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The Hermeneutics of Competence

 
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The Hermeneutics of Competence - 9/18/2010 4:52:08 PM   
Nemo121


Posts: 5821
Joined: 2/6/2004
Status: offline 		Recently there's been quite a bit of discussion about various Allied strategies on the forum. I've engaged in a couple of the discussions but, honestly, the reality is that in life most people are satisfied once they have an explanation which exonerates them from responsibility. Whether that be due to the game hating them, their opponent being ueber-awesome or some supernatural entity/deity making the crops fail --- Note to self, sacrifice more virgins next year so the rains come.

In any case I've been interested recently to see various people anchor the discussion of strategy with various assumptions both explicit and implicit and I've also been thinking of the hermeneutics of the situation - Yes, you've guessed it. I'm on call to the ER for 72 hrs straight and I'm a bit bored - which is good because it means no-one is currently psychotic or trying to kill themselves - and desperately trying to avoid having to look at statistics for my research * shudder*.

So, for those of you who aren't aware of hermeneutics it is the concept that communication is a process of interpretation and that words have meaning only because we ascribe them meaning. When you listen to a foreign language which you don't know it is simply a collection of sounds, just as English ( to choose an example ) is simply a collection of sounds which ONLY have meaning because those who "speak" English have all agreed that those sounds have meaning. The smallest conglomeration of sound to which we ascribe a meaning is called a phoneme and words are made up of a series of phonemes which are joined together to create a unique-sounding collection of phonemes which everyone ascribes a meaning to. We call this collection of phonemes a word and in the truest sense of the word words have NO meaning beyond that which we, humans, agree them to have.

E.g. The word "automobile" has no objective uniqueness which associates it with a car. It could refer to anything if we all agreed that its meaning would change. So, words have meaning because we agree on their meaning. Without our agreement these collections of phonemes have no meaning. If we went back in time we could decide that the first time we saw a plane we'd not call it a plane but call it a "zoomer".

There are some caveats to do with compound words - which are very common in agglutinative languages like German and to a lesser extent in English "aero-plane", "auto-mobile", "sub-machine-gun" etc.

Ok, so those are the basic terms.... It gets a little more complicated when we realise that combining hermeneutics with neuro-linguistic programming ( and not in the "How to pick up any woman in 10 minutes" books which claim to channel NLP to make you irresistible to the opposite sex ( or same sex, or both if that's your thing ) sense but in the proper, psychologically researched sense of the term ) means that collections of sounds have meaning because we agree them to have meaning and that agreement on meaning comes with all manner of other, inter-related, implications ( this can be seen when we have to translate from one language into another and can get a literal translation but are told, by the translator - or have to tell others if we're translating - that the literal translation doesn't capture the entirety of what was said because a certain word carries various other connotations in the foreign language.... said connotations arising not out of the phonemes or their arrangement but out of the cultural context of the foreign country/culture etc and thus being unknowable unless that cultural context is explained to you. ).


So, to summarise. A phoneme is a sound. Words are collections of phonemes to which we agree to ascribe a meaning. A language is a collection of words all with different meanings put together according to certain rules. Languages only have meaning because we all agree on the meaning of the words ( collections of phonemes ) and agree to follow the same structures. Sometimes when people have serious brain injuuries or psychotic illnesses one of the signs is that they make up their own languages and words and lose sentence structure and thus become incomprehensible to the rest of society.

So, all of that is the obvious bit of words. The other aspect is the subconscious aspect ( an oversimplification but correct enough for our purposes ) wherein words and sentence structure convey all manner of other information which isn't actually, strictly, contained within the sentence structure. E.g. Informer in Ireland carries a very negative connotation which "passing on of information" doesn't.

