Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

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ORIGINAL: bklooste

How can the RAF do this they would have had to evacuate London since the Germans could strike airfields within fighter range of it...I'm sure the Luftwaffe would have loved sending 300 planes every day over London with indecinaries I think whoever was in charge of the RAF who did that would be out of a job .

What have you been smoking? At best, the Germans hoped to force the British to abandon the airfields along the SE Coast of England. London is farther NW, and at the very limit of Bf-109 range. In fact, many of the airfields in that area were beyond German fighter range. Trying to bomb London in daylight was what got the Luftwaffe soundly trounced in the Battle of Britain..., and closing down the Southeastern airfields would just put more fighters in the London area.

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ORIGINAL: bklooste

Historically they did not abandond all the SE airfields that were around and N of London ( you dont get more SE than London) which led to the results... Note the premise of my coments was a reply to a suggestion to abandon SE airfields so the germans can continue their atatcks vs the airfields, so your saying you can abandon the SE and have airfields > 250 km N of London ( ie N of York which is still at about 40% range from a plane comming from Calais) and still cap /protect London with reasonable loiter time, now thats smoking. London to Calais is only 149km ( 82 nautical miles)
Range of the Me109 was certainly enough to escort any raids of airfields within range of London. Note the comments about London being at the extreme range of the Me109 are garbage , at that range from further bases than Calais they had only 10 minuntes dog fight time but at combat speeds its only 20 minutes to london and dogfighting uses a lot of fuel.

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ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

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ORIGINAL: bklooste

How can the RAF do this they would have had to evacuate London since the Germans could strike airfields within fighter range of it...I'm sure the Luftwaffe would have loved sending 300 planes every day over London with indecinaries I think whoever was in charge of the RAF who did that would be out of a job .

What have you been smoking? At best, the Germans hoped to force the British to abandon the airfields along the SE Coast of England. London is farther NW, and at the very limit of Bf-109 range. In fact, many of the airfields in that area were beyond German fighter range. Trying to bomb London in daylight was what got the Luftwaffe soundly trounced in the Battle of Britain..., and closing down the Southeastern airfields would just put more fighters in the London area.

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ORIGINAL: bklooste

Historically they did not abandond all the SE airfields that were around and N of London ( you dont get more SE than London) which led to the results... Note the premise of my coments was a reply to a suggestion to abandon SE airfields so the germans can continue their atatcks vs the airfields, so your saying you can abandon the SE and have airfields > 250 km N of London ( ie N of York which is still at about 40% range from a plane comming from Calais) and still cap /protect London with reasonable loiter time, now thats smoking. London to Calais is only 149km ( 82 nautical miles)
Range of the Me109 was certainly enough to escort any raids of airfields within range of London. Note the comments about London being at the extreme range of the Me109 are garbage , at that range from further bases than Calais they had only 10 minuntes dog fight time but at combat speeds its only 20 minutes to london and dogfighting uses a lot of fuel.

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ORIGINAL: Mark Weston
5. "Range of the Me109 was certainly enough to escort any raids of airfields within range of London." We know for a fact that the Luftwaffe didn't believe this so I'm not sure why you do.

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ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

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ORIGINAL: Mark Weston
5. "Range of the Me109 was certainly enough to escort any raids of airfields within range of London." We know for a fact that the Luftwaffe didn't believe this so I'm not sure why you do.

Might I suggest that he is looking at the direct transfer range, without the factors of climbing to altitude, forming up, or having to travel at less-than-optimal speed to maintain station on the bombers being escorted? He's probably also assuming that the game's "sweep" routine has some relevance here.

With only the Brits having radar and the forward observer corps, the RAF's Spits and Hurricanes simply avoided the Luftwaffe's "Free Chase" missions and waited for the real targets (the bombers) to show up. All sweeps got the Germans was ops losses..., thus Goering's insistance that his fighters fly "close escort" (severely limiting their range).

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ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Which do you think cost the Axis Powers the greatest strategic harm in World War II?

1) Japanese failure to equip fighters with self-sealing gas tanks and armor

2) German failure to equip heavy tanks with machine guns

3) German failure to have fighters with sufficient legs to escort bombers deeply into Britain

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ORIGINAL: DaveP

As much as it offends American pride, the participation of the US in Europe only helped speed up a Russian victory (though it was decisivie in keeping Western Europe free of Russian domination in the post-war period).

