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- 7/24/2002 4:10:54 AM   
elmo3

 

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Thanks for the update Joel. Do you know if the PBEM coast watcher bug will be fixed in this patch?

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 211
- 7/24/2002 4:28:28 AM   
1089

 

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From: Portland, OR
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Joel Billings
[B]Gary also added code that would make low level bombers without experienced pilots (exp 70 +rnd(20)) very bad at hitting targets that are defended by decent CAP/flak. [/B][/QUOTE]

Do you mean the pilots exp must be greater than 70 + rnd(20), in order not to fail the check for accuracy?

kp

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Post #: 212
- 7/24/2002 4:44:49 AM   
Nikademus


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From: Alien spacecraft
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by dgaad
[B]I do find Mdiehls arguments persuasive because they appear to be based on sources that based their conclusions, numbers, assumptions, on the most reliable primary source documents available.

I find Nikki's viewpoints and arguments to have some value as well. But he is evasive when faced with the numbers, as he realizes that's an argument he cant win. The numbers pertaining to kill ratios do not bear out the general claim that the zero was a "much better plane" or that the Japanese were "much better pilots."

[/B][/QUOTE]


Point. The reason i dont come up with the "numbers" is because first off, i'm not exactly disputing them though as i've said, i do question their vericity. The primary point I and others have made is that these "kill ratio" statistics that mdiehl has pulled from his one or two books cannot in any way support some of the outlandish and all-encompasing conclusions that he has drawn from them. I dare say that the authors being quoted would agree either if faced with the questions. The kill ratios say nothing about the conditions that were being fought, how much time the respective sides had (for example, Guadalcanal....at the limit of the Zero's range with about 10-15 minutes time over the target max to fight it out....a similar problem that the Germans had in the BoB) and certainly do not support such claims that all Japanese aircraft were junk and that their pilots were subpar.

Nor do i agree with such all-encompasing asertations that the Allies knew even before the war started the best way to face planes such as the Zero, did so on all occasions nor that the Japanese pilots couldnt do anything about it. I find such conclusions sloppy and biased. When evidence is found to the contrary it is dismissed. Just because Sakai for example doesnt present his information in spreadsheet format doesn't mean its any less pertient. Nor was this something written half a century after the conflict ended with memories faded

As for the "numbers" themselves. It is something i do intend to investigate as my interest is piqued. Already i have read one source which questions some of the figures given and already it is dismissed as twaddle (big suprise) It certainly did not, as i related paint the gloomy picture that mdiehl would have us all believe. Such statements as "Sakai probably never even fought a P-39" can be dismissed as the ignorant statement it is.

Even if the numbers are true....it will never justify some of the steps being suggested by my esteemed opponent. I would like to see such a suggestion fielded on other forums just to see the reactions they would entail. Why not suggest that the Luftwaffe always score a 5:1 kill ratio against the Russians? statistically the 'facts' would support such a move. Why not suggest the Germans in an operational level game should always suffer 1:1 losses in tanks during their peak periods? What point, all the myriad of internal factors that games like UV implement in if there is to be some all encompasing rule that restricts one side from ever scoring better than 1:1 all because someone with a book in his hands keeps quoting numbers without qualification other than to say.....a plane that might be 10mph faster assuming its flying level and had time to creep up to maxium speed cant be touched by an enemy aircraft. right.

Utter nonsense. I wont rehash what has already been stated by myself and others. The arguments revloving around the explanation of "kill ratios" is there for all to see.

So its not the numbers i argue against.....it is the premises that are drawn from them. And regardless of what myself or others come up with in the way of explanation or possible explanation, it is always the same answer in reply. quoted stats from a wide variety of combat situations with little to no qualification therin, and when there is, of a highly dubious and questionable nature.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 213
- 7/24/2002 5:11:12 AM   
Joel Billings


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[QUOTE]Originally posted by 1089
[B]

Do you mean the pilots exp must be greater than 70 + rnd(20), in order not to fail the check for accuracy?

kp [/B][/QUOTE]


Yes, that's what I meant. The high experience pilots will never fail this accuracy check. Those with insufficient experience that are disrupted from CAP/flak may fail based on their level of disruption.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 214
- 7/24/2002 5:18:57 AM   
Kavik Kang

 

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Hi again... I know I just happened to get the game and make a few posts right when they were finishing up a new patch. And I could tell when I first mentioned it, that the low level bomber issue had been mentioned before. But I just have to say that in over 20 years of playing games I have never bought a game, had one big problem with it I didn't like, mention it on the board, and have a patch adressing exactly my complaint within 2 weeks!!!

I know it's most just coincidence, but I love you guys anyway:-)

_____________________________

"If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice." -- Neil Peart

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 215
- 7/24/2002 5:19:09 AM   
mdiehl

 

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"The reason i dont come up with the "numbers" is because first off, i'm not exactly disputing them though as i've said, i do question their vericity."

Which is a really evasive way of disputing them without actually providing any substantive basis for disputing them.

"The primary point I and others have made is that these "kill ratio" statistics that mdiehl has pulled from his one or two books"

again, the pejorative non-sequitur, noting that the three references I have cited are infinitely more than the *none* that you have cited and three times as many as the *one* to which you have obliquely referred

"... cannot in any way support some of the outlandish and all-encompasing conclusions that he has drawn from them."

None of which I have made. Your extreme charicature of my observations is *your* all-encompassing conclusion, not mine. That's the problem with reductio ad absurdem arguments: you have to be careful when you deploy them. Unless someone actually *makes* the absurd argument, all you've done is mark yourself by fabricating an obvious straw man.

"I dare say that the authors being quoted would agree either if faced with the questions."

In which Nikademus appoints himself to be the spokesmen for the referred sources. I at least have the intellectual honesty not to put words in *their* mouths or, for that matter, *yours.*

"The kill ratios say nothing about the conditions that were being fought..."

