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This runied my day. - 8/13/2002 8:08:10 PM   
Gabby

 

Posts: 67
Joined: 4/26/2002
Status: offline 		I'm playing scen 17 as the American. Things have been going very well. I secured Gili Gili, and Lunga by September, and by the end of December, Lea was sucured, and I was establishing bases in New Georgia.

On top of everything else I had not lost any carriers, while sinking at least 1 CV and 2 CVL's and putting some serious hurt on some other CV's so they would not be bothering me for a few months.

In December I sent the Lexington and Yorktown back to pearl so they could get AA upgrades.

Ops in January were a bit lite, to allow my remaining CV's to fix acculmated sys damage(All 4 were between 12 and 15).

So I get my big new Essex CV, and I send it out with the Hornet, to and a TF of 2 CVE's to cover a landing a Vila. Everything is going well and between the CV's and my fighters in Lunga, Russell Island and Munda, I'm having no trouble keeping the Japaneese air raids in hand.

So guess what happens. Suddenly a Sub shows up and puts not one but TWO toprs into Essex, leaving her at 50+ on sys and flot damage, plus fires at 15.

Well eventally I did get the Essex back to Noumea, and sent her back to Pearl, where she'll be available on 260 days, so I'll never see her again. And now that Lex and Yorktown are ready in Pearl, Cincpac won't send them back. I guess they didn't like the way I sent the last one back, huh?

Well I'll stop my rant now. I just wanted to share this with somepeople who would appricate it. Never waste a good rant, I always say.
Post #: 1
- 8/13/2002 8:15:20 PM   
U2


Posts: 3332
Joined: 7/17/2001
From: Västerås,Sweden
Status: offline 		Hi

Great story and I feel your pain:) Anyway the IJN sub force can be used with a deadly outcome in this game. I once put 5(!) torpedoes in a PBEM buddies USN BB and it sank. My greatest sub victory ever. Banzai!

Dan

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Post #: 2
- 8/13/2002 8:20:22 PM   
Raverdave


Posts: 6520
Joined: 2/8/2002
From: Melb. Australia
Status: offline 		Said it before and I'll say it again....the AI has this habit of bitting you on the a$$ when you least expect it!:D

_____________________________




Never argue with an idiot, he will only drag you down to his level and beat you with experience.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 3
- 8/13/2002 8:47:15 PM   
Mojo

 

Posts: 915
Joined: 2/6/2002
From: Portland, Oregon USA
Status: offline 		I'm not quite as far along in scen 17 as you Gabby but I have this sense of impending doom. I've been seeing Japanese subs shadowing my two carrier TFs and they've been sinking lots of escorts.

My subs get sunk regularly but I've had little luck discouraging the Japanese from engaging in this type of unacceptable behavior.:D

I've actually go so far as to put together sacrificial TFs to engage IJN subs when I move my carrier TFs. It might be gamey and it sure boosts the subs experience levels but since I sank 3 carriers and 3 BBs (including Yamato) in one engagement I'm playing very carefully for the next few months while my available resources ramp up.;)

_____________________________

If something's not working you might want to tunk it a dite.
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(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 4
- 8/13/2002 9:37:05 PM   
Sonny

 

Posts: 2008
Joined: 4/3/2002
Status: offline 		The only time my subs have gotten a shot at a IJN carrier it missed and got sunk. How could he miss something that big?:(

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 5
- 8/13/2002 9:46:17 PM   
Mojo

 

Posts: 915
Joined: 2/6/2002
From: Portland, Oregon USA
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by Sonny
[B]The only time my subs have gotten a shot at a IJN carrier it missed and got sunk. How could he miss something that big?:( [/B][/QUOTE]

Lousy torpedoes.

When I got the Yamato I seriously damaged her and while she was limping back home I sent all the subs in the vicinity to try and stick a fish into her. Five subs enaged over a few days. All missed and all were sunk by escorts. Then just a couple of hexes from Rabaul she sunk.

I was kind of bummed because I figured she had escaped but I knew it would be months before I ever saw her again. I know my neighbors think I'm nuts because I was jumping around yelling when I got that report;)

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If something's not working you might want to tunk it a dite.
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Post #: 6
- 8/13/2002 9:55:30 PM   
dtx

 

Posts: 72
Joined: 8/13/2002
From: Pennsylvania
Status: offline 		Just think about how superbly UV models WWII in this regard. While defective torpedoes servely impeded the effectiveness of US subs (1941-43), the Japanese subs did achieve occasional successes. I'm sure the loss of the Wasp and the Yorktown to subs also "ruined the day" of the US commanders of the time.

The frustrations that American UV commanders feel inregards to the ineffectiveness of their subs is reflective of that felt by US commanders in the war. In other posts, some have complained about the apparent ineffectiveness of various weapon systems in UV - however, this is among UVs greatest strength. In war, Murphy's law is continually triumphant and weapons and the men that use them rarely perform as well as the commander wants them to.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 7
- 8/13/2002 10:33:06 PM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		Japanese subs occasionally got their licks in, as did USN ones in 1942. Leaving aside the high reliability of the M10 torps of the old S-Class, the first Japanese CA lost in combat fell to an American sub.

I am bothered by the notion that IJN subs are having a great time sinking USN escorts, while the USN subs are taking it the other way. That's quite silly. The most likely result of an IJN sub engaging a USN escort is a sunk submarine.

