Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: Mynok

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

You can say that more bombs could have hit..., but that's bull. These were the best pilots in the IJN, operating under optimum conditions, and this is what they achieved. Too say that they could have done 3-4 times better is just not statistically viable.

You can't even measure '3-4 times better'. What does that mean? More ships sunk? Oil storage destroyed? It's meaningless statistically and any other quantifiable way. They sank two BB's under optimum conditions..., so to sink 6 or 8 would be "3 to 4 times better" and statistically unviable without some improvement in the situation (of which there were none available).

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ORIGINAL: witpqs

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

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ORIGINAL: witpqs

Well I do not think that the PH results should be 'tightened up'. I like the variability. IRL we only know what happened in the one instance, we do not (cannot) know what the odds were. Maybe the results as obtained were 80% likely, or maybe they were 1 in 10. We just can't really know. So, I think tightening up around the one IRL result might just result in a worse 'simulation' aspect of the game because we would be skewing the game odds toward one particular roll of the dice result obtained IRL.

Actually, yes we can. Please name all the things that went wrong tactically during the attack. Strategically, the carriers weren't there, which was a dissappointment..., but during the actually attack every problem the Japanese had anticipated failed to arise. Total suprise, no CAP, AAA unmanned..., you name the advantage and the Japanese had it. So in reality, the historical results were pretty much the top end of what could be expected from this attack. You can name all kinds of things what would have created worse results, but none that would create better ones.

You can say that more bombs could have hit..., but that's bull. These were the best pilots in the IJN, operating under optimum conditions, and this is what they achieved. Too say that they could have done 3-4 times better is just not statistically viable.

Mike - I agree with what you write here. It's just that you are addressing a different question. Yes, I too think the results were on the high end. Given that the carriers were absent just how much could have gone better? Not a whole lot. But the point I am making is this: we cannot know what was the likelihood of the attack turning out that way? Sure, we can rule out 100%. We can rule out the really low percentages too. But what was it - 20% likely, 80% likely, 50% likely? The world wonders! So when we look at the game results from 1,000 Pearl Harbor attack runs, it is hard for us to know how true to the real life odds are those game results. Should the "average" be two BB's sunk (game equivalent to real life results), none sunk, 5 sunk, etc.? Dunno.

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ORIGINAL: Historiker

I've seen a lot of "PH strike broken?" threads where everyone claims that the strikes are too effective.
Well, in 15 test runs of my scenario 2 PBEM, I never sank a single BB in PH. I didn't change anything with the KB and use the latest public patch.

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
... can't we at least begin with something that resembles history?

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ORIGINAL: Mynok

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ORIGINAL: Historiker

I've seen a lot of "PH strike broken?" threads where everyone claims that the strikes are too effective.
Well, in 15 test runs of my scenario 2 PBEM, I never sank a single BB in PH. I didn't change anything with the KB and use the latest public patch.

Did you run 15 brand new games? Just curious if there might be an issue with when the random number seed is generated.

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ORIGINAL: witpqs

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
... can't we at least begin with something that resembles history?

I thought they called that the Dec 8th scenario?

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ORIGINAL: madgamer

Perhaps in the next version (AE 2 WitP 2, etc) it might be possible for the Japan side to have greater choice of what ships start where. Yamamoto knew if the CV's were not in PH the attack was a basic washout. His line "I fear all we have done is wake a sleeping giant and fill it with a great rage". sort of says it all.
What I am getting at is being able to put some TF's in a totally different place. Why do we have to bomb PH all the time?
What happens if the KB is in the PI or DI areas. Starting the war our own way would be fun.

Madgamer

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ORIGINAL: witpqs

Let me pose this question to set a baseline of what people mean:

What (approximate) result in the game do you consider historical?

The question is necessary because the game has different mechanisms than were present IRL. For example, IRL only 2 BB's remained sunk in game terms. Whereas in the game, once sunk is always sunk. Less obvious game-play impacts might apply to other results of the battle (leaving that open ended for your answers).

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ORIGINAL: Q-Ball

What was "sunk" historically? Isn't this tough to pin down?

Only Arizona was too damaged to ever return to service. Oklahoma could have been, but it was decided that it wasn't a good use of resources, and she was scrapped instead. California, West Va, and Tennessee all had major damage that took until 1943 or 1944 to repair,and had major rebuilds; if the USN had decided not to invest those resources in rebuilding those three ships (and there was some debate about that), would they have also been "sunk"?

