF prefixes I need. I note that you seem completely unreasonable about units with IJN prefixes: you will no doubt say "I don't want ANY of those - unless I ask" - but really - I am to take away Saigon or Singapore naval base forces?
I am not to send any to Ceylon or Rangoon? That is silly. Nor do I expect a unit sent (or already at) those locations with a long term mission to come back to my control in some later month or year. Nor do you - if you are really honest. You know that some things are defined by function and geography. So act like you know it. I am tired of bickering over what you must already know is reasonable. You said you could behave like a team. You said not to say "I get my way or I quit". So honor those principles yourself. And do so in good humor. As I am.

quote:

REPLY: OK - keep it simple: You allocate a divison to IJA - count it gone forever.

No. This is what you would LIKE. It is not what will ALWAYS happen.


REPLY: This is a cryptic medium. Of course it will not ALWAYS happen. But it does solve the problem of "you have to say how long you want something." I don't want to say that for the 1000 or 2000 units I need, line by line. So I am trying to make it easy: count em gone and the list gets short! But really - if I know this is for a certain limited purpose - I will say so. "I am about to engage a major invasion fleet. I need the Me-264 force to compliment my mobile and land based air forces. This will take two days to stage - three days to execute - and win - lose or draw I will disengage every long range air unit - mine as well as yours - in 7 or 8 days." On the other hand, a land unit sent well forward in PTO vs the American front is not likely to return. It will probably eventually be overrun or isolated by enemy operations. Some offensive units we should exchange for garrsion units - but they will move on to other operations nearby - not go 1/3 of the way around the world to India or Siberia - at least as the general case.


It might turn out to be what usually happens in-game but I'm not prepared to concede that it will ALWAYS happen.


REPLY: And I am not prepaired to spend a man month listing what I guess might be the case for every unit with an IJA prefix of interest to me. Such an effort is silly: it won't work out as I guess anyway. All I was doing was responding to an unreasonable demand I say "I need this unit for four weeks." I also have no intention of risking major convoys to return units over the vast ocean just because X weeks have passed. This is fatal to efficient operations - and I am shocked you think otherwise (if you are thinking at all about the implications of your unreasonable demand).


I am quite prepared to be reasonable about this and accept it is probable but I am not going to give you a blanket ability to just that an IJA division in the Southern Area Army is YOURS from Day 1 and for the rest of the war.


REPLY: That isn't being reasonable. Odds are long most of these units will die in the field - or be defending something vital - sooner or later. What is the point of taking Java if I don't defend it? Or anything else? And what is the point of running ships to move units back - and others forward to relieve them? [Maybe if morale was a factor - but it isn't]
It probably is the normal case that units that go forward won't come all the way back. If they succeed they will move to a nearby forward place for other ops - or defend what they took. It is much more efficient than planning to return them every one. And I am close to saying what you said above - if you don't shift gears and really be reasonable. I am not being unreasonable at all - and I believe you must have very paranoid views of me to think otherwise. We are a team. AND we are responsible for our areas. If I send a division of subs to North and East - because I insist on that - under your control - I expect to have to replace your losses - not get them back.

I'd be an idiot to fall for that. Now, you can either deal with me or find someone else who is stupid enough to grant you the right to all IJA units which appear in IJN areas or with planning set to bases in the IJN areas.

REPLY: Only because I do not think you are an idiot or stupid am I disappointed in your attitude - which is short sighted - and impractical.

Turn it around: suppose I said "I agree - Everything that has an IJA prefix is yours - AND everything with an IJN prefix is mine - no matter its location, planning, loading, function, name it." Now imagine the taske before us to sort this out. IF we made a long list of what we might want to do - we would find hundreds or even thousands of cases we had tasked the same unit for different tasks. We would need years of political points to reassign them. We would waste a vast amount of our supplies and shipping shuffeling them - assuming we ever agreed that "these 488 units go East - those 466 units go west" or whatever - just day one. And this 1744 units move south as reinforcements - while that 2766 units move west as reinforcements - and 199 move north etc." Is that what you think is reasonable?

Of course if you do find someone who falls for that then they are likely to be a poor player. Your choice, you can either be reasonable and give me the benefit of the doubt that I understand it is in my interests to have your operations succeed ( which requires me giving you enough ground forces) OR you can be all control-freaky about it and push on with this current rather silly idea and find another player.


REPLY: Interesting mirror imaging! I am the control freak - I who said I require you have IJN forces - even beyond what you ask for. But you - who demand control of everything IJA - are not a control freak. And I am the unreasonable one. I suggest you reconsider. Really I do. I also said if you had something positive and simple in mind - please state it. That was not an invetation to be accused of being unreasonable. That was an invetation to explain why your idea really is easy - why it only takes 7 minutes of my time to list what you want? Or whatever.
I see a principle here - and I could use virtually every phrase you are using: I am just being more polite and team spirited than you are doing and not using such language. In fact - in this thread - you long said you would not tell me what to do - then lately you started saying "send PI units to the South Pacific" - ignoring their role in DEI - or in some cases- defense of the vital center squares of the naval chessboard. Send the units from Hawaii there. Send them back to me. Sounds like you are doing what you said you don't like me doing. I see lots of contradictions - but no trace of reasonable. Yet I am refraining from ultimatums - and I am refraining from saying listening to your demands would make me a fool or stupid. I have taken a different tack: if there is an easy fast way to do what you want - explain it to me? It appears you want a list longer than playing the game - before we ever begin.

quote:

I don't think the idea I have to withdraw a unit at a certain time - in the context of operational events I cannot predict or control - is good strategy. Do you?