The loss of Yorktown can hardly be credited to great sub doctrine. Yorktown was dead in water at the time. Had a US fleet boat lined up on dead in water Yamato or any other target, the results would have been substantially teh same, even given the crummy 1942 torpedoes.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 8
- 8/14/2002 12:03:29 AM   
Drongo

 

Posts: 2205
Joined: 7/12/2002
From: Melb. Oztralia
Status: offline 		Gabby,

Looks like you have everyone's sympathy and understanding (makes us sound like a bunch of shiela's).

Well, I'm in touch with my feminine side too. IJN sub effectiveness combined with early (and in your case, late) USN escort ineffectiveness never makes a pretty picture for the allied player in UV. I think most of us just grin and bear it. And swear a lot too (of course, my feminine side makes me say OH POO instead of OH XXXX).

Not saying it is the case but I've thought for a while that the problem lies with the fact that anti sub capability seems heavily tied to experience. This gives the IJN escorts an A/S killing power that never quite sat right with what I'd read. I'd bet the historical IJN escorts would have loved to have had that when they were trying to deal with the USN subs that were carving up their charges later in the war.

I was wondering what were other player's opinions on the idea of petitioning (pestering) Matrix for the introduction of a seperate experience rating for ASW (if this has been discussed before, apologies). I know UV probably won't get it but if people think it's worthwhile, we may get it into WITP. A seperate ASW rating would mean allied escorts could benefit from 2 years of Atlantic ASW knowledge (and in some cases, experience) without affecting their other experience ratings (which I assumed were supposed to represent day/night surface combat). It would also stop IJN escorts benefitting from their other ratings and give them an ASW effectiveness closer to what would be indicated by their historical results.

Probably a pipe dream but I was still interested in what people thought.

Oh well, off to bed now (a girl needs her beauty sleep).

P.S. Originally posted by mdiehl

[QUOTE]The loss of Yorktown can hardly be credited to great sub doctrine. Yorktown was dead in water at the time. [/QUOTE]

mdiehl, my most respected mate

When in the name of The Son of Heaven will you say something nice about the poor old Nipponese. :p

_____________________________

Have no fear,
drink more beer.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 9
- 8/14/2002 1:53:48 AM   
FAdmiral


Posts: 378
Joined: 12/20/2002
From: Atlanta,GA, USA
Status: offline 		I've found out one very important fact about TFs. If they are
docked, subs will not attack. So I dock the Carrier TF at a
nearby green dot and have never been attacked by enemy subs.
In fact, even the enemy scout planes won't spot you. Don't
really know why that is but I'll take it just the same.

JIM BERG, SR.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 10
- 8/14/2002 2:17:27 AM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		"Not saying it is the case but I've thought for a while that the problem lies with the fact that anti sub capability seems heavily tied to experience. "

That was one of the most critical and fundamental flaws of the air-to-air combat model in GGPW as well. It seems like every time Matrix/Grigsby make one of these sims they (1) erroneously assume that the Axis had more experience, and (2) drastically inflate the relevance of said experience. Based on training, you'd expect the Japanese to be about as experienced at ASW as the Italians, and much less experienced than the USN. The Japanese war plan never considered startegic warfare against their supply lines, and Japanese ASW detection equipment maintenance was miserable, the training lax, and the operators pretty much regarded ASW as the place to which a**holes got sentenced to a life of pointless labor.

Starting to think that Matrix should just abandon "Exp" entirely.

Wups, Drongo, sorry about the dearth of nice things said about the Japanese. It's just that I've wasted lots of bucks and time on games that have either a really simplistic stereotyped understanding of naval combat, air combat etc, or that (in some games) amount to pure Axis fetishism. The usual stereotype is that Japan had an elite force from top to bottom with superior weapons in almost every category, but were eventually ground into dust by the crude application fo a big, dull, cudgel wielded by a bunch of comical round-eyed trolls. I once believed that stuff until one day a little light bulb went on. I read Frank's Guadalcanal, then "the First Team" and so on and asked myself, if the Japanese pilots were superior, and flying superior a/c, how come they did not sustain a favorable kill ratio over the USN pilots? *Ever?* Indeed. it's hard to find single engagements where IJN Zekes bested USN F4Fs in direct confrontations.

I proceeded from there to look at submarine doctrine, night vision and spotting, aerial recon, operational planning, aircraft design, gunfire accuracy, torpedo success (Did you know that at Sunda Strait the IJN fired 86 torpedoes, scoring more hits on their own transports than they did on the virtually ammunition-less Perth and Houston? Did you know that Perth made the first observation? Did you know that at Balikpapan the superior night fighters on the IJN CL and DDs there completely missed observing the USN flush decks torpedoing their transports at a range of about 3000 yards? At least at Savo Island, the Allies knew they were being shot at and from which direction.) And so forth.

I'll say this for the Japanese. Their initial operational plans were very good and they executed them quite well. Thereafter, they died with honor.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 11
- 8/14/2002 4:42:36 AM   
TIMJOT

 

Posts: 1822
Joined: 4/30/2001
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]"Not saying it is the case but I've thought for a while that the problem lies with the fact that anti sub capability seems heavily tied to experience. "

That was one of the most critical and fundamental flaws of the air-to-air combat model in GGPW as well. It seems like every time Matrix/Grigsby make one of these sims they (1) erroneously assume that the Axis had more experience, and (2) drastically inflate the relevance of said experience. Based on training, you'd expect the Japanese to be about as experienced at ASW as the Italians, and much less experienced than the USN. The Japanese war plan never considered startegic warfare against their supply lines, and Japanese ASW detection equipment maintenance was miserable, the training lax, and the operators pretty much regarded ASW as the place to which a**holes got sentenced to a life of pointless labor.

