Matrix Games Forums

 Forums  Register  Login  Photo Gallery  Member List  Search  Calendars  FAQ 

My Profile  Inbox  Address Book  My Subscription  My Forums  Log Out

Not sure I like this aspect....

 
View related threads: (in this forum | in all forums)

Logged in as: Guest
Users viewing this topic: none
  Printable Version
All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> Uncommon Valor - Campaign for the South Pacific >> Not sure I like this aspect.... Page: [1]
Login
Message << Older Topic   Newer Topic >>
Not sure I like this aspect.... - 6/7/2002 11:33:15 AM   
Ron Saueracker


Posts: 12121
Joined: 1/28/2002
From: Ottawa, Canada OR Zakynthos Island, Greece
Status: offline 		Someone posted this before but, wow, ever annoying. Jap ships travelling faster than airplanes and blasting the crap outa PM before even seeing them. Three times now it's happened! Can't be right.

Also. Can't seem to get my aircraft to attack Jap barges, no matter what height they are given or what level of Nav Search etc.. Any suggestions oh learned ones?:)

Sure could use more detail in sighting reports. Direction and speed would be a start, but might not be necessary given the situation in the first paragraph.:(

Been playing all day, literally. Man this here baby is addictive and fascinating. Hurray for UV (Uncommon Value might be a good nick)!:D

_____________________________





Yammas from The Apo-Tiki Lounge. Future site of WITP AE benders! And then the s--t hit the fan
Post #: 1
Re: Not sure I like this aspect.... - 6/7/2002 12:21:02 PM   
von Murrin


Posts: 1760
Joined: 11/13/2001
From: That from which there is no escape.
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by Ron Saueracker
[B]Someone posted this before but, wow, ever annoying. Jap ships travelling faster than airplanes and blasting the crap outa PM before even seeing them. Three times now it's happened! Can't be right.[/B][/QUOTE]

The only ships that can do that are the fast IJN BB's and any CA's. Either way, you can deploy a surface TF in PM and a CV TF just below Gili. If you do that, the damage caused in the surface action will leave them vulnerable to the CV's. In all my (limited? ;))experience, the Japs never try this more than twice if you pound them in such a manner.

[QUOTE]Also. Can't seem to get my aircraft to attack Jap barges, no matter what height they are given or what level of Nav Search etc.. Any suggestions oh learned ones?:) [/QUOTE]

Fighter-bombers on naval attack will kill them quite nicely. Subs work too, but the surest way is PT's.

[QUOTE]Sure could use more detail in sighting reports. Direction and speed would be a start, but might not be necessary given the situation in the first paragraph.:([/QUOTE]

Agreed. I can still remember the first time I savaged a TF, and found out that they went the other way during the night. Not entirely ahistorical, but even a useless course and speed report would make me feel better. :)

[QUOTE]Been playing all day, literally. Man this here baby is addictive and fascinating. Hurray for UV (Uncommon Value might be a good nick)!:D [/QUOTE]

LOL
Just responding here so that I can say this:

Ooo, look! I did a detailed posting! :p :D

_____________________________

I give approximately two fifths of a !#$% at any given time!

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 2
Re: Re: Not sure I like this aspect.... - 6/7/2002 3:00:38 PM   
Reg


Posts: 2787
Joined: 5/26/2000
From: NSW, Australia
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by Ron Saueracker
Someone posted this before but, wow, ever annoying. Jap ships travelling faster than airplanes and blasting the crap outa PM before even seeing them. Three times now it's happened! Can't be right.
[/QUOTE]

[QUOTE]Originally posted by von Murrin
[B]

The only ships that can do that are the fast IJN BB's and any CA's. .....
[/B][/QUOTE]

This is a consequence of the scale of the game turns. Many hours can elapse between the ship spotting and the organisation of a aerial strike (it's impossible to maintain squadrons at the alert levels achieved by a carrier airgroup in the midst of a naval engagement). During this time the targets can steam quite a distance, possibly out of (or into) the range of the strike aircraft if they are fast enough.

Did you know that the Japanese cruisers were spotted by a Hudson on the way toward what was to become the Battle of Savo Island*. The result of this engagement could have been very different (maybe) but the Hudson belonged to SWPAC. Because Operation Watchtower (a SOPAC operation) was so secret, they had no idea that Allied ships were in the area so the sighting report did not receive the priority it could have as nobody realised the significance of the spotting. The advantages of 20/20 hindsight!!!

The real world problems of the decision cycle (gather information, analyse, act) appear to be well simulated by this game.

Cheers,
Reg.


* The Shame of Savo, Bruce Loxton, 1994.
ISBN 1 86373 650 6.