*That,* at least, is true. Indeed, my whole point about the early war Allied losses rests upon the observation that the conditions in which they fought, vis, logistics and supply, surprise, and numerical inferiority, had alot to do with early Japanese success. A focus on the numerical losses might go a long way to illustrate some of the similarities (and differences) not only in plane and pilot quality, but also the circumstances that mitigated in favor of one side or the other.

".. how much time the respective sides had (for example, Guadalcanal....at the limit of the Zero's range with about 10-15 minutes time over the target..."

With, in most cases, numerical superiority, often (but not most of the time) with the element of surprise, in combats that for any given plane/pilot, probably lasted less than 3 minutes.

"...and certainly do not support such claims that all Japanese aircraft were junk..."

Not a claim that I've made.

"...and that their pilots were subpar."

Not a claim that I've made for 1942.

"Nor do i agree with such all-encompasing asertations that the Allies knew even before the war started the best way to face planes such as the Zero..."

Not a claim that I've made. They trained for tactics that were superior with or without the Zeke in the equation.

"...did so on all occasions..."

Not a claim that I've made.

"...nor that the Japanese pilots couldnt do anything about it."

In the long run, vis, the A6M vs. P40 or F4F, they were unable to do anything about it.

"When evidence is found to the contrary it is dismissed."

You've not offered any. You've yet to actually state even one source for your opinion.

"Just because Sakai for example doesnt present his information in spreadsheet format doesn't mean its any less pertient."

If I want to know what is the best way to fly a Zeke, Sakai is a great source. If I want a strategic assessment of the relative merits of the a/c, the training, or the pilots, Sakai is a lousy source because his information is anecdotal, unresearched (in re Allied losses) and has not been verified.

"Nor was this something written half a century after the conflict ended with memories faded."

Irrelevant. Pilot claims about victories are as notoriously unreliable on the day they engage as they are 50 years later.

"As for the "numbers" themselves. It is something i do intend to investigate as my interest is piqued."

Outstanding!

"Already i have read one source which questions some of the figures given..."

Do tell. And that is? Your source has critically reviewed either the numbers in Guadalcanal by Frank or the two sources by Lundstrom? It's an authoritative, peer-reviewed book or journal article? Please share.

"Sakai probably never even fought a P-39" can be dismissed as the ignorant statement it is."

Name the Allied unit to which the P39 was assigned that Sakai fought. Do it. What's holding you back?

"Even if the numbers are true....i[extended]..."

Imposing a 1:1 kill ratio limit is a better model than one that produces wildly skewed results in roughly historical situations. Clearly not the best, or the only, solution.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 216
- 7/24/2002 5:43:57 AM   
Joel Billings


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[QUOTE]Originally posted by elmo3
[B]Thanks for the update Joel. Do you know if the PBEM coast watcher bug will be fixed in this patch? [/B][/QUOTE]

I don't know about the coastwatcher PBEM bug. I got involved with this patch because of the level bomber problem. Mike had already made many other changes, but I don't see one listed on the patch notes that has to do with coastwatchers. At this point unless the patch gets bounced out of testing in the next few hours, it is frozen. Do you have a thread to point me at that details a coastwatcher problem?

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 217
- 7/24/2002 5:51:19 AM   
dpstafford


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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Joel Billings
[B]I don't know about the coastwatcher PBEM bug. I got involved with this patch because of the level bomber problem. Mike had already made many other changes, but I don't see one listed on the patch notes that has to do with coastwatchers. At this point unless the patch gets bounced out of testing in the next few hours, it is frozen. Do you have a thread to point me at that details a coastwatcher problem? [/B][/QUOTE]

I'm not sure there is a "coastwatcher" bug. The combat resolution / reply sequence no longer identifies coastwatchers by name when TF's are sighted, but I thought that might be because the resolution / reply file is the same for both IJN and USN players. A compromise to the "fog of war".
Or I could be comletely off track.

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Post #: 218
- 7/24/2002 6:42:31 AM   
elmo3

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Joel Billings
[B]

... Do you have a thread to point me at that details a coastwatcher problem? [/B][/QUOTE]

Yup, and thanks for the reply:

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=22272

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 219
- 7/25/2002 12:02:57 AM   
dgaad

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Nikademus
[B]

So its not the numbers i argue against.....it is the premises that are drawn from them. And regardless of what myself or others come up with in the way of explanation or possible explanation, it is always the same answer in reply. quoted stats from a wide variety of combat situations with little to no qualification therin, and when there is, of a highly dubious and questionable nature. [/B][/QUOTE]

IIRC mdiehls numbers were being used to dispute your claim/premise that the Zero was a much better plane in the theater / time period of the first 6-12 months of the war. IIRC no one is asking that raw kill ratios be used, but that the best estimate of genuine air to air combat losses be used to estimate the relative effectiveness of pilots and planes. IIRC these numbers do not bear out the (your) claim that the Zero was a much better plane or piloted by vastly superior pilots in the period we are talking about.

Your response to this general line of presentation has been to dispute validity without providing alternatives, or evasiveness. This is okay though. When something strikes me as "wrong" and I don't have any hard evidence to back up my instinct, this is what I do to. I make my best guess and try to back it up with logic.

Your instinct is that the Zero had superior manuverability, range, and with an experienced pilot was a formidable opponent, particularly if the opponent was not aware of any of the Zero's weaknesses. This was largely the case early in the war. Its also true in this period there were far fewer total sorties (both sides) than there were later in the war. Even mdiehl admits, obliquely, that for about a 3 month period (Jan-March 42) the kill ratios were very favorable to the Japanese.

As time went on, allied pilots became more experienced, the weaknesses of the Zeros became more generally known, and the "superiority" of the Zero was exposed as a myth, particularly by exploiting the inferior energy characteristics of that plane. Air to air kill ratios bear out this "curve of superiority", but they do not support the general claim that, objectively, the Zero was a superior craft. I do agree that it is a classic of the war, for reasons I spoke of in earlier posts.

