Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: sprior

Or what ifs on doctrine. What if the RAF focused on Mosquitoes instead of heavy bombers?

Great! I believe that this would have made a massive number of German civilians happy.

Why? The Mossie could lift the same as a B-17.

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ORIGINAL: sprior

Or what ifs on doctrine. What if the RAF focused on Mosquitoes instead of heavy bombers?

Great! I believe that this would have made a massive number of German civilians happy.

Why? The Mossie could lift the same as a B-17.

they were often reluctant to join the morale bombing.

Not in Japan they weren't, why do you think they used mostly incendiaries? And even in Europe 8th Air Force "on March 9, H2X radar-equipped B-17s mounted a third attack on the Reich capital though clouds." Think that was anymore accurate than bombing by H2S aircraft bombing at night?

Bigger boys stole my sig

(in reply to sprior)

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ORIGINAL: sprior

Why? The Mossie could lift the same as a B-17.

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Not in Japan they weren't, why do you think they used mostly incendiaries? And even in Europe 8th Air Force "on March 9, H2X radar-equipped B-17s mounted a third attack on the Reich capital

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"... on March 9, H2X radar-equipped B-17s mounted a third attack through clouds." Think that was anymore accurate than bombing by H2S aircraft bombing at night?

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ORIGINAL: Dixie
As for the USA AF, whilst their stated aim was precision bombing the technology of the era meant that any strategic campaign was in effect an area campaign. IIRC the USAF dropped their bombs on cue from the lead bomber rather than from individual targeting which would add to the inaccuracy. The Brits suffered the post war negatives as they never claimed their campaign was anything other than area targeting.

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ORIGINAL: Dixie

A Mosquito would have had a lesser logistics requirement, meaning more technically minded types available to serve in the other arms instead of as RAF groundcrew. More aluminium available for fighters, or steel could be shipped across to the UK instead and less fuel and bombs needed to keep BC operational. More Merlins available for the Americans to put into long-range fighters and for the Brits to put into Spitfires. A focus on heavy bombers would leave coastal command able to get more long range aircraft for convoy patrols. There could have been a switch to daylight 'precision' raids. Plus plenty of other effects

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As for the USAAF, whilst their stated aim was precision bombing the technology of the era meant that any strategic campaign was in effect an area campaign.

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IIRC the USSAF dropped their bombs on cue from the lead bomber rather than from individual targetting which would add to the innacuracy.

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The Brits suffered the post war negatives as they never claimed their campaign was anything other than area targetting.

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ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

To live within a few blocks of a US bombing target was not very safe, but to live anywhere in the same city as a RAF target was very unsafe.

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ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

I'm aware that not all US missions were strictly "precision raids", so I'm not claiming any moral high ground-do not misunderstand. I do, however, maintain that for the tonnage dropped US raids had a much greater effect on German production.

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Germany was the power which had huge investments in new equipment (actually fully developing 3 or 4 times more a/c than the U.S.) which were not utilized do to some strange decision making process. Thus it is much easier to speculate about "what ifs" of new German weapons-especially a/c.

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Was it not HE that developed the first jet a/c-flown in September of '39?

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However, it is the opinion of those that had good info on Germany's aviation engineering that Germany could have possessed multiple, fully functional jet a/c by mid '42-if they had an organization that could properly judge just how long it would take to develop new a/c and to concentrate on just a few models. For the first two years of the war almost nothing was done to pursue this technology which they had a huge lead in.

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ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

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ORIGINAL: Dixie
As for the USA AF, whilst their stated aim was precision bombing the technology of the era meant that any strategic campaign was in effect an area campaign. IIRC the USAF dropped their bombs on cue from the lead bomber rather than from individual targeting which would add to the inaccuracy. The Brits suffered the post war negatives as they never claimed their campaign was anything other than area targeting.

Judging by today's standards I would agree. However, for that era, the difference in US/British strategy was, well, like day and night. The US forces could totally devastate a factory with 200 to 400 bombers in one mission. The RAF would destroy large parts of a city while doing little damage to a prime manufacturing plant located within the same city. Of course, in time, the British strategy had huge effects also, but it took many thousands of sorties to accomplish a total factory shutdown.

To live within a few blocks of a US bombing target was not very safe, but to live anywhere in the same city as a RAF target was very unsafe. I'm aware that not all US missions were strictly "precision raids", so I'm not claiming any moral high ground-do not misunderstand. I do, however, maintain that for the tonnage dropped US raids had a much greater effect on German production.

To avoid thread drift; what about the "Arrow"? A push/pull a/c that first flew in '41, but was never utilized. It had a fantastic range with internal bomb storage. Its top speed far exceeded any other prop a/c. IIRC, it was also the first time an ejector seat was installed as normal equipment. This was done to placate fears of aviators of having to bail out with another prop right behind them. This a/c is another example of superb German aviation engineering and also of a huge waste of these same engineering assets.