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 3
Reg - 6/7/2002 4:18:18 PM   
Ron Saueracker


Posts: 12121
Joined: 1/28/2002
From: Ottawa, Canada OR Zakynthos Island, Greece
Status: offline 		I read somewhere that on top of all the desk jockey screw ups with this report, the Hudson crew went and had a leisurely "cuppa" tea before filing their report!:)

Seems that the scale must cause this and the way the phases mesh, perhaps. Was quite the shock initially. What was even worse was PM mission were cancelled while IJN TF was in the same hex.:eek:

_____________________________





Yammas from The Apo-Tiki Lounge. Future site of WITP AE benders! And then the s--t hit the fan

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 4
- 6/7/2002 4:20:11 PM   
corbulo

 

Posts: 213
Joined: 2/28/2002
From: rigel 5
Status: offline 		I am having the same trouble getting a naval attack on bombardment TF right next door! I set all level bombers on naval attack alt 1000. What should naval search setting be in this instance, or does it matter? I set it to 0, because I thought, if they cant find enemy ships in the same hex, they are out of it.

_____________________________

virtute omne regatur

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 5
Re: Re: Not sure I like this aspect.... - 6/7/2002 7:08:47 PM   
Didz


Posts: 728
Joined: 10/2/2001
From: UK
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by von Murrin
[B]

The only ships that can do that are the fast IJN BB's and any CA's. Either way, you can deploy a surface TF in PM and a CV TF just below Gili. If you do that, the damage caused in the surface action will leave them vulnerable to the CV's. In all my (limited? ;))experience, the Japs never try this more than twice if you pound them in such a manner.

[/B][/QUOTE]

I think I am the annoying that person that first raised this issue in my thread 'Bombardment TF's not only cloaked but warp drives too'

The bottom line (eventually: admitted by the game designers) is that this is an exploitation of a feature in the turn phasing combined with the turn length/ground scale issue and the fact that surface/air detection is only tested at final destination.

The net result is that a TF can use its entire 12 hour night movement to close undetected with an enemy base and then because Surface Movement takes place before Air Attacks it can use the entire of its next daylight move to escape back out of air range again. Therefore a BB capable of 30 knots can leap a massive 824 miles (27 hexes) without risk of detection by enemy aircraft enroute.

So! any TF can pass directly through opposing surface forces and air umbrella's without risk of being detected providing it has a fast enough cruising speed and none of its end phase destination hexs are occupied by an enemy TF or lie within a air umbella.

This option is not limited to BB, CA and DD class vessels nor is it limited to TF's on Bombardment Missions. In fact any TF can do this its just that it becomes more noticeable with Bombardment Missions in which BB and CA vessels predominate.

My main objection to this feature is that it would be physically impossible to achieve historically (even with Fast BB's) and after some lengthy debate I think this point has finally been accepted.

This is probably the biggest issue I have with UV and unfortunately there is no easy solution.

Reducing the length of the game turn would put a stop to it simply because the TF's would not be able to cover enough distance between Air Attack Phases to get out of range.

Alternatively, testing for detection every time a TF crossed a hexside and allowing mid-phase interdiction would also work.

But both of these solutions would mean a major rework of the game engine and I don't see it happening. Therefore, I think we will be forced to live with this problem and no doubt veteran players will soon learn to exploit it in Email games.

My main hope is that the problem is not duplicated in WiTP.

_____________________________

Didz
Fortis balore et armis

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 6
Didz - 6/7/2002 8:05:40 PM   
Ron Saueracker


Posts: 12121
Joined: 1/28/2002
From: Ottawa, Canada OR Zakynthos Island, Greece
Status: offline 		I was not referring to you as annoying:)....just the anomaly. Perhaps an extra search and combat cycle could be included easily(? ;) )

_____________________________





Yammas from The Apo-Tiki Lounge. Future site of WITP AE benders! And then the s--t hit the fan

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 7
- 6/7/2002 8:23:05 PM   
Wilhammer

 

Posts: 449
Joined: 5/24/2002
From: Out in the Sticks of Rockingham County, North Caro
Status: offline 		The perfect solution would have to have been done at game conception, Si-Move.

If you play CM or the World at War series, you know what I mean.

In real life, planes move and ships move at the same time. No surface phases or air phases exist.

I think it is a very good suggestion if the turn were to be at least broken down to something like 4 or 6 hour execution phases.

I would still like to make the point that this is a great game.

However, the lack of most everything happening in betwen the start and end points of movement do provide weakness and exploitation of the game system.

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 8
Simultaneous Movement - 6/7/2002 8:34:52 PM   
Ron Saueracker


Posts: 12121
Joined: 1/28/2002
From: Ottawa, Canada OR Zakynthos Island, Greece
Status: offline 		UV. Yup, great game Willhammer.:) But wouldn't Si Move be a nightmare at the scale and breadth we all know WITP will be? It would take longer than the actual war I'd think...:eek:

_____________________________





Yammas from The Apo-Tiki Lounge. Future site of WITP AE benders! And then the s--t hit the fan

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 9
Re: Didz - 6/7/2002 8:36:35 PM   
Didz


Posts: 728
Joined: 10/2/2001
From: UK
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by Ron Saueracker
[B]I was not referring to you as annoying:)....just the anomaly. Perhaps an extra search and combat cycle could be included easily(? ;) ) [/B][/QUOTE]

Sorry! I'm getting used to being the odd-man out in these discussions as most people seem willing to ignore that fact the this would simply not be possible historically.

The consequences of this feature pop up all over the place not just in Bombardment missions as the turn length/ground scale/phase sequence/Detection combination has a negative impact on a lot of different area's. It certainly affects surface v surface combat as well as air v surface and ASW operations.