It is no worse than the idea that a unit assigned to you for invading the Phillipines is lost to the IJA for the next FOUR YEARS .


REPLY: Not much news here - but I disagree with you. I note, however, the implication you admit it is not good strategy. Why should we make promises we are not likely to be able to keep? Will that foster trust? In general - and there will no doubt be exceptions - I expect a unit that moves vast distances forward will - whatever its fate - not end up being moved back so it can go to Siberia. If there were some exceptional reason - then that would warrant our attention - agreement - supplies and shipping.

Another point: ALL these units belong to Japan. It sounds like CONTROL is what matters to you - not the team - not the mission that could not be achieved without IJA assets. If I don't need it - you will find it listed on the daily list of assets available for reassignment.


As I said you can choose to try to push for total control and the IJA losing all control over IJA formations once they ever enter an IJN zone of operations OR you can be flexible and rely on the fact that if I know I'll be getting units back once a give objective is achieved I'll probably be a LOT more generous.


REPLY: Wow. I am almost in despair. I don't think you have any idea what is about to happen. Lets surrender China and not fight this war! I said it above - but you were not listening (as usual):

I need some units to start and more units later on. Most units will not be coming back. These are not like Kiddo Butai - which can sail in and sail out - and must do so (being needed in other places badly). Now SOME mobile units - particularly long range air units and army ships - may be different: I am speaking of a typical army unit in the general case.

IF you suffer under the illusion I can take this area - and then not need to defend it - but can send most of these forces back so (what? they can conquer Siberia?) - we have a major problem Houston. I am not going out there to just hand it back to the enemy.

I believe in phasing operations sequentially and massing the same overwhelming force against a series of enemy positions.

REPLY: And I believe there is a lot more to operations than just the assault forces. I believe that a base must have a support force and a garrison - and probably air units - or there is little point it taking it. NONE of those local base units or garrisons or air units is EVER coming home - although they may move around from time to time. MOST will die in the field - unless the mobile air forces (land and sea based) can win decisive battles. Your doctrine makes sense for certain assault units and associated air units - for a while. But some day we will face enemy armies - real armies - not corps misnamed as armies. THEN we will need these major units just to contest an area - and we probably won't be overwhelming enemy positions with them - at least not all the time. If you are not prepaired to build up military forces to the point that SOME points can be contested by major land units - the former assault forces - we won't hold much for long.

I am prepared to give many divisions to the IJN once I've taken care of China so that the IJN can mount operations with large numbers of divisions

REPLY: I don't recall asking for "many divisions" to "mount operations with large numbers of divisions." In general, in PTO a division is a big thing. I don't like putting a corps or an army into a hex - and risk losing it. Or even have to feed it - under pressure of enemy air attack. To the extent I will need "many divisions" it is mainly so I can erect points of major resistence across a vast area (1/3 of the globe - being conservative - MORE than 1/2 is on our map)
forcing the enemy to concentrate to engage: I hope to hurt his efforts by striking his LOC - defeating him in detail.
But these units will not generally be mounting offensive operations in the usual sense. It is like ASW - ASW seems to most to be defensive warfare - but it is almost purely offensive warfare. I use land units to create a network of points - mostly defended by brigades - a few by divisions - that both support the fleet and air units - and are supported by them. The enemy needs to mass slow transports with troops to take them - and I sink those. It is not fair or elegant - but it works.


BUT I am not prepared to give those divisions if that means never getting them back, That's just plainly idiotic.

REPLY: Then perhaps I am an idiot. I am perfectly serious: most units are going to go to a place and operate from there - as long as they can - until they die. After a while many units will not be able to withdraw even if I want them to - assuming the enemy ever gets an offensive going. Once he has air control of an area sending in transports is a great way to lose them.

In reality the IJA would never have assigned 3 divisions to invading Pearl Harbour if it knew they would NEVER be given back and replaced by lesser-quality IJA and IJN garrison formations.

REPLY: Perhaps - instead of reasoning by assumption - you might read the official history? Or translations of summaries? There is no evidence IJA expected any of those divisions to return. I am much more cautious and conservative - and I intend to leave only half of them there: I want the "divisions" in the form of two divisions and three brigades/regiments. One division will defend Oahu - to make it stiff - and I want it reinforced by a tank battalion and a real CD unit of some kind. One brigade will defend the other island with a good port/airbase. Naval units will defend Hilo and other points in the area. And one division and two brigades - assuming they have not been lost - will return to the area of Rabaul - hopefully to move on Noumea - Port Moresby - Fiji - etc. If that works out well - I expect the division to defend Rabaul for the duration. Rabaul is the most distant point Japanese historicans think Japan can make a MAJOR logistic effort.

quote:

Aside from the tiny fact I don't think you would give me the troops

On the understanding that they'd be given back once NZ was captured and replaced by lower-quality garrison troops ( some of which would be IJN and some of which would be IJA), yes I would happily give you the necessary troops.


REPLY: Noted. I don't have any chance of having enough base units or garrison units to contemplate defending NZ - wish it were otherwise. There is also the matter of fuel/ship range etc. The only ships able to make the trip are far to valuable to risk so far forward. If they were not - they need to be hauling resources - not troops. Ships cannot to both at once - and the pie is only as large as we allow it to be - logistically speaking. I really am a logistician - and a naval one. Japan is not the USA. This isn't a realistic or wise op.