_____________________________

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Post #: 220
- 7/25/2002 1:09:36 AM   
Nikademus


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"Imposing a 1:1 kill ratio limit is a better model than one that produces wildly skewed results in roughly historical situations. Clearly not the best, or the only, solution."


Nothing can ever justify the imposing of an artificial rule that states that it is impossible for one side to win an engagement regardless of situation and that the "best" it can hope for is a draw. It defeats the entire purpose of combat resolution in the first place unless one considers resolving how badly the one side will meet defeat each time it squares off with the enemy. I would not advocate such a rule in any situation, any type of combat or any nationality.


"Name the Allied unit to which the P39 was assigned that Sakai fought. Do it. What's holding you back?"


well since you asked so nicely; 8PG

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 221
- 7/25/2002 1:13:10 AM   
Nikademus


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[QUOTE]Originally posted by dgaad
[B]

IIRC mdiehls numbers were being used to dispute your claim/premise that the Zero was a much better plane in the theater / time period of the first 6-12 months of the war. IIRC no one is asking that raw kill ratios be used, but that the best estimate of genuine air to air combat losses be used to estimate the relative effectiveness of pilots and planes. IIRC these numbers do not bear out the (your) claim that the Zero was a much better plane or piloted by vastly superior pilots in the period we are talking about.

Your response to this general line of presentation has been to dispute validity without providing alternatives, or evasiveness. This is okay though. When something strikes me as "wrong" and I don't have any hard evidence to back up my instinct, this is what I do to. I make my best guess and try to back it up with logic.

Your instinct is that the Zero had superior manuverability, range, and with an experienced pilot was a formidable opponent, particularly if the opponent was not aware of any of the Zero's weaknesses. This was largely the case early in the war. Its also true in this period there were far fewer total sorties (both sides) than there were later in the war. Even mdiehl admits, obliquely, that for about a 3 month period (Jan-March 42) the kill ratios were very favorable to the Japanese.

As time went on, allied pilots became more experienced, the weaknesses of the Zeros became more generally known, and the "superiority" of the Zero was exposed as a myth, particularly by exploiting the inferior energy characteristics of that plane. Air to air kill ratios bear out this "curve of superiority", but they do not support the general claim that, objectively, the Zero was a superior craft. I do agree that it is a classic of the war, for reasons I spoke of in earlier posts. [/B][/QUOTE]

A fair accessment. My only correction would be to assert that the Zero's superiority was not a "myth" but a case sensitive situation which could be negated by the Intel level, experience, equipment and overall opening situation of the enemy side it was fighting.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 222
- 7/25/2002 1:23:50 AM   
mdiehl

 

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"Even mdiehl admits, obliquely, that for about a 3 month period (Jan-March 42) the kill ratios were very favorable to the Japanese."

Indeed, I suspect they were. I'm digging for hard numbers, and having a difficult time coming up with an authoritative source.

The only reason why I'm digging is that at one time Nik and I would have agreed about the general superiority of the Zeke vs P40 or F4F and the general superiority of Japanese exp/training. As I kept reading, I kept finding instances in the early war that bucked the received wisdom, leading me into Lundstrom's research.

Somewhere along the line I came to the following question. If the A6M was superior and Japanese pilots were superior, how is it that US navy pilots managed to consistently shoot down as many or more Zekes than they lost in F4Fs? This seems to have been true starting in February 1942 (Lundstom: The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign, page 4, notes the loss of 16 Zekes in direct confrontations with Wildcats, with the loss of 10 F4Fs, in the interval IIRC 1 February through 1 June 1942).

So now I'm trying to figure out just how badly the various Allied *army* air forces in the Burma/Malaya/PI/Indonesia/Darwin and Port Moresby areas fared, and what the specific cirsumstances were. How many a/c lost in combat with Japanese fighters and of what type, rather than to ground fire, operationally, absence of parts, voluntarily destroyed, etc. And what numbers of a/c were involved? In which engagements was tactical surprise a factor? Was Allied radar present and operational at the time of an engagement?

Also, how does one model the learning curve effect? It seems to me to have spread like a virus. Much faster than the EXP gain rates modeled by GGPW, and possibly much faster than the rates posited by UV. Clearly, a pilot in, say, October 1942, need not have actually flown an engagement against an Oscar or Zeke to have heard and taken to heart the general admonition to keep one's airspeed up.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 223
- 7/25/2002 1:31:31 AM   
mdiehl

 

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"Nothing can ever justify the imposing of an artificial rule that states that it is impossible for one side to win an engagement regardless of situation and that the "best" it can hope for is a draw. It defeats the entire purpose of combat resolution in the first place unless one considers resolving how badly the one side will meet defeat each time it squares off with the enemy. I would not advocate such a rule in any situation, any type of combat or any nationality."

Look. All the rules are "artificial." That makes them all equally subject to rejection and testing. It really does not matter how much detail is in the equation that resolves combat outcomes, if the assumptions underlying each piece of detail are incorrect, such that relatively historical engagements result in manifestly ahistorical results *consistently.* In that event I'll take a hyper-simplistic "simulation" (the hypothetically imposed 1:1 loss ratio maximum) that provides roughly historical results over a complex simulation that attempts to throw in a variable for every initial condition but produces incorrect results. (That'd be GGPW. I've read some really wierd UV AARs that suggest that the problem still exists.)

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 224
- 7/25/2002 2:15:58 AM   
Nikademus


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"Look. All the rules are "artificial." That makes them all equally subject to rejection and testing. It really does not matter how much detail is in the equation that resolves combat outcomes, if the assumptions underlying each piece of detail are incorrect, such that relatively historical engagements result in manifestly ahistorical results *consistently.* In that event I'll take a hyper-simplistic "simulation" (the hypothetically imposed 1:1 loss ratio maximum) that provides roughly historical results over a complex simulation that attempts to throw in a variable for every initial condition but produces incorrect results. (That'd be GGPW. I've read some really wierd UV AARs that suggest that the problem still exists)"

Not in the way you are suggesting. The rules are only artificial in the sense that a numbers game is being calcuated out in an attempt to resolve a real life situation between machines of war and flesh and blood. As such there of course, will be inaccuracies as no amount of computation can totally predict what the outcome will be.