The situation is made even worse by the fact that in most cases you have to switch 'React to Enemy' off to avoid the AI making stupid moves.

I just hope the WiTP design team are reading these threads and taking notes.

_____________________________

Didz
Fortis balore et armis

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 10
Re: Simultaneous Movement - 6/7/2002 8:43:53 PM   
Didz


Posts: 728
Joined: 10/2/2001
From: UK
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by Ron Saueracker
[B]UV. Yup, great game Willhammer.:) But wouldn't Si Move be a nightmare at the scale and breadth we all know WITP will be? It would take longer than the actual war I'd think...:eek: [/B][/QUOTE]

Hmm! Yes this reason has been made elsewhere and not being a programmer I can't really comment other than to wonder how, if it so difficult, other games seem to achieve exactly that result without being dreadfully slow.

If it came to a choice between a game that works in terms of detection and combat and one that kept careful track of how many kills, missions, and decent nights sleep each of my personally named pilots had had since the start of the campaign. I would prefer to have the detection routines working.

_____________________________

Didz
Fortis balore et armis

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 11
- 6/7/2002 8:45:59 PM   
Wilhammer

 

Posts: 449
Joined: 5/24/2002
From: Out in the Sticks of Rockingham County, North Caro
Status: offline 		Perhaps Si-Move would be too much to ask for, but why not something like continous time like Airborne Assault?

In that system, time is broken up into minutes, and everything moves at once, and combat happens as folks encounter each other, and units fade in and out of spotted status.

It is like Si-Move, but it plays like Real Time. The player can decide when to pause a game or to give orders during play.

A naval operational level game could do something similar.

Break the execution of a turn into smaller chunks, and instead have a daily planning phase.

I advocate the 6 hour method. The reason is that it neatly devides the night in half. To plan a bombardment (or high speed transport run), in the real thing, the prime consideration was you had to be out of air range before you did your run, and out of it after the run. This almost always meant you had to be at the target at midnight.

I know it gets dark after 6 PM, but day time operators would be in a retirng for night mode, so one could expect reduced activity during the dusk (and dawn) hours.

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 12
- 6/7/2002 8:49:15 PM   
Dirtweasle

 

Posts: 22
Joined: 5/19/2002
From: Colorado
Status: offline 		It does change the way you think of things that is for sure. Where reasoning alone tells you ought to be able to do X, the mecahnics of the game make it impossible. Untill I realized this was the problem I could'nt believe my air crews were so ill trained!

The associated problem of surface engagements only possible at end of turn locations, (or also at port hexes durring a turn?) is another factor that is a problem for me to grasp. It just seems to me to be a very wrong thing.

This is particularly true if you are used to playing CM where there is a more natural, intuitive flow. I guess I am spoiled by CM where sightings and fire are calculated throughout the turn.

If you are not "spoiled" by that type of system, I suppose the way UV works in this repect would never bother you.

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 13
- 6/7/2002 8:57:42 PM   
Wilhammer

 

Posts: 449
Joined: 5/24/2002
From: Out in the Sticks of Rockingham County, North Caro
Status: offline 		The question was asked, "How to exploit it in PBEM?".

Theoretically, since both of the humans are aware of it, it can be watched for.

Taking a quick look at a map, a good way to try to exploit might be this:

Have a Bombardment TF in Shortland.

Orders, Do Not Retire, do not react to enemy.

Have this goup steam to a fixed point north west of Shortland, about 12 hexes north of Lunga during the day.

Reset to allow retirement. The TF jets in and should be back at Shortland before the next day cycle.

The only way to absolutely interfere with this is to keep a surface TF in the Lunga Hex.

Countermeasures:

Mines.

Subs in Lunga. A lucky torp hit might slow that TF down for the return and put it in air range.


In, out, and likely unscathed.

A similar thing can be done against PM, but you will need to provide at least long range cap as the fleet will wind up in the Solomon Sea and potentially in Carrier Range, and still in unescorted bomber range from PM.

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 14
- 6/7/2002 9:11:43 PM   
Wilhammer

 

Posts: 449
Joined: 5/24/2002
From: Out in the Sticks of Rockingham County, North Caro
Status: offline 		Also,

I have been exploring another way of using this against the AI, but since I am in my first PBEM game, I have not tried it against a person.

Surface Ship Commerce Raiding, "The Graf Spee Scenario".

The battle in NG is hot and heavy. The forces of the allied side are all committed to the fight.

No reserves in the rear.

The Japanese player (me) , taking those long ranged CAs and BBs, cruises on the far right hand side of the map, to the north of the Santa Cruz Islands.

The mission, setup a night time dash into Luganville.

I used two AVs to patrol ahead so they could use their spotters to detect surface targets. Being inconsequential targets themselves, and knowing the AI would not keep planes piled up this far to the west, I could be reasonably assured they would be unmoleseted.

They were.

They also helped guarantee that might BB/CA force would remain undetected by detecting first those forces that might spot it first.

So, I came in, undetected, encountered 4 minesweepers, which were smashed one after the other as they gamely intercepted my force, and then I encounter a very large convoy of APs and AKs, unloading.