Of course you don't have to go there if you don't want to. It is your theatre and unlike some people I'm not going to try to dictate o you what you can and cannot do in your theatre. I will offer to support some operations and leave you the option of undertaking them. If you don't want to undertake them then you don't get the formations you would need to undertake them. Simple.


REPLY: Agreed. Didn't ask - not an issue. Sorry for the snyde remark. I was wrong. You would send the troops.

quote:

In case you missed it - I believe that you should control Northern and Western Borneo.

No, I asked for this before and you argued long and hard I shouldn't have northern and western Borneo. In the end I settled for Sumatra and the eastern base on Ceylon. I'm a man of my word. I made an agreement and I make a point of never violating something I've agreed to. If there are things you should have agreed with me but didn't then, sure, I'll utilise them to my advantage but in this case we were clear. Northern and Western Borneo are yours at least in part to help support your Grand Escort Command etc etc.

REPLY: OK - you missed it. It is posted. Doesen't matter. I think this is a good idea - and at one point you had suggested drawing a line THROUGH Borneo - so essentially I am agreeing with your position.

I've made my agreement and I would need far more compelling reasons to go back on it than this.... YOu should take note of this... I fight so hard before agreeing to something because once I've agreed I, generally, won't renegotiate and will stick to the letter of the agreement even if you offer something more favourable to me. If you wanted me to have northern and western Borneo you shouldn't have argued so hard against it a few pages ago.

REPLY: Nor - apparently - does it matter I later said otherwise. I framed it in terms of sea control - and I worry you don't understand that. I note you several times said things about not wanting ASW units - and really we won't have enough. Our only hope of managing submarines is statistical attrition at all times from all possible directions/methods.



Your plan re: shifting forces and maintaining uncertainty while stockpiling the means of production seems sound and I support it in general.

REPLY: Noted.

quote:

REPLY: You are forgetting these units already have a second stage mission: DEI. The SAME units that take PI take Java. Further - SOME units from Malaya ALSO hit Java - at the same time.

Historically they did. We are playing a game and not constrained by this history. From December 7th 1941 our path will diverge from history

REPLY: The Japanese centrafugal offensive is one of the great events of military history. Many aspects of it were sound - and sound for very simple reasons. Once a unit is forward on a vector - it is easier to move it farther on that vector. IF you want me to take DEI after PI - I need some units. It is far easier to know the units and plan their movements than to send them back to Japan and get new ones. I don't think it is wise to diviate for its own sake - when what they did makes sense. And the scenario starts our units in their starting positions with their planning. Changing that a lot is not very practical either.


and I certainly do not intend to be bound by taskings from 1941 when deciding what goes where. Now, with that said, if it took 3 divisions in real life I will do my best to allocate 4 or 5 or 6 divisions to it in this game BUT I am not prepared to concede the following:
i) allocating a division to a task in the IJN area means it is under IJN control for the duration. That's silly.

REPLY: I don't think it is silly. I have no idea how to estimate how long I need a unit for. I have no idea what will happen to that unit in operations. You got a crystal ball? Am I missing something obvious to you?


ii) that because a unit went to a particular place in the real war means it must go there in this game. If I wanted to replay the war I'd look at a documentary and forget about WiTP.

REPLY: OK - but UNLESS you propose DIFFERENT units for DEI - it pretty much must be the same ones. Since you want so much control - it easier to say "give me this - I can count on it " and I don't need something else. Nor the process ( not fun ) of asking for it. I see no good reason not to use the units for both ops. Do you? I see no good reason to ask for more or different units? Do you?

Within those confines I am prepared to be generous BUT I am amused by your desire to have as few rules as possible in large areas but then insist that in other areas we must conform with reality ( when it results in the IJN getting control of a load of IJA units) . Talk about flip-flopping to your own advantage.

REPLY: I don't follow this. A dislike of house rules is not germane to this point. So what is your point? I also think you are somehow missing a big point: IJN units - even a major IJN command - are yours. No fuss from me. I expect you to need naval units and forces appropriate to your commands. And I don't expect them to come to Taan and report for duty in six months.

quote:

By 1943 I expect to have a dozen divisions as such, an equal amount in small units (only a third of these latter being Navy because - that is all there is - and probably some of those will be in your areas farther west and in the north).

Well, what you expect and what will happen will depend upon what sort of case you make for these allocations in-game. I am opposed to the concept that you can set rules in place which obviate most of the need to actually discuss anything with the IJA.

REPLY: Since I have not done that, please erase and reset your mind. There is no rule involved here. There is nothing that eliminates a need to discuss things with IJA. I cannot imagine where such concepts come from?
But they are not in my mind. So you are making them up - presumably by assumption. Possibly by misunderstanding what I mean or intend. This isn't the way I think.


These rules you are trying to institute pretty much torpedo the whole idea of this tag team game. If you want the forces PROVE you need them and can use them and you will get them.


REPLY: How can I do that? I submit I have done above in a general sense. I submit that it would take us years to start if I have to do a Pentagon type document for every micro operation and every unit. Again - if you actually have something feasible, reasonable, simple, easy and fast in mind - explain it. So far ALL I hear is you want CONTROL of ALL units with an IJA prefix - a justification for TEMPORARY loss of that control - and a FIRM time line for that loss.
I don't think I am even interested in what that sounds like - but assuming I really am a dunce - I will allow you to show me what simple easy thing I have overlooked. Go ahead - tell me how to justify - or even name - all the units I need for initial ops - in a few minutes - and how I can know - case by case - exactly how long they are needed - and how we can afford the supplies fuel and ships to sail both ways to bring them back from places with no resources - and I will then plug in the data to your simple idea and send it to you - in about 30 minutes. But I must admit - I have not one clue how to do any of these things?