Starting to think that Matrix should just abandon "Exp" entirely.

Wups, Drongo, sorry about the dearth of nice things said about the Japanese. It's just that I've wasted lots of bucks and time on games that have either a really simplistic stereotyped understanding of naval combat, air combat etc, or that (in some games) amount to pure Axis fetishism. The usual stereotype is that Japan had an elite force from top to bottom with superior weapons in almost every category, but were eventually ground into dust by the crude application fo a big, dull, cudgel wielded by a bunch of comical round-eyed trolls. I once believed that stuff until one day a little light bulb went on. I read Frank's Guadalcanal, then "the First Team" and so on and asked myself, if the Japanese pilots were superior, and flying superior a/c, how come they did not sustain a favorable kill ratio over the USN pilots? *Ever?* Indeed. it's hard to find single engagements where IJN Zekes bested USN F4Fs in direct confrontations.

I proceeded from there to look at submarine doctrine, night vision and spotting, aerial recon, operational planning, aircraft design, gunfire accuracy, torpedo success (Did you know that at Sunda Strait the IJN fired 86 torpedoes, scoring more hits on their own transports than they did on the virtually ammunition-less Perth and Houston? Did you know that Perth made the first observation? Did you know that at Balikpapan the superior night fighters on the IJN CL and DDs there completely missed observing the USN flush decks torpedoing their transports at a range of about 3000 yards? At least at Savo Island, the Allies knew they were being shot at and from which direction.) And so forth.

I'll say this for the Japanese. Their initial operational plans were very good and they executed them quite well. Thereafter, they died with honor. [/B][/QUOTE]


Not entirely true Mdheil, Yes the Mogami's salvo of 6 torps directed at the Houston missed and preceded into Bantum Bay where 4 Transports and a gunboat were hit, but hte Perth was hit by 4 Torps and the Houston was eventually hit by 4-6 torps. So it is incorrect to say that the IJN scored more hits on its own transports than they did on the Perth and Houston. Also the Fubuki sighted the Allied TF first, it was subsequently sighted by the Perth while tailing the TF in an attempt to indentify it.

At Balikapan it was a moonless night and the IJN ships were backlite from oil fires onshore. While the USN DDs were obscured by the smoke of those same fires. Yes the IJN escorts missed the US DDs, but at the time they were off chasing a Dutch sub in the opposite direction.

It is indisputable that the IJN trained far more in night combat pre-war and thus were more expirenced in night fighting than their US counterparts early in the war. It is also true that IJN optics were far superior to the USN. Granted this advantage was all but wiped out once the USN got proficient with radar. Still the IJN were still able to hold there own in night surface actions well into 1943.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 12
- 8/14/2002 4:55:14 AM   
Oleg Mastruko


Posts: 4921
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]I'll say this for the Japanese. Their initial operational plans were very good and they executed them quite well. Thereafter, they died with honor. [/B][/QUOTE]

So, what you basically say in half a dozen or so of your utterly boring posts, you want a game to perfectly simulate this? Dying with honor?

Wow.

Some game.

I guess it would sell in like 100 copies worldwide.

I for one sincerely hope someone's going to make it for you one day, now let us indulge in our "Axis fetishism" that is UV. (Axis fetishism, wow... like, I get off on Me-109s and Claudes at the same time.)

O.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 13
- 8/14/2002 4:59:57 AM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		"Not entirely true Mdheil, Yes the Mogami's salvo of 6 torps directed at the Houston missed and preceded into Bantum Bay where 4 Transports and a gunboat were hit, but hte Perth was hit by 4 Torps and the Houston was eventually hit by 4-6 torps. So it is incorrect to say that the IJN scored more hits on its own transports than they did on the Perth and Houston."

Four hits on Perth, we agree. (One after she was DIW -- dead in water) but four hits. Two to four on Houston, but most survivor accounts place the number at two. In calculating torp accuracy, I usually give the IJN 3 on Houston, just because I think it possible. Since the IJN sank 5 of their own ships in disparate places, Mogami's salvo does not account for the damage. Japanese accounst on the losses are sketchy at best, because in the flush of successive victories, nobody wanted to open an inquiry about which IJN skippers to sack for the error. It has been a darned long time since I've read an account from the Japanese targets, but, IIRC, three of these transports suffered multiple hits.

That makes it 8 hits on Japanese vessels and 6-8 on Allied ones by my count.

At Balikpapan the IJN vessels sortied during the action. They went off looking for subs because they assumed that the damage occurring in harbor was caused by a submarine. Once clear of the harbor, they ought to have spotted the USN DDs. I can only explain their failure to do so to teh incorrect assumption of the prexsence of submarine, and therefore a general laxity about looking for surface vessels. Had they actually blundered into Pillsbury & Co, they'd have been torpedoed for their carelessness. Also, if the smoke from the battle was obscuring the Japanese view of the USN DD force, then it logically follows that the smoke was between the USN DDs and their targets. The relevance, however, is the common claim that IJN night optics and their users were so excellent and well trained that they were very reliable in adverse conditions. Clearly not the case at Balikpapan. Also, at Sunda Strait, Perth had the first obsersvation. I could double check Frank, but there was at least one instance where the USN made visual contact in that campaign prior to USN radar or Japanese visual, and there were several instances where the USN radar made first contact.