I pulverized them.

I dashed out, and came back the next night to finish the job.

Thus, the future thrust on the Solomon Islands was pre-emptively aborted by the IJN.

The second strike might be suicide against a human, but one could expect the first one to be wildly succesful.

The everlasting effect would be to shorten the amount of time the Allies have to counter attack in the Solomons, and force the player to keep an anti0Naval air reserve off the front and far to the rear, weakening the front.

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 15
- 6/7/2002 9:51:53 PM   
elmo3

 

Posts: 5820
Joined: 1/22/2002
Status: offline 		Wilhammer

I don't see where you have exploited a flaw in the game system with this example. Rather you noted that your opponent had overcommitted in one area so you hit him where he was weakest. Great tactics only.

Your opponenet could have handed you your head, within the current game system, if you had overlooked a reserve force your AV's had failed to spot it. If an enemy combat TF had been in L'ville or even if one had been in the area with Patrol/React orders you could have been in for a tough surface fight and your cripples would have been subject to LBA attacks the next morning.

elmo3

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 16
- 6/7/2002 10:04:07 PM   
Wilhammer

 

Posts: 449
Joined: 5/24/2002
From: Out in the Sticks of Rockingham County, North Caro
Status: offline 		That is the discussion I wanted to happen.

Is it in fact an exploitation?

It was certainly easier to pull off, I can tell you that.

I could only guess that Louganville had no A/C, so knowing that the game only cared about my end points, I was aware that any threat against my ships, no matter what was based there, was not a concern, as I would arrive in the dark, and be out of most bomber's effective range in the day.

PBYs and B-17s do not frighten the Surface TF commander.

The AVs, being much slower, and being aware they could not see things all the time, were in the region scouting the port and surrounding areas for a couple of days before I was ready for the dash.

The big CAs carry their own search planes, so that helped as well.

Granted, if an enemy TF was there that I thought contained anything larger than a DD, I would switched to another plan.

An enemy surface TF of sufficient size does prevent this manuever.

My only concern was enemy TFs, not the planes, if any had been there.

BTW, I also used the AV's scouts as recon to take pictures of the AB, and the AVs functioned as bait. They did get attacked by some P-400s, but the damage was light. Against my Bombardment TF, P-400s are just targets.

BTW, one can think of the ge0-military relationship of Louganville to Noumea to be much like that of Lunga/Tulagi to Rabaul.

That perception is worth exploring as a strategy.

Given tankers and a good facility at Shortland, and a minr one at Tulagi, one could stage a daring offensive on Louganville and make IT the PM of the game. The goal woudl be to sieze or Neutralize Noumea as much as possible.

I don't know [YET] how effective this might be, but Louganville could be a key to a dangerous strategy, for the loss of Noumea or its isolation could cripple the Allied war effort.

And imagine the LBs of Rabaul flying out of Louganville...

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 17
- 6/7/2002 10:17:41 PM   
Von Rom


Posts: 1705
Joined: 5/12/2000
Status: offline 		Why not allow for "Opportunity Attacks"? This would be similar to SPWAW: If a ship, TF, or air group comes within range of an enemy TF (such as carriers with aircraft set to naval interdiction), then an engagement would take place interrupting movement during that turn cycle. Combat would be resolved, then those ships would keep moving (if they can).

Would a feature like this be that difficult to implement? This type of system seems far more realistic, then allowing an enemy TF to steam unmolested under the noses of nearby friendly forces. . .

Just a few thoughts. . .

_____________________________


(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 18
- 6/7/2002 10:40:06 PM   
Snigbert

 

Posts: 2956
Joined: 1/27/2002
From: Worcester, MA. USA
Status: offline 		I recall in the book 'Guadalcanal, a Definitive History' there was more than one sighting of the Japanese task force on its way to Savo Island...or it could have been the Hudson. I know planes from SWPAC spotted them but it was not communicated to the correct people.
The part of this incident I found humorous, was one of the planes that spotted the Japanese task force identified them as '2 Southampton Class Cruisers'. I guess nobody told them that there werent any British ships in the area, but it gives you an idea of how tough identifying ships from the air must have been.

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 19
- 6/8/2002 12:01:24 AM   
Didz


Posts: 728
Joined: 10/2/2001
From: UK
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by Wilhammer
[B]
I advocate the 6 hour method. The reason is that it neatly devides the night in half. To plan a bombardment (or high speed transport run), in the real thing, the prime consideration was you had to be out of air range before you did your run, and out of it after the run. This almost always meant you had to be at the target at midnight.

I know it gets dark after 6 PM, but day time operators would be in a retirng for night mode, so one could expect reduced activity during the dusk (and dawn) hours. [/B][/QUOTE]

I also favoured the 6 hour turn solution for the same reason but the poll which was taken showed that 70% of players were happy to keep the one day turn despite the problems it creates.

This doesn't quite satisfy the 80:20 rule but is probably near enough that the design team will feel justified in ignoring it. The amount of work required introduce a shorter turn option might not be considered necessary to satisfy 30% of the user base.