It is a far different thing to impose a limit, or a rule or whatever you want to call it that says one side cannot......"absolutely" cannot win an engagement, because some sources contest that the first (and only) go around some debatable kill ratio from whatever source says it happened a certain way. But the debatable part is irrelevent. You simply cannot have a credible wargame when you make statements from the start that says such things as "oh by the way, your airforce? it cant win any air engagements.....regardless of pilot exp, fatique, morale, plane , position etc etc etc. sorry kid, you might pull even losses but thats the best you can hope for."

As i've said in the past....try suggesting a similar type situation in other areas of the conflict. how about a rule that states that during an early war period.....5 IJN Destoyers at night will automatically defeat 5 USN destroyers? How about a similar rule that imposes something similar on the ground combat? Seem ridiculous? not really. There's been alot of complaining in that dept too....on how the IJN doesnt seem to dominate enough despite having better exp ratings. You dont see me or anyone else suggesting some all encompasing "rule" put in place to counter this. Its part of the uncertainy of war.

No. I cant agree on such an absolute. I cant speak for all the AAR's. However i can speak for my own campaign. I havn't seen such a disparant phenomenom in regards to the Zero or any IJN/IJA fighter. Hell if all will recall, the reason Matrix added all those additional air combat msgs was due to player complaints that their air forces were'nt dominating enough, wern't shooting down the enemy in droves.....a couple even wailed against the seeming inability of their zeros to decimate and dominate air bases like Port Morosby which prompted Matrix to wax poetic about all the factors that were going on "under the hood". Far more than simple unit (or in UV's case. indiv pilot) experience, morale and fatique.

Even GGPW wasn't so bad when one considered that on average 1/2 to 3/4 of all allied air "casualties" were in fact actually just damaging hits leaving plane and pilot intact to fight another day. At least, thats what i saw in my AAR's. Inevitably, in any high attrition environment, IJN/A exp ratings dropped steadily as pilots were slowly and not so slowly killed by the law of averages thats too the low probability of their planes only recieving damage as opposed to outright destruction.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 225
- 7/25/2002 2:26:55 AM   
mdiehl

 

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All right then. We'll just have to agree to disagree about what's the best way to fix a broken simulation when one is found to be broken.

Here's two quick and dirty substantiating web links about USN team tactics that establish:

1. The use of the 2 plane section by the USN in 1941 for the purpose of mutual support and the use of team tactics, and the known inferiority of the 3 plane section.

2. The origin of the "beam defense" (a.k.a. Thach Weave as Flatley later named it) which was developed in 1941 by Thach as a response to attributed Zero performance in China and ME109 performance in the ETO. Since it predates the start of US involvement in the war by about 6 months, it can't be attributed to bitter lessons learned by US pilots facing Zekes.

3. That USN tactics in 1940, 1941, were substantially influenced by the BoB and in-place prior to 7 December 1942.

4. That USN F4Fs bested A6Ms in direct engagements at Midway.

http://www.history.navy.mil/download/ww2-25.pdf

and

http://www.centurytel.net/midway/appendix/appendixfourteen_usvftac.html

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 226
- 7/25/2002 2:57:36 AM   
mdiehl

 

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By the way, thanks for the reference to the 8th PG. So far, I've been able to determine that itw as deployed to PM in May 1942, with 3 groups -- the 35th, 366th or 36th, nad 80th. Of these, the 80th was equipped with P39s, and did not engage in any combat until 22 July 1942, having lost 4 P39s in training accidents. On 22 July, they lost 1 p39 to flak from a Japanese DD. Several Japanese air-raids occurred in late July, early August, with several attempted interceptions but no combats. Apparently the Betties and Zekes were operating around angels 20-22, way out of the reach of P39s, and did not come down.

The first direct engagement I can find mentioned (although I need to find out more about the 36th and 35th PG) was 26 August 1942, in a raid by PM P39s of the 80th PG against a Japanese airfield. On that day, the losses were 4 Zekes to 1 P39. Admittedly one of those situations where the "initial conditions" (being bushwacked by a pack of P39s) hardly favored the Japanese. But, as the Japanese planes were neither parked nor even in a landing circle, they should have been operating in their favored airspeed/maneuverability box.

While I do not dispute that the P39 was a dog, this is one datapoint that somewhat refutes the contention that the Zeke was an incredible P39 killer. It may simply be that local circumstances greatly outweighed pilot experience or plane qualities in this case, but then the same kind of observation probably applies to many of the early-war engagements in which Zekes prevailed.

Apparently the 80th lost 1 P39 to Zekes during the entire war. The rest of the losses were in ground-attack missions.

The link:
http://www.mindspring.com/~jaybirdone/headhunters/wwii.htm

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 227
- 7/25/2002 2:59:17 AM   
Jeremy Pritchard

 

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There are many reasons for the high loss rate of Japanese aircraft when compared to that of Allied aircraft.

One might theorize that since more Japanese aircraft were lost in the Solomans campaign then the Allies lost that it must speak something of pilot and aircraft quality.

However, other factors must be taken into account.

1. Bases:

The Japanese were not known for their effective base contruction. One of the reasons they did so well in the Philippines, Malaya and the East Indies was that they captured fully intact air bases that could be made operational in a matter of hours. In the Solomans they had to build their own bases, whic proved to not only of poorer quality, but took much longer than Allied airbases. The USMC managed to get Henderson field operational in a fraction of the time that it was taking the Japanese, and they also expanded it to accomodate more aircraft.