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ORIGINAL: DaveP
Allow me to throw a handgrenade into this discussion.

All of this talk of the Battle of Britain and the lack of German strategic bombing capability is interesting, but irrelevant. WWII in Europe was fought and won in Russia; the participation of the Western Allies was peripheral and of minor importance. The German forces left in the west before 1943 were litttle more than garrisons -- the British posed no real threat (only slightly more than if Britian had been driven to its knees in 40-41). By the time there was a true two front war, the turning point had been reached in Russia and the outcome was already decided. As much as it offends American pride, the participation of the US in Europe only helped speed up a Russian victory (though it was decisivie in keeping Western Europe free of Russian domination in the post-war period).

Most people argue that the turning point was either Stalingrad or Kursk. My old military history professor positied that the turning point was during the winter of 41-42 when the Germans lost 10% of their armored forces -- loses that their production capacity (as has been well described by other posters) was unable to make good. Pick whichever you like, but they are all before the Germans faced a real threat in the West.

Ducking for cover,
DaveP

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ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

With only the Brits having radar and the forward observer corps, the RAF's Spits and Hurricanes simply avoided the Luftwaffe's "Free Chase" missions and waited for the real targets (the bombers) to show up. All sweeps got the Germans was ops losses..., thus Goering's insistance that his fighters fly "close escort" (severely limiting their range).

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ORIGINAL: Torplexed

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ORIGINAL: DaveP

As much as it offends American pride, the participation of the US in Europe only helped speed up a Russian victory (though it was decisivie in keeping Western Europe free of Russian domination in the post-war period).

Doesn't offend me. With a vicious enemy on her throat, Russia had the far more brutal, but straightforward and simple war. Essentially, a vast land struggle with the Red Air Force acting as flying artillery. The US had a complex war in many dimensions. On land, at sea, under the sea, in the air, and had to conduct a strategic bombing campaign against two very different antagonists. In addition, the US had to play some delicate diplomatic balancing acts with Britain and China, and a host of minor allies while plying them with arms and oil, while also supplying Russia with a substantial amount of aid and equipment (Stalin, on the other hand could afford to ignore most diplomatic niceties). The US managed to work in a very expensive atomic bomb program too. All this from a stubbornly isolationist nation with an army smaller than Portugal's was in 1939.

And, in the end Russia's staggering causality list probably saved a lot of American lives. D-Day, as conducted wouldn't have been possible if the majority of German divisions had been stationed in France.

Plus, we got the part of Europe with the better-looking women.

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ORIGINAL: DaveP

All of this talk of the Battle of Britain and the lack of German strategic bombing capability is interesting, but irrelevant. WWII in Europe was fought and won in Russia; the participation of the Western Allies was peripheral and of minor importance. The German forces left in the west before 1943 were litttle more than garrisons -- the British posed no real threat (only slightly more than if Britian had been driven to its knees in 40-41). By the time there was a true two front war, the turning point had been reached in Russia and the outcome was already decided. As much as it offends American pride, the participation of the US in Europe only helped speed up a Russian victory (though it was decisivie in keeping Western Europe free of Russian domination in the post-war period).

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Most people argue that the turning point was either Stalingrad or Kursk. My old military history professor positied that the turning point was during the winter of 41-42 when the Germans lost 10% of their armored forces -- loses that their production capacity (as has been well described by other posters) was unable to make good. Pick whichever you like, but they are all before the Germans faced a real threat in the West.

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ORIGINAL: mikemike

Now some remarks about German industry:
- During the Battle of Britain, Messerschmitt was working only one shift so the Luftwaffe was having problems replacing their fighters
- Series production of the best German bomber, the Ju88, was impeded by a design that was not productionized, there were about 11,000 different types of screw in a Ju88!
- Most of German industry was not geared for mass production at the beginning of the war, this changed only slowly until Speer became War Production Czar in 1943. Mass production started with some vehicle types pre-war (the Volkswagen Kübel, Opel and Ford trucks - yes, US trucks provided the major share of motor transport for the Wehrmacht, too, about 180,000 Opel Blitz trucks - an adapted Buick design produced originally in a purpose-built GM plant near Berlin - and about 50,000 Ford trucks). Later extended to small arms (MP 38/40, MG42, StG44, Panzerfaust). From about 1944 onwards the German industry successively switched to mass production methods, indeed, a number of economy historians tell us that this paved the way to convert most of the industry and its workforce quickly to mass production post-war (providing the basis for the "Wirtschaftswunder" or economic miracle), something British industry never quite managed. That's why cars built in Britain nowadays are either handcrafted small-series production, German, or Japanese.