_____________________________

Didz
Fortis balore et armis

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 20
best method of repairing the problem - 6/8/2002 2:04:56 AM   
bradfordkay

 

Posts: 8683
Joined: 3/24/2002
From: Olympia, WA
Status: offline 		I don't know if the game code could handle this alteration, but it seems to me that since the game is already breaking each turn into phases (night, morning air phase and afternoon air phase) then the naval movement should also be handled in the same manner. Rather than having the ships move their full movement rate before the first morning search phase perhaps they should only move one half of the distance during the night phase, and then finishing their movement after the morning air phase. This could posibly leave them within range of attacking bombers during the first daylight air phase, but not the second (unless damage is received during that morning attack).

I think that this would not change the flavor of the game and would be a more realistic portrayal of the action.

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 21
- 6/8/2002 2:24:36 AM   
Mark W Carver

 

Posts: 83
Joined: 4/26/2002
From: South-central PA
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by Wilhammer
That is the discussion I wanted to happen. Is it in fact an exploitation? It was certainly easier to pull off, I can tell you that.[/QUOTE]

I'm curious as to what was the time frame you were capable to pull this off?
Trying this against a competent human American player might not reach the same success against the A/I as elmo3 has stated.

[QUOTE]I could only guess that Luganville had no A/C, so knowing that the game only cared about my end points, I was aware that any threat against my ships, no matter what was based there, was not a concern, as I would arrive in the dark, and be out of most bomber's effective range in the day.[/QUOTE]

In my game against the A/I. I'm in scenario #17, it's 15 Jul '42, and I'm doing my own 'Washington Express' against the A/I at Lunga with CA's and DD's. I have two TF's stationed at Lunganville. I'm schuffling CA's and DD's out of my 'Express' to minimize system damage on the CA's and DD's. Thus, there is always a TF of CA's and DD's stationed in Luganville while the other is bombarding Lunga. Air coverage, well there is an AV with PBY's at Vana (provides great eye-in-the-sky for me, almost to Nggatokae Island in the middle of The Slot. And then there are the American A-20's, British Beauforts and Hudsons stationed in Luganville and yep all of the B-17's which are bombing Lunga at 35,000 in the stone age. No rest for the Japs in Lunga. Lunganville is a level 2 port and the airfield is at a level 7 (1 past it's level 6 max!). All available engineers were flown in and transported in asap to Lunganville.

New Guinea is well secured with the 3rd Aus and the New Guinea Force as well as Gili Gili with the 7th Aus stationed there when they re-took it from the Japs in the middle of June '42. Two carrier TF's (with 5 total CV's) are on station in Noumea as I await the arrival of the 1st Marines and my build-up of supplies and fuel to Lunganville.

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 22
- 6/8/2002 4:00:03 AM   
Wilhammer

 

Posts: 449
Joined: 5/24/2002
From: Out in the Sticks of Rockingham County, North Caro
Status: offline 		I guess this boils down to the oldest argument in wargaming;

The Grog Debates.

I play in a style based on historical knowledge and many, many nights of playing naval campaigns in the Pacific where we did everything in "real time", we broke time up, moved planes and ships in 30 minute phases on maps covered in plastic using grease pencils, matched the overlays, used a judge to track potential intercepts, and then fought detailed engagemnts in one minute turns on a beautiful 16 ft X 16 ft blue table.
Of course, I was a teenager to young man, and had about 6 guys I could always count on to play, and a retired Naval CPO who introduced it to us and indoctrinated historical accuracy and "groginess" in us.

I was a bit mystified in that historical tactics did not quite work in UV.

Why did the Tokyo Raid get launched early?

Hmmm, a gamey carrier Rush on a Japanese port was potentially spotted by a fishing trawler picket. This cannot happen in UV, unless the time is Midnight, 6AM or 6PM (one night search phase, and 2 daytime search phases).

Get past the surface ship argument.

Carriers are passing each other at high speed and not intercepting each other. React to enemy mitigates that some, but Japanes Admirals don't seem to no that their airplanes have far greater ranges than American ones. They dash in too close, and the Americans dash in closer, and the lowly Devestator is a giant killer.

Make it Ignore Enemy, and they zoom past each other.

What SHOULD happen?

The search planes from my carrier should always be looking, and once something is communicated to the fleet, a moment of decision has been reached, and then time should stop, and see who spots who when, and then the airstrike planning takes place.

Too tactical for you in an Operational Level game?

In an Operational Level WW2 Pacific Warfare game, an Aircraft Carrier is every bit as important as an entire sector of a frontline in an operational level game on land in Europe.

It would be like losing Bastogne in a Bulge game, and you get into the details of waging the battle around that in PzC Bulge '44.

It is not that many units we are talking about.

A potential intercept routine need only compare hexes traveled to rate of speed by overlaying all paths and comparing crossed areas to determine if they could of been in the same place at the same time. I use to do this with a Master Plot Comaprison Map, two opposing Plot Maps, platis overlays and grease pencils.

If a potential intercept is determined, the game then does a random check to see if one does take place, then the time stops at that point and executes that action. The units involved suffer Operational Point Loss, the turn proceeds.