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ORIGINAL: John Lansford
Nevada, California and WV, now, all three of them had heavy damage that kept them out of the war until 1944.

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Perhaps in the next version (AE 2 WitP 2, etc) it might be possible for the Japan side to have greater choice of what ships start where. Yamamoto knew if the CV's were not in PH the attack was a basic washout. His line "I fear all we have done is wake a sleeping giant and fill it with a great rage". sort of says it all.
What I am getting at is being able to put some TF's in a totally different place. Why do we have to bomb PH all the time?
What happens if the KB is in the PI or DI areas. Starting the war our own way would be fun.

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ORIGINAL: Ketza

If you want to sink more BBs dont bomb the airfields. Adjust all of your targets accordingly.

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If you want to sink more BBs dont bomb the airfields. Adjust all of your targets accordingly.

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ORIGINAL: bklooste

...

He said no such thing , that was from the movie "Tora Tora Tora" , the "we always knew CVs were important" brigade is also a post war creation this was not accepted till 43. The Pacific fleet was the main target and the carriers were a bonus both sides still believed BB were far more important than CV at that point otherwise they would not have build / designed the Yamotos , Iowas and Montana's. Also note the Lexingtons were convert to carriers only because no more battleships were allowed under the Washington treaty if not for the treaty it is likely the US would have 1-2 fleet carriers less and at least 2-4 battleships more and most counties carrier doctrines and capabilities would have been far less developed .

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ORIGINAL: Dr. Duh

Anyway, thinking you're going to take out the enemy's most important forces by targeting his battleships and planning to do it with a carrier strike force would seem to call for - a certain degree of cognitive dissonance.

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ORIGINAL: witpqs

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ORIGINAL: Q-Ball

What was "sunk" historically? Isn't this tough to pin down?

Only Arizona was too damaged to ever return to service. Oklahoma could have been, but it was decided that it wasn't a good use of resources, and she was scrapped instead. California, West Va, and Tennessee all had major damage that took until 1943 or 1944 to repair,and had major rebuilds; if the USN had decided not to invest those resources in rebuilding those three ships (and there was some debate about that), would they have also been "sunk"?

The Japanese also refloated ships in port later in the war this is also not modeled unless refloating is modeled you could argue the number of ships sunk is 4-5. They went to the bottom after all.

50 bombers with 800kg AP
40 with torps

Arizona Sunk , placed in the reserve fleet. 1 torpedo , 2 800kg AP , 1 critical hit , 1 bounced of turret
Oklahoma Capsized/ Sunk , re-floated and scrapped , 5 torps hits
Nevada Sinking and beached ,1 torp , (6-10 other bombs)
California Sunk , 2 torps , (2 250 kg bombs)
Utah Capsized , 2 torps
West Virginia Sunk , 7 torps , 2 800kg AP ( 1 dud)
Tennessee damaged back in 26th Feb 42 , 2 800kg AP ( 1 was damaged failed to explode after )
Maryland damaged back 26th Feb 42. 2 800kg AP ( both low order)
Pennsylvania minor damage in dry dock , torps fired at dry dick caisson

Other
Helena 1 torp
Raleigh 1 torp



Comments :

• 5 Battleships sunk ,1 capsized , 2 with significant damage
  
• With the same damage in blue waters only 2 would have survived ( note not same battle same damage)
  
• Serious damage seems to be repaired quickly eg the Tennessee had 2 16" shells explode inside her , 1 went through the turret the other knocked out the guns.
  
• The game doesn't model any special abilities in terms of shallow water and re-floating so why shouldn't the average be 5 sunk ? Why cant you refloat sunk ships in port like the US is in Pearl and the Japanese in 44-45 ?
  
• Did the Japanese get lucky or did they aim for the Turrets and Magazine if so thats some pretty accurate bombing ?
  
• the 800kg AP 16" rounds had a high dud rate but the explosions were pretty nasty.
  
• Hit rates ( assuming Japan used 5 torpedoes on the caisson ) torps 20/ 35 57% , 800kg AP 8/50 16%.
  
• No torps or 800 kg bombs were used on the 2nd ( or possible 3rd ) wave as all the ships were sinking or on the bottom. The Kates used 2 * 250 kg bombs and target the installations and air fields , The Vals attacked smaller ships .
  
