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Transport Poverty III: An Alternate Perspective

 
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Transport Poverty III: An Alternate Perspective - 7/8/2002 2:02:59 AM   
segorn

 

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Hi Folks,

I started the original transport poverty thread a couple of weeks ago, and I was sort of surprised that so many people were having similar issues. I spent some time thinking about the issue and I'm sort of toying with a different explanation.

The basic problem, as the allies, it that you can't keep your bases supplied with the transports that you generally have in theatre.

As far as I can tell, my amphibious sea-lift capacity for troops is in the ballpark e.g. I can get about two divisions afloat at a time.
Its the supply issue that kills it b/c there just aren't enough transports to move supplies around and run an attack.

My original thought was that the problem was that the game wasn't giving me enough transports.

My new theory is that the game does, in fact, give me the roughly historical number of transports.

The problem is that the game uses too many supplies e.g. more than was historical.

I'll give you a brief example.

Port Moresby, garrisoned by 20,000 troops and some 500 planes, needs about 30,000 supply points a week, or, assuming a supply point = 5 metric tons, about 150,000 metric tons of shipping a week.

That may not sound like a lot, especially when you think of all those bombs being dropped. So, lets work out how many 500 pound bombs 150,000 metric tons/week represents.

150,000 metric tons is about 330,000,000 pounds.

That'll work out to 660,000 500 pound bombs. *per week*. That means that each of the 200 B-26's at Moresby was carrying 3,300 bombs per week, or 471 bombs a day.

Of course, the base needed more than just bombs. 150,000 metric tons can also get you:

330 million cans of spam per week. That's enough to give each member of the 20,000 man garrison 16,500 cans per week.

Assuming you could pack them into the available space, 150,000 metric tons will also get you about a quarter of a million US army jeeps.

Now I'm certainly aware that these examples are spurious. The actual supply used at a major base probably includes varying quantites of hundreds of different items from rifle amunition to paperclips to light bulb.

The concern I seem to have though is that the game is requiring an ahistorical amount of shipping to supply its bases.

Did Port Moresby *really* require 150,000 tons of shipping a week?

If so, then the game needs to release more AK's and AP's to the theatre.

Alternately, if the historical number of AP/AKs in the theatre really did hover around 30, then we have to accept that the supply useage algorythms are off because we can't supply the historical bases with the historical transport.
Post #: 1
- 7/8/2002 3:17:09 AM   
dgaad

 

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I've studied the UV supply problem in some detail.

Each type of unit in the game adds to the "supplies required" figure in an amount that is not at all synchronous with other types of units.

For example, B-17 groups add 1000 to that figure, even though the B-17 group has only 12 aircraft. If you add 10 B-17 groups to a base, you just added 10,000 to the "supplies required" figure. Moreover, each mission the B-17s run uses an extraordinary amount of supplies, but I don't have an exact figure for this. For this reason, its extremely difficult to keep a base with enough supply to use B-17s for more than a week or two against enemy bases.

As an example, in the game I'm playing I loaded up Lae with over 100K supplies. I transferred 16 B-17 bomber groups there. Those groups, in addition to what was already there, took the "supplies required" figure to 27,000. I was able to maintain this bomber group on station for about 1 week before the supply level dropped below the 54,000 mark, at which point all of the bomber missions got halved in size.

In order to sustain Lae's supply level and keep the 17s flying, I have to use virtually my entire transport force to and from Noumea constantly. Basically, if I'm engaging in a heavy bombing campaign, everything else is flushed down the toilet.

This is a fact that's often overlooked by people who complain about the B-17 (or the large number of allied Heavy Bombers) as being "uber weapons".

If I take all of these heavy bomber groups out of the action. I don't have much trouble keeping the forward bases supplied with even the paltry transport I am given from pearl. Its me wanting to use these aircraft, and the many dozens of other aircraft groups I have sitting at Brisbane and Noumea, that leads me to complain about the lack of transport. I have more than enough LSTs to mount landings, too.

Rule of thumb breakdown for supplies needed by airgroup types :

Fighters 200 per group
Fighter Bombers 250 per group
Medium Bombers 500 per group
Heavy Bombers 1000 per group

It should only be a matter of time and effort before more exact figures are available.

BOTTOM LINE : its the number and type of aircraft at a base that are the MAJOR users of supply and MAJOR reasons for supply problems.

