mdiehl
Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000 Status: offline
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Mike Scholl got my point correct. A Midway like disaster was almost inevitable and also, in my view, in precisely the circumstances that were in effect at Midway. And in a way you COULD say that the Japanese complained to the game design team in their pre-operational wargames. They lost three CVs to the unanticipated early arrival of two American CVs in their wargame. Then they complained to the umpire, who changed the results of their simulation. If it weren't for bad luck at Midway, the USN would have had no luck at all. The sudden northward turn putting the Japanese CVs miles off their reported course. The errant diversion of one squadron each of TBFs, SBDs, and F4Fs that put them out of the fight entirely during the critical phase of the battle. The lucky break that the Japanese received in having Tone #4 plane delayed long enough for it to discover Yorktown, which it otherwise would not have done. If the American plan had gone as WELL as circumstances might have permitted, the Japanese could have lost many more ships than 4 CVs and one CA at Midway, and the USN might have easily have walked away from it with no ship losses at all. quote:
The point is more the probability of that event occurring. I am arguing that there is maybe a 1 in 10 or 1 in 20 chance of that event, (i.e. all carriers being lost ) occurring since you need, again, a bunch of lucky breaks for the americans, namely CAP at sea level, flight decks covered with bomb/torpedo laden ACs, CVs out of position, US dive-bombers at just the right position/altitude, no cloud cover over the CVs, etc, etc. I disagree. I think that having poorly positioned CAP was likely for the IJN in any CV engagement, especially after fighting off waves of land based air from Midway. There was a reason why, in 1942, operational planners in both the IJN and USN tried to avoid going toe to toe with land bases when they lacked complete surprise. The Japanese simply did not bring enough carriers to the battle to handle both Midway Island and also any American CVs that might intervene. quote:
You seem to be arguing (not to put words in your mouth ), that this is a normal, predictable event, i.e. a 1 in 2 or 2 in 3 chance of occurring, which seems too high to me. Nimitz himself was far from confident that the US gamble could work. No problem. I think it was a normal, predictable event, with a 60% chance or better of coming out exactly how it did, and a 30% chance or better of coming out much worse for the Japanese than they did, and a slim chance of the Japanese doing a little better (say, losing only 2 or 3 CVs, sinking one American CV, and retiring from the engagement without taking Midway).
< Message edited by mdiehl -- 1/6/2010 5:40:45 PM >
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Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics. Didn't we have this conversation already?
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