E.g. In Ireland to call someone an informer would be one of the worst things you could ever call someone. Even the police when they refer to informers in their employ tend not to use the term. Why not? Simple, most Irish uprisings in the timeframe 1400 to 1916 were destroyed by informers who infiltrated the organisations and undermined them. So, in Ireland, saying someone "informed" on someone else carries a huge weight of emotional information conveying disapproval of the person doing the "informing" and a very real sense that they should NOT have done so.

Saying someone "passed on information", however, carries with it the sense that they didn't betray people and that what they passed on was appropriate and right. It is the phrase which is often used officially since it doesn't have the unfavourable subconscious connotations.


All cultures have similar words, phrases etc which we often don't even think about and those words/phrases influence how we interpret things ( the hermeneutics of the situation ). That's words and phrases taken care of.... Now we move on to interpretation and subconscious anchoring of entire discussions.

It is possible through the selection of words to impart the exact same information yet create entirely different emotional responses in the readers and it is possible to predict this pretty accuracetly if you've got a homogenous audience drawn from a single culture ( either born there or assimilated ) and you know the triggers for that culture. Phrasing and word selection creates subconscious associations and also anchors the discussion at a certain point and towards a certain goal. E.g. When asked "Have you stopped beating your wife yet?" It is very difficult to begin having a discussion about what a good relationship you and your wife have. The question anchored the discussion in the territory of either, yes, you still beat her or, no, you used to but don't anymore. Either way the subconscious anchoring among listeners even before you answer is to view you as a piece of slime who is capable of serious violence and who, if he denies the question entirely, is probably lying.

Another example is as follows:
In a game one player may be complaining about the lack of surface interceptions in the game. The other player, who mightn't be trying any such interceptions might want to:
a) convince the 1st player that he's trying interceptions to force the other player to commit naval search assets in vain or
b) think the 1st player is probably making an error in his taskings which is causing the failed intercepts but not want to highlight this.

The 2nd player could stay silent or he could say, "Yeah, I'm having problems with surface intercepts too." That's a reasonable phrase but it is the sort of phrase which will automatically be run through the 1st player's filters for accuracy. We don't want that as that will set the first player to thinking and analysing and maybe coming up with a better option next time. So that's a BAD phrase to use. Much better would be, "Yeah, we're both having the same trouble with those damned SC TFs."

The use of WE helps communicate a commonality of experience which is shown to promote identification and limit the amount of scrutiny to which the rest of the phrase is subjected - after all when someone experiences exactly what we're experiencing we don't tend to waste time double-checking their experience. That's a time-saving measure we've learnt as a child. So, WE subtly takes advantage of that childhood schema to both sidestep some of the scrutiny we'd normally experience and also sets up a commonality of experience - which immediately shifts us away from being "the other" - of which humans are naturally included to be suspicious and sets us up as, at least, potentially a common journier.

BOTH builds on the subconscious "pairing" which was initially promoted by WE.

SAME is the third of the troika of building blocks to subconsciously assert that you're both co-journiers on this road of trouble with those damned SC TFs. You're both in this together, experiencing the same thing and you're fully supporting his findings... so he needn't check into things any deeper.

TROUBLE - The problem you BOTH SHARE in COMMON

"THOSE DAMNED SC TFs" - Finally identifying the common enemy you BOTH SHARE in COMMON which is TROUBLING you BOTH EQUALLY in the SAME WAY.


The same basic information has been imparted but the first method is pretty obvious and direct and doesn't take advantage of any psychology to promote identification between your opponent and you and doesn't then use that to label the trouble as an external thing you both share in such a manner as to confirm your opponent's prejudices and thus cast the problem as something he needn't waste time studying in detail ( a la childhood mental schema ).

Obviously you can't rely on every such sentence working to the above extent. That's only an example but if you throw enough such phrases in there then, eventually, you should be able to build a belief in a commonality of outlook vs the game and things you say will be scrutinised less allowing you to slip in disinformation without it being properly analysed.


