Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

1. Chinese units in open terrain are toast. Move them. Now.

2. Chinese units even in decent terrain (like forest hexes) take tremendous losses. Move them unless you really need to guard/block/delay in a decent-terrain hex.

3. Chinese units near the coast can be cut-off and destroyed. I prefer to move them beginning turn one and get them back to my MLR. But it may also be useful to keep them behind Jap lines to threaten LOS and LOC. Choose your poison.

4. The only way the Chinese can stand is to get into base hexes and behind forts. The best chain of bases to form an MLR appears to be Nanning, Liuchow, Kweilin, Hengyang, Changsha, Chengtow, Nanyang, Chengchow, Loyang, Sian. If the Japs bust through Nanyang/Chengchow or Loyang, the Chinese MLR can be consolidated at Sian. If Changsha, Chengtow, Hengyang, or Kweilin fall, though, it appears that the Chinese will have to fall back and defend Chungking and Chengtu. Yikes!

5. Thus far I have been able to hold the MLR described above. In part this is due to big forts and in part because the Japanese have to be careful not to advance to far and get cut-off themselves. I *think* this line is tenable. At the very least I hope it will buy me enough time to allow Chinese troops and aircraft squadrons to train and to begin to bring in Western Allied aircraft squadrons.

6. Replace as many low quality Chinese leaders with better quality leaders.

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ORIGINAL: stuman

What I am a bit unclear on from a historical perspective is whether Jap. could not conquer more of China than it did, or chose not to conquer more.

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ORIGINAL: stuman

What I am a bit unclear on from a historical perspective is whether Jap. could not conquer more of China than it did, or chose not to conquer more.

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ORIGINAL: wpurdom

I fear it is a hopeless task to simulate the China front historically in a Pacific-oriented game.

1. Consider first that some things should be even harder in China for the Allied leadership. Most notably for the period of the Pacifac War until about the time of the Russian intervention, the Red Army and the Japanese have a de facto truce. This followed the Hundred Regiments offensive where the Red Army attacked and did the Japanese large damage and the Japanese counterattacked and devastated the best Red Army formations. The Red Army is busy building up an infratructure behind Japanese lines, but it is not actively engaging the Japanese. It is fighting the Nationalists more than the Japanese, largely behind Japanese front lines.

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2. The Hundred regiments offensive was apparently launched by Red Army commanders against Mao's wishes, at a time when Chiang was afraid everything was about to fall apart politically and militarily.
3. After the Chinese defenses had time to solidify, the Japanese Army made an assessement like that suggested by Jim Burns - that they did not have the wherewithal to drive on and take Chungking without losing control of either their logistical support or large areas they were occupying - even when limited to consideration of the part of China controlled by the Nationalists. They did not think that lesser conquests would serve much purpose as long as the political support for resistance remained, and they thought that political support was propped up by Western and Soviet support for Chiang.

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4. As for whether they were right, who knows. It's sorta like the Germans had gone on the defensive, except for limited punishing counterattacks after the winter of 1941-42. (Let's say they smash the Kharkov offensive and stop). We would be in a poor position to judge whether they were right or wrong.
5. Some specifics that are wrong IMHO on the China front, but don't address many fundamental issues:
a. Allies being able to use the Red Army without a Japanese attack on it.
b. Offensive use of artillery to wear down Chinese forces outside of fixed defenses, like cities. (See next for distinction between light contact and hold fast).
c. Lack of Chinese option to break contact at low cost in the countryside and retreat - they should have a hold fast and light contact option on defend. Perhaps one could have special rules for combat with units in reserve, with putting all your forces in reserve being a sensible light contact option, so that the artilley can't get them and the caualties before retreat being minimized.

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d. Chinese infantry are overvalued in victory points - their value should be minimal, perhaps a fifth.
e. Chinese infantry units should be able to reconstitute on any unoccupied hex with a Chinese controlled hexside. They should be able to send small infantry units to continually break supply lines and be able to afford it in victory points. And if occupation forces get too low they should be able to form in surrounding unoccupied hexes, even if all hex sides are Jap controlled.