This "overlay over overlay" check is done once at the beginning of each phase, and the game stops at each battle that got generated, thus no need to process in real time.

A turn based game with opportunity "fire".

What of "following the sounds of battle"?

That is React To Enemy Plus.

================================

Going on vacation now, be back next week.

Hope the patch is out when I get back, I still enjoy this game a bunch. I just would like to see it get better.

They seem to have so much detail in the units (down to commander and pilot level!), detailed units, but the crucial component of time and spotting is out of skew in its abstraction.

When you get right down too it, though both sides planned naval actions, the actual point of encounter was a meeting engagement.

As it is now, it feels a lot like seige warfare at times, circa 1756.

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 23
- 6/8/2002 5:45:06 AM   
Paul Vebber


Posts: 11430
Joined: 3/29/2000
From: Portsmouth RI
Status: offline 		THe problem I se in most of the arguments - things "well in CM you don't have problems with..." is a "lowest tactical denominator" being looked to that is not workable in an operational level game.

This game has no business being comparable to CM, a game of individual tank and squad combat !!! IF it were i would call it a failure!

Do you really want to play the Pacific war with Carriers at War, resolving the location of thousands of units at 5 min intervals?

I certainly can see the point of wanting to "play out" the key battles in a 'tactical' fashio, but i think a lot of folks are taking GAME experience with TACTICAL naval games and wanting the same level of detail in a game that spans years and not days.

The assumption that your god's eye view is shared by all your subrdinates, that the reports you see on the map are exactly accurate are not necessarily valid!

operational games tend to get "tacticalized" and that leads to discussions why certain tactics succed or fail - something that is beyond the scope of operational level games!.

I don;t think people realize how much the game would drag if you tried to run the thing in "continuous time". All the caluculations to resolve all the little details of the spotting situation would have to be done every "x" minutes and the game would take FOREVER to play.

And what would the result be. IT could be VERY AHISTORICAL if all the details of teh tactical situation were not modeled exactly right .

That is why operational games employ abstraction. I can create a computer program that models the intricate workings of a precision time piece the friction of the jewels, the relaxing of the spring. IT can model perfectly the little variations over time. Or I can query the system clock.

If I want to know what time it is, all the effort to model the clock is wasted efort. If I know on average such watches lose 3 secs per month I can account for that and even through in a random sec here or there. Will you know which I use based on me telling you what time it is?

This is a CONSTANT problem of "real" wargaming too, "buy-in to the abstraction layer" is always painful and never universal, but required at the operational level.

You CAN'T just assume the battlefield is a Newtonian Machine and by turning the crank and watching everythin move exactly as ordered with no mistakes or confusion produces anything more realistic than a well considered set of abstractions that produce "good enough" results. ITs nearly always teh other way around. That is why so many think baordgames more "elegant" for their abstraction than a brute force computer calculation that always leaves out "just one more crucial variable.."

"continuous time" tracking of ships on a hexless ocean is only "more realisitc" if the navigationa and reproting limitations are strictly represented, and the modeling of those human failings is notoriosly difficult and can be approximated by methods not all that far removed from the techniques the game uses. (Queueing theory being one). These techniques don't model the PHYSICS of situations, but realtionships between the interactions that can occur. IN many cases the special dimensions don't have the sort of impact one would expect, when one includes realistic errors.

So those of you offended by seeming "holes in the phyics" you have good company with senior military officers in multi-million dollar service wargames. SOmetimes a tweak toward the tactical level is warranted (we ARE evaluating options - don't take my comments as "blowing you off").

But the reality is that the principle trap that both military and commercial wargames tend to fall into is the argument that "the only way the operational level can be right is to explicitly model the tactical". Thats just not true, and the "glory days" of operational level wargaming here at the Naval wargame were done based on "tactical resolution" not far removed from "dicing for 6's"...yet the games, according to Nimitz predicted every operational facet of the actual wa, except the Japanese resorting to kamikaze's.


If anything this exchange has denstrated that LIMITING what tactical details teh player is given so they have less to potentially offend their sensibility is arguably better than trying to explicitley model tactics to produce details with a stronger physical pedigree - yet with no more basis in historical correctness than the assumptins all teh number crunching is based on.

I had all sorts of trouble with TOAW and its "detailed reports" until one day I just turned them off and never looked back. The "macro results" based on "attack facotr" seemed to work at the scales I was interested in , and not paying attention to the distraction of figuring out how the detailed reprts could possibly have been arrived at, let me enjoy the game.

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 24
Savo Island: Myths and Truths - 6/8/2002 6:41:31 AM   
Paul Dyer

 

Posts: 60
Joined: 10/1/2000
From: New Zealand
Status: offline 		A number of myths have grown up about how the allies missed the approach of the Japanese to Savo Island. In many ways the litany of missed signs is like a mini-Pearl Harbour, or the current debate about 9/11. Please bear with me & I’ll try to summarise what I think is the accurate story.

This is relevant to UV – it shows how reconnaissance can fail when it ought not to and spotting an enemy can be a matter of chance. There were various chances to sight the Japanese - intelligence had an idea something was up, and there were at least four sightings of Mikawa’s force. The role of the RAAF Hudsons seems particularly misrepresented, and this seems to be a rare area where Morrison went astray.