Since I don't care to put up with the wailing and gnashing of teeth which arose when I used a bit of psyops early on in the game I amn't doing so in-game BUT neither do I feel compelled to tell Mike my entire plans. So, if he mentions something then I feel free to be not entirely honest about it or, at least, use it to push him a bit more in a given direction.

E.g. Mike said in his email accompanying the last movie...
quote:

Here's the movie. I sure hope those were allied tanks that went down @ Menado. In truth I thought you had carriers there (according to mouse-over intel). I suppose any intel named after a mouse should be suspect anyways... <grin>.


He states a hope that the vehicles were tanks.... He also states he thought I had CVs there. He's fishing for info. He then makes a joke about mice and the quality of intel they provide.

My reply:
quote:

Nah, they were remnants of Base Forces and some infantry units. I think the port was too small to take the motorised support elements of the troops or the engineer vehicles of the BFs. Now those units will rebuild using the supplies on Manado so that's ok. A pain to lose those ships but c'est la guerre.


The above is all entirely true... I do think he sank ships loaded with motorised support and engineer vehicles which can only unload at a greater than level 2 port. So, that's perfectly true. The fact that those units will rebuild on Manado is also true.

The observation that his raid with all those BB and CAs etc will only result in my land forces rebuilding using the supplies at Manado and my endless reserves also is the nth example of me recharacterising the result of one of his missions so as to reduce the damage he feels he inflicted and to paint a picture of myself as viewing the setback he caused as inconsequential. Over time I believe this has inculcated a belief that his attacks aren't hurting me and aren't achieving what he wants them to achieve. Over time if he believes the results of his missions are less than he would like he will begin being reluctant to mount missions as the risk reward ratio is not, in his mind, in his favour. R|ight now he isn't mounting many missions because the risk vs reward ratio isn't, in his mind, favourable. Do I think that is related to my policy of downplaying those results to highlight my limitless reserves and my ease of replacing losses? Absolutely. I think that he has, by now, incorporated THAT viewpoint into his planning and it is making him avoid missions which WOULD hurt me.

quote:

My CVs are a bit further back. I can't face you straight up so I'm hoping you'll impale yourself on my land-based defences and then my CVs can nip in and get a few licks in.... Not tomorrow though, I'[m sure your BBs are well-covered.


This is also true. My CVs ARE a bit further back.... In Capetown but it is war and I'm not bound to tell him that. Right now he is afraid of impaling KB on my land-based air ( as is every Japanese CO ). By telling him openly that that's my hope also I promote his view that I'm creating fighter CAP traps. I actually am but by telling him I am I am hoping to make him exaggerate their size and numbers. Right now I can CAP trap about 3 bases on the map. Everywhere else KB can roam with impunity. In his mind though I'd bet he views every one of my bases as a bit of a CAP trap.

The "then my CVs can nip in and get a few licks in" is an example of building on and reinforcing a fear he must have. The obvious Allied plan is to destroy his fighters over my base and then nip in with CVs to hit him. Again, it is what he fears and I'm happy to reinforce that fear to promote indecision --- people are pretty quick to believe you if what you tell them promotes no cognitive dissonance ( a fancy way of saying that they'll believe you if you tell them what they want to hear ).

"Not tomorrow though, I'm sure your BBs are well-covered." Each aspect of that phrase is true.... I won't attack him tomorrow AND his BBs are sure to be covered by CAP. By linking them with a comma though I promote a linkage between them which is erroneous. I promote the idea that I won't hit his BBs as they are covered by CAP. In reality I won't hit them because my strike groups are gathering to hit Singers. Reading that sentence without that knowledge though would feed into one's own expectations and be readily accepted. The ramifications of said acceptance is that you would expect anti-naval strike groups to be in the area - when they are not.

Such simple measures can be used to promote a significant missassessment by the enemy of your allocation of forces using little more than words and their own fears and assessments.

quote:

As to mouse-intel... Maybe if it said there was cheese we could believe it? ;-)

It'd be weird to reply to the other two aspects and not the third so I replied to that also.