• Note only about 7 torps per CV were used there would have been plenty in stores. If the first wave did not sink all those ships they would have been used on the 2nd wave.
  
  

Excluding major loss of surprise at worst we should see 4-5 BB sunk every time if the first strike doesn't do it the 2nd one will. Ships Sunk in a major port to take 90%/90% damage instead provided damage is < 150%.

(in reply to witpqs)

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ORIGINAL: treespider

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ORIGINAL: Dr. Duh

Anyway, thinking you're going to take out the enemy's most important forces by targeting his battleships and planning to do it with a carrier strike force would seem to call for - a certain degree of cognitive dissonance.

Except the Japanese used the British attack on Taranto as the model...and IIRC a capital ship was not sunk at sea by carrier aircraft prior to the Coral Sea (although carrier aircraft did play a part in the disappearance of the Bismarck (it was scunked, right))...whereas a carrier had been sunk by battlecruisers at sea in 1940.

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That both sides believed BBs were far more important than CVs wasn't exactly a completely settled matter - clearly there were progressives in both navies that saw air power as the future, so I think at best one could only argue that traditional proponents of the decisive battle between big-gun surface fleets still held sway in both camps.

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Um, the point I was trying to make was, how can you hold to both of these ideas at the same time:

1. Classic battleship doctrine - which was that the only reliable plan to take on a force of battleships was with another force of battleships - if you manage to sink one some other way, you just got lucky.

2. Plan to cripple an entire fleet of battleships - using only airpower from carriers.

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Except the Japanese used the British attack on Taranto as the model...and IIRC a capital ship was not sunk at sea by carrier aircraft prior to the Coral Sea (although carrier aircraft did play a part in the disappearance of the Bismarck (it was scunked, right))...whereas a carrier had been sunk by battlecruisers at sea in 1940.

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ORIGINAL: Dr. Duh

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ORIGINAL: treespider

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dr. Duh

Anyway, thinking you're going to take out the enemy's most important forces by targeting his battleships and planning to do it with a carrier strike force would seem to call for - a certain degree of cognitive dissonance.

Except the Japanese used the British attack on Taranto as the model...and IIRC a capital ship was not sunk at sea by carrier aircraft prior to the Coral Sea (although carrier aircraft did play a part in the disappearance of the Bismarck (it was scunked, right))...whereas a carrier had been sunk by battlecruisers at sea in 1940.

Um, the point I was trying to make was, how can you hold to both of these ideas at the same time:

1. Classic battleship doctrine - which was that the only reliable plan to take on a force of battleships was with another force of battleships - if you manage to sink one some other way, you just got lucky.

2. Plan to cripple an entire fleet of battleships - using only airpower from carriers.

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ORIGINAL: treespider

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ORIGINAL: Dr. Duh

quote:

ORIGINAL: treespider

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dr. Duh

Anyway, thinking you're going to take out the enemy's most important forces by targeting his battleships and planning to do it with a carrier strike force would seem to call for - a certain degree of cognitive dissonance.

Except the Japanese used the British attack on Taranto as the model...and IIRC a capital ship was not sunk at sea by carrier aircraft prior to the Coral Sea (although carrier aircraft did play a part in the disappearance of the Bismarck (it was scunked, right))...whereas a carrier had been sunk by battlecruisers at sea in 1940.

Um, the point I was trying to make was, how can you hold to both of these ideas at the same time:

1. Classic battleship doctrine - which was that the only reliable plan to take on a force of battleships was with another force of battleships - if you manage to sink one some other way, you just got lucky.

2. Plan to cripple an entire fleet of battleships - using only airpower from carriers.

There is a slight disconnect between your two ideas...

The PLAN was a gamble to find and sink the BB's in port when they were completely stationary with complete surprise , the plan was not to engage the US Pacific Fleet in a game of maneuver warfare with the carriers.

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ORIGINAL: Dr. Duh


True enough. Although this wasn't exactly the same as sneaking into Scapa Flow either. Here's where we get into stuff I don't remember ever reading about though - what were their contingencies if the battleships hadn't been in port that morning? Was the plan to slink home with their puny carriers and just send another cable to Washington ("oops - my bad") while they put together a proper battlefleet to find and engage the Pacific fleet in a decisive battle? Or did the plan say that if they weren't in port, KB would look for them and try to sink them wherever they were?