As far as I can make out, the missed opportunities went as follows:

- intelligence could have provided some clues. An increase in signal traffic, plus ordering of submarines and aircraft towards the area were noted, but these were to be expected. One significant clue was that on the 7th Mikawa had shifted his flag from Rabaul to a ship, and there was suspicion at Pearl Harbour that this was Chokai. The following day MacArthur’s HQ confirmed this. A message that the Japanese force was en route Guadacanal was intercepted on the 7th. However, due to a recent code change this was not decrypted until two weeks later.

- the first sighting of the Japanese force was by the submarine S-38 at dusk on the 7th. The report was “two destroyers, plus three other larger vessels, headed south-east”. It reached the invasion fleet late the following morning. However, since this sighting was distant and near a major Japanese base it was not thought of much consequence. The presumption was that should this force approach the air searches would locate it the following day.

- The next morning came a sighting by some B-17s who passed overhead on the way to bomb Rabaul (actually in support of Watchtower). Their sighting seems to have been treated similarly to that of S-38.

- There were actually two Hudson sightings. Neither crew was aware of Watchtower, and both had been told to expect allied ships in the region. It was therefore something of a surprise when the vessels turned out to be hostile and opened fire.

- The first, by Hudson 218 flown by a Sgt Stutt, immediately sent back a contact report. Indeed the crew were so concerned to get the message through that when no acknowledgement was received they aborted and returned to base. However, Stutt made one significant error due to inexperience. He thought he had seen 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, plus 2 remaining ships which he couldn’t identify. Instead of saying so, he referred to the latter as “either seaplane carriers or gunboats”. This was nonsense, and served to deflate the warning, since no group composed of these types of ships would be an immediate surface threat. Had the message reported cruisers/destroyers + unknowns possibly the warning bells would have rung loud.

- On arrival (just after midday) Stutt wasted no time in making his report. The cuppa tea story is, I think, completely fallacious. The inexplicable delays were in the time this took to be relayed by the shore staff. The message had to be sent to Townsville, on to Brisbane, then to Pearl for transmission to the US ships. It did not reach Brisbane until 6 hours after Stutt had landed. All this despite the message being headed “Emergency”. Thereafter the process was swift. Ghormley’s HQ received it about 20 minutes later, around 1840 on the 8th. Even this would have been in time, had the reported composition of the enemy been accurate and the staff at Savo been more receptive and alert.

- the second Australian sighting was by Hudson 185 in early afternoon. Again inexperience played a major role. This aircraft tried to send a report, but was told to maintain silence by its home base. It did accurately report its sighting on arrival. However, the debriefing officer refused to believe it, and a flaming row ensured. One of the cruisers was described as “similar” to an RN Southhampton class – as Snigbert mentions. A watered down message eventually reached Guadacanal just before Mikawa did.

In summary, had anyone pieced the available evidence together they might have summarised “a day after we landed, Mikawa has moved to sea in Chokai. We know that various other cruisers are I the vicinity, and air and submarine reinforcements are on the way. Late on the 7th a surface task force was reported headed south east, and there have been two sightings of a similar sized group in the slot the following day.” Put like that Mikawa’s intention and the threat seem obvious.

To repeat, the implications for UV/WITP seem to be that sighting reports always have a random element in them. Delays and inaccuracies are the norm. The experience rating of the searchers should also matter. Finally, in this case, complacency also played a role. A more alert staff might have grasped the significance of the various sightings that did get through. But at that time the vicious surface battles and tenacity of the IJN lay in the future and were not yet appreciated.

An excellent account of the debacle is “The Shame of Savo” by Bruce Loxton. The author was an 18yr old midshipman on HMAS Canberra when she went down. He subsequently became Director of Naval Intelligence for the RAN.

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 25
- 6/8/2002 7:08:14 AM   
strollen

 

Posts: 159
Joined: 5/18/2002
Status: offline 		Interesting post Paul, but isn't there a compromise solution between calculating everthing and doing nothing.

While I don't agree with Didz that problem is particularly bad. There clearly is something unrealist about a TF being able to sail 300 miles bombard, or unload and than sail 300 miles back without being able to be subject to an air attack.

It seems to me that there is already a mechanism to help address the problem. Operations Point, my understand is that Opps points simulates actions that take a fraction of a 12 hour phase (refueling, aircraft operations, loading/unloading). Currently neither Bombarding nor Fast transport evacuation or unload consume any ops points.

Simply making them consume a fixed or variable 100 or 200 ops points means that bombarding/Fast TF would only be able to move 8-10 hexs on the way out instead of 10-12 making them more likely subject to air attacks. Since very few Japanese TFs were successful attacked inbound to Henderson, while more than few were attacked outbound this seems to solve the problem.

What I am missing?

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 26
- 6/8/2002 7:20:22 AM   
Paul Vebber


Posts: 11430
Joined: 3/29/2000
From: Portsmouth RI
Status: offline 		I don't know, I must be missing it too...