_____________________________

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(in reply to segorn)
Post #: 2
- 7/8/2002 3:27:51 AM   
juliet7bravo

 

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Well, I'd have to look, but US troops/units were notorious supply hogs. With surface shipping, it's not the "weight" that's the killer, it's the cubage. Unless it's a very high density cargo, you run out of room long before you run out of carrying capacity. If you've been in the military, you'll probable remember all the dunnage or packing material used.

I also think the USN is "shortchanged" on the carrying capacity of its ships, especially the oilers. Look at it...the biggest ship carries 3000t of cargo, while they had numerous 14,000t ships running around. Oilers are all 4000t "Neosho" class, while they had some huge oilers running around...25,000t I think. Also, I think, dealing with oilers, the rule of thumb is they can carry either 1.5 or 2x their displacement in fuel. That isn't reflected. Also fuel unloading seems to take far too long. Added up, while the USN might be getting the "correct" ships, they're taking it in the shorts on overall cargo carrying capacity, for both cargo and fuel.

The IJN on the other hand, should get a break on troop carrying capacity...they could wedge an entire division on a single freighter somehow.

The USN should also, after around the start of 1943, start getting a break in cargo handling/unloading rates. By then they'd gotten their thumb out and had stated loading ships properly and getting cargo handling equipment in theatre. One thing the USN took to heart, that the IJN didn't or couldn't, was that a ship that could make twice as many trips due to quicker turn-around times in port, could do the work of 2 ships.

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- 7/8/2002 3:52:54 AM   
segorn

 

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I've been operating under the assumption that each supply point is 5 metric tons.

This gives the allied small APs a load of 5,000 metric tons, and the large ones about 15,000 metric tons.

This seems more or less in line with the historical numbers e.g. a liberty ship had a gross tonnage of about 7 english tons, or just about 6 metric.

Regarding US Units using lots of supplies:

A) I'm sure we did. We've never been a light army, but I for one see no problem with being well fed and equipped.

B) Even if each guy in Port Moresby used 8 tons of supply a week, they still couldn't go through the amount of supply port moresby was eating up.

C) I think what people are forgetting, and what I tend to forget as well, is that cargo ships are #!%% HUGE. Go down to the dock some time and watch a container ship unload. Its *unreal*. A cargo ship can carry more supplies than thousands of semi trailers.

(in reply to segorn)
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- 7/8/2002 4:51:10 AM   
juliet7bravo

 

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Well, I think you're right about the supply useage being too high.

Ships, random sampling;

AO Neosho 4000t-in game: 4000t
AK Betelgeuse-7500t-in game: 1500t
AK Bellatrix-8000t-in game: 2000t
AO Cimarron-7500t-in game: 4000t
TK Suamico-22,000t-in game: 3000t

Some of the AP's are waaaaaaay off just as badly. There is no ryhme or reason to it. They just picked some standardised classes in game and stuck historic names on them I think. The USN is getting shorted badly on carrying capacity. The loss in TK displacement alone is enough to hurt us badly...those huge TK's should be what's transferring fuel to the main bases.

I think it's a mix of the carrying capacities being off, and supply usage being too high. I think there should be some larger size ship classes for both sides to ease the supply situation somewhat.

(in reply to segorn)
Post #: 5
- 7/8/2002 4:53:33 AM   
dgaad

 

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A Liberty Ship designated an EC2, which meant {E for Emergency, C for Cargo, 2 for large capacity]


The Liberty Ship design was adapted from that of an old and time-proven British tramp ship The contract plans and many others for the Liberty ship were obtained form th eBritish. Detailed plans were prepared by Gibbs & Cox, a firm of naval architects in New York, and by the U.S. Maritime Commission. The design came from sunderland and originated in 1879. Various claims for the Liberty ship design have been made by U.S. Citizens, even a gold metal was awarded for one, but they were erroneous and no award was deserved


The standard Liberty was as follows: 441'6" long; a beam of 56' 10 3/4"; draft of 27' 9 1/4 "; deadweght tonnage was 10,920; gross tonnage about 7,500; and displacement tonnage 14,257. They carried 9,140 tons of cargo with a full load of fuel.


The vessel had 5 holds: Three forward of the engine spaces and two aft. Cargo capacity was equaled to that fo 300 railroad freight cars. A liberty could carry 2,840 jeeps, 440 light tanks, 230 million rounds of rifle ammunition, or 3,440,000 C-rations.


