Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: YankeeAirRat

I just finished Lundstroms new book. I would highly recommend it. It talks pretty well of how Black Jack Fletcher was shuffled off to the side following the success of the 'Canal campaign. He took it to a point as a personal insult from Nimitz, but instead of brooding about it he rose to successfully turn around the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and the Pacific Northwest Naval Region in general. Lundstrom also seems to take on the myth that Fletcher was a coward and didn't know what he was doing, rather the theme that Lundstrom puts across is that Fletcher understood what dire straits the US was in post-PH. So he did his best to preserve forces that would be needed for defense rather then try and go for the finishing kills in a couple of the battles. Lundstrom points out that Fletcher knew that with the US Fleet trying to do double duty and the majority of the fleet on the bottom of Pearl those units available for use wouldn't be useful if they were heavily damaged or sunk while awaiting the latest round of ship building to catch up.
Overall a good book and worth the cost of buying it.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Admiral DadMan

It seems to me that many early writers (most notable Morison) flog Fletcher for excessive fueling and a lack of aggressiveness. Yet more and authors of late paint a different picture of him as you said Nik.

I also feel he got the shaft for not possessing omnipresent knowledge of hindsight.

quote:

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

quote:

ORIGINAL: Admiral DadMan

It seems to me that many early writers (most notable Morison) flog Fletcher for excessive fueling and a lack of aggressiveness. Yet more and authors of late paint a different picture of him as you said Nik.

I also feel he got the shaft for not possessing omnipresent knowledge of hindsight.

Fletcher was a nuts and bolts guy. If every last line was not secured it creeped him out. On the one hand this led to him mounting the searches that allowed Spruance to maintain contact with Nagumo following the morning strikes and get Hiryu in the afternoon. It also led to TF 17 launching a well-coordinated strike on June 4, where that of TF 16 was a debacle that was rescued from utter failure only by some clear-headed thinking from Wade McClusky and Dick Best.

On the other it also led to him bugging out from supporting the Lunga landing after 36 hours (cutting the planned time on station short by more than half) because the fighter strength available on his 3 CVs had fallen from 99 to 78, and because he wanted to refuel.

The night following the day he left was the Savo island disaster. The presence of US carrier air during the preceding afternoon could have made a difference here.

quote:

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

I confess my only source is Morison; he does say that Fletcher told Turner he would only cover him for no longer than two days, even though Turner said he needed four days. Apparently Ghormley left it for them to work out such details. Clearly this is not Fletcher's "fault", although it might have been well if he had been more committed to his mission of supporting the landing.

Another question I have is in regard to the area Fletcher was operating in. On the 7th he steamed along the southern shore of Guadalcanal, maybe 50 miles south of the beaches. Throughout the 8th (the afternoon before Savo) he was operating further to the east and south, more off San Cristobal than off Guadalcanal. It is not surprising that he did not find Mikawa, as this deployment kept this carriers on the disengaged side of the operation. At best this can be called "distant cover", but I have never read what his orders were or what the plan had been for the op. Again, this is not Fletcher's "fault", in the same way that Halsey was not at fault for failing to cover San Bernardino Strait.

If Morison is accurate, Fletcher turned southeast to leave the area pertty much at the same time that he requested permission to do so. He steamed in that direction for 8 hours before turning back to the northwest (still not having received permission to retire); at this point he was already nearly halfway back to Espiritu Santo. Clearly his enthusiasm for covering the landing force was not high. If the landings were going to take place at all, they should have been properly supported. Again, more Ghormley's failure than Fletcher's. But Fletcher does not cover himself with glory here.

quote:

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

In Morisson's Guadalcanal volume on p. 59 he shows Wasp's track from 0230 on the 7th through 0840 on the 9th. After about 1200 on the 7th, Wasp was never further west than Cape Esperance or further north than the northernmost tip of San Cristobal.

It is certainly possible that Fletcher's 3 carriers were not operating together the whole time.

quote:

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

A strike from Rabaul was always the danger. This surely was clearly recognized from the earliest stages of planning the operation. It did not really become terribly more dangerous with 78 fighters than it was with 99. And Rabaul's strike aircraft had suffered equally heavy losses during their attacks on Turner earlier that day. Those results ought to have been encouraging.

quote:

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

A strike from Rabaul was always the danger. This surely was clearly recognized from the earliest stages of planning the operation. It did not really become terribly more dangerous with 78 fighters than it was with 99. And Rabaul's strike aircraft had suffered equally heavy losses during their attacks on Turner earlier that day. Those results ought to have been encouraging.

quote:

Fortune favors the bold.....until it doesn't.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

There's truth in that, but i still prefer the smart, cautious commanders like a Jellicoe or Spruance vs. a hothead like a Beatty or Halsey.