Have a little faith that I will analyse the situation and come to reasonable conclusions and stop trying to control-freak everything so that the IJN can build up large ground forces without ever having to talk to the IJA.


REPLY: I see a great deal of demand for control by you - not by me. I am about to take on the greatest naval powers on the planet - with not only a smaller navy - but only part of it (you have some, and we have some in the Grand Escort Command which is NOT engaged in front line actions). I need to have some things I can count on not already in the force. Tell me how to do that - and be reasonable. And why thinking a unit assigned - say - to garrison Rabaul or Truk or Kwajalein or Soerabaja will ever return? MOST of the units under my control are assigned to missions at a location and do not move once they get there. And most of my offensive operations are small or medium scale- often simultaneous - and in an operational sense entirely improvised from what is nearby. One cannot know what recon will disclose - and one must move appropriately to what it has disclosed - not restricted to a plan made before one knew it.
I have fought enemies that had to stick to plan - and I found it was a severe disadvantage -- for them.

(in reply to Nemo121)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Timeline:
When do you expect to close the Phillipines as a going concern?

REPLY: As soon as possible. I don't like enemy air bases or submarine bases in the heart of what should be our major SLOC. I am pretty creative and able to move much faster than history for all locations EXCEPT Bataan and Manila. I am not sure it is practical to force them quickly - or if it will hurt the assault units if one does? I once knew chap from Ireland who felt that supply sinks could be a big problem. And certainly 40 units running to one hex can be a problem - IF they do that. I expect to neutralize air units in a few days. I expect to have everything that matters on Luzon except the center four hexes (Baguio, Clark, Bataan, Manila) - in a week. I expect Baguio and Clark to fall fast - and Manila next - and Bataan last - but it is not clear for sure how long that will take? However - it probably will be less than half of history.


Are you going to take Borneo, Amboina, Kendari and Balikpapan while you are taking the Phillipines or only afterward?

Well - I move into the southern area fast - isolating fleeing units. But I see the vital wedge as driving toward Borneo from Palau - and I reagard Cagayan and Jolo as the points to start with. It takes a bit of time to get to Ambon - and I am not even trying for Kendari right away. My focus is the other direction - Thursday Island - and all points North of it to Ambon and Palau. Also I am working on Rabaul - and some nearby points. I hope to create a big block in the areas not well defended - and start working up the primary air bases by construction. When the PI are secure I then move on to Kendari and Borneo and Java. If all goes well - we then invest the Darwin area.



When do you foresee yourself invading the DEI and when do you foresee it falling?

REPLY: It is somewhat flexable - but I generally try to move twice the pace of history. I find that greatly minimizes resistence. But I don't commit exhausted units and I take the time to work up a few functional advance air bases.
I use long range air to shift power as reqired and otherwise timetables are determined by shipping to move the units and supplies.

You have said you envision requiring 2 divisions and 2 Brigades to take the Phillipines. Do you believe that you will require more units to go for Borneo and Java? If so how many divisions and Brigades would you require?

REPLY: I am ignoring Sumatra and Sarawak - and Brunei - and the very Western end of Borneo (all yours).
Historically a force from Malaya hit the West end of Java - and AI does that as well. Not sure you want to do that - but forcing the enemy on Java to worry about two forces is not entirely bad strategy. I am flexable on Western Java - and I figure you on Banka and Sumatra will focus him almost as much as you invading Batavia would. I am coming from the East - securing all the lesser islands and then attacking under cover of land based air from Borneo, Celebes and the lower islands. I will bring the armor from PI to help. My main concern is enough base units and garrisons to leave in the wake of the offensive forces - but we better have one more fresh division - as insurance.

I can certainly guarantee you the 2 divisions and 2 Brigades but am interested in how much more you would like and when you will need it. I particularly require the answer to the Java operations as it will impact the timing of my operations against Sumatra.

REPLY: My concern is the Southern area - Darwin - New Guinea - the Solomans. I got no units to speak of and - focused on Hawaii, PI and DEI - virtually none to send. I will need an offensive unit to take Port Moresby - probably - and it probably will take two to get Darwin. Maybe three months.

quote:

I don't recall asking for "many divisions" to "mount operations with large numbers of divisions."

quote:

and Sarawak - and Brunei - and the very Western end of Borneo (all yours).

quote:

ORIGINAL: Monter_Trismegistos

I am sceptic if that game will ever start. Sid, you are still acting like a dictator, in a sense that you are not sharing with Nemo with your plans. Dictator does not need to inform lower ranks about his plans, he is the planner, he is the only person that is giving the orders. Here is different situation. You are not Nemo's superior - you are on the same level of command. You have to cooperate, so you must give him as much information as possible. He (probably ) can't read in your mind so you must write it here.

Now Nemo has to guess what your moves will be. All you said is so generic that makes it completely worthless. We still don't know which units are you going to send to Philippines and which of these units are next scheduled for DEI. Or if some of DEI bases are going to be invaded during invasion of Philippines? When Nemo asked about that, you had more less refused to answer because it was obvious. It was obvious for you, but not for him (he wouldn't ask if it was obvious).

Sid, I think you will communicate better if you will remember one simple thing: when you think something is obvious, it is not.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Sid,

If you would outline your actual plan and assumptions as clearly as you would outline objections and WHY things should be obvious I would actually have a clue what was going on.