Speed of about 11 Knots.....some would get 11.5 knots when things were extremely good.


Officers had private rooms. Crew slept two to three to a room.


Sixty-one percent of the Liberty ship was prefabricated, with more that 152,00 feet of weld performed.


A Liberty ship required 3,425 tons of hull steel, 2,727 tons of plate, and 700 tons of shapes, which included 50,000 castings.


Women made up more that 30% of the work force.


Work force totaled 700,000 by 1943


The result of some sloppy work due to lack of training, inadequate inspection, and other reasons is as follows: Henery Wynkoop fractured her decks while loading in New York on Nov. 17, 1943. George P. Garrioson developed cracks up forward and in her deckhouse during a North Atlantic crossing. Alexander Baranoff broke in two and was welded togethr again. John Philip Sousa had grease fouling her boiler water. Thirteen buckets of grease was removed form one boiler.


By 1942 746 ships were built. 1943 1896 ships were built of which 1238 were Liberty's.


Est of cost of a Liberty was $1,500,000. Contractors fee added $60,000 to 140,000 for each ship.


In 1940 the entire U.S. merchant marine, from ocean liners to tow boats included some 65,000 men [a few women]. In 1943 it was 85,000. In 1944 it was 175,000. At end of WW II 250,000.
Men to lod for th edraft.....or not accepted in the armed forces.....found the merchant marine as something they wished to enter into.


Early on manning the Liberty's was difficult. New vessels was being procuced faster than man power could be obtained. So crews was usually a hodgepodge of individuals.


Crewing the ships was a joint effort by the various maritime unions, government and steamship company hiring halls, and the government training schools, including the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy.


Largest training establishments for unlicenced seamen was at Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn, New York. Intended to process 30,000 men per year.


The age limit for enlistment in the Maritime Service was lowered to 16 years in May, 1944. In one week more that 7,000 youngsters volunteered as some 40 recruiting offices.


On 17 November 1941 Congres authorized the use of Navy guns and gunners for the defense of American merchant ships. The first vessel portected was the SS Dunboyne.


Civilian crews was paid at the end of each voyage whereas military mne were paid a lower amount.....a great cause of some friction among both types of crewmen.


Pay for crewmen was standardized on 24 February 1943, in the form of voyage, area, and attack bonuses. Seaman was paid an additional 40 to 100 percent of this total wages, including overtime, during the time his ship was transiting certain areas considered subject to enemy action. Five dollars a day was added for Murmansk, Mediterranean, and South Seas. Finally there was a bonus of $125 paid to each man if a vesel was under enemy attack at any port or anchorage.


An average Liberty carried a crew of 41 men. Deck officers included the master, chief mate, second and third mates; engine officers included the chief engineer and first, second and third assistants. The deck crew included a boatswain, six able seamen, three ordinary seamen, and a carpenter. Unlicenced engine room personnel included three firemen, three oilers, two wipers, and a deck engineer who took care of the deck winches, steam lines, rediators, and othe requipment outside the engine spaces. The stewards department included a chief steward, chief cook, second cook, night cook and baker, six messmen, and a galley man. Each ship also carried a radio operator and a purser to take care of ships business.

=============

Note : in game terms, this means a liberty ship would have a load capacity of approximately 9000 supplies assuming that 1 supply = 1 ton.

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Post #: 6
- 7/8/2002 5:42:00 AM   
dgaad

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by juliet7bravo
[B] They just picked some standardised classes in game and stuck historic names on them I think. The USN is getting shorted badly on carrying capacity. [/B][/QUOTE]

They may have picked some class ships and used those as a DB template for most or all of the other transport ships. This is an acceptable shorthand in wargaming IMHO.

However, they got the Liberty Ship class WAY OFF. Carrying capacity should be 9000t. Even if just the Liberty classes were accurate, the allied Transport Poverty situation would be greatly allieviated.

_____________________________

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Post #: 7
- 7/8/2002 6:32:33 AM   
juliet7bravo

 

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Exactly. It might be historically accurate on the numbers and names, but the actual carrying capacity appears to be woefully short.

There's absolutely no margin for error in the USN supply scheme. You get a bazillion troops and AC, but 75% (or more) of them sit in Brisbane and Noumea eating their heads off as there's no way to keep them supplied. You can't even properly garrison bases, as there's no way to keep them in supply.

I'd speculate that there should be several new larger capacity "boilerplate" ship classes for each side. As I've said before, there's also a need for several smaller ship classes as well.

