ChezDaJez
Posts: 3436
Joined: 11/12/2004
From: Chehalis, WA
Status: offline
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quote:
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I said:
But you're right... I am ignorant of your version of WWII history... you know, your version of history that says the Japanese should never have won a single battle anywhere, anytime or in anyway. To hear you tell it, Pearl Harbor should have been a resounding Amercan victory. And to think the rest of us have been reading all those lies by Lundstrom, Shores, Bergstrom, Parshall et al.
You said:
I've never made any of those claims or anything remotely like 'em. If you could provide a quote, your credibility may be restored.
Not in exact words but that has the gist of every posting you have ever made. And as far as my credibility goes, I don't give rat's behind as to whether you find me credible or not. Its the other members of this forum that will determine my credibility, not you and your constant denunciation of other's opinions.
Of course, when asked to put up or shut up with facts, you don't provide any. You claim equality yet you don't provide the actual numbers that prove it... only a summation of what you SAY you have done. Oh, I forgot... it's a work in progress. Yeah, okay.
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The challenge, then, is to figure out how other intangibles such as force ratios, perceived mission (fixation on intercepting bombers to the detriment of defending self, and that sort of thing), range, secure non-combat area, &c, fit into the mix. It's not the sort of thing one does in a few months, not even if one limits oneself to the USN campaigns and Guadalcanal, unless one does this sort of thing for a living.
i assume of course that you are willng to apply the same standard to the Japanese? Oh, silly me... that's not your style, is it? If it ain't US, it ain't worth a hoot. That's your style... about as natiocentric as they come.
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Oh, can't have that can we? Got to throw out any fact that slews the result away from your preconceived notion, right? Just like you wanted to throw out the air combat over Darwin with the P-40s and Zeros.
Look, we all know that you are adept at attempting character assasination, even though you make a poor job of it. But the fact is I never said I wanted to throw out the air combat over Darwin. Find any place where I did. What I said was that there are intangibles. You and, as I recall, Nik, seem to think that Zeroes operating at long range to Guadalcanal was an important intangible that subtantially adversely affected A6M performance there. It is a reasonable claim to make, albeit one that I think is overstated based on the evidence. But if it is fair game to note such intangibles, where they adversely affect the Japanese, it is also fair game to track the ones that adversely affected the Allies.
Tap dancing but you forgot to put the taps on the shoes. And there you go again... everytime the US aircraft suffered higher losses in combat, you attempt to explain it away with "intangibles." Oh, they were taking off... oh, they were at low power settings... oh, they were kept awake all night.... oh, they didn't have breakfast... oh, they forgot to wipe their butts...
Intangibles work both ways. Take the Guadalcanal campaign for example. You arbitrarily dismiss the fatiguing effects of flying daya after day 3-4 hours to engage in a 30 minute battle and then flying 3-4 hours back, sometimes in a damaged aircraft that requires all your strength and concentration to keep it in the air. But then you turn around and say that US pilots were more fatigued because of an occasional Japanese night nuisance raid and the fact that they had to sit on alert waiting for the bombers to appear. Of course, you fail to mention that the Wildcats were seldom in the air for more than an hour at a time.
Yet you fail to include the intangibles that allowed the Wildcat to be successful on defense such as radar and coast watchers. Without this early warning, the Wildcats would seldom have been in position to intercept. It's what's known as a force multiplier. Indeed, the ability of radar to detect and then direct Wildcats to the enemy certainly was the most important factor in allowing Wildcats to engage at virtually every battle it fought in. Because its obvious that the Wildcat certainly wouldn't have had the time to climb to altitude without it. But that doesn't fit your opininion that the Wildcat was the equal of the Zero, does it.
Another intangible that greatly benefitted the US was tactical innovation, something the Japanese singularly failed to appreciate. If pilots like Thatch and Flatley hadn't discarded their tactical training and developed new tactics to counter the Zero's strongpoints, the US pilots would certainly have suffered higher casualties. The AVG is a prime example. By adopting slashing attacks, they negated any numerical advantage the Japanese had.
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As to Darwin, see: http://home.st.net.au/~dunn/darwin02.htm
By my reading that's 36A6Ms at full power setting attacking a CAP of 5 P-40s, with 5 more P-40s on the ground refueling, and five P-40s bounced while scrambling to take off. Not exactly any intelligent person's idea of a meeting engagement or even a meeting of aircraft on roughly even terms, even if we ignore the 7:1 initial force ratio advantage favoring the Japanese.
