Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: m10bob

Naval Fire Control Systems WW2..(The size of the gun is not always better).


http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-052.htm



Japanese Naval ordnance


http://www.combinedfleet.com/guns.htm

quote:

Naval Fire Control Systems WW2..(The size of the gun is not always better).

quote:

ORIGINAL: EUBanana

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin
BTW, 14" AP had a bursting charge of 22 lbs in the USN, while the 6" common projectile had a bursting charge of 7 lbs.

Well, I got it from navweaps.com. No idea how accurate that is!

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_14-45_mk7.htm

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_6-47_mk16.htm

It says 48lbs (22kg) for the 14", so maybe it's a measurements thing.

I had some fun working out kinetic energy for the shells too () as I presume unless the shell comes out the other side most of that gets turned into damage as well. But finding out how many joules per mole an explosion of ammonium picrate creates to see if the kinetic energy is actually relevant is apparently beyond Google.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rapunzel
Well Japanese Surface TFs running amok too. Only lack of ammo stopped the carnage.

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin
If both sides realise that one side is getting the worse of it (clearly higher percentage casualties), the losing side can be expected to disengage.

quote:

ORIGINAL: EUBanana

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rapunzel
Well Japanese Surface TFs running amok too. Only lack of ammo stopped the carnage.

Ouch.

Though at least Saratoga lived. Her escorts got massacred to let her get away!

quote:

ORIGINAL: EUBanana

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin
If both sides realise that one side is getting the worse of it (clearly higher percentage casualties), the losing side can be expected to disengage.

I don't doubt that when a convoy escorted by some DDs sees a battleship coming their way, 'Oh s***' is on their mind and they will attempt to disengage.

But they key word there is attempt.

That said, Convoy HX84, attacked by a heavy cruiser, lost 6 AKs and 1 AMC out of 38 merchants. 38 merchants is a frickin' huge convoy by AE standards, but I do wonder what would happen if you sent in CL Boise against 38 merchants and an AMC.

I'm tempted to try it out tonight.

quote:

ORIGINAL: EUBanana

[
That said, Convoy HX84, attacked by a heavy cruiser, lost 6 AKs and 1 AMC out of 38 merchants. 38 merchants is a frickin' huge convoy by AE standards, but I do wonder what would happen if you sent in CL Boise against 38 merchants and an AMC.

I'm tempted to try it out tonight.

quote:

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Day Time Surface Combat, near Tawi Tawi at 71,92, Range 16,000 Yards

Japanese Ships
CL Natori, Shell hits 10, heavy fires
DD Satsuki, Shell hits 1
DD Minazuki
DD Fumizuki
DD Nagatsuki
DD Harukaze
DD Hatakaze, Shell hits 2, heavy fires

Allied Ships
CL Boise, Shell hits 7



Maximum visibility in Clear Conditions: 30,000 yards
Range closes to 16,000 yards...
CONTACT: Allied lookouts spot Japanese task force at 16,000 yards
Allies open fire on surprised Japanese ships at 16,000 yards
CL Boise fires at DD Harukaze at 16,000 yards
CL Boise fires at DD Satsuki at 16,000 yards
Range closes to 9,000 yards
CL Natori engages CL Boise at 9,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Hatakaze at 9,000 yards
Range closes to 5,000 yards
CL Natori engages CL Boise at 5,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Hatakaze at 5,000 yards
DD Nagatsuki engages CL Boise at 5,000 yards
DD Minazuki engages CL Boise at 5,000 yards
Range increases to 6,000 yards
CL Boise engages CL Natori at 6,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Nagatsuki at 6,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Minazuki at 6,000 yards
Range increases to 9,000 yards
CL Natori engages CL Boise at 9,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Fumizuki at 9,000 yards
Range increases to 13,000 yards
CL Boise engages CL Natori at 13,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Harukaze at 13,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Nagatsuki at 13,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Satsuki at 13,000 yards
Range increases to 15,000 yards
CL Natori engages CL Boise at 15,000 yards
Range increases to 17,000 yards
CL Natori engages CL Boise at 17,000 yards
Range increases to 19,000 yards
CL Natori engages CL Boise at 19,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Hatakaze at 19,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Harukaze at 19,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Nagatsuki at 19,000 yards
CL Natori engages CL Boise at 19,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Harukaze at 19,000 yards
CL Boise engages CL Natori at 19,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Harukaze at 19,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Satsuki at 19,000 yards
Moran, E. orders Allied TF to disengage
Range closes to 16,000 yards
CL Boise engages CL Natori at 16,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Minazuki at 16,000 yards
Range increases to 17,000 yards
CL Boise engages CL Natori at 17,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Minazuki at 17,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Satsuki at 17,000 yards
Range increases to 20,000 yards
CL Natori engages CL Boise at 20,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Hatakaze at 20,000 yards
Range increases to 23,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Hatakaze at 23,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Satsuki at 23,000 yards
Range increases to 25,000 yards
CL Boise engages CL Natori at 25,000 yards
CL Boise engages DD Harukaze at 25,000 yards
Task forces break off...

