RE: Bios for Pope, Ewell, Gregg, Taliferro & Ricketts - 1/8/2007 9:55:40 PM
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Battleline
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A Tale of Two Personalities: John Pope
Ezra J. Warner, in his book “Generals in Blue” calls John Pope “one of the Civil War’s more controversial figures.” And that’s probably putting it mildly. Pope was an officer of promise during his early war experiences in the Western theater. But when promoted and brought east, he became something different.
Pope came from a distinguished family. Being a collateral descendant of George Washington, the son of a Federal judge and the nephew of a Kentucky senator (being related by marriage to Mary Todd Lincoln probably didn’t hurt either), probably helped him get his brigadier’s rank in 1861.
Nobody can question Pope’s early triumphs. His moves against Island No. 10 were brilliant. Within two months, he was a major general in command of a whole wing of Gen. Halleck’s army as it moved on Corinth, Miss.
But from the time he was called east Pope changed. Perhaps, as Warner speculated, he “began to get in over his depth.”
Assigned the Army of Virginia to help shield Washington and pull attention away from McClellan, Pope was an utter and dismal failure.
He couldn’t get along with his subordinates. John C. Fremont, who had commanded him out west, now was under Pope’s command and he wanted no part of it. Of course Fremont was a free spirit of his own.
Pope brought a lot of wrath on himself with his General Orders, which expressed his own hard line in dealing with Rebels. Warner called them tactless and bombastic. As for being out of supply, Pope brought that upon himself with General Order No. 5.
“Hereafter, as far as practicable, the troops of this command will subsist upon the country in which their operations are carried on. In all cases supplies for this purpose will be taken by the officers to whose department they properly belong under the orders of the commanding officer of the troops for whose use they are intended. Vouchers will be given to the owners, stating on their face that they will be payable at the conclusion of the war, upon sufficient testimony being furnished that such owners have been loyal citizens of the United States since the date of the vouchers. Whenever it is known that supplies can be furnished in any district of the country where the troops are to operate the use of trains for carrying subsistence will be dispensed with as far as possible.” (Official Records of the War of the Rebellion).
General Orders 7 and 11 were excessively oppressive on the civilians under his control.
Pope showed feistiness in moving his command forward, yet he couldn’t apprehend the situation when Jackson and Lee split to come together. He also didn’t quite get it when Stuart pillaged his command in a cavalry raid, grabbing his orders, and details of strength and disposition. His lack of initiative to change things around plagued his command.
If Pope had, as was stated, a “a motley collections of corps,” it was his fault. As army commander, it was his responsibility to train these men. Pope himself thought his forces were ready for operations:
“To the Officers and Soldiers of the Army of Virginia:
By special assignment of the President of the United States I have assumed the command of this army. I have spent two weeks in learning your whereabouts, your condition, and your wants, in preparing you for active operations, and in placing you in positions from which you can act promptly and to the purpose. These labors are nearly completed, and I am about to join you in the field.
Let us understand each other. I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and to beat him when he was found; whose policy has been attack and not defense. In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our Western armies in defensive attitude. I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving. That opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. Meantime I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases, which I am sorry to find so much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of "taking strong positions and holding them," of "lines of retreat," and of "bases of supplies." Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before us, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance, disaster and shame lurk in the rear. Let us act on this understanding, and it is safe to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed and that your names will be dear to your countrymen forever.
JNO. POPE,
Major-General, Commanding.”
(Official Records of the War of the Rebellion).
According to William Allan, in his “Relative Strength at Second Manassas.” Southern Historical Society Papers Vol. VIII Richmond, Va., May, 1880. No. 5, Pope had at least 72,600 men at his disposal to the 54,000 that Lee and Jackson had.
“But enough. No one will ever know precisely how many of his march-worn 54,000 troops General Lee was able to hurl against what was left of Pope's 75,000 in the last great struggle of the 30th of August. By one of the boldest and most skillful military movements of our times, he broke into fragments this army of Pope, so much larger than his own, while an army equal in number to the Confederates lay near Alexandria and Washington, within one day’s forced march of the battlefield.”
By the time Lee, Jackson and Stuart were done with him, Pope’s command was nearly in the Washington, D.C. defenses.
Instead of taking the blame himself, Pope managed to pin blame on Fitz John Porter, who was court-martialed.
Warner states: “Nevertheless Pope succeeded in having Fitz John Porter cashiered for disobedience of orders impossible of execution and displaying the grossest ignorance of the situation at the time they were issued (Porter, a supporter of Gen. McClellan, years later won a reversal of the verdict).
Pope’s actions in Virginia proved to be a huge victory for McClellan and his supporters as Little Mac was given command of all Union forces in the east and Pope was sent to Minnesota, the Civil War equivalent of the German Eastern Front. Again, with a smaller command, he behaved credibly during the Sioux uprising.
Pope was an aggressive general, and worked brilliantly with smaller units. In army command, despite having some excellent subordinates, he was unable to lead them to victory.
In regards to ratings, if you want to mark him the best of each trait (western service), then avatar’s ratings are too low. If you want to rate him for his command of the Army of Virginia, avatar’s ratings are closer to correct (maybe too high on initiative). If you want to give him some sort of average, avatar again is closer to what’s right, in my mind.
I don’t believe Pope should be rated higher than Robert E. Rodes, one of the most capable brigade and division commanders in the ANV Second Corps. Rodes’ lone slip didn’t lead to utter defeat.
It’s too bad there aren’t sliding ratings, such as changing from brigadier to major to lieutenant general, or from western to eastern theaters.
As for Pope, he was a great brigade-division commander in the west, but a utter despotic failure as an eastern army commander.
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