If they'd make a ship name listing for both sides available, I'd be quite happy to research the historical displacements for comparison. It'd allow me to complete the dbase project as well.

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- 7/8/2002 8:35:31 PM   
jww60

 

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There should be a distinction between "normal" loading, for supply runs, and "combat" loading, for amphibious assaults. Combat loading was very inefficient but let units unload in the proper order as well not putting all of a vital item, such as the artillery ammunition, on one ship. -- Jeff

(in reply to segorn)
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- 7/8/2002 9:43:44 PM   
Wilhammer

 

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1. As for American Units being way to dependednt on supply, in this Campaign, I don't buy it. It was called Operation Shoestring for a reason, it was a lean operation running on minimal logistics.

2. History. Prior to Admiral King taking over, the supply situation was horrible. The French would not cooperate, the Commonwealth had the labour unions, the British made shipping demands that were unrealistic globally, and Admiral Gromley was ineffective. When King came in, he TOLD the French what to do, not the other way around, he dealt with the unions by taking there jobs with American troops, and they dismissed Gromley. Within a few weeks of the King transfer, the logistical situation had greatly improved.
This could be modeled in UV by the scenario design allowing all those pent-up transports in Pearl to be released in order to conincide with Ernesrt's arrival and command.

3. As for the design having flaws in supply usage, I have no information to provide, as I play as the Japanes exclusively, who, BTW, seem to have more than enough transports.

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Post #: 10
Jap Guadalcanal Diary - Logistics - 7/8/2002 9:53:43 PM   
Wilhammer

 

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http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/MarApr02/MS717.htm

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Post #: 11
An excellent Paper - 7/8/2002 10:23:32 PM   
Wilhammer

 

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http://papers.maxwell.af.mil/projects/ay1998/acsc/98-061.pdf

Need to have a PDF viewer to read this, but what a good read it is.

The gist of the paer is this:

During the period up to Novemeber 1942, the US was in the "Halt Phase", commitment of just enough to stop the enemy, while the enemy was in the offensive phase.

But once the US decided that Gudalcanal WAS THE battle, it became a Build Up phase followed by the Offensive.

========================================

Gaming note.

When players do this campaign, they KNOW from the beginning that this IS the battle. The real contestants did NOT realize this until November 1942. When the US took Guadalcanal, the original plan did NOT include Henderson Field. It was designed to stop the Japanes from using it as a base, and NOT to gain an offensive springboard for the Allies.

The Japanese player, unlike his historical counterparts, is going in with a Total War attitude, and the Allied player is going into this as an eventual all out attack on the IJN/IJA forces.

In other words, the final goal of this campaign in NO WAY matched the intentions of the historical combatants.

=======================================

In an overall view of this in game terms:

1. The Japanese get Total War commitment in the logistical realm from the beginning. They NEVER enjoyed this level of commiment until it was too late. By the time they commited to Total War, the will could not match the means.

2. The Americans seem to be suffering under (perhaps exagerrated) 'realistic' shipping restricitions.

Questions:

Does the Allied side get better with released shipping after November 1942?

Do you think (as I do) that the logistics are too generous for the Japanese, especially in the early part of the campaign?

====================================

With a bit more cooperation amongst the Japanese command (how glaring is the lack of team work in this operation historically amongst the commanders and sefvices of IJ), some bad luck thrown the Allies way, this could of been a disaster for the Allies.

It was a very near thing.

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Post #: 12
Oil Logistics in the Pacific War: In and After Pearl Ha... - 7/8/2002 10:34:20 PM   
Wilhammer

 

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http://papers.au.af.mil/projects/ay2001/acsc/01-205.pdf

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Post #: 13
- 7/8/2002 11:50:19 PM   
juliet7bravo

 

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Combat loading; Okay, you might make half a dozen amphibious assaults in a game...but you make thousands of trips hauling general cargo from point A to point B. Doesn't explain how 20,000t tankers become 3000t tankers, or how a 22,000t APA becomes a 2000t APA. It's a shame they didn't keep "cargo" TF's and make some type of discrimination between them and transport TF's. Cargo TF's could haul at normal load rates, but unload slower. Transport TF's could haul much less per ton of ship, but unload quicker. Giving ships something approaching their correct carrying capacity, and separating it into "cargo TF's, and "amphibious assault TF's" would deal with the entire situation nicely, AND add realism.