While it is true that the Allies could have played a different game with technology, their focus was war winning. Germany was the power which had huge investments in new equipment (actually fully developing 3 or 4 times more a/c than the U.S.) which were not utilized do to some strange decision making process. Thus it is much easier to speculate about "what ifs" of new German weapons-especially a/c.

For example, the HE 219. This a/c would have been a disaster for the RAF bombing campaign, but was constantly delayed because of what really seems like political difficulties with Goering-or someone very high up in the RLM. IIRC, it was also Heinkle which developed a far superior single engine fighter early in the war-the only time it saw combat was while being flown by company pilots defending Heinkle factories. There was also the dive bomber by HE (or possibly Henshel) which had a forward facing weapons officer-very modern concept. This a/c was much superior to the JU87, but not chosen (pre-war times) due to a flaky decision making process. Was it not HE that developed the first jet a/c-flown in September of '39?

Again, Germany was the power that had real options on the table for gaining a technological superiority-in the air anyway. Many of us have seen the show LW '46. However, it is the opinion of those that had good info on Germany's aviation engineering that Germany could have possessed multiple, fully functional jet a/c by mid '42-if they had an organization that could properly judge just how long it would take to develop new a/c and to concentrate on just a few models. For the first two years of the war almost nothing was done to pursue this technology which they had a huge lead in.

The U.S. did not even fly its first jet until 1942. By '45 it was still lagging far behind Germany even though it made a major effort to catch up. The ME 262 was not some fanciful dream weapon, it was a weapon that, if pursued earlier, could have had strategic consequences. Add to that jet bombers and CAS a/c and the picture becomes startling.

Some "what ifs" were not just wild dreams, those were just recognized for the potential and practicality far too late in the war to do any good for Germany.

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ORIGINAL: Warfare1
If we look at the picture holistically, in addition to the technology advance the Nazis could have achieved early on, we must also consider the decisions in strategy.

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ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

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ORIGINAL: Warfare1
If we look at the picture holistically, in addition to the technology advance the Nazis could have achieved early on, we must also consider the decisions in strategy.

One clear connection of grand strategy affecting R&D was what was considered achievable during the likely time frame of the war being prioritized. As mentioned above, they did not use the proper men and/or organization best able to make that determination.

If we break out into operational errors, R&D tidbits will vanish in a sea of sauerkraut. Best leave that for another thread.

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While a lot of these weapons never saw the light of day, and while many more were pure fantasy, one still has to wonder at the sheer inventiveness of the German scientists.

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Even more, one has to wonder what might have happened had the Nazis leadership developed a more cohesive approach to weapons' research.

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We know that the Germans had invented the first jet aircraft in 1939,

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The Me-262 was a superb jet fighter

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Almost 1200 Me-262s sat on runways for lack of fuel in 1945.

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What would have happened had Germany invented these weapons sooner? Or, if the war had dragged on longer?

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HITLER'S AMERIKABOMBER

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ORIGINAL: GoodGuy
Seriously now, interesting thoughts. I do believe the wooden structure (resulting in lack of protection/survivability) of the plane would have kept it from being as successful as heavy bombers.

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I dunno about that - The Mosquito was known for its ruggedness... and its accuracy.

We're talking about fantasy doctrine here after all, so what about Mosquitoes used as precision weapons against precision targets? That was my original point. Rather than spending 1/4 of GDP on heavy bombers to indiscriminately level cities, they could have spent 1/8th on Mosquitoes and gone after specific target.

That said I know the Americans here love to compare American precision bombing to RAF area bombing, but in the words of Albert Speer, "In the end not one tank, plane or weapon was not delivered due to a lack of ballbearings." So all those ballbearing precision raids?

Did bugger all, in the final analysis.

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The de Havilland Mosquito operated in many roles during the Second World War. Mosquito equipped squadrons were asked to perform medium bomber, reconnaissance, tactical strike, anti-submarine warfare and shipping attack and Night fighter duties, both defensive and offensive until the end of the war.[77]
Mosquitos were widely used by the RAF Pathfinder Force which marked targets for night-time strategic bombing. Despite an initially high loss rate, the Mosquito ended the war with the lowest losses of any aircraft in RAF Bomber Command service. Post war, the RAF found that when finally applied to bombing, in terms of useful damage done, the Mosquito had proved 4.95 times cheaper than the Lancaster[78]

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ORIGINAL: EUBanana

That said I know the Americans here love to compare American precision bombing to RAF area bombing, but in the words of Albert Speer, "In the end not one tank, plane or weapon was not delivered due to a lack of ballbearings." So all those ballbearing precision raids?

Did bugger all, in the final analysis.

