Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: ColinWright

None of this addresses the actual point I am making; that your method for deciding how many squads to put into a unit, ...

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whatever its other merits, is going to skew the density equation away from what it would seem reasonable to assume Norm anticipated.

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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

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ORIGINAL: ColinWright

None of this addresses the actual point I am making; that your method for deciding how many squads to put into a unit, ...

Again, the technique in post #76 is about how to model whatever squads anyone may want to put into a unit. Forget what I'm doing in France 1944.

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whatever its other merits, is going to skew the density equation away from what it would seem reasonable to assume Norm anticipated.

Whatever assumption you make about Norm, it still can't support treating all squads as if they have the same density, regardless of size.

Let's take your line in post #80:

"Assuming Norm's original density formula is accurate, your density is now off by (47/36=1.31) -- 31 percent."

Let's just assume that you're right and there is actual basis for assuming Norm meant for 13-man squads to be the standard (unlikely). But that means that if the squads are 10-man, then that 36-squad unit must now be modeled as 360/13 = about 28 squads. And if they are 8-man, then it must be modeled as 288/13 = about 22 squads.

There is still no way you can fit modeling all three different sizes as if they were equal density into any logical system. The unit sizes are 288, 360, and 468. They can't have the same density.

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ORIGINAL: ColinWright

I find your argument that the rear echelon elements can wind up fighting of some merit; the one for the need to reward encirclements less so. Encircling the enemy is plenty beneficial as it is.

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So whether adding the rear echelon elements would improve matters would depend on the answers to several questions:

1. In the decisive engagements, did the rear-echelon elements participate frequently enough to have a significant effect? It's much less important if they only joined in when the cause was already lost. In general, is the average combat power of the unit best represented with or without the rear-echelon units? The mapping section of the US 34th Infantry division may have once taken up arms -- but on the 383 other occasions when the division entered battle it did not. We're not going to improve our representation of the division if we put in two light rifles to represent the mapping section -- we'll make it worse.

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2. Will the added fidelity -- if any -- of modeling these elements outweigh the distortion to the density paradigms induced by dumping in so much extra equipment?

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3. Did the rear-echelon elements fight well enough to make a big difference? My three year old son might well help me unload the truck; how much help he's providing is another matter.

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ORIGINAL: ColinWright

You're managing to insert an assumption that Norm employed the same rationale as you do about how to determine how many squads a unit should have.

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The POINT -- which you are rather predictably failing to concede -- is that dumping in additional squads, whatever the rationale, will throw off the original density ratios.

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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
Since I'm modeling only a fraction of the rear-area elements, their impact is effectively de-leveraged. Allied divisions may have had 14,000 non-frontline men in them. I've probably modeled less than 5,000 of them. Without some modeling of the rear combat elements, breakthroughs wipe out the artillery, HQs, etc. like they were civilians. It's unrealistic.

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ORIGINAL: golden delicious

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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
Since I'm modeling only a fraction of the rear-area elements, their impact is effectively de-leveraged. Allied divisions may have had 14,000 non-frontline men in them. I've probably modeled less than 5,000 of them. Without some modeling of the rear combat elements, breakthroughs wipe out the artillery, HQs, etc. like they were civilians. It's unrealistic.

You've added rear area elements to the combat units as well, though. How else would you get to over 200 squads for a British infantry brigade?

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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay




This is actually kind of fun. I've somehow manuvered you into a hopeless situation. And since you can never admit you're wrong, you can't vacate it.

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ORIGINAL: vahauser

Well, here is one way.  The area of a 5km hex is 21.65 sq. km.  The area of a 50km hex is 2165 sq. km. 

What is the 'average area' of a squad of 10 men?  If the average frontage is say, 10 meters per man (which I don't think is unbelievable), then a 10-man squad will occupy 1000 sq. meters.  1 square kilometer is 1,000,000 square meters. So, the area of a 5km hex is 21,650,000 square meters.  Thus, 21,650 10-man squads will "fill up" a hex at 10 meters frontage per man.

If the average frontage is 31.6 meters per man, then a 10-man squad will occupy 10,000 sq. meters.  And at this frontage only 2,165 10-man squads will "fill up" a 5km hex.

But, what happens when we are dealing in 'generalities' (and generic squads) and suffering density penalties when talking about only 216 squads?  At that point (100,000 sq. meters per 'squad') it doesn't matter much whether 14 men or 10 men or 8 men are filling that space (100,000 sq. meters).  The density difference of 14 men occupying 100,000 sq. meters and 10 men occupying 100,000 sq. meters is not terribly significant. 