2. Range:

The main operational base in this region was Rabul. There were some minor fields built on New Guinea, but never reached the operational status as Rabul did. Henderson field was one of many US Fields built in the region. On their main strikes in the Soloman Islands the Japanese were forced to travel long distances, where they were a prey not only to fatigue, short duration over the target but to engine problems and effects of damage. An Allied plane damaged in operation could make it to a friendly base, because of their closeness and number, while a Japanese aircraft had to fly long distances, and in most cases were lost.

3. Durability

Allied aircraft can take much more punishment than Japanese aircraft. An P-40 can take a few bursts of the 2 7.7mm guns of the Ki-43 and still fly as if nothing happened, but a single burst from the P-40 can send a Ki-43 down in a flaming ball of wreckage. This is probably a shortcoming of the design being its poor defensive capability, but does not mean tha the P-40 was a better FLYER than the Ki-43. The Ki-43 could get in firing position of a P-40 many times, hitting it, without sending it down, but if a P-40 gets behind a Ki-43 once and hits it, then chances are the Ki-43 is gone.


So, the Allies had the benefit of better bases, more bases, and that their bases were closer to the point of battle as well as tougher aircraft, with more guns, that can afford to be hit once and a while whereas Japanese aircraft should avoid all bullets, and has fewer and lighter guns then their opponent.


One of the main reasons why we are not experiencing this same historical limitations on the Japanese Air Force is primarily because of the limitations of the code. In Pacific War, an airbase was an airbase, and the Japanese could build them as fast and as good as the Allies. Nobody in their right mind would leave Rabul as the only airbase in the Soloman Islands, but would build a series of them as quickly as possible all along the island chain in early 1942 (which was not histirically done until 1943, when it was too late). Also, in Pacific War fatigue is not measured. It does not matter if an air strike is set 2 hexes, or 10 hexes from the main base, the attackers will be at a constant readiness.

I cannot say anything for Uncommon Valour, but it looks like many of the same arguments can be held as for PacWar. You cannot say to a Japanese player that they cannot build a base where they want to. They have hindsite that can make their forces fight at a higher state of readiness and ability than historically through acceptable means.

Just try to have Rabul as your only main base of operations for most of 1942 and see how well the IJNAF behaves.



Looking at your websites, it does not necessarily prove anything outright. It states that the Thatch Weave was developed 6 months before the war, however, was not in universal practice when the war began. In fact, it was not even in full use in Midway (it was being used in training but had not reached the majority of pilots). It even states that without this tactic, being implemented as the war progressed, was the only thing keeping the quality of the A6M and Ki-43 from savaging the F4F and P-40. It even went to state that the A6M and Ki-43 were hindered by the use of obsolete formations and individual attack patterns, not by their equipment.

It seems that the battle of Midway, when the tactic was proven to work, did it start to be used by a wide range of pilots. However, this does not mean that the Allied aircraft were better, just that they eventually used a better tactic. Still, these articles neglected to mention the actual situations at hand did hinder Japanese operations. At Midway, when the Japanese encountered USN Aviation they had already been on CAP or missions against Midway itself while the Allied pilots were comparatively fresh and rested. In the Solomans, the same fatigue imposed on Japanese pilots was felt due to their fighting at extreme ranges, much like the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain suffered, and who also used 4 plane flights. Indeed, the British used the obsolete 3 plane flight during the Battle of Britain and still managed to win and get positive fighter to fighter kill ratios. Yet, the pilot quality can definitely be put on the side of the Germans (who had, on the most part, between 1 and 4 years combat experience) and aircraft quality generally equal.


If the game is changed so that every action in UV results in a 1.5:1 kill ratio then what would the point of playing the game be? There were reasons why this ratio came into being beyond aircraft tactics and aircraft types, but due to deployment and base location. These last two can be easily manipulated by the player as to maximize the ability of their airforce beyond what was experienced historically.

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Post #: 228
- 7/25/2002 3:29:28 AM   
mdiehl

 

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Jeremy, it's clear that the USN was training its pilots in mutual defense in late 1941. The "Thach weave" is one of many kinds of weave, and as you say employed first, and successfully, at Midway. At Coral Sea the Zeke vs. F4F losses were much closer to 1:1. At Santa Cruz and Eastern Solomons the USN F4Fs inflicted much higher losses on their IJN Zeke-flying counterparts.

When we're talking naval engagements in 1942, the situational circumstances that you and Nik emphasize were reversed. Generally, the carrier battles in 1942 were fought at or near the limit of F4F range and well withing the comfortable operational radius of the Zeke.

As to the rest, I repeat I do not dispute that the Zeke's vulnerability was flimsy construction, inadequate firepower, and bad high-speed performance. Nor do I disupte that local circumstances can mitigate against differences in pilot ability or a/c performance.

BUT. And this is the big BUT. If you can't prove that the Zekes routinely won, then you can't necessarily claim that they had any kind of advantage. You can't disprove, for example, that USN pilot training and doctrine were superior despite the F4Fs poor maneuverability at low speed. Indeed, since the circumstances of carrier based fighter engagements tended to favor the IJN (with respect to range and numbers engaged), I'm led to think the USN training/doctrine was somewhat better, initially, and as attrition also affected the Japanese pilot pool, the USN advantage was even greater.

"So, the Allies had the benefit of better bases, more bases, and that their bases were closer to the point of battle as well as tougher aircraft, with more guns, that can afford to be hit once and a while whereas Japanese aircraft should avoid all bullets, and has fewer and lighter guns then their opponent."

That is *manifestly* wrong on several accounts. Rabaul, Gasmata and Buna were much larger and more heavily defended (by flak) bases than the PM airfields or Henderson. And those were the only two US airbases in the combat area for a considerable amount of time. So Japan had in fact more bases, larger bases, and in some cases better-supplied bases.