I keep saying that such "compromise options" are being evaluated, but there is no assurance they may not break more than they fix...and the "tacticians" seem to more firmly cling to "bottom up" modelling to the point of saying "historical results don't matter" as long as the "physics" looks right...:rolleyes: A classic "top-down" vs "bottom up" modeling catfight! I;ve cetinaly been to this fire enough times. The "right answer" is always a combination, but that means SOME "bottom up abstraction", and some"top down marginally supported detail"...I think the current compromise is a good one!

My point is that the game is fundamentally operational and could just have easily have used 'Sea areas' as hexes. We could probably take the hexes away, draw areas on the map and do nothing else and folks and the "issues" would go away, becasue the player couldn't tell...

If I had you combat results of an ultra-detailed tactical model and another set form "dicing for 6's" and you couldn't accurately sort them out, what does that tell you about the operational relevence of the model? Would that mean the "dicing for 6's" was "unrealistic" or simply produced a distribution of results just as "believable' as the ulta realistc model, except perhaps "at the margins".

A lot of research and testing went into givin gthe player the point of view of being in operational command. In that the game has succeeded. I'm surprised nobody has complained that 99 jeeps, er...destroyers can sink a Battleship :p

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 27
- 6/8/2002 8:58:07 AM   
Wilhammer

 

Posts: 449
Joined: 5/24/2002
From: Out in the Sticks of Rockingham County, North Caro
Status: offline 		Paul,

Just to make it clear, I am not suggesting a tactical system.

When I refer to CM, I am referring to its turn execution system.

You plot for a certain interval of time (this could be a minute or a day), and then the units of all types interact as the action unfolds after it was computed.

I only compared it to CM as it is the latest incarnation of this.

World At War uses such a system with 4 hour turns in a game like Operation Crusader.

I am referring to a possible system for a future design.

Saying we are "tacticians" looking for a tactical simulation is not the question here.

I bring up the naval miniatures to highlight our campaign system.

Why can't a computer program compare the "overlays" of two opposing plots, and compare tracks to rate of speed and path traveled, to create the chance that if two opposing forces get within a few miles of each other, and spot each other enroute, and then either avoid by chance, avoid by choice, or engage.

As it stands now, two types of intercepts do in fact occur; collision with mines and minesweeping.

One force is moving, the other force is stationary.

How do you determine this collision? A ship passes through, and a random event is generated that signifies either a collision or a succesful detection and removal, modifed by manf factors such as density and crew experience.

Now suppose the mine could move?

The point I am focused on is not tactical (I want an operational level game), but on the limitations of the 12 hour phases with end point only search/combat situations.

So please, focus on that.

BTW, it is one of the finest Operational Games ever produced.

You have succeeded in putting us in Operational Command in the SW Pacific.

Try to see this as positive feedback with a strong desire to see the search/engage interaction in time and space to be as detailed as the rest of the simulation.

A-, could be an A+.

I will continue to play it, it is good.

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 28
keep it operational by all means... - 6/8/2002 9:49:57 AM   
bradfordkay

 

Posts: 8683
Joined: 3/24/2002
From: Olympia, WA
Status: offline 		When I first received UV, I realized that this was not a computer version of the classic boardgame Flattop (a multiplayer CAW with updated graphics...hmmm)and have come to truly appreciate the operational level of the game.

Uncommon Valor is dangerously close to the perfect SoPac wargame. I've only had it one week, and have finished only two scenarios (Coral Sea and Operation MO). I lost each of those at least twice before finishing... The game flows beautifully, keeping you on edge waiting for news of the enemy carriers (invasion force, resupply convoy, whatever is your latest worry). There is just the right amount of detail to make the game seem realistic without bogging down too much.

However, the bombardment situation does need a little help. An excellent example is a situation in my last game. On or about July 12 a Japanese BB TF is sighted in the China Strait (30nm E of Gili Gili) by Hudson patrol craft. At that moment a US 3CV TF is approx. 150nm south of the New Guinea shore midway between Gili Gili and Port Moresby. The BB taskforce mauls the airfield at Port Moresby that night and at the start of the daytime air operations phase is now 60nm ENE of Gili Gili. The forecast for the day IS overcast, but the failure of the CV TF to find the battlewagons passing between them and the shore until they reached the end of the day's passage detracts somewhat from the experience.

I do not argue that it couldn't have happened that way. It's just that now there is no other way that it will happen in the game. So the gamer is induced to try to order his forces to intercept where the enemy will be at the end of the day rather than placing them more reasonably located to intercept the enemy during the passage of the day.

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 29
- 6/8/2002 1:34:56 PM   
deilthedog

 

Posts: 97
Joined: 5/16/2002
Status: offline 		paul
im just curious to what options are being looked at in forthcoming patches in relation to this?

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 30
Page:   [1]
All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> Uncommon Valor - Campaign for the South Pacific >> Not sure I like this aspect.... Page: [1]
Jump to:





New Messages No New Messages
Hot Topic w/ New Messages Hot Topic w/o New Messages
Locked w/ New Messages Locked w/o New Messages
 Post New Thread
 Reply to Message
 Post New Poll
 Submit Vote
 Delete My Own Post
 Delete My Own Thread
 Rate Posts


Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI

1.344