For all the training in night combat, it did not help the Japanese recognize SoDak for what she was until she opened fire. And there is some evidence that they mistook Chicago for a BB at Savo Isl. At 2nd Guadalcanal, not a single torp fired hit SoDak or Washington, despite overwhelming favorable circumstances.

It is indisputable that extensive Japanese night training made little difference, and that USN training was adequate to the job even for the battles fought in 1942. Despit a demonstrably better optical spotting system in their binocs, if you count up the instances (skipping radar) where visual observation occurred first, you again come up with approximately equal frequencies for both the IJN and USN.

"Hold their own" is kind of vague, but if you said that of the USN in 1942 through the Guadalcanal Campaig, and of the IJN through April 1943, I'd agree.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 14
- 8/14/2002 12:35:06 PM   
TIMJOT

 

Posts: 1822
Joined: 4/30/2001
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl

"Four hits on Perth, we agree. (One after she was DIW -- dead in water) but four hits. Two to four on Houston, but most survivor accounts place the number at two. In calculating torp accuracy, I usually give the IJN 3 on Houston, just because I think it possible. Since the IJN sank 5 of their own ships in disparate places, Mogami's salvo does not account for the damage. Japanese accounst on the losses are sketchy at best, because in the flush of successive victories, nobody wanted to open an inquiry about which IJN skippers to sack for the error. It has been a darned long time since I've read an account from the Japanese targets, but, IIRC, three of these transports suffered multiple hits."


What most survivor accounts? Just how many survivor accounts have you read? My sources state that the Houston was hit by one torp initially an then by 3 in quick succession and may or may not have been hit by 2 more before she went down. Four IJN transports were hit by 6 Mogami torps. It is uncertain if the fith ship, a MSW was sunk by a torp, mine or gunfire from the Houston.


"That makes it 8 hits on Japanese vessels and 6-8 on Allied ones by my count."

That makes 6 hits on Japanese vessels and 8-10 hits on Allied ones by my count.


"At Balikpapan the IJN vessels sortied during the action. They went off looking for subs because they assumed that the damage occurring in harbor was caused by a submarine. Once clear of the harbor, they ought to have spotted the USN DDs. I can only explain their failure to do so to teh incorrect assumption of the prexsence of submarine, and therefore a general laxity about looking for surface vessels. Had they actually blundered into Pillsbury & Co, they'd have been torpedoed for their carelessness. Also, if the smoke from the battle was obscuring the Japanese view of the USN DD force, then it logically follows that the smoke was between the USN DDs and their targets. The relevance, however, is the common claim that IJN night optics and their users were so excellent and well trained that they were very reliable in adverse conditions. Clearly not the case at Balikpapan. Also, at Sunda Strait, Perth had the first obsersvation. I could double check Frank, but there was at least one instance where the USN made visual contact in that campaign prior to USN radar or Japanese visual, and there were several instances where the USN radar made first contact."


They assumed they were being attacked by subs because the Dutch sub K-XVII had been making attacks on the TF just prior to the US DD attack, scoring a torp hit on one transport. The initial pass positioned the US TF to the north where the prevailing winds and smoke from the oil fires provided a handy smoke screen. The IJN transports however could be seen through the smoke because *logically* they where effectively silohetted by those same oil fires. The US DDs fired a total of 48 torps at close range at clearly visible, defenceless and stationary targets and only 6 struck home. So why do you believe that Pope & Co (Pilsbury was not at Balikapan) would have faired better against combat vessels?

Re: Perth obsevation, you better double check, because and I quote " At 22:15 Fubuki has bout 2500 yrds east of Babi Island when it sighted *strange ships* Rounding the island to the east. She set course that took her north of the island and then turned to follow the suspected intruders" Shorty after 22:44 Perth detected Fubuki which had been following behind.

Re: first contact, I would expect the USN to make first contact everytime if they had radar.


"For all the training in night combat, it did not help the Japanese recognize SoDak for what she was until she opened fire. And there is some evidence that they mistook Chicago for a BB at Savo Isl. At 2nd Guadalcanal, not a single torp fired hit SoDak or Washington, despite overwhelming favorable circumstances."


Well the SoDak was a new class BB, besides several lookouts did indentify her as a BB, but the Admiral in charge refuse to believe it.


I may be wrong but I cant think of a single surface action in which the USN TF didnt have at least one ship with radar during the whole Solomons campaign. So its remarkable that the IJN ever got first contact.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 15
- 8/14/2002 11:51:45 PM   
panda124c

 

Posts: 1692
Joined: 5/23/2000
From: Houston, TX, USA
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by TIMJOT
[B][QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl

"Four hits on Perth, we agree. (One after she was DIW -- dead in water) but four hits. Two to four on Houston, but most survivor accounts place the number at two. In calculating torp accuracy, I usually give the IJN 3 on Houston, just because I think it possible. Since the IJN sank 5 of their own ships in disparate places, Mogami's salvo does not account for the damage. Japanese accounst on the losses are sketchy at best, because in the flush of successive victories, nobody wanted to open an inquiry about which IJN skippers to sack for the error. It has been a darned long time since I've read an account from the Japanese targets, but, IIRC, three of these transports suffered multiple hits."