I don't know yet, in detail, the following:
1. Do I get CVEs to cover my Sumatra and Malaysia operations - I've asked this several times.

REPLY: And I answered the first time. CVEs are NOT available. They have a mission - and risking their loss forward means they could NEVER perform it. So we won't do that. On the other hand, I refuse to allow your landing forces to be uncovered. I refuse to give you a whole squadron of battleships to operate uncovered. I require that naval operations - even your naval operations - be covered by either land based air or CVLs. I have three different mechanisms in mind - and I so posted them:

a) Base short range army fighters forward when possible;
b) Cover with long range fighters; To this end transfer Zeros to JAAF; to the extent this is not possible in sufficient quantity, assign naval units; I listed the naval units already in Saigon from which tasking can be drawn;
c) Cover with naval fighters on CVL(s).

Exactly what is not clear about this?

2. How many Betty/Nell daitai do I get control of at game start?

REPLY: Again, I posted an answer. I suggested immediate creation of an Army Sentai from the pool of Nells.
I also posted more than once - and you can see in all RHS scenarios - that 22nd Air Flotilla is in Saigon. I cannot go simultaneously to PI, Rabaul, Hawaii and DEI without this unit - yet to the extent you need it - it either must remain - or we must work up your own units to use the same types of aircraft to relieve its units for transfer. You said you wanted two daitai - so I hope that means that one regiment plus one daitai works for you. You NEVER agreed to the assignment of the regiment - or identified which one. I can arrange for this to occur ahead of time - so it won't be down on day one - but not if you don't identify it.


3. Precisely how many of my army air units do you want control of at game start and do you think that any unit assigned to the phillipines is yours for the rest of the game?

REPLY: I want the air brigade (5th?) assigned to the PI op - and absolutely I do think it must be moving with the major army forces that sweep PI and then DEI - not going somewhere else and leaving them unsupported. I also think it is irresponsible NOT to plan to defend the PI and DEI with army air units. I posted that I eventually need two more air brigades (from your long list of them) - one for PI - one for DEI - and one for New Guinea and Rabaul area.
Finally I posted about Hawaii - and you offered specific numbers of bombers - and better bombers than I asked for.
I said I want a regiment of interceptors to remain there later - and I need two to start with - because fighters cannot fight when exhausted. Figure that eventually Hawaii will have a recon unit, a fighter Sentai and a bomber Sentai. I intend to base an Air Flotilla such that it covers Hawaiian waters - even if Oahu is contested. I will pull back the other fighter and bomber units from Hawaii and send them to the Rabaul area.


4. how MANY divisions and Bdes you actually want during the first 6 months. I got one concrete figure ( 2 divisions and 2 Bdes for the Phillipines) and I was happy to agree to that. But I don't know about any other units you want elsewhere.

REPLY: Read above. I posted recommendations. 3 for Hawaii (but one not in divisional form). One for DEI. One for New Guinea/Rabaul (to which add one of those from Hawaii). Two for Darwin. [Not posted - one for Noumea - to RETURN after the op to reserve - reassign to you - not sure]. Otherwise I want garrison units - mostly low end brigades - and small specialist units - in particular CD units, AA units, base units for JAAF, tank companies -
and a few independent mixed brigades or regiments - more or less whatever is available in your view. [IF too much is available - they will be somewhere easy to feed and easy to transfer in any direction - including your direction - or I will flat out say "leave em in Japan or assign them where you please - not required"].


Honestly I simply am being told assumption after assumption and operating with a dearth of information.

REPLY: Me too. How many ships do you have you don't need for operations (so they can be used for moving resources and oil)? What are YOUR plans? I am interested to know (not just hope) that Manchukuo has enough to stop a Red Army invasion? That home islands are defended against raids and worse? That you plan three divisions (my posted advice) to invade Ceylon - or one (your stated preference) - or some other number - so I have an idea what needs moving and covering?

(in reply to Nemo121)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Sid,

quote:

I don't recall asking for "many divisions" to "mount operations with large numbers of divisions."

REPLY: Yet you posted you were willing to assign such - and those quotes are quotes of what you said.

Correct. I am floundering in a sea of vagueness.

REPLY: So post somethign speific; tell me "exactly" (quoting your email) what you plan to do - and make recommendations what you think I should do. Better - list units you think I SHOULD have. If you agree that 48th division, embarked for Luzon, planned for Luzon, SHOULD be mine - why do I have to ask for it and then "justify" (quoting you again) it in writing? For sure, you say "you get to have 48 division, 16 division, 65 Brigade (and whatever brigade is on Palau) for PI, then DEI" that would be nailed down - not vague - and not dependent on my saying anything at all. If I knew what you planned to do ("exactly" and when) I would have a better sense of what too coordinate my planning with.

Otherwise, expect to wait. I am NOT planning at this time. I am going to complete the mod in the form we will use. It is not fair to plan and then change the rules on people. Let everyone plan from the same foundation. And I CAN NOT plan BEFORE that is done - neither is there time to do it nor would I know what to plan with? Finally - I cannot plan until WE get some kind of agreement that I can count on: I did not agree to do PI with NO IJA units - or with temporary units and then give them back - neither defending PI nor moving on to take DEI. Hearing you think I should say "I give them back in 4 weeks" (or something) makes me fear I should not move at all. I need to know what counters are mine to play with for sure in order to make a plan.