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ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Which do you think cost the Axis Powers the greatest strategic harm in World War II?

1) Japanese failure to equip fighters with self-sealing gas tanks and armor

2) German failure to equip heavy tanks with machine guns

3) German failure to have fighters with sufficient legs to escort bombers deeply into Britain

• 1) a) Japan's failure to protect its own resource convoys. (US subs sunk a vital part of Japans total tonnage).
  
  
• 1) b) Japan's failure to solely focus on carrier production (instead of building the biggest Battleship of the time).
  
  
• 2) a) Germany's failure to streamline (and dramatically increase) tank production (figures) before 1943.
  
  
• 2) b) Germany's failure to draft everyone who could hold a rifle before 1944.
  
  
• 3) Germany's failure to FOCUS on (the then anything than ineffective) raids on British airfields and radar stations in the South and the South East, and the Supermarine manuf. (main) facility.
  (But no, psychopath Adolf threw a fit because the RAF managed to drop a few bombs on Berlin for the first time [he got used to it later on], so he started to shift the main effort to London and London's docks instead. Adolf was probably the most idiotic military leader of the last century, he just showed some good instinct once when he picked up Manstein's idea for the offensive against France).
  
  My 2 cents.
  
  < Message edited by GoodGuy -- 3/5/2010 3:51:57 PM >
  
  _____________________________
  
  
  "Aw Nuts"
  General Anthony McAuliffe
  December 22nd, 1944
  Bastogne
  ---
  "I've always felt that the AA (Alied Assault engine) had the potential to be [....] big."
  Tim Stone
  8th of August, 2006
  
  (in reply to Canoerebel)

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ORIGINAL: DaveP

Allow me to throw a handgrenade into this discussion.

All of this talk of the Battle of Britain and the lack of German strategic bombing capability is interesting, but irrelevant. WWII in Europe was fought and won in Russia; the participation of the Western Allies was peripheral and of minor importance. The German forces left in the west before 1943 were litttle more than garrisons -- the British posed no real threat (only slightly more than if Britian had been driven to its knees in 40-41). By the time there was a true two front war, the turning point had been reached in Russia and the outcome was already decided. As much as it offends American pride, the participation of the US in Europe only helped speed up a Russian victory (though it was decisivie in keeping Western Europe free of Russian domination in the post-war period).

Most people argue that the turning point was either Stalingrad or Kursk. My old military history professor positied that the turning point was during the winter of 41-42 when the Germans lost 10% of their armored forces -- loses that their production capacity (as has been well described by other posters) was unable to make good. Pick whichever you like, but they are all before the Germans faced a real threat in the West.

Ducking for cover,
DaveP

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ORIGINAL: GoodGuy

[

3) Germany's failure to FOCUS on (the then anything than ineffective) raids on British airfields and radar stations in the South and the South East, and the Supermarine manuf. (main) facility.
(But no, psychopath Adolf threw a fit because the RAF managed to drop a few bombs on Berlin for the first time [he got used to it later on], so he started to shift the main effort to London and London's docks instead.

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Adolf was probably the most idiotic military leader of the last century, he just showed some good instinct once when he picked up Manstein's idea for the offensive against France).
My 2 cents.

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ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

So, what was Germany's biggest mistake? Short answer-creating a two front war with limited resources.

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ORIGINAL: GoodGuy

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ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

So, what was Germany's biggest mistake? Short answer-creating a two front war with limited resources.