What most survivor accounts? Just how many survivor accounts have you read? My sources state that the Houston was hit by one torp initially an then by 3 in quick succession and may or may not have been hit by 2 more before she went down. Four IJN transports were hit by 6 Mogami torps. It is uncertain if the fith ship, a MSW was sunk by a torp, mine or gunfire from the Houston.


"That makes it 8 hits on Japanese vessels and 6-8 on Allied ones by my count."

That makes 6 hits on Japanese vessels and 8-10 hits on Allied ones by my count.[/B][/QUOTE]

You should read 'Japaness Destroyer Captain', where the author states that he could not believe how bad the torpedo shooting was.

[B][QUOTE][Re: first contact, I would expect the USN to make first contact everytime if they had radar.[/B][/QUOTE]

The American Radar was new, it was cranky, prone to blanking out at the most inopertune moments. Several new curse words were added to the Navy's vocabulary due to the radar. And please do remember this was not the radar we see today. Basicly you are looking at a couple of CRTs with blips on a line to indicate a target's direction and range.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 16
- 8/15/2002 2:26:17 AM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		Sorry about the "first contact" post. I thought I'd left it in context of a night engagement on the open sea. Early radar was crude, but the hinkiness in the Solomons actions were, I thought, cause primarily by the proximity of land masses.

Timjot: the DDs were firing at the limit of their range (sucks to be a Mark 10 torpedo), through the same smoke to which you attribute obscured vision. By the way, 6 hits of 48 for a night engagement is 12.5% -- the same hit rate achieved by the IJN with the Type 93a in most of their best night actions. IIRC there is a link that you can look up via Warships1.com to a study on the fit between Japanese strategic doctrine and Type 93a torpedo accuracy.

I agree as to why the IJN escorts sortied looking for subs. Here's a more general point:

You have, appropriately IMO, pointed out that there are mitigating circumstances at Balikpapan. To me the command decision to assume that only subs could be causing the damage, (leading to what? lax visual observation?) is a poor command decision. Then there was the smoke, and the fact that the USN DDs kept cool heads and did not open up with guns until the last of the torps had been expended. It was a classic torpedo doctrine attack delivered in textbook fashion.

Clearly, one would not take Balikpapan and generaliz, from that, that the USN were superior night fighters, more extensively trained, or used better torpedoes. So, why then, is it so challenging to look at the engagements that the IJN won and see what kinds of decisions really affected the outcome? IMO, in almost every circumstance it comes down to one of the following (and this applies to the USN victories in 1942 as well):

(1) Lopsided force structure
(2) Poor recon leading to laxity prior to the engagement at the command level
(3) Poor command and control during the engagement
(4) Incorrect assessment of the tactical situation
(5) The type 93a torpedo fired at night at a range less than 7000 yards *in combination with* one of the above.

I do not agree that the results achieved by the IJN or USN in their 1942 victories had much if anything to do with crew training or experience, or weapons systems generally (except case 5 above). Moreover, I'm not inclined to think there was anything systematically wrong with USN admirals doctrine just because in two cases that I can think of the fault clearly lay with the USN admiral in charge.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 17
- 8/15/2002 7:46:52 AM   
ADavidB


Posts: 2464
Joined: 9/17/2001
From: Toronto, Canada
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by dtx
[B]Just think about how superbly UV models WWII in this regard. While defective torpedoes servely impeded the effectiveness of US subs (1941-43), the Japanese subs did achieve occasional successes. I'm sure the loss of the Wasp and the Yorktown to subs also "ruined the day" of the US commanders of the time.

The frustrations that American UV commanders feel inregards to the ineffectiveness of their subs is reflective of that felt by US commanders in the war. In other posts, some have complained about the apparent ineffectiveness of various weapon systems in UV - however, this is among UVs greatest strength. In war, Murphy's law is continually triumphant and weapons and the men that use them rarely perform as well as the commander wants them to. [/B][/QUOTE]

This is one of the ( satisfyingly ) weird things that I've experienced with playing the Allies in scenarios 16 & 17 - I send all my subs to Raboul/Shortlands/Buin and/or Buna/Gili-Gili if the AI is attacking, and my subs can't spend a week on patrol without using up all their torps sinking ships. In one scenario 17 the subs have sunk 10 transports, 5 tankers, and 3 MSWs in 6 weeks, while damaging an equal amount. It really doesn't matter that they aren't going after combat ships, because the AI can't transport any troops or supplies anywhere.

I wouldn't have expected the subs to be this good. I also suspect that if I let the AI send them off to Truk, like it wanted, I wouldn't have those results either.

It's an odd game at times.

Dave Baranyi

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 18
- 8/15/2002 10:07:41 AM   
TIMJOT

 

Posts: 1822
Joined: 4/30/2001
Status: offline 		Quote: Pbear

"You should read 'Japaness Destroyer Captain', where the author states that he could not believe how bad the torpedo shooting was. "


I would like to. Can you tell me the author and publisher? Is this the book written by the captain of that famous IJN destroyer(cant (cant remember the name) that was in virtually every major surface action of the war?