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But making the China front work would be a whole game within a game requiring the work-up of a separate release.

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ORIGINAL: treespider

You can already subdivide the existing "small" corps into three sub sections and send them hither and yon...and when eliminted they reappear in Chungking stronger than what they started.

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4. As for whether they were right, who knows. It's sorta like the Germans had gone on the defensive, except for limited punishing counterattacks after the winter of 1941-42. (Let's say they smash the Kharkov offensive and stop). We would be in a poor position to judge whether they were right or wrong.
5. Some specifics that are wrong IMHO on the China front, but don't address many fundamental issues:
a. Allies being able to use the Red Army without a Japanese attack on it.
b. Offensive use of artillery to wear down Chinese forces outside of fixed defenses, like cities. (See next for distinction between light contact and hold fast).
c. Lack of Chinese option to break contact at low cost in the countryside and retreat - they should have a hold fast and light contact option on defend. Perhaps one could have special rules for combat with units in reserve, with putting all your forces in reserve being a sensible light contact option, so that the artilley can't get them and the caualties before retreat being minimized.

You can already place units in reserve and they are unaffected by the artillery...but you run the risk of being retreated out of the hex.

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The third Battle of Changsha (December 24, 1941 – January 15, 1942) was the first major offensive in China by Imperial Japanese forces following the Japanese attack on the Western Allies.

The offensive was originally intended to prevent Chinese forces from reinforcing the British Commonwealth forces engaged in Hong Kong. With the capture of Hong Kong on December 25, however, it was decided to continue the offensive against Changsha in order to maximize the blow against the Chinese government.[1]

The offensive resulted in failure for the Japanese, as Chinese forces were able to lure them into a trap and encircle them. After suffering heavy casualties, Japanese forces called for a general retreat.[1]

Course of battle
On December 27, the Japanese 3rd, 6th, and 40th Divisions massed at Yueyang and advanced southward in three columns and crossed the Sinchiang River, and tried again to cross the Milo River to reach Changsha. However, the Chinese formed a deep pocket around the city and set up ambush parties around the Luoyang River. Halfway from Milo River and Changsha, the Japanese columns faced strong resistance from the Chinese and the eastern column was forced to take a detour further east, and the other two columns had to move closer together than originally planned. During the southward advance the Japanese encountered three Chinese army divisions that were pushed aside but not crushed; they retreated into the eastern mountains.

Changsha was evacuated except for the Chinese army and some 160 civilians who wished to stay to help the defense. On December 31, the Japanese troops stormed the southeastern defense of the city but failed to make any gains, and then made an attempt at the southern and then eastern part of the defense. Meanwhile, the northern part of the city was heavily bombarded. The Japanese eventually cut through the first line of defense, only to meet stubborn resistance from a second line of defense near the city center.

On January 1, the Chinese quickly counter-attacked and surprised the Japanese with heavy guns and inflicted heavy casualties on them. At about the same time, the previous army units that had retreated to the mountains swept down to attack the Japanese supply lines, with plenty of aid from local guerillas. The Japanese line collapsed on January 4. The three Japanese divisions were besieged and requested the help of the Japanese 9th Independent Brigade stationed in Yueyang. However, on January 9 they faced heavy fighting with the Chinese and were unable to relieve the besieged Japanese divisions. The Japanese then attempted to retreat through the Luoyang River, not knowing that an ambush party was already stationed in the region. Losing heavily at the river crossing, the Japanese eventually reached the Sinchiang River on January 15 to complete the retreat.

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ORIGINAL: Barb

Result: The Japanese had not enough forces to subdue whole China and China was forceless to do something with the situation.

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ORIGINAL: Barb

At first - Japanese didnt want to have China under their complete control and occupation - too much troops required for that. What they prefered was to have China with some leader colaborating with them who will sign a peace treaty, assign all Japanese controled areas to them officially and to keep peace and order in the rest of China - co-prospering with Japan (well we all know this means giving up what they had for "protection").