Yes. And this makes me wonder ... what would have happened if Hitler wouldn't have been so trigger-happy to declare war on the US? I am not sure whether the US would have declared war on Germany say before 1943. Now imagine no US landings in Africa (Montgomery had Rommel on the run, finally, but it still would have taken quite some time to drive Rommel out of Africa), no second front in South Italy. I doubt England would have had the resources to carry out the landings in Italy on their own. No US aircraft screen from Iceland's airbase to suppress the German subs. The subs would have had a free for all in that sector in 1942 and 1943, at least outside the British aircraft screen. The US could have focused on the Pacific, which they did until late 1942 anyways. Landing crafts (LST/LCP) designed for the landings in Normandy wouldn't have been developed/needed before 1946, probably. I think that was another big mistake. Involving the US did not turn out favorably for the Germans in those 2 wars.

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ORIGINAL: Torplexed

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ORIGINAL: DaveP

As much as it offends American pride, the participation of the US in Europe only helped speed up a Russian victory (though it was decisivie in keeping Western Europe free of Russian domination in the post-war period).

Doesn't offend me. With a vicious enemy on her throat, Russia had the far more brutal, but straightforward and simple war. Essentially, a vast land struggle with the Red Air Force acting as flying artillery. The US had a complex war in many dimensions. On land, at sea, under the sea, in the air, and had to conduct a strategic bombing campaign against two very different antagonists. In addition, the US had to play some delicate diplomatic balancing acts with Britain and China, and a host of minor allies while plying them with arms and oil, while also supplying Russia with a substantial amount of aid and equipment (Stalin, on the other hand could afford to ignore most diplomatic niceties). The US managed to work in a very expensive atomic bomb program too. All this from a stubbornly isolationist nation with an army smaller than Portugal's was in 1939.

And, in the end Russia's staggering causality list probably saved a lot of American lives. D-Day, as conducted wouldn't have been possible if the majority of German divisions had been stationed in France.

Plus, we got the part of Europe with the better-looking women.

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ORIGINAL: laika

Yep, don,t forget that Germany lost the war in the east long before the West launched D-day.

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ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

IIRC, the US occupied Iceland in '40-in any event, long before the US entered the war. The U.S. Navy was actually attacking German subs long before the U.S. was in the war. This is one of the justifications Hitler gave (against all advice-again) to DOW the U.S.

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It is an interesting scenario where England and Russia go it alone against the European Axis-with only industrial help (limited) from the U.S.

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"Americans only know how to make refrigerators and razor blades".

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ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

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ORIGINAL: laika

Yep, don,t forget that Germany lost the war in the east long before the West launched D-day.

30 to 50% of the German Army was tied down in Norway, France, the Balkans and Germany waiting for a real attack from the west. I strongly feel that those deployments had something to do with Germany being heavily out-gunned in the east.

If you add in the naval and air requirements for the war in the west, then the picture becomes even more sharp. The Soviets did not, and could not, go it alone.

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ORIGINAL: GoodGuy

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ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

IIRC, the US occupied Iceland in '40-in any event, long before the US entered the war. The U.S. Navy was actually attacking German subs long before the U.S. was in the war. This is one of the justifications Hitler gave (against all advice-again) to DOW the U.S.

But this was not fully fledged warfare against German operations in the Atlantic Ocean. The tard could have held his horses there. :P (I'm not saying "should", as I wouldn't have liked a "1000" years Reich thingy.

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It is an interesting scenario where England and Russia go it alone against the European Axis-with only industrial help (limited) from the U.S.

I'd like to see this sufficiently covered as a what-if in games, actually.

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"Americans only know how to make refrigerators and razor blades".

LOL. Hey, you forgot Swing (Swing kids in Germany were persecuted, tortured, imprisoned, some were sentenced to death or died in KZs), Coca Cola and MickeyMouse.
The US had everything Adolf hated.

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ORIGINAL: DaveP

... German forces in the west were little more than was necessary to control conquered countries, and those troops were largely reserve and replacement units that had little or no front line combat capability. The entire British land combat capability was tied up in North Africa by a very anemic panzer corps. Good troops with a talented leader, I grant you; but not exactly a draining "second front."

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ORIGINAL: Torplexed

Just out of curiosity, roughly how many Germans in 1941-42 were tied up in the Kriegsmarine and the U-Boat arm in the Battle of the Atlantic?

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ORIGINAL: GoodGuy

I'd say you should then also consider the amount of maintenance, guard/garrison, aerial recon, air support, coastal defense and resupply personnel, including the massive workforce that erected U-boat bunkers in France.