Anyway. Im not saying Sunda straight was text book, far from it, but you have to remember that the Houston and Perth were fleeing not engageing. Its extremely difficult to launch a torp attack on a fleeing target. Besides the initial torp salvo was at extreme range and was more an attempt to slow down the fleeing targets than anything else.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 19
- 8/15/2002 10:49:11 AM   
TIMJOT

 

Posts: 1822
Joined: 4/30/2001
Status: offline 		Quote Pbear:

"The American Radar was new, it was cranky, prone to blanking out at the most inopertune moments. Several new curse words were added to the Navy's vocabulary due to the radar. And please do remember this was not the radar we see today. Basicly you are looking at a couple of CRTs with blips on a line to indicate a target's direction and range."



Agreed, Im well aware of limitations of early radar. My only point is that the IJN made due without any radar and managed well enough initially. This wasnt luck. Night action was a conerstone of IJN tactical doctorine and they trained vigorously in it throughout the 20s and 30s. On the otherhand, USN doctorine saw night action as something that should be avoided during this same time period. Pre-war bugetary retraints also played a part in relegateing night training to low status. You might want to read "Kaigun" (Evans?Pettie) to get a better idea on just how extensively IJN trained in nightfighting. Mdeihl's contention seems to be that the IJN did not have a night fighting advantage early in the war.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 20
- 8/15/2002 11:02:32 AM   
FAdmiral


Posts: 378
Joined: 12/20/2002
From: Atlanta,GA, USA
Status: offline 		In other words, you are saying that the beedy-little-eyes
have it !!!!! :eek:

JIM BERG, SR. :D

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 21
- 8/15/2002 11:19:05 AM   
ReDDoN45

 

Posts: 135
Joined: 2/25/2002
Status: offline 		LOL - a war of facts!

Night fighting capabilities are more than spotting the enemy first. It means the whole coordination of night combat and there the Allied often (despite having Radar and first contact) made a poor show. OFten enough the "first spotting advantege" was lost by inadequate reaction. Also formation keeping in maneuvers and other stuff belongs to night fighting capabilties as well as fast torpdo/gunfire attack coordniation. COncerning this Balikapan and "other war story stuff" - they were humans and humans make mistakes, even experienced ones and fatigue creates even more mistakes. WHen you look at military history and see someone making a stupid action, one later would wonder about - how stupid - it was because of fatigue. It is allways more difficult to patrol and watch out all the time for an enemy than to know that one moves into action at a certain time in a certain place... like in UV - when you have to patrol you wear out your units in both readiness and fatigue. Someone who moves in to strike a known target at a known time doesn´t have this disadvantge. THis has to be take into account for battles like Balikapan, Tassafaronga and Cape Esprance and (Savo).
I think the reality is somewhere between mdiehl´s anti-jap attitude and the game. THough I have to say I also request for an seperate ASW value (and I mainly play Japs !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!), but I feel the impact of experince in general on gameplay isn´t as strong as in WIR or PACWAR. It´s quite good they way it is. 1-1, an experienced pilot makes short work with an average one. Ships and Ground units act in combination in ground battles (even jap ones) and thereby the experince factor more influences coordiantion than actual ships experience (I´d say 50% crew esp, 50% coordiantion proficiency). Superior Coordination makes up LOT in ground battles ------> I don´t have to tell wargamers how much, this makes. A considerably smaller force, which coordinates better can and often does beat a bigger, bad cooperaing force, both, at sea and on shore. But, as allways there are also excpetions to rules.

Besides their real superiority in the beginning of the war the Japs also had one habbit , which can´t be represented in the game - they sometimes tended to underestimate their enemies and act lax (especially IJA) - (((((otherwise they would even never have attacked Pearl Harbor, I guess.
Something like that sometimes had a real influence on battle, but can harldy be implied in UV or WITP

Concerning this F-4F vs Zero stuff. Allied fighters had radio and used team tactics very effectively (Thach Weave, Bait and Kill...)
Japanese fighters didn´t have radios at all and were completely unfamiliar with any kind of team fighting in the air... I know what I am taliking about, when I day this makes a great difference. Also the US captured a Zero during the ALeutian Operation in June and were able to check it very accurate, so they found out all its weaknesses.
In those Carrier battles were the really superior Jap pilots meat some of the US F-4F pilots the Japs (in strike escort missions) were completely outnumbered (and lacked team tactics... very bad combination... even the best pilots die then) + ALlied had Air Radar, which often enabled CAP to be reinforced.
In Jap defensive fighter missions the F-4F often made a acceptable show, once again due to team tactics... they flew continuously Thach Weaves (largely outnumbered by Zeros) and got damaged badly. Most of the US planes on escort had plenty 7.7mm holes in their plane. But they costed the Jap CAP time, enabling the US bombers to do their job. Coral Sea was a surpirse batle for the Japs... Midway an unexpected disaster (where the US had so much luck, one must read the whole story, to know how much!!!!) and at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz the US had some luck again as second Jap stirkes failed to locate their target (both times the BiG E), once because of navigation error - happens! (even far more often to the ALlies) and the second time by weather (sudden rain squalls). Otherwise things could have happened quite different. After that the Japs almost lost their experience bonus, due to this cont. attrition. They just failed to score decisively when they had it... that´s all.