That's why I want detail so I know what the hell your assumptions are. Every few days you pop in with a whole new list of assumptions and the ground is pulled out from under my plans. That sort of thing is unsustainable over multiple months/years.

REPLY: IF you have plans, you might share them. That way I would understand the limits of what is possible for me.
Further - if you have some brilliant way to describe how you can know "exactly" what thousands of units will do "exactly" when - I could use it as a model to give you the same thing for my smaller number of thousands of units.
I don't think it is practical to plan out a long way except in general terms. But I do think one can agree on basic roles and missions and forces to implement those. So that is how I think. For me "exact" planning occurs at the moment I make a move - looking at what I have - where it is - the situation - I decide "load here, move there." I didn't know that until I did it.

I'm not alone in this Sid... I have had several emails which have pointed out the same thing and asking me variations on "How can you be enjoying this?", "It looks like a car wreck in the making" and "Do you actually have ANY idea what your forces are?"


REPLY: One assumes you have all the forces in your command areas - and in the SAA on your side of the line we drew - and any other units planned to operate in those areas. There are plenty of other cases - particularly the reinforcements - and one assumes you will get to decide where those go - wether yours or not. Maybe you want this, but if you think I need it more - and say so - it isn't after all - but at least it was your choice. To the extent this comment is germane, how is it different for me? If YOU are unsure - what can I be sure about? I started with the assumption that ALL naval units in your areas were yours. You said "no - I don't want them." Now you complain that you don't know what is available or not? Sort of stewing in your own juce as far as I can see. You really could clarify this to a great degree: make your own list - say this is what I think is best - and I can say "I agree" or list things we need to consider in detail. Or vice versa, I could do that. Or go down the road of general principles, and you can ask for exceptions, but unless you do, the general principle tells you the answer.

quote:

and Sarawak - and Brunei - and the very Western end of Borneo (all yours).

No, we agreed they are yours and while I may have wanted them I am not prepared to accept them and raise the principle that things can be re-negotiated mid-game....


REPLY: Just because you didn't read - or don't remember - what was agreed does not change it. You can go back and see what was posted.

Further - it is NOT practical if we cannot renegotiate from time to time. You even said you wanted in principle to be able to do that. It seems to me we should always be free to make a proposal - and if it is acceptable - that is that.
Does not matter what we said before - just that we both agree now. ONLY in the case a proposal is not acceptable should we not change what we did before. Surely that is more reasonable?


I don't want to have a game of "Re-negotiations in the Pacific". I want to settle things at the start in a VERY clear manner so that I can point to previous agreements in-game and cut off attempts to re-negotiate every little detail.

REPLY: Me to. Total agreement.

(in reply to Nemo121)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Sid,

You wanted all of Borneo and fought hard for it in your negotiations. Well, now you are stuck with them. I won't take them and open up the possibility of renegotiating old agreements ad nauseum.

REPLY: I will compromise to this extent (only): You insist they are mine, I will respect your insistence. I do not want to renegotiate command areas - but I would ALWAYS consider a request from you to do so for some good reason.
"I have too little do to - I conquered China and Russia and the enemy is tame in India - please let me have one of your two active fronts" - and further - if that were the case - I would likely say "I have a full plate in the East - take Australia" or something like that. Anyway - you can ask.

When you say 3 months... Do you mean you will need the units for Darwin and PM in 3 months or do you mean you will need them for three months or what? Also does that mean that you think the DEI will be wrapped up within 3 months?

REPLY: Sorry. Thought that was clear: I expect to complete phase one ops, repair up, and be ready to go to phase 2 ops in three months. That means I will have DEI secure and want to invade Northern Australia. I hope to have PM before that - but if not - I will go for it then as the backup plan. I believe the units sent to Darwin will be engaged in combat forever - until destruction. There may be a passive period - but sooner or later I expect the enemy to attempt to retake Darwin. I intend to contest it mightily - as long as I can - years if possible. It is not an island - so it takes some forces to not allow it to be too easy to overwhelmed.

(in reply to Nemo121)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Sid,

Sid,
Either we clarify things and agree there's no renegotiation mid-game or I think it is best one of us walks now and a new player comes in.

REPLY: I agreed not to threaten to quit if I didn't get my way. I hold you to the same standard. Neither walk nor threaten to walk. I agreed to compromise if we disagreed. I hold you to the same standard: compromise. I too want to clarify things. I DO agree we don't renegotiate mid game. That does not mean either of us cannot make a request - but any request in the other area / units is either accepted or not - period. No argument. It is your unit - your decision, and vice versa. Propose a mechanism for clarification? Or just do yourself what you ask from me: tell me your exact ideas and I will then have a context to deal with. When there is no problem - there is no problem. We could then focus on the exceptional cases.


That I still don't know how many divisions I will have for my operations, which army air units are mine and what level of escorts I can have for the Malaysian operations speaks volumes as regards the clarity and detail of communications...

REPLY: Well - I tried to say we use principles. You don't seem to like them. Seems to me IF you can count on EVERY unit already assigned to the op - planned for it- loaded for it- based in your command area - in your TFs already - you would indeed know. It is only you who say that units on Formosa - clearly tasked with PI - should not be clearly mine - so that means I guess (in your mind) that units in Indochina are not clearly yours. But it is only fuzzy because you don't want to just honor the agreement in place - and stuff on your side of the line is on your side. IF I want something on your side I have to ask - and vice versa. But there is another way: we list all 17,000 units - and post a choice - case by case.

and what it speaks to is not excellence. I really have begun to think today that it is better for one of us to walk away and bring in someone else. If you want me to walk away then that's fine. If you want to walk and oversee both sides of the RHS model in-game ( which may have greater utility in terms of enhancing EOS in future releases) then that's fine too. I believe I know someone who would be willing to step in as the IJN commander.