Please stow any complaints about PsyOps. It is valid and, to be honest, if Mike fishes for info I don't see why I should be bound to give him the exact co-ordinates of my CVs etc etc. If he fishes for intel in a game he should expect a little misdirection to be sent his way. Technically though, I'm mostly using correct intel to misdirect him through creating linkages and implications which are incorrect. That's my concession to the "uproar" here and why I doubt I'll be playing AE anymore after this.


Ok, so I'll end this post here now and go onto the post dealing with the discussion of good players/bad players and suchlike next.



PresterJohn,
"It is an avenue which can bring advantage only if your opponent doesn't know what you're doing."

I disagree. I think that as with all things even in the full knowledge of what is happening some people are better at it than others and so can play double and triple-layered games in which they use the knowledge that their opponent is aware of conscious ploys to show him what he expects ( consciously recognised ploys which make him think he's on top of this aspect of the game, relaxing his guard as he luxuriates in his brilliance at spotting the ploy ) whilst either:
a) double-thinking the conscious layer of ploys to make the reaction to the obvious ploy fit his deeper plan or
b) using the obvious ploy which is spotted as a mere carrier for the deeper ploy which insinuates itself and achieves the objective.

So, I don't think awareness is, necessarily, a guarantee of immunity. I think it comes down to the quality and depth of knowledge, usage and self-reflection. People who are used to self-reflection and objective self-reflection are usually pretty good at identifying their triggers and how someone might play on them. They can guard against those things. Most people, however, are very poor at objective self-evaluation and don't engage in it much at all.

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to FatR)
Post #: 631
The self, projection and dissonance - 9/18/2010 4:54:40 PM   
Nemo121


Posts: 5821
Joined: 2/6/2004
Status: offline 		So far a lot has been said about how words convey meanings and how those words and those meanings can be used to influence others. There are other aspects to this though and one of them is assessing the other person and how they see themselves and what drives them.

The words a person uses convey a lot of information. Does the person use contractions or not, do they use allegory, do they spell things properly, do they use archaic sentence structures, do they deviate from the vernacular? Those things all tell us about the person's educational level, their upbringing, whether it was a first language or not etc. Those are things we're all aware of.

The words one uses also frame one's thought processes. Words have meanings and meanings are specific and limited. E.g. The word "two" means two items, not three, not one etc. When we say there are two birds outside the window that not only conveys information but primes the other person's thought processes. As they look outside the window their occipital lobe is being primed to interpret whatever they see outside the window as being TWO BIRDS. Not three birds or two cars but two birds. Some interesting experiments have been done which show that if you prime people and show them something pretty close to what they are expecting but not quite what they were expecting that they interpret it as being what they were expecting. E.g. Show them two pictures of birds stuck to a tree branch out that window and they may process it as being two real birds since that's what their brain is primed to see.

Alternately if you show them something so utterly different than the two birds - e.g. an abattoir - then their brain can be even more shocked by the dissonance they are experiencing than if they had looked out the window and seen an abattoir without having any expectation of what they'd be seeing.

Dissonance requires the brain to abandon its schema ( mental shortcuts we use to reduce processing power required to process a situation ) and begin examining the situation from its most basic elements. That puts a lot of strain on the brain and frequently overloads it. In survival situations the first senses which disappear are colour vision ( as colour vision isn't essential to survival), sound ( again, not essential to survival - if you were a caveman 20,000 years ago and a wolf was trying to eat you you didn't need to hear it howl to be able to kill it and survive the attack ) and field of vision ( which is replaced by a tunnel vision ). All of the above remove extraneous information from the processing loop in order to limit the amount of information your brain has to process in this new, unique situation it has no mental schema for. Lessening the information to be processed directly feeds into improved survival.

Anyways back to the topic. Words influence but also constrain. The words a person uses not only tells you about their education etc but ALSO tells you the limits of their thought processes. The meanings of words ( both obvious and subconscious ) limit thought and thus limit what the person typing/uttering those words is capable of grasping or mentally manipulating.

