GoodGuy
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Joe D.
My impression of IJN doctrine was that it was so offensive-oriented that everything else – such as damage control – was only a secondary consideration.
I’m certainly not an expert on IJN CVs, but the authors of Shattered Sword are, and they claim the following from Chapter 14 (Fire and Death)
I'm not sure about that one ... They were interested in details about the IJN since they were kids, and they did their homework, no doubt, plus they got a good reputation.
But I can't stop thinking that they were "just" very good at collecting facts and informations which were already known in Japan (for quite a few years), so they kind of "transfered" or "forwarded" infos/facts to the western hemisphere, where - contrary to the japanese POV - the focus used to be on the USN, on what the USN did right, or - regularly picked up by writers from the western hemisphere - on what amount of luck had been involved on the US side.
Many of the numbers/facts they collected were submitted by japanese experts, researchers or historians, they did not get to see/verify original documents nor did they go to Japan to interview eye witnesses (afaik). It is a kind of "remote work", imho.
I think "Sword" doesn't factor in one vital fact: Besides "Sword" not covering USN decisions/POVs to draw the big picture (although some decisions/actions on the USN side might have had a bigger impact than the authors may think - or bigger than they would accept, whatever), the book doesn't factor in that the USN commanders could not gather/develop tactics, type of approaches etc. from real battles/conflicts where carriers were envolved, nor did the respective USN commanders have air combat experience. The book draws a picture where the IJN was a a doomed force right from the start (due to design flaws, bad doctrine, etc.), without taking into account that the USN did accept risks to a level where they fielded all available CVs (Midway), although there was a chance that they would have been confronted with a superior enemy carrier force. Many of the USN commanders were aggressive and acted as if they would have had combat experience, although they received the vital knowledge on academies only.
Let me quote from a dissertation authored in 2005 (someone posted the link in another thread):
quote:
ORIGINAL : DOUGLAS VAUGHN SMITH - Carrier Battles:Command decisions in harm's way, Florida State University
Most of all, however, since war is an interactive endeavor, the outcomes of the
five Pacific carrier battles can be attributed to the relative merit of decisions taken by the
opposing commanders. But the success of U.S. commanders in making appropriate and
timely decisions at sea in World War II is also a function of the correct or erroneous
decisions and actions taken and executed by their Japanese counterparts........
I don't think that good/bad decisions were the only factors that triggered the outcomes, and it seems that the author didn't know vital details about the IJN side (logistics, doctrine, carrier design, etc.) presented in "Sword", but the decisions were important cornerstones during these battles.
quote:
The Japanese naval leadership had considerable combat experience even before the decision was taken to attack the U. S. at Pearl Harbor. Japan’s aircraft carrier commanders - and particularly Admiral Chuichi Nagumo who commanded all major carrier operations, including the six-carrier attack on Pearl Harbor, prior to U.S. Fleet opposition which started with the Battle of the Coral Sea -- had considerably more operational experience in a combat environment than any Admiral the United States could muster to oppose them. In fact, the first carrier commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to see action, and the senior commander in the first three of the five Pacific carrier battles, Radm. Frank Jack Fletcher, was not even an aviator and thus lacked conceptual insight into air battle, out of sight of the carrier that launched the attack and in an extra dimension as compared to battle on the ocean’s surface. Nor had he seen any opposing surface naval action while in command of a Navy fighting vessel, though he had won the Medal of Honor for service as a Lieutenant during the United States’ occupation of Vera Cruz and the Navy Cross for service in European Waters in 1918........
....The American Admirals had merely pondered in the classroom and on the gaming board situations that their Japanese adversaries had experienced in real life. ......
One of the dissertation's goals:
quote:
.... through evaluation of the decision processes of the commanders concerned, it will attempt to identify the inter-War educational system -- and particularly Sound Military Decision -- as the cornerstone of success in those battles.
That's where the dissertation shines, it also shares my idea of USN commanders who were willing to take risks, with many of them acting aggressively or quickly.
quote:
ORIGINAL: Joe D.
- All IJN warships had wooden furniture, ensuring they would burn easily.
I tend to think that the designs of many carriers' structures + battle stations were flawed and more of a risk/threat than any furniture could be, and maybe these designs even played into the hands of the USN: battleships or CA's which were converted to CVs/CVLs, either during the construction/planning phase or even after completion, and all the carriers with wooden superstructures, where some of the changes made in the dockyards were applied hastily, while others took years, due to lack of resources or problems during production.
Wooden Interior/furniture might have been no more than the "sugar" on top.
quote:
There is much more, but suffice it to say that Agaki became a burning hulk after only one direct hit; what does that say re IJN damage control?
It does say a lot about the flawed design, about the (the lack of) awareness regarding potential high damage caused by direct hits or fire. It does say a lot about the general offensive posture/doctrine, where the IJN was supposed to strike first (and deadly), so the focus wasn't on safety/damage control, obviously.
quote:
As for AA, Sword said at this stage in the war, most IJN CVs avoided enemy air thru violent maneuvering, which undid the computerized firing solutions for it's guns. That probably explains the low AA kills I previously posted.
Not sure if they really did these manouevres during dive bomber attacks, I doubt that they could reduce the chance of being damaged that way.
Check this: http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/f000001/f057576.jpg
I'm sure that chances were high to minimize damage when that kind of manoeuvre had been used, if being attacked by level bombers.
< Message edited by GoodGuy -- 10/4/2007 4:29:21 PM >
_____________________________
"Aw Nuts"
General Anthony McAuliffe
December 22nd, 1944
Bastogne
---
"I've always felt that the AA (Alied Assault engine) had the potential to be [....] big."
Tim Stone
8th of August, 2006
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