REPLY: The problem would remain: you would not know how many divisions or air units are yours. Unless you became a dictator and just said "this and that" you would still somehow have to communicate. Much as you may not like to hear it - it will be easier with me than almost anyone else. I know something of your plans, something about the data set, and I am willing to agree to almost anything at this point. I have too much time invested in this - and the mod is too taylored to your desires - to walk away. So I will do whatever I have to in order to play it. It is a shake down anyway - it won't be perfect whatever we do. So I seek not perfection - just get a game going.

This is why I've decided to give you the choice of sorting out these things in detail or finding another player for my role or letting me find another player for yours. It really is that simple... and now I'm gonna watch a movie and chill. Seeing Jet Li kick some ass in Fearless will take my mind off this I'm sure ;)

REPLY: I cannot negotiate alone. And if I did, surely someone would call me a dictator! I do not believe it is possible to really specify the "exact" plan for units in five figures - and "justify" that plan - unless some general principles can be applied. I have attempted to outline principles that make sense to me: things like

1) a unit is loaded to invade a place of an assigned objective;
2) a unit is planned for a similar place;
3) a unit is located at a base that is inside an agreed command area;
4) a unit is associated with one of the above in terms of support, escort, etc.

and you said you didn't like them. So I need some communications stream to find what principles you would like? And frankly - since you are not satisfied with my efforts - it seems to me much more productive if YOU "sort out these things in detail" and teach me how to do it?

You will find a number of specific proposals in your email - and not reading them is not helping very much. To insist I do this alone - in a way that will please you - is probably wholly impractical. In fact - having spent four hours writing to you with a single response (to the effect you are "taking a break") - and not giving me any encouragement or guidance or coordination - I think I must now cease my efforts. Until you address the great amount of information provided there is no point in proceeding further. I repeat - if I sorted out everything in great detail - someone would say I was dictating.

It could be easier: you could assume you have every thing Yamashita had - or could have had but turned down.
If it is in Indochina, or Hainan, or China, or Japan, or Korea, or Manchukuo, or the Northern Area - it is yours - unless some exceptional factor makes it clearly not yours. We would then only have to manage a much smaller list of unclear, ambiguous cases. Also - you could try reading what is written - accepting what is offered - and asking for anything else you really think you need. You could try making a plan and - if some case seems ambiguous in your mind - ask for clarification. I grant I replied to your request for air cover with principles. Among those was that I insist you have it. I want you self supporting off land bases insofar as possible. And I will fill in the blanks. But UNTIL you say "yes - I will cover from Singora immediately" I cannot know I don't have to cover the Singora forces. Etc.

(in reply to Nemo121)

quote:

He wants to take areas not historically done

quote:

You NEVER agreed to the assignment of the regiment

quote:

I want the air brigade

quote:

I posted recommendations. 3 for Hawaii (but one not in divisional form). One for DEI. One for New Guinea/Rabaul (to which add one of those from Hawaii). Two for Darwin.

quote:

Ok, let me give you my final position... I'll trade you Java and Borneo ( in total) in return for having eastern Ceylon and Sumatra... I think that's pretty fair... You get that non-malarial base you've been lusting for and full control of Borneo - which you can fit into your Grand Escort Command etc - while I get to have Sumatra ( which is directly beside Singapore and Malaysia and an essential first line of defence for Malaysia) and control over how the forces in eastern Ceylon are utilised... since Ceylon is essential to IJA plans in India .

quote:

Sorry. Thought that was clear:

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Sid,


4.

quote:

I want the air brigade

This is another problem. Can you please quit using terms which don't apply in-game and which you haven't explained. What is an "air Brigade"? Do you mean a Sentai or 3 Sentais or what? The game has sentais, talk of Brigades is needlessly confusing. Also it seems that you are using regiment and sentai interchangeably... Is brigade now supposed to be used interchangeably with these other two terms also?


REPLY: Well - perhaps you are not familiar with RHS or with the historical JAAF OB? There are two air brigades in the Southern Area at start. One is in Indochina and one is on Formosa. [There is yet another in China]. It is easy to know what units are involved - because there are no exceptions: all the JAAF units on Formosa belong to one brigade, all the JAAF units in Indochina belong to another, and all those in China to yet another. These are the functional major units of the JAAF - just as Air Flotillas are the functional major units of the JNAF. JNAF starts with four Air Flotillas - one of them in reserve in Japan. 21st and 23rd are on Formosa and Palau. 22nd is at Saigon. Eventually a reasonable number of others appears - and even inactive areas (e.g. Northern Command) gets one. These major units are not simply a collection of air units - they also include base units - and engineering units. Just as a naval force needs air support - so does a field army. Not even in China did IJA attempt to operate without air support. It didn't occur to me you would want to do that. Note that these units are quite different in composition and function. Naval air units are optimized for locating and engaging ships. They also are not numerous enough to take on JAAF functions in major land campaigns. To try would be to insure defeat at sea.


5.

quote:

I posted recommendations. 3 for Hawaii (but one not in divisional form). One for DEI. One for New Guinea/Rabaul (to which add one of those from Hawaii). Two for Darwin.