That's why intagibles matter.
The link you posted is typically of your mindset. "Oh, gee, let's use a single internet source that is one-sided and accept it as gospel."
But okay, have it your way... we'll use it. Of course, you failed to mention that the site states that 6 Zeros were busy strafing Brathurst Island and that 9 Zeros had engaged a Catalina and become separated from the main force. So of those 36 Zeros you say engaged, only 21 were actually available to engage the 5 P-40s on CAP. And of course we don't know how many Zeros really engaged the CAP while the others dove down to strafe the P-40s attempting to take off, do we.
Oh, but they were surprised! Oh, duh, I forgot, can't have that, can we. It's one of your intangibles you want to include. Why do you never include surprise against a Japanese force as an intangible? Yeah, yeah, I know... it's not how you play this game...
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That is not correct. In any case, in the Marianas engagement most of the Japanese pilots from the IJN CVs were extensively trained. Not as extensively experienced as their forerunners of the Kido Butai of 1941-1942, but substantially trained nonetheless. How they compare in training vs the slight experienced and highly trained American pilots who comprised TF58/38's regular air crews is not easy to quantify.
And your source for that statement would be......? Substantially trained... hmmm.... yeah, okay. More than 70% of these pilots had never seen combat and only the flight leaders had any substantial combat experience. According to the "Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945", most pilots had less than 100 hours in the air. Hardly call that substantially trained. The US pilots at this point in time were better trained and had more experience in type and in battle.
Let's look at the actual results from the Marianas Turkey Shoot... specifically the part the Japanese carriers played in it. And we'll use a few facts... something you are adverse at doing.
Ozawa had 3 carrier squadrons, a total of 9 carriers. 3 of these were fleet carriers, 3 were CVLs and the last 3 were somewhere in between. Between them they carried a mximum complement of 431 aircraft: 249 fighters, 113 dive bombers and 69 torpedo planes. How many were operationally is not known but we'll assume that a significant portion (90+%) was.
The US had a total of 15 carriers: 7 fleet carriers and 8 CVLs. Maximum aircraft complement consisted of 902 aircraft: 476 fighters, 233 dive bombers and 193 torpedo planes. We'll use the same assumption for the US in regards to operational aircraft.
On 19 June 44, Ozawa launched 4 strikes. The US fleet had over 200 fighters on CAP. FD directed them in successive waves to their targets.
The first consisted of 90 aircraft. 42 were shot down with 25 of those attributed to fighters, the rest to AA. The attack damaged the South Dakota.
The second strike consisted 128 aircraft. 97 were shot down with 70 attributed to fighters. Several managed to attack the US carriers but scored no hits.
The third strike consised of 47 aircraft. 7 were lost to fighters and none to AA.
The fourth strike was given the wrong position and 49 diverted to Guam. 27 Hellcats intercepted and shot down 30 while landing. The remainder found TF 58.2 and attacked. Of the 33 that attacked, 24 were shot down: 9 to fighters, the rest to AA. This strike achieved no hits.
So, of the 347 carrier aircraft launched, 200 were shot down, 141 of those to fighters. 75% of these total losses were bombers. The Japanese lost 43 fighters in air-air combat but it should be noted that of the 14 fighters that accompanied the third strike, all but 5 carried bombs. The US lost 23 fighters in air-air combat.
Impressive results to be sure but a 2:1 numerical superiority in fighters, radar, good FD, and plenty of flight decks tends to produce them. However, the losses in fighters was only a 2:1 ratio in favor of the US and reflects the original 2:1 numerical superiority in fighters.
Please, if you wish to dispute these facts... do so with facts, not rhetoric, not wishful thinking but with facts.
Chez
_____________________________
Ret Navy AWCS (1972-1998)
VP-5, Jacksonville, Fl 1973-78
ASW Ops Center, Rota, Spain 1978-81
VP-40, Mt View, Ca 1981-87
Patrol Wing 10, Mt View, CA 1987-90
ASW Ops Center, Adak, Ak 1990-92
NRD Seattle 1992-96
VP-46, Whidbey Isl, Wa 1996-98
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