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ORIGINAL: RHoenig
At first I was a bit miffed, I mean, I have a CL and 6 DDs vs. a sinle CL and the Boise scores twice as many hits as my whole TF.

quote:

ORIGINAL: RHoenig

Well, not a huge convoy, but I met Boise when I tried to intercept

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ORIGINAL: herwin
*snip*

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ORIGINAL: EUBanana

As for accuracy, at night, at close range, against high speed targets, yeah, I can see the BB not covering itself with glory.  (Though the High Seas Fleet ripped lots of flotillas of destroyers at night to pieces in WW1, so we can assume that would be a minimum ability given a WW2 battleship should certainly not be less effective than a WW1 one).   

But in my experience BBs can't even hit cargo ships at their optimal range of 15-20k yards in daylight - surely the ideal target, where weight of broadside will matter the most, unmitigated by allegedly poor accuracy of big guns.

quote:

AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR Dec 13, 41
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Night Time Surface Combat, near Hong Kong at 76,68, Range 1,000 Yards

Japanese Ships
BB Ise
BB Hyuga, Shell hits 4, Torpedo hits 3, on fire, heavy damage (my comment: it sank from this damage later in turn)
DD Yakaze, Shell hits 1
DD Kuretake, Shell hits 2

Allied Ships
DD Scout
DD Thracian
xAK Bennevis, Shell hits 3, and is sunk
xAK Hanyang, Shell hits 2, heavy fires, heavy damage
xAK Hinsang
xAK Ming Sang, Shell hits 1
xAK Nanning, Shell hits 1
xAK Haraldsvang, Shell hits 1, and is sunk
xAK Hai Lee



Reduced sighting due to 28% moonlight
Maximum visibility in Clear Conditions and 28% moonlight: 7,000 yards
Range closes to 4,000 yards...
Range closes to 1,000 yards...
BB Hyuga engages DD Thracian at 1,000 yards
BB Hyuga engages DD Scout at 1,000 yards
DD Kuretake engages DD Scout at 1,000 yards
DD Yakaze engages DD Thracian at 1,000 yards
DD Kuretake engages xAK Hanyang at 1,000 yards
Range increases to 2,000 yards
DD Yakaze engages DD Thracian at 2,000 yards
BB Hyuga engages DD Scout at 2,000 yards
DD Scout engages DD Kuretake at 2,000 yards
BB Hyuga engages xAK Bennevis at 2,000 yards
Range increases to 5,000 yards
BB Hyuga engages DD Thracian at 5,000 yards
BB Ise engages DD Scout at 5,000 yards
xAK Haraldsvang sunk by BB Ise at 5,000 yards
BB Hyuga engages xAK Hanyang at 5,000 yards
xAK Bennevis sunk by BB Ise at 5,000 yards
Range increases to 8,000 yards
BB Hyuga engages DD Thracian at 8,000 yards
DD Scout engages DD Yakaze at 8,000 yards
DD Scout engages DD Kuretake at 8,000 yards
BB Hyuga engages xAK Ming Sang at 8,000 yards
Range increases to 11,000 yards
DD Yakaze engages DD Thracian at 11,000 yards
DD Yakaze engages DD Scout at 11,000 yards
DD Scout engages DD Kuretake at 11,000 yards
BB Ise engages xAK Nanning at 11,000 yards
BB Hyuga engages xAK Hinsang at 11,000 yards
Task forces break off...

quote:

ORIGINAL: Sheytan

The discussion of rates of fire, and fire "weight" is interesting. It dosnt address the dynamics of a engagement. Many factors contributed to the end result. NOTE IN THIS AAR THE IMPACT OF RADAR, which has been much critisized in AE as giving the Allied player too much of a advantage. What EA and WITP actually FAILS to model is this effectiveness, less so in AE, which frankly I think could be solved by giving a qualifier to the year of employment, or a skill check, vs vie crew skill.