US bases were as you point out closer to the battle. This did not affect shoot-down rates as much as it affected pilot survivorship, IMO. When radar gave the Allies an advantage it helped them achieve a superior position, at-start, but the burden of hitting the bombers tends to result in the defending forces losing fighters at a greater rate than the escorts (at least that's how it routinely played out in the 8th AAF campaign in the ETO). So I view some of these circumstances as equivocal.

Why is it so hard to contemplate that some of the logistical, numerical and (very late in 1942) base advantages enjoyed by the Allies might have favored the Japanese through April 1942?

If so, *maayyybe,* the Allied army fighter losses in, say, Indonesia and Malaya are less attributable to superior Japanese pilots & equipment than to these same situational advantages.

In that event, *mmaaaaybe* a sim that posits that Japanese pilots were superior (vis. routinely much higher EXP values) are just plain wrong.

P.S. If Sakai actually fought a P39, it was not in the 8th Pursuit Group. They were the 35th (P40), 36th (P400), and 80th (P39) Fighter Squadrons (USAAF). The first P39 lost in these groups was lost on 26 August in a raid against a Japanese a/f (not Rabaul, where Sakai was statinoed at the time). About this time, Sakai was grievously wounded in a raid on Henderson, when he mistook a tight group of SBDs for TBDs. If he saw P39s at Moresby, the closest he came was about 7000 feet of vertical separation.

Sakai may have encountered the P400s of the 36th. These are essentially P39s (an export version) with, varying pieces of equipment removed. Outwardly a P39, however, so the mistake would be a perfectly forgivable one.

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Post #: 229
- 7/25/2002 12:51:19 PM   
dgaad

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Nikademus
[B]

A fair accessment. My only correction would be to assert that the Zero's superiority was not a "myth" but a case sensitive situation which could be negated by the Intel level, experience, equipment and overall opening situation of the enemy side it was fighting. [/B][/QUOTE]

Wow. I may have succeeded in finding commonality. It was not a "myth" in the classic meaning of that word. I will assert that given an equal, high level of training, evenly matched pilots flying, say, a P40 versus a Zero, the P40 would probably prevail due to slightly better energy characteristics which give the craft the ability to determine the flow of the air engagement. You can't get into a dogfight with a plane that flys 10-15mph faster than you, unless the other guy is just dumb.

However, see my below comment, Nik.

[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]"Even mdiehl admits, obliquely, that for about a 3 month period (Jan-March 42) the kill ratios were very favorable to the Japanese."

Indeed, I suspect they were. I'm digging for hard numbers, and having a difficult time coming up with an authoritative source.

The only reason why I'm digging is that at one time Nik and I would have agreed about the general superiority of the Zeke vs P40 or F4F and the general superiority of Japanese exp/training. As I kept reading, I kept finding instances in the early war that bucked the received wisdom, leading me into Lundstrom's research.

Somewhere along the line I came to the following question. If the A6M was superior and Japanese pilots were superior, how is it that US navy pilots managed to consistently shoot down as many or more Zekes than they lost in F4Fs? This seems to have been true starting in February 1942 (Lundstom: The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign, page 4, notes the loss of 16 Zekes in direct confrontations with Wildcats, with the loss of 10 F4Fs, in the interval IIRC 1 February through 1 June 1942).

So now I'm trying to figure out just how badly the various Allied *army* air forces in the Burma/Malaya/PI/Indonesia/Darwin and Port Moresby areas fared, and what the specific cirsumstances were. How many a/c lost in combat with Japanese fighters and of what type, rather than to ground fire, operationally, absence of parts, voluntarily destroyed, etc. And what numbers of a/c were involved? In which engagements was tactical surprise a factor? Was Allied radar present and operational at the time of an engagement?

Also, how does one model the learning curve effect? It seems to me to have spread like a virus. Much faster than the EXP gain rates modeled by GGPW, and possibly much faster than the rates posited by UV. Clearly, a pilot in, say, October 1942, need not have actually flown an engagement against an Oscar or Zeke to have heard and taken to heart the general admonition to keep one's airspeed up. [/B][/QUOTE]

You are diving at and going after exactly what is needed in this entire discussion : objectivity and rationality.

I think you are on the right track when you talk about what exactly was the level of knowledge of the corps US fighter pilots. What did they know, and when did they know it? I think you are on the right track when you are looking at the problem from the perspective that its entirely possible that the correct tactics might have been known even before December 7th, but that they might not have gotton out to all the pilots. The kind of things we know about in the present day with respect to fighter training and the huge effort the US government puts forth to make sure pilots know everything they need to know as soon as they possibly can, regardless of whether we are "at war" or in a hostile situation somewhere, was NOT the kind of situation we had in the year before the war. Training was done, but I don't think you can say with absolute certainty that EVERY pilot knew that energy attacks (or whatever was effective for their situation) were the way to go. Standardised requirements and methods, along with the necessary support, for extensive, excellent fighter pilot training programs wasn't really in place until about mid-1942.

So, its quite possible that entire squadrons of US pilots had had no formalised instruction on the efficacy of energy attacks against the Zero, and may not have even heard of the Thach Weave. Even if they had had such instruction, actually using this type of attack takes a tremendous amount of discipline, especially given the mentality of young fighter pilots.

And, given that as well, it is at least possible from an objective viewpoint that generally speaking the outcomes for Zero encounters were largely favorable until the training and flow of information gaps were rectified.

However, I also agree mdiehl that we are to some extent dealing with popular conceptions that insidiously seep into even organized thinkers, popular conceptions like the bushido / samurai Zero pilot who could with his "legendary" Zero, shoot down a bunch of Dakotas painted to look something like a fighter because the movie budget couldn't afford a real F4F. So, its also quite possible that there were a number of squadrons, even early in the war, that would have been a match for the Zero, and this in fact does fly in the face of more popular conceptions of that period of history.

Last point : keep in mind that unless most of the pilots were trained in and disciplined enough to use only energy attacks, a furball could well result in a favorable kill ratio for the Zero. My guess is that it wasn't until mid-to-late 1942 when we could say with a degree of certainty this was the case for a US fighter squadron.