It seems to me that given the 4 divisions you need initially ( 2 for Hawaii and 2 for Phillipines) and 4 Brigades that the other divisions you are looking for can easily come from the Phillipines invasion force. If you have 3 division equivalents and figure you need one for DEI then take 1 from the Phillipines and head over to the DEI with it. I think that is crazily light. I much prefer to hit the DEI with 4 or 5 divisions to be honest but it is your choice. I do, however, predict disaster if you hit it with just a single division.

Same for Darwin and Noumea... A half-dozen divisions for each target is much more likely to be the bare minimum than 2 for Darwin and 1 for Noumea. Still, this isn't my problem anymore.

REPLY: You are misreading what I said. I didn't say it takes 1 division to take the DEI. I said it takes one MORE division. Further - I pointed out that the force from the PI was only one of two which hit Java - and the other came from Malaya. If you are not going to hit the Batavia end of Java - I might have to revise this estimate. But for me - divisions are the big units - I don't often need a corps.


6. North and Western Borneo.
No Sid, they were definitely yours.

REPLY: This does not change that, for reasons of sea control, I later posted I believed you should control the area. I think that it is useful to ops vs Malaya and Sumatra to have bases on the Western end of Borneo. I think that there needs to be patrols over the South China Sea. I am mystified why you - who wanted all of Borneo - are being difficult about this? I think you secretly must like being difficult.

(in reply to Nemo121)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Sid,
You assume so much telepathy on the part of your team mates that it is scary.


REPLY: This is plain false. At no time have I said or implied telepathy was appropriate. You are experiencing unfulfilled expectations. I am sorry for you. But they were YOUR expectations - not expectations I set.

It is far more scary that you do not apply your own reasoning to yourself. You have not communicated your assumptions or expectations - except in the negative sense of complaining when I didn't (by telepathy?) understand them perfectly. You have not told me "exactly" what you wanted to do, when, and where, and what units you needed to do it - nor what units you think I need. The concept of leading by example seems to be one you have not considered: if you feel there is a reasonable and practical way to say "exactly" what is planned - and quickly - you could either show by example how to do it or at least answer queries when asked.

You also are not comprehending what I post - or not reading it at all: I have NOT planned a detail campaign. I am working on the mod. I won't attempt to do more than preliminaries until EVERYONE has the mod. It is not fair to do otherwise. And it is not possible to do otherwise: IF I do not work on it we can not ever finish it. To demand an 'exact' detail plan - complete with 'justification' - before I have spent any time on the matter - and before we have come to terms about what is available to whom - is grossly unreasonable. I won't stand for any more outrageous personal attacks of this sort: you required I be respectful - I require the same in reverse.

If you missed it - then process the information now - and apologize. I cannot tell you what I have not worked out. And I have no intention of working anything out until it is clear you will be civil, and won't break your word about things like "no ultimatums I will quit if I don't get my way." I also won't work it out before we agree we have a completed product - not less than a few days off if we DO NOT argue any more.

I too am not having fun. But I have invested many hundreds of hours doing tasks you set for me - and I am unwilling to leave the whole set of ideas untested. I need you to try to use what was designed for your use - so we can know if it works as intended - or not. And I have a hundred other things you don't even know about that need testing.
I am going to finish the mod - and if you have not diserted the cause - I will then work out a plan - based on whatever is available. If you don't let me have enough - I won't go as far. Simple.


This isn't real life and so, obviously, assasination is off the cards .


REPLY: Glad to hear it.

It is however a GAME and meant to be FUN.


REPLY: Check your inbox. I have proposed a mechanism to achieve that.

In my work I may have to put up with all sorts of people, and I do... I put up with rapists, murderers, drug addicts, paedophiles etc.


REPLY: And I am in the same ball park as they are? Wow. Seriously, this is about control. You are always in control of people - and you somehow fear not controlling me in microscopic detail. I have a solution that will give it you - without the need to "justify" each unit in a formal Pentagon style report (I hope). Check your inbox.


I'm on holidays this week and I felt I had to make a choice. MY decision was to raise this issue one last time as otherwise I could see it ruining my holiday. So, I raised the issue and today I've received about a dozen emails all going into great detail on communications styles and mistakes I've made etc etc but I haven't seen the creation of the clarity I think is essential.


REPLY: And you yourself have failed to define what you want in any sense - even the most abstract and vague.
In spite of being asked publically and privately. Just HOW can "clarity" be achieved to your satisfaction?
I made a wide variety of proposals - and not one of them has produced a response. I think what is going on is more subtle: "lack of clarity" is an excuse; you have made up your mind already - and whatever I say or said - however heroic - is really germane: you are going to say "it wasn't clear enough" and - never having defined what would be - no one can say your standard was not indeed met. I saw you do this once before.

There are two problems in this case: we have created some interest in this project - and some people have invested some time on it. We have some obligation to behave in a civil way; Also, we have done a great deal of work - and it needs to be tested. EOS would not be in its present form except for your lobbying for what you wanted. Be honorable enough to help me understand how this package works.

As for the rest - I am finished debating with you: its all on your shoulders now. YOU make it clear. YOU tell me what units I have. I may ask for something - but only once. You no longer own IJA - you own Japan. I just work here. If that isn't enough control - well I will let that go... I have a backup plan. Either take charge and SHOW me the clarity you want - or quit - in spite of our agreements not to do so - and our long negotiations (which, I think, produced a remarkable division of tasks). But I will not abandon this project. I have a man year in it. And I don't make promises I won't keep (in this case to the group).

< Message edited by el cid again -- 11/20/2006 3:48:59 PM >

(in reply to Nemo121)