All what I want to say: THere are many, many, many additional factors, whcih lead to the resutls of the battles.
On a 1 by 1 plane basis the A6M is definetly better than the F-4F. But that doens´t count in war. The La-5/7 was also better than Bf-109G-6. But the G-6 killed far more enemy planes (also in percentage) than Las, or P-51s did. DOn´t want to start a new "facts - discussion". Just wanted to add this

I have to agree that the game doens´t fully imply the teamteactic-superiority of the Allies into the A-A engine. But, as allways, that´s compensated.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 22
- 8/15/2002 12:18:27 PM   
XPav

 

Posts: 550
Joined: 7/10/2002
From: Northern California
Status: offline
quote:

Also the US captured a Zero during the ALeutian Operation in June and were able to check it very accurate, so they found out all its weaknesses.

It crashed in June, the US found it in July, evaluation began in September 1942.

[URL=http://www.vectorsite.net/avzero.html]Source[/URL]

_____________________________

I love it when a plan comes together.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 23
- 8/15/2002 12:37:28 PM   
ReDDoN45

 

Posts: 135
Joined: 2/25/2002
Status: offline 		early enough! I allways thought they would have found it earlier as the Japs tried to destroy the lost Zero, but when they looked for it it was gone - I don´t know the exact story - perhaps you can tell

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 24
- 8/15/2002 10:23:47 PM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		"Mdeihl's contention seems to be that the IJN did not have a night fighting advantage early in the war."

TIMJOT. My position is that "superior night fighters" is, like "better planes" a contentless gloss. Here's where the Japanese were demonstrably superior, IMO: (1) Visual night spotting. I mean that literally, not range finding. USN and Japanese range finders were pretty comparable in the early going, especially at the ranges at which these battles were fought. (2) The CA torpedo doctrine. One reason why the USN took it in the teeth at Tassafaronga was that the USN flotilla commander was a CA Admiral. USN CAs did not have torpedoes, so, (without sounding too critical, hinsdight is *always* very good), torpedo doctrine wasn't at the forefront of his mind during the engagement. He denied the USN DDs permission to fire when they had range, were not yet observed, and textbook firing solutions. A delay resulted in the DDs taking their shots from an inferior position. He also seemed to be unaware of the threat of torpedoes, despite earlier engagements that demonstrated that the Japanese had great torpedoes.

The torpedo doctrine is emblemic of IJN night training. One uses torpedoes at night because at night the ship that can attack without firing its guns (and thus be spotted by its flashes) is the ship with the advantage.

Also, IIRC, the IJN used a lower flash powder for thier naval weapons. I'm sure that this made Allied visual night ranging more difficult, sans mitigating factors (moonlight, flairs). I'm not sure that made a difference in the battles that were fought. At Savo, the IJN operated a float plane dropping flares. In 1st, 2nd G'canal, and Cape Esperance, USN shooting was just fine. At Tassafaronga, the torpedoes did the day. At Sunda Strait, everybody shot like rookies.

There's no disputing that the IJN trained more at night. Do I think this affected the intrinsic abilities of crews and skippers... not really. Did it affect USN admirals ability to coordinate ships in a TF. Quite possibly. There are, however, so many situational differences between each engagement that it is difficult to identify systemic weaknesses.

Re: Sunda Strait. The USN TF was trapped between a land mass and three converging groups of IJN ships. They were also virtually out of ammunition. The shooting all around was abysmally inaccurate. Since the results seem to have had no great strategic effects (the Japanese still took Java easily, despite the drowning of a division or whatever, the USN was not especially depleted by the loss of Houston, the personal tragedies all around were great), with nice hindsight it is easy to suggest that it would have been better for everyone if Houston and Perth had slipped away undetected. But that of course is not th enature of warfare.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 25
- 8/15/2002 11:47:56 PM   
TIMJOT

 

Posts: 1822
Joined: 4/30/2001
Status: offline 		Mdheil

Im not deneying that many victories are won because, as you say of poor command decisions, poor force dispostiions, poor command and controll of the loseing side. My position is that training and expirence plays a significant part in reduceing the chance that this happens. The more you train for a situation and the more expirence you have in operating in a certain situation the less likely you will make poor command decisions, be caught in poor tactical positions and loose control of a situation. Thats why the arm forces train.

Case in point. I can think of several instances when the IJN were surprised, but were able to react effectively and efficiently to come out ahead ( 1st Guad.Cnl, Tassforonga, Kolombagara to name a few). I cant think of a single instance when the USN was surprised in night action and came out ahead. Can you?

BTW, Im not saying there were not times where the IJN reacted poorly ( 2nd Guad.Canal for instance).

Re: Sunda, as I said certainly not text book, but more an example of the vagaries and confusiion inherent in all combat, than an inditement in IJN night combat training and doctorine.

Re: Balikapan, not to dengrate the achievment of those 4 flush deckers, IMO desron 29 performed admiralby under impossible circumstances in the short lived ABDA. However the transports where in a compact grouping, silhouetted by shore fires and most importantly *stationary*. You would expect, the DDs fireing at *close* range (approx. 1000 yrds ) would score better than 6 out of 48. The IJN 12% ( Debatable ) hit ratio you site is based on hits against manuevering combat vessels. That the US DDs didnt score more hits at Balikapan can be attributted by defective torps, launching at too high speed and poor marksmanship.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 26
- 8/16/2002 2:05:36 AM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		TIMJOT-

Balikpapan is a complicated battle for all the reasons you mention. Bear in mind that the Mark 10 torpedo was somewhat more reliable in detonating than its replacement, but still had crummy speed and range, and detonation problems. Some of the blame has to be placed on the weapon. There comes a point where you have to take the numerical results from the use of a weapon at face value. Had these DDs been armed with Type 93s (if one is allowed to speculate about the installation of a modern Japanese torp on an obsolete USN DD), the results may well have been more damaging.