_____________________________

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(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 230
Re: Re: Yes... - 7/25/2002 7:08:09 PM   
panda124c

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by dgaad
[B]

You are quite wrong. Level bombers used in the low level skip bombing role were probably responsible for the destruction of more transport than any other class of weapon except submarines in the Pacific. Basing an assessment of the relative threat posed by medium bombers to your ships based on a story about an attack on the most heavily armored ship of WWII is inadvisable. [/B][/QUOTE]

Not quite wrong during the early part of the war level Bombers (read meduim) were used in the way they were designed for, bombing at altitude to destroy targests. When it was discovered that this did not work against moving ships and airfield were easy to repair 'Pappy' Gunn came up with the idea of using them at low levels to take out aircraft on the airfield (good pilots are of no importance if they have no plane to fly) and against ships, the potential losses were accatible since the possibility of sinking the ship was high. Yes is is accatible to trade one medium bomber for one ship. B-26s were not used for this type of attack (I can't find any referece to it) they were used as level bombers to attack land targets such as Rabaul where they were succusful. B-17s were used as stratigic bombers attacking suppy sources repair facilities and communications centers.

Aircraft classification time. the B-26, B-25 were classed as Med Bombers, the A-20 was classed as a Light Attack Bomber. The B-25s took over this role as the war progressed. The Med bombers was designed to bomb from medium altitude targets such as rail centers, supply centers, airfields, docks, repair centers and such. The A-20 Light Attack Bomber was designed to attack at low altitude rail centers, rail lines, supply vehicals, airfields, docks, troop concentrations more tactical targest. These differences merged and dissapeared during the war so you ended up with B-25's skip bombing, and A-20 doing level bombing.

The whole crux of the B-17 matter is no one knows how good a B-17 is at low altitude against ships, since it was not done in reality so we have no data to base a model on. Anything else is best guest.


Just a side note the British deployed a squadron of Mosquitos to Australia that were outfitted with the anti-shipping version of the Barns Wallis 'Dam Buster' bombs. They were never used because no one could come up with a defense against them. Can I use them in the game.:D :D :D

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 231
- 7/25/2002 7:15:20 PM   
panda124c

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by thantis
[B]A great description of this entire encounter can be found in "A Glorious Way to Die" the Kamikaze Mission of the Battleship Yamato. [/B][/QUOTE]

Another discription can be found in the book "Destroyer Captain" by the commander of the YAHAGI. IIRC

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 232
- 7/25/2002 8:38:57 PM   
byron13


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Actually, I think it's "Japanese Destroyer Captain" by Tameichi Hara - or at least that was the title when I read it oh, so many years ago as a kid. I also apologize for probably butchering his first name.

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Post #: 233
- 7/25/2002 9:14:38 PM   
byron13


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MDiehl:

Your one cite to a website regarding the Thach weave also seems to support what your opponents have being saying about training pilots in boom-n-zoom tactics. I don't believe that U.S pilots - army or navy - were trained in these tactics but were, instead, planning on fighting a traditional furball. I admit right up front that, like everyone else, I don't have references to back that up.

However, the article you cite to seems to support this. First, it states that the Zero "enjoyed a long period of virtual absolute superiority over the Army Air Force's P-36, P-39, and P-40 fighters in the early days . . . ." So much, apparently, for the 1:1 kill ratio. Or at least the author, LtCdr Parsons, thinks so. He further states that the AVG was the only outfit to have notable success against the Zero in the first six months of the war.

Second it clearly indicates that Chennault was considered radical for his theories of slashing attack. He also states that this was "unorthodox for conventional fighter tactical thinking." This says to me that pilots were not trained in this type of tactic - or more accurately, that it was not doctrine. This type of comment on Chennault being on of the first to develop slashing tactics was certainly the conventional wisdom when I was growing up in the sixties, and most conventional wisdom has its genesis with actual participants. I haven't read "God Is My Co-Pilot" in decades; what does he say?

I think it is also significant that Thach's answer to the manueverability problem faced by Wildcat pilots was not to use the superior diving characteristics of the Wildcat, but to create a defensive weave that would have conceded the initiative to the enemy and was only a little better than the Lufberry. Big difference between that and your argument that Navy pilots were trained, as a matter of doctrine, to use the few advantages the Wildcat did have.

I'm enjoying watching this argument immensely and only wish I had the time to actually research the subject more completely.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 234
- 7/25/2002 9:46:09 PM   
mdiehl

 

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"I don't believe that U.S pilots - army or navy - were trained in these tactics but were, instead, planning on fighting a traditional furball. I admit right up front that, like everyone else, I don't have references to back that up."

Well, that the USN was training for teamwork is evident not only by the web site that I mentioned but also the concluding chapters in the two books written by Lundstrom. IIRC, in The 1st Team at Guadalcanal he speicifcally attributes F4F success there to teamwork and excellent training in deflection shooting. Then of course there is the fundamental reorganization from the 3-plane section to the 2-plane section in 1941... a reorganization that specifically occurred to allow planes to fly mroe effectively in mutual support.

The particular maneuver, the "beam defense" or Thach Weave was one particularly effective maneuver that, as I understand the various books, let outnumbered F4Fs fight very effectively. It was not the only kind of weave, nor was it the only way for F4F pilots to provide mutual-support. Indeed, Lundstrom's book on Guadalcanal clearly shows that many VMF F4F pilots had not been trained in that *specific* maneuver. They had, nevertheless, been trained to attempt to provide mutual support and that is clear from the pilot intervies, the tactics and, IMO, the long-term outcome of the campaign.