FURTHER AE AND WITP FAILS to model the sheer rate of fire a BB possessed, it expends it main gun battery too casually and frankly is much too shallow in WITP AND AE to model these capital ships. "except in the famed and amusing NUCLEAR bombardments notable for WITP".

This AAR illistrates NOT only the CC confusion of the application of radar but its utter distruction when employed ideally.

Battleship Night Action
Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
November 1942

In this decisive action WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKOTA engaged a Japanese force termed around the battleship KIRISHIMA. SOUTH DAKOTA suffered extensive topside damage, but WASHINGTON's accurate fire mortally injured KIRISHIMA. Set aflame and racked by explosions, KIRISHIMA was scuttled by her crew. The last major Japanese naval thrust at Guadalcanal had been turned back, and WASHINGTON had done what she had been designed to do -- sink one of her own kind in a gunnery action. WASHINGTON was the only American fast battleship to defeat another capital ship.


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VIEW MAP OF BATTLE


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WASHINGTON ACTION REPORT
SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING EVENTS AND GENERAL COMMENT

On the night of November 14-15 WASHINGTON was flagship of Commander Task Force 64 (ComBatDiv 6). In column, with four destroyers ahead and SOUTH DAKOTA astern, she stood north between Russell and Guadalcanal, then east and southeast, passing north of Savo. Standing west from this point, first radar contact was made at 0001 with enemy ships east of Savo. From 0016 to 0019 fired 42 rounds 16", opening at 18,500 yards, at large cruiser or battleship which it is believed was sunk. From 0016 to 0017 fired 100 rounds 5" at ranges 12 to 13,000 yards at enemy cruiser or large destroyer which was also engaged by SOUTH DAKOTA and was left burning. Standing on north-westerly courses fired 133 rounds 5" from 0025 to 0034 at ranges about 10,000 yards at light craft close to south-east shore of Savo which were engaging our destroyers; all were silenced and one was left burning. From 0100 to 0107 fired 75 rounds 16'' and 107 rounds 5" at ranges from 8,400 to 12,650 yards, at battleship northwest of Savo which was firing at SOUTH DAKOTA. This battleship was silenced and was subsequently tracked by radar through a 500-degree turn. From 0100 to 0107, fired 120 rounds 5", at ranges from 7,400 to 9,500 yards, in succession at three enemy cruisers illuminating and engaging SOUTH DAKOTA.

By the time our 5" fire on light craft close to southeast shore of Savo had ceased, one of our destroyers was sunk, one was hopelessly afire (she exploded and sank a few minutes later) and the other two were put out of action (they retired southward). Subsequently, and before we opened fire on ships northwest of Savo, the SOUTH DAKOTA was seen to the eastward between this ship and Savo on a course to northward of WASHINGTON course. What appeared to be the SOUTH DAKOTA was seen at about 0121 at a considerable distance to the southeastward between this ship and Guadalcanal on a southerly course.

From radar tracking and visual observation of enemy ships, there were:

(1) Fired upon by this ship and apparently sunk:

•1 large cruiser or BB (WASHINGTON only.)
•2 large cruisers (WASH 5".)
•1 destroyer (our DD's plus WASH 5".)
(2) Fired upon by this ship and apparently damaged:

•1 14" BB silenced and out of control (WASH. only.)
•1 DD burning (WASH. 5".)
•5-9 light craft silenced (our DD's plus WASH. 5" plus S.D.)
•There was no melee. This ship was undamaged.

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COMMENT

The following comments are submitted:

•Our radar is effective for accurate gunfire at long ranges at night. Japanese radar aboard ships present, if any, is not effective for surface targets.
•Japanese are sufficiently familiar with radar and aware of our use of it to make full use of land cover both between them and ourselves and closely backing them up.
•Our optical vision is superior to Japanese.
•Our fire control and the effectiveness of our projectiles meet or exceed our expectations.
Accordingly,

•We should seek rather than avoid night action, opening at ranges as great as satisfactory solutions can be obtained.