(in reply to segorn)
Post #: 14
- 7/9/2002 4:18:59 AM   
dgaad

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Wilhammer
[B]1. As for American Units being way to dependednt on supply, in this Campaign, I don't buy it. It was called Operation Shoestring for a reason, it was a lean operation running on minimal logistics.

2. History. Prior to Admiral King taking over, the supply situation was horrible. The French would not cooperate, the Commonwealth had the labour unions, the British made shipping demands that were unrealistic globally, and Admiral Gromley was ineffective. When King came in, he TOLD the French what to do, not the other way around, he dealt with the unions by taking there jobs with American troops, and they dismissed Gromley. Within a few weeks of the King transfer, the logistical situation had greatly improved.
This could be modeled in UV by the scenario design allowing all those pent-up transports in Pearl to be released in order to conincide with Ernesrt's arrival and command.

3. As for the design having flaws in supply usage, I have no information to provide, as I play as the Japanes exclusively, who, BTW, seem to have more than enough transports. [/B][/QUOTE]

This is all understood, and accurate, Will. However, as has been pointed out by Julie, the ship ratings are WRONG. WAY WRONG. Liberty ships, the most common transport ship ("AK" in the game, though I'm not sure all AK ships were in fact Liberty ships), had a displacement of 14,000 tons, and could carry 9000 tons of cargo. The largest AK ship the USN has in the game has a transport capacity of 2000. Thats just ill.

Simulate the supply situation with REALISM, not twinking the hard ratings of ships. Realism in this case would be limiting the USN to the actual numbers of actual ships with accurate load ratings. Instead, here's what matrix did :

1. The actual round trip radius of the Dakota was chopped from 1600 miles to 367 miles.
2. AK and AP ship load capacities were chopped by about 70%.
3. Whether its a bug or not, I don't know, but the Allies get very little in the way of the historical committment of supply and transport. Read my post where I outline the 86 AK ship sitting in Pearl through August, 1943.

Anyone playing the Allies in the long campaign usually has between 60-80% of their ground and air forces sitting in Brisbane or Noumea for almost the entire game because they simply can't be supplied if moved out of these locations. Again, that is also historically TOTALLY incorrect.

Bottom line : the Allies are ahistorically and inaccurately HAMSTRUNG in the one thing that the Allies had a tremendous advantage in throughout the war : logistics.

_____________________________

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Post #: 15
- 7/9/2002 8:22:57 AM   
Wilhammer

 

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Based on what I just read, the load modeling is deeply flawed.

Compounded with the other problems cited, it seems this game models the logistical balance in the opposite extreme of the real thing.

Whenever I read about the campaign, I always came away with the idea that Allied situation was desperate in terms of front line strength, but adequate and always getting better logistically, while the Japanese had awesome front line potential, ham strung by poor logistics. In Winter 1942-43, the Allied fortunes went forward, while the Japanese tide had ebbed.

In other words, it seems this has flip flopped?

Worth more digging time...

(in reply to segorn)
Post #: 16
- 7/9/2002 8:40:07 AM   
dgaad

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Wilhammer
[B]

Worth more digging time... [/B][/QUOTE]

I don't think it needs much more digging.

Everything associated with Allied logistics in UV has incorrect data ; wrong ship ratings, wrong air transport ranges, etc. Get the right numbers and the right ratings, and the Allied supply problem would be of a more historical nature, rather than what it is now : an ahistorical bug/tweak.

_____________________________

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Post #: 17
- 7/10/2002 1:31:21 AM   
juliet7bravo

 

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From "Japanese Merchant Marine in WW2";

Boiled down; 2.5 tons gross displacement per man for "normal" transport. 5 tons per man being the optimum in long trips or bad conditions. 5 tons per man for combat loading. I'd speculate a figure of 2.5t "normal" and 5t "combat" for the IJN, and 5t "normal" and 7t "combat" for the USN...this would be relatively easy to determine. I think there's a copy of the Amphibious Assault Handbook circa 1944 online (Hyperwar?) somewhere which would lay it out for planning purposes.

Tankers; Fuel load can be figured at 1.5-1.7 tons per ton of gross displacement. The USN Suamico TK clocked in at 22,000 tons, and carried 140,000 barrels of oil. 1 barrel of heavy fuel oil weighs 0.2 US tons. This equates to a fuel load of 28,000 tons vs. the current 3000 tons.

(in reply to segorn)
Post #: 18
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