The VF F4F pilots on the other hand seem nevere to have lost, if one defines "lost" meaning lost mroe fighters than fighters shot down, at *any* time in 1942. So, quite clearly, both discipline, teamwork, and tactics combined to make *CV* based US fighters the equal or superior of the Zeke. You can't write thos fights off as occurring in conditions adverse to the Japanese, since the Midway engagements (well, over Kido Butai, anyhow occurred at the extreme limit of F4F operational range.

Also, I would not say the F4F's tactic is best described as boom and zoom. If they had the altitude advantage they could apply that tactic. In many engagements they did not have that advantage. For an F4F, "good altitude," say 10000 feet or more, is a defensive advantage because you can dive out if you realize you are in peril, and the Zeke can't follow. From what I've read, it was not the case that F4F pilots at Cactus tried maneuvering to escape peril. The seem in almost every case to have dived out, in most cases losing their pursuers in the process. This may be because one does not need to ever have fought a Zeke to know that their F4F dives like a brick with a purpose. Likewise, one does not need to have fought a Zeke to know that in general it is always preferable to maintain a high airspeed. It was already generally known that a plane with higher airspeed in general had the advantage.

Moreover, the Zeke's reputation as a highly maneuverable a/c was well-known, so there is compelling reason to believe that US pilots had a fair if not precise idea of what to expect from the A6M.

Finally look at the engagements at Guadalcanal, Coral Sea and Midway. I'm not sure what you mean by a "furball." It's a phrase that cutely evokes a sort of Warner Bros cat-and-dog fight. But almost nothing in the literature of F4F combat in 1942 describes an action that fits that phrase (except, of course, the handlful of F4Fs and the F2s based on Midway Island). You don't see Allied pilots forming Lufbery circles, attempting immelmans, wasting much time trying to turn inside a Zeke.

So, what it comes down to is that I'm not conceding anything insofar as VF and VMF F4F pilots are concerned. They were at the very least the equals of the Japanese pilots with respect to situational awarness, flying to their a/c's strengths, and they had as everybiody knows a more durable mount, better armed and (and here's something that is *NOT* in the algebraic determination of air combat, they had superior formations and superior doctrine).

As to the rest:

Look at the darned a/c listed. The P36? Give me a break. Who ever said that the P36 was a match for the Zero. Even Sakai in a P36 would be ina a world of trouble facing *any* garden avriety American aviator in a Zero. The P39? Again, not contest. (One would wish that the P39's blower had been retained!!).

The P40? That's basically the research I'm trying to acquire. I no longer trust generalized statements like "virtual absolute superiority over the .. P40." People *used* to (some still do) say that about the F4F and they were wrong. Erik Shilling rated the P40B as a much better plane than the A6M (but may never have fought one), and Ford and Bond had no complaints about the *general* characteristics of their P40s.

So, in re the P40, there is now in my mind substantial doubt. I've yet to see a credible source an the actual losses in combat, and then, like Nik, I'd want to know what the general circumstances of the engagements were.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 235
- 7/26/2002 12:15:20 AM   
byron13


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Apologies. I have gotten you off track. My post was meant to reference earlier arguments with Nikademus and others up to six months ago related primarily to the P-40. In general, the argument was that the P-40 maintained around a 1:1 kill ratio in the early days of the war and most particularly that American pilots, at the outbreak of the war, had already been trained to use, or doctrine dictated, the slashing tactics that took advantage of the characteristics of the P-40. I was merely pointing out that the web site referenced does not seem to support these arguments.

You know, the problem with these discussions is that they change so quickly, I can't keep up! In two days, this thread will be arguing over whether the Panther was superior to the T-34.

Was too . . .
Was not . . .
Was too . . .

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 236
Re: Re: Re: Yes... - 7/26/2002 3:02:15 AM   
dgaad

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by pbear
[B]



The whole crux of the B-17 matter is no one knows how good a B-17 is at low altitude against ships, since it was not done in reality so we have no data to base a model on. Anything else is best guest.


.:D :D :D [/B][/QUOTE]


Again, you are quite wrong when you say that no one has data on how good B-17s were at low altitude against ships. B-17s pioneered the skip bombing tactic and were used extensively from September/October 1942 to April 1943 in this role.

_____________________________

Last time I checked, the forums were messed up. ;)

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Post #: 237
Re: Re: Re: Re: Yes... - 7/26/2002 3:17:45 AM   
Raverdave


Posts: 6520
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by dgaad
[B]


pioneered the skip bombing tactic and were used extensively from September/October 1942 to April 1943 in this role. [/B][/QUOTE]

Can you point me some referances regarding the early use of B-17 in the skip bombing role so that I can read up on it?

_____________________________




Never argue with an idiot, he will only drag you down to his level and beat you with experience.

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Post #: 238
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Yes... - 7/26/2002 3:27:19 AM   
dgaad

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Raverdave
[B]

Can you point me some referances regarding the early use of B-17 in the skip bombing role so that I can read up on it? [/B][/QUOTE]

[URL=http://www.afa.org/magazine/valor/1290valor.html]Valor Magazine[/URL]

[URL=http://www.kensmen.com/narr2.html]MacCullar Narrative[/URL]

[URL=http://harrisonheritage.com/adbc/salecker.htm]Salecker Narrative[/URL]

[URL=http://www.users.bigpond.com/stevebirdsall/page4.html]List of books about the B17 which include specific works on Skip Bombing[/URL]

[URL=http://www.discovermilitaryhistory.com/military2/0275945405AMUS259689.shtml]Short Feuer Narrative[/URL]

[URL=http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/history/wwii/combatp.htm]USAF Museum Online History Website[/URL]


That should get you started, and put to rest the minds of the doubters. ;)

_____________________________

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Post #: 239
- 7/26/2002 6:13:14 PM   
panda124c

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by byron13
[B]Actually, I think it's "Japanese Destroyer Captain" by Tameichi Hara - or at least that was the title when I read it oh, so many years ago as a kid. I also apologize for probably butchering his first name. [/B][/QUOTE]

Oops, you are correct, sorry IDRC. :D

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Post #: 240
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