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ORIGINAL: Jonathan Pollard

I think Speer was able to get enough ball bearings from Sweden to cover the shortage.

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ORIGINAL: EUBanana

I dunno about that - The Mosquito was known for its ruggedness... and its accuracy.

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That said I know the Americans here love to compare American precision bombing to RAF area bombing, but in the words of Albert Speer, "In the end not one tank, plane or weapon was not delivered due to a lack of ballbearings." So all those ballbearing precision raids?

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ORIGINAL : United States Strategic Bombing Survey

"The Attack on Oil"

"With the reduction of German air power, oil became the priority target in the German economy. The bomber force for several months had been adequate for the task. A preliminary attack was launched on May 12, 1944, followed by another on May 28; the main blow was not struck, however, until after D-day. In the months before D-day and for a shorter period immediately following, all available air power based on England was devoted to insuring the success of the invasion.

Virtually complete records of the German oil industry were taken by the Survey. In addition, major plants that were subject to attack and their records were studied in detail.

The German oil supply was tight throughout the war, and was a controlling factor in military operations. The chief source of supply, and the only source for aviation gasoline, was 13 synthetic plants together with a small production from three additional ones that started operations in 1944. The major sources of products refined from crude oil were the Ploesti oil fields in Rumania and the Hungarian fields which together accounted for about a quarter of the total supply of liquid fuels in 1943. In addition, there was a small but significant Austrian and domestic production. The refineries at Ploesti were attacked, beginning with a daring and costly low-level attack in August 1943. These had only limited effects; deliveries increased until April 1944 when the attacks were resumed. The 1944 attacks, together with mining of the Danube, materially reduced Rumanian deliveries. In August 1944, Russian occupation eliminated this source of supply and dependence on the synthetic plants became even greater than before.

Production from the synthetic plants declined steadily and by July 1944 every major plant had been hit. These plants were producing an average of 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September. Production recovered somewhat in November and December, but for the rest of the war was but a fraction of pre-attack output.

The Germans viewed the attacks as catastrophic. In a series of letters to Hitler, among documents seized by the Survey, the developing crisis is outlined month by month in detail. On June 30, Speer wrote: "The enemy has succeeded in increasing our losses of aviation gasoline up to 90 percent by June 22d. Only through speedy recovery of damaged plants has it been possible to regain partly some of the terrible losses." The tone of the letters that followed was similar.

As in the case of ball-bearings and aircraft, the Germans took the most energetic steps to repair and reconstruct the oil plants. Another czar was appointed, this time Edmund Geilenberg, and again an overriding priority on men and materials was issued. Geilenberg used as many as 350,000 men for the repair, rebuilding, and dispersal of the bombed plants and for new underground construction. The synthetic oil plants were vast complex structures and could not be easily broken up and dispersed. The programs of dispersal and underground construction that were undertaken were incomplete when the war ended.

The synthetic oil plants were brought back into partial production and in remarkably short time. But unlike the ball-bearing plants, as soon as they were brought back they were attacked again. The story of Leuna is illustrative. Leuna was the largest of the synthetic plants and protected by a highly effective smoke screen and the heaviest flak concentration in Europe. Air crews viewed a mission to Leuna as the most dangerous and difficult assignment of the air war. Leuna was hit on May 12 and put out of production. However, investigation of plant records and interrogation of Leuna's officials established that a force of several thousand men had it in partial operation in about 10 days. It was again hit on May 28 but resumed partial production on June 3 and reached 75 percent of capacity in early July. It was hit again on July 7 and again shut down but production started 2 days later and reached 53 percent of capacity on July 19. An attack on July 20 shut the plant down again but only for three days; by July 27 production was back to 35 percent of capacity. Attacks on July 28 and 29 closed the plant and further attacks on August 24, September 11, September 13, September 28 and October 7 kept it closed down. However, Leuna got started again on October 14 and although production was interrupted by a small raid on November 2, it reached 28 percent of capacity by November 20.

Although there were 6 more heavy attacks in November and December (largely ineffective because of adverse weather), production was brought up to 15 percent of capacity in January and was maintained at that level until nearly the end of the war. From the first attack to the end, production at Leuna averaged 9 percent of capacity. There were 22 attacks on Leuna, 20 by the Eighth Air Force and 2 by the RAF.
Due to the urgency of keeping this plant out of production, many of these missions were dispatched in difficult bombing weather. Consequently, the order of bombing accuracy on Leuna was not high as compared with other targets. To win the battle with Leuna a total of 6,552 bomber sorties were flown against the plant, 18,328 tons of bombs were dropped and an entire year was required.

"Today we have finished rebuilding the plants and tomorrow the bombers will come again."

(Saying attributed to German workers engaged in rebuilding synthetic oil plants.)"