Japanes know that drive to Chunking even if they tried to would not bring what they wanted, so they focused on isolating China - result was the Vietnam ports closed and later Burma Campaign. But they underestimated the situation.

On the other hand Chiang Kai Shek knows that if he had signed peace treaty with Japan he will be overthrown in no time. He also wanted to get rid of the Communists. Once the Second World War had begun, he wanted the americans to fight the war instead of him, so he could keep his units intact for fight with Communists. He requested 500 airplanes (later raised to 1000) because he was convinced that airpower alone can drive the Japs out of China. Stilwell wanted to have strong Chinese army (disbanding half of the divisions to have sufficient manpower to keep fewer units up to their TOE), train 30, later 60 and 90 Chinese divisions with american tactics, equip them with american weapons and have excellent core force, which could take up the Japs and later the Communists. Chiangs opinion prevailed and more effort was thrown into the "Hump" than Ramagh.

The crisis in China started when the Japanese begin their Ichi-go offensive. As Chiang didnt want to commit his own central reserve troops and various generals commanding War areas (Warlords) retreated before the Japanese.

Result: The Japanese had not enough forces to subdue whole China and China was forceless to do something with the situation.

" Gentlemen, you can't fight in here! This is the War Room. " President Muffley

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ORIGINAL: stuman

So then a question from one ignorant of the details of the China front : if Ichi-go was successful late war, why not an version of Ichi-go two years earlier ?

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

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ORIGINAL: stuman

So then a question from one ignorant of the details of the China front : if Ichi-go was successful late war, why not an version of Ichi-go two years earlier ?

It will make more sense if you think of "Ichi-Go" as a good weather raid. The Japanese pulled a lot of units out of garrisons to drive on the B-29 airfields, but had to return them to their original positions soon after or lose control of areas they already held. China simply proved too big and too populated for them to hold down.

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ORIGINAL: Jim D Burns

Given the kind of war they faced in China, Japan had no choice but to station large strong permanent garrisons along all their supply routes to prevent these guerilla type forces from starving their inland troops. In fact Japan was having major troubles in Dec. 41 keeping their logistic network functioning, as they lacked sufficient troops to hold open supply routes to everything they had.

Jim

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ORIGINAL: Barb
3. One of the reasons of the "Japanese run wild in AE"
Did the Japanese player buy out Artillery, Engineers, Armor and Air forces from Manchukuo? Well for few PPs and no decrease of AV in Manchuria he has twice the firepower Japan could have in the area. Japanese feared the Russian attack so they should in no way pull all their corps artillery, mobile reserves and air force out of Manchuria - exactly the thing any Japanese player will do ASAP.

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ORIGINAL: maybee
there should be multiple allies players of conflicting interests.

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ORIGINAL: vonTirpitz

I totally disagree. I have one PBEM opponent who has managed to gather at least 2 stacks of +200k and 2-3 more stacks of +80k Chinese and run rampant over the map by late December 41. One stack easily routed 3 full strength defending IJA divisions. So unless one of you is going to inform me that his tactics aren't sustainable then I have to disagree entirely with your assessments about the so-called Japanese advantages...

T

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ORIGINAL: Jim D Burns
AE has nerfed the Chinese unit’s combat abilities to such an extent and made artillery so completely overpowered that it has ruined the game and turned China into a complete blowout again.

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

His position is that Japan CAN conquer China while at the same time taking on the Western Powers. My position is that if Japan couldn't conquer China when she had nothing else "one her plate", she damned well shouldn't be able to do it after starting the "War in the Pacific".

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ORIGINAL: USS America

I am eager to see several games progress into late '42 and '43 when Japan has spent an enormous amount of supplies on the offensive in China.  I have a suspicion that putting so much focus on China will slow down the Japanese advance elsewhere in the Pacific, and make her weaker when the Allies come calling.  

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Just as one that allowed the US to leap the entire Pacific and land in Tokyo in 1944 would be wrong.