For example: Is a caveman who doesn't know the words surprise or ambush and has never spoken to anyone of the concepts able to individually come up with the view that a surprise attack sprung from an ambush situation will give him an advantage when attacking another caveman? I would suggest that he is but it is highly unlikely that he is going to be so innovative and so it is highly unlikely that he'll do so. Humans innovate but do so relatively rarely mentally and much more frequently mechanically.

So, by looking at how someone talks you can tell what their cultural context is and also the constraints on what they consider possible ( or ethical/religuously acceptable etc ) and can, mentally, fit into their mental schema. Once you have that done you:
a) know which levers are available to you to gain effect
b) know what they have mental schema for and what they don't - and thus know how to throw them back into a processor-intensive situation for them which will cause them to begin ignoring more and more crucial data as they focus more and more of their brainpower on solving the unfamiliar situation they find themselves confronted with.

In real life in various boat sinkings, plane crashes etc they've found that up to 1/3rd of people become so overwhelmed that they literally can freeze in place waiting for someone else to tell them what to do - obedience is, despite what we might like to tell ourselves, a natural state for most humans and one which is eminently comforting when the situation is threatening and unfamiliar - hence the rise of dictators who offer us easy solutions to unfamilar problems which frighten us.

As a commander you don't have someone to turn to to tell you what to do. You are it and so, often, commanders find themselves overwhelmed and lapse into inappropriate actions or just abandon command entirely and seek a soldierly - and operationally ineffective death ( a la one of the Roman consuls at Cannae ).


This sort of thing is particularly important to us nowadays when we have to realise that people opposing western forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere have very different cultural contexts than we have whcih create a cognitive dissonance between the two sides which renders much of the psyops both sides try to engage in relatively ineffectual. The simple matter of what Jihadis consider recruiting material tells us this. They post pictures of the dead bodies of their ex-comrades to recruit others to the battle. Often these pictures show these guys having suffered horrific wounds. I imagine if Western armies used similar pictures as recruiting tools enlistments would plummet. However the cultural imperatives and viewpoints are very, very, very different and this can be seen through what they put out as psyops material and how they speak both amongst themselves ( to the limited extent that I'm aware of that ) and how they address the west in psyops efforts to turn the population masses against the various wars/invasions/whatever you want to call them. Look at the language they use and what they link things to and you'll find many interesting meanings which often go unmentioned by western media. E.g. What does Bin Laden's linking of the dates of various attacks to great battles during the Crusades in the 12th and 13th Century tell us? Why does he call us infidels? Sure it is a word which has become hackneyed through being thrown around left right and centre buth within the population groups he is trying to recruit from/motivate by those messages to self-organise into little cells what does that word conjure up? I'm sure most of us don't know because we don't know the tales these kids have heard about the infidel crusaders defiling Jerusalem or the slaughter of the prisoners are Acre during the 14th Century etc etc etc. So when we hear those messages I think we miss a lot of the subtext and cultural reverberation which acts on people subconsciously and motivates them to respond within those cultures. That's an aside though and I know that in various little rooms governments have people at work who DO know all those ramifications working on counters. I'm not sure there's enough or that they are sufficiently effective though, which is a pity.



Also every person is a mix of who they wish to be, who they think they are and who they actually behave as. Most of us strive to live up the ideal we aspire to and come varyingly close to doing so, in our own minds. How we actually behave though can be radically different than how we view ourselves. For such people confronting them with how they actually are vs how they believe they are can be so shocking and destructive to their psyche and cause such painful cognitive dissonance that they kill themselves. I know of a few people/cases where individuals were told something which was obvious to their therapist at a time when they themselves hadn't journeyed far along their particular journey of self-discovery to find such a disclosure acceptable and went off and killed themselves.

In one very sad case a few years ago I know