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[...]
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LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Radar has forced the Captain or OTIC to base a greater part of his actions in a night engagement on what he is told, rather than what he can see. This ship was not hit but examination of SOUTH DAKOTA revealed completeness with which bridge structure may be riddled by shells and splinters which penetrate 1" ST S bulkheads. The enemy may be counted upon to hit foremast superstructure.

The captain and navigator should be in Conn. An experienced officer, other than the navigator, should be FOOD and should filter for the Captain the tremendously numerous reports received at the conning station over the various telephone circuits.


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ComBatIve 6 ACTION REPORT

This action demonstrated the tremendous value of radar in a night action. Battleships obtained excellent fire control results using radar range and radar spots, combined with optical instruments.

Strong signals from enemy ships permitted quick and accurate solution and spots.

First phase opening ranges 16,000 - 18,000 yards, illumination by setting moon. Hit with second Salvo. Second phase opening range 6,000 - 9,000 yards; illumination by star shells, did not add to accuracy of fire.

No indication that enemy used radar. Enemy apparently ranged on gun flashes, but inaccurately. SOUTH DAKOTA hit after enemy searchlight illuminated her.

Own gunfire superior to Japs, particularly as range increased.

SG radar invaluable in locating surface targets and coaching fire control radar's on.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Samuel Eliot Morison,

HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II, Volume V

The battleship action of November 14-15 was vastly better fought by the United States Navy than the unorganized brawl of two nights earlier. Admiral Lee had a positive doctrine that he maintained, despite the absence of his entire destroyer screen. An able and original scientist as well as a flag officer, he appreciated the value of radar, used it to keep himself informed of enemy movements and tactics, and made quick, accurate analyses from the information on the screens. Yet some mistakes of earlier night battles were repeated. Lee's task force was a scratch team, destroyer and battleships captains alike being unfamiliar with each other and with their commander. Apparently the recurring urgencies in the South Pacific imposed a haphazard composition for every task force thrown together to meet the enemy. Again, and not for the last time, the Japanese taught the American a lesson in the use of torpedoes. SOUTH DAKOTA was lucky to escape alive. WASHINGTON, conned by Captain Glenn Davis and directed by Admiral Lee with a skill and imperturbability worthy of her eponym, saved the day for the United States.

quote:

It doesn't matter if a Brooklyn or Cleveland could only generate 8-10 rpm per tube, it was still able to mess up more waterline area of a DD per minute than a BB, especially given that the BB couldn't track the DD at close range with its main battery and so had to rely on its secondaries.

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In gaming terms: both commanders begin by deciding whether the battle is worth fighting and then assess the balance of forces continuously. Every few percentage own casualties, they reassess the situation using both the current force ratio and the relative casualty rates. If the battle is no longer worth fighting, they break off; otherwise they continue. Fog of war plays a role in this, producing an unexpected victory for the losing side about 10% of the time.

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ORIGINAL: EUBanana

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin
*snip*

That sounds rather like... stating the obvious.

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ORIGINAL: herwin

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ORIGINAL: EUBanana

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin
*snip*

That sounds rather like... stating the obvious.

Almost every wargame (commercial or professional) uses a breakpoint model. Helmbold demonstrated they were all seriously wrong. Unfortunately, nobody has been able to come up with an alternative. I mentioned earlier something about poker. I did a game-theoretic analysis of the situation and discovered the best strategy evolved chaotically--forever. Thinking hard about the problem made me feel like I was schizoid-a bit like your typical spy-catcher gets to be.

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It sounds like the disengagement algorithm would be quite complex, an AI project in itself.

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ORIGINAL: herwin

Almost every wargame (commercial or professional) uses a breakpoint model. Helmbold demonstrated they were all seriously wrong. Unfortunately, nobody has been able to come up with an alternative. I mentioned earlier something about poker. I did a game-theoretic analysis of the situation and discovered the best strategy evolved chaotically--forever. Thinking hard about the problem made me feel like I was schizoid-a bit like your typical spy-catcher gets to be.