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ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Believe that if you wish. As before, your conviction is only a comment upon yourself.

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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

At 5km/hex, density penalties begin at 100 peices of equipment and above. So it makes a big difference.

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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

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ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Believe that if you wish. As before, your conviction is only a comment upon yourself.

I suppose I've tormented you enough with that. But think how much grief you could have saved yourself, if you had made the effort to actually comprehend what I was saying, instead of making a knee-jerk assumption that it was about France 1944.

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ORIGINAL: vahauser

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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

At 5km/hex, density penalties begin at 100 peices of equipment and above. So it makes a big difference.

Exactly. So, the problem isn't with the equipment, it's with the density calculations. At 50km per hex, how may pieces of equipment before density effects kick in? 5km has 21.65 sq. km area. 50km has 2165 sq km area. Thus, density effects at 50km should kick in at 10,000 pieces of equipment. I wonder if this happens...

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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

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ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Believe that if you wish. As before, your conviction is only a comment upon yourself.

I suppose I've tormented you enough with that. But think how much grief you could have saved yourself, if you had made the effort to actually comprehend what I was saying, instead of making a knee-jerk assumption that it was about France 1944.

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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Don't think of that unit as a peice of cardboard on a hexgrid. Think of it as a unit just as complicated as the division or corps, and the hex not as a hex, but as a huge tactical map. So, if the division can have its rear-areas affected, the brigade can, in a similar way - within the hex.

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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

That's why I continue to believe that, if the situation is going to get wild or desperate, you've got to model the rear-areas.

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ORIGINAL: golden delicious

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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Don't think of that unit as a peice of cardboard on a hexgrid. Think of it as a unit just as complicated as the division or corps, and the hex not as a hex, but as a huge tactical map. So, if the division can have its rear-areas affected, the brigade can, in a similar way - within the hex.

Right. In the duration of the scenario, on how many occasions did rear area elements of a British infantry brigade enter into significant combat? Ten times? Twenty?

Now, how many does that work out to per brigade? How many times does the brigade fight in the scenario?

I'm going to estimate that rear area elements would become engaged in somewhere between 1% and 5% of actions. So in at least 95% of actions, those elements will fire and be fired at quite inappropriately.

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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

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ORIGINAL: golden delicious

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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Don't think of that unit as a peice of cardboard on a hexgrid. Think of it as a unit just as complicated as the division or corps, and the hex not as a hex, but as a huge tactical map. So, if the division can have its rear-areas affected, the brigade can, in a similar way - within the hex.

Right. In the duration of the scenario, on how many occasions did rear area elements of a British infantry brigade enter into significant combat? Ten times? Twenty?

Now, how many does that work out to per brigade? How many times does the brigade fight in the scenario?

I'm going to estimate that rear area elements would become engaged in somewhere between 1% and 5% of actions. So in at least 95% of actions, those elements will fire and be fired at quite inappropriately.

Both sides have to be designed to the same standard, regardless. Otherwise, the Germans would have unrealistic counterattack abilities...

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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Think if the scenario had been designed at the 2.5km/hex, company scale.

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ORIGINAL: golden delicious

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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Think if the scenario had been designed at the 2.5km/hex, company scale.

Quite. In that situation, a British brigade HQ would never see action. Not so here. Why the difference?

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ORIGINAL: ColinWright

I think this fails on three scores.

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First, it's undemonstrated that the Germans would have 'unrealistic' counterattack abilities. Faced with a German counterattack, would an Anglo-American infantry brigade of mid-1944 really have started hoicking the cooks up to the firing line? Wouldn't they just have yelled for help and fallen back? Cooks, etc were sent up to the front in the Battle of the Bulge -- at least so legend says -- but the very fact that this was seen as remarkable points to how rare the practice was. Moreover, in that situation there was no help to hand. It wasn't like Normandy, with units jammed in cheek to jowl.

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Second, even if it can be demonstrated that rear-area elements need to be represented for both sides, this ignores the question about whether the gains in fidelity offset the loss in fidelity due to the skewing of density factors.

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Third, when rear-area elements are put in, they don't just fight in the 0-30% or whatever of engagements they did fight in -- they fight in all of them.

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You have two sides. On one side, rear area elements virtually never fought. On the other, they fought some unknowable percentage of the time. Let's be generous and say 60%.