I can only think of one battle where the USN was substantially surprised. Savo Isl. I've no qualms about crediting the Japanese with a first rate thrashing of the USN/Australian units engaged there. And the US failures were multiple. Failure to search for an enemy TF approaching the slot with CV based planes. Failure to maintain a proper state of readiness. Etc. These are clearly not crew or skipper training issues. They're command issues.

Here's something ironic. I think the IJN reacted as well as might be expected at 2nd G'canal. True, the IJN torps missed all the critical targets. But, it *was* after all night, there were ships in near-collision circumstances among friendlies and between hostiles, SoDak was drawing *everyones* attention (I can see the Jpns skippers -- "Crikey that thing's HUGE!!"). It's no wonder the thing became a barroom brawl with the lights out. And I can't see the Jpns CB living through the encounter unless the Type 93s get their licks in on SoDak and Washington *early.*

Re torp accuracy. See again the study of long lance doctrine and torpedo accuracy available as a link from Warships1. It's a very interesting analysis. The numbers are all neatly summarized, assuming they're correct.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 27
Back to the original point... - 8/16/2002 2:14:41 AM   
RevRick


Posts: 2617
Joined: 9/16/2000
From: Thomasville, GA
Status: offline 		about the disparity between IJN ASW performance as opposed to USN ASW performance. I had an experience similar to the original posters - this time trying to ambush Shokaku. Sent four subs in on four successive days against Shokaku and ONE ({[ONE!!!}]) IJN tin can - which immediately proceeded to launch enough DC's to ruin the fishing industry in the South Pacific and sunk three subs in a row, without so much as an attack on the Shokaku, which was running along about about two kts from rate of progress from day to day. In the meantime, IJN subs are sneaking into a bunch of tin can escorted shipping and popping torps into my CA's with astounding frequency. And the cans mostly have good exp ratings and I had chosen them for the loadout of ASW weps onboard. Seems to me to need a bit of tweaking - I ought to get a torp hit on an IJN vessel every once in a while, and ought to get a successful attack out of tin cans once in a while - it's now October 1 and haven't dinged one yet except for a very lucky shot by a flock of PC's out of Brisbane - who by and large are doing well to find the port when they come back from their sortie (exp. levels in the low 40's - go figure!) The rest of the IJN boats are cruising around on full shields with a photon torpedo in the tubes - it seems - can't touch them. Of course, I'm an old tin can sailor and consider every sub a target and worth sending further on the way they already have gone - down!

_____________________________

"Action springs not from thought, but from a readiness for responsibility.” ― Dietrich Bonhoeffer

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 28
Re: Back to the original point... - 8/16/2002 3:05:24 AM   
TIMJOT

 

Posts: 1822
Joined: 4/30/2001
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by RevRick
[B]about the disparity between IJN ASW performance as opposed to USN ASW performance. I had an experience similar to the original posters - this time trying to ambush Shokaku. Sent four subs in on four successive days against Shokaku and ONE ({[ONE!!!}]) IJN tin can - which immediately proceeded to launch enough DC's to ruin the fishing industry in the South Pacific and sunk three subs in a row, without so much as an attack on the Shokaku, which was running along about about two kts from rate of progress from day to day. In the meantime, IJN subs are sneaking into a bunch of tin can escorted shipping and popping torps into my CA's with astounding frequency. And the cans mostly have good exp ratings and I had chosen them for the loadout of ASW weps onboard. Seems to me to need a bit of tweaking - I ought to get a torp hit on an IJN vessel every once in a while, and ought to get a successful attack out of tin cans once in a while - it's now October 1 and haven't dinged one yet except for a very lucky shot by a flock of PC's out of Brisbane - who by and large are doing well to find the port when they come back from their sortie (exp. levels in the low 40's - go figure!) The rest of the IJN boats are cruising around on full shields with a photon torpedo in the tubes - it seems - can't touch them. Of course, I'm an old tin can sailor and consider every sub a target and worth sending further on the way they already have gone - down! [/B][/QUOTE]


I would agree that IJN ASW is over-rated in UV. Particularily when you take into account that historically that the IJN spent almost zero effort in ASW training , were handicaped with rudimentary sonar sets and hydrophones and had no foward or side throwing depth charges. It should be no better and maybe even slightly effective than US capabilities in UV.

I dont however, think US subs should be any better than they are currently in UV, if history is any guide

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 29
- 8/16/2002 3:28:38 AM   
FAdmiral


Posts: 378
Joined: 12/20/2002
From: Atlanta,GA, USA
Status: offline 		In the Salvo Island scenario, the Jap ships coming down the
slot WERE sighted by American planes and reported the
sighting back to Noumea High Command (Ghormley). The
message was picked up by the communications at Guad
station but was not de-coded right away because it was
not addressed to them. Ghormley figuring they got the
message when he received it, did not forward it on to them.
This would happen again & again later on in the war too.....

JIM BERG, SR.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 30
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