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So for both forces in combination, the percentage of the times rear area elements fought comes to around 30% -- and I wouldn't be surprised if the number could be shown to be a third of that.

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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

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ORIGINAL: ColinWright

I think this fails on three scores.

First of all, it doesn't fail on any score. The scenario works, period.

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First, it's undemonstrated that the Germans would have 'unrealistic' counterattack abilities. Faced with a German counterattack, would an Anglo-American infantry brigade of mid-1944 really have started hoicking the cooks up to the firing line? Wouldn't they just have yelled for help and fallen back? Cooks, etc were sent up to the front in the Battle of the Bulge -- at least so legend says -- but the very fact that this was seen as remarkable points to how rare the practice was. Moreover, in that situation there was no help to hand. It wasn't like Normandy, with units jammed in cheek to jowl.

I'm talking about how the scenario would work under TOAW. And if German units are designed to one standard, with lots of rear-area elements included, and Allied units are designed to another, with none - the Germans will be unrealistically strong.

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Second, even if it can be demonstrated that rear-area elements need to be represented for both sides, this ignores the question about whether the gains in fidelity offset the loss in fidelity due to the skewing of density factors.

Again, by designing to the same standard for both sides, the relative densities are correct. And, at least in Normandy, the absolute density is effectively adjusted by the adjustment to the Attrition Divider.

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Third, when rear-area elements are put in, they don't just fight in the 0-30% or whatever of engagements they did fight in -- they fight in all of them.

I think the rationales that I've listed for the way I did it are more important.

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You have two sides. On one side, rear area elements virtually never fought. On the other, they fought some unknowable percentage of the time. Let's be generous and say 60%.

The Germans sent about 500,000 men to Normandy. About 60,000 got out. The rest became casualties of one sort or other. Everybody fought.

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So for both forces in combination, the percentage of the times rear area elements fought comes to around 30% -- and I wouldn't be surprised if the number could be shown to be a third of that.

15th Army didn't fight too much in this campaign, either. By this line of reasoning, I should have omitted them. The rear-area elements were on the field of battle and eventually fought. They need to be included.

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ORIGINAL: ColinWright

It seems fairly obvious that simulation would be better served if the rear-echelon elements from neither side were included. Perhaps up the German rifle squad replacement rates.

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ORIGINAL: ColinWright

If by this you mean that in hot-seat matches with yourself, the forces wind up about where they did historically, that's not good enough.

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No...not really. If we assume Norm's density factors are correct, then where he (and probably the historical combatants) could jam in four regiments, if you try it, the density light will go off and you'll pay dearly for it. What one will get is a system where the historical density of troops simply cannot be put on the line -- assuming one doesn't want to get creamed, that is.

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Should we apply the same logic to the French campaign of 1940? By the end of the campaign, over two million Frenchmen were casualties 'of one sort or other.' Ergo, everybody fought. Fact of the matter is, rear echelon elements can surrender. They can even fight ineffectually. They'll become casualties of 'one sort or another.' It doesn't follow that they were fighting usefully in the majority of engagements their parent formations were engaged in.

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No...it would be nice if you could selectively include them. However, you can't. Therefore, you don't 'need to include them.' You need to decide which leads to a better simulation -- including them and having them fight in all battles (and drive up the density past what Norm intended), or not including them and have them not fight ever.

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I also note that you didn't address my query about why it is appropriate to include Allied rear-echelon elements when it is quite improbable that they would have fought under any circumstances likely to arise in your scenario.

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You asserted a while back that this had to be done because German rear-echelon elements were always fighting...

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... -- but this seems to be going at it the wrong way. Having included rear-echelon elements from one side because they sometimes fought, you find yourself including them from the other side even though they never fought.

It seems fairly obvious that simulation would be better served if the rear-echelon elements from neither side were included. Perhaps up the German rifle squad replacement rates.

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ORIGINAL: vahauser

Here is a summary of a German infantry division TOE from 1939-41. Based on numbers of LMGs, can you derive ballpark estimates of the number of combat squads (rifle, heavy rifle, engineer, assault, etc.) in the division?

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Of interest to me, the number of motorcycles does not seem to correspond to combat personnel. My estimate is that the vast majority of those motorcycles are being used (unarmed) as messengers, communications. My guess is that of the 450+ motorcycles in the division, perhaps only 120 or so (~12 squads) are actually armed combat machines.

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ORIGINAL: golden delicious



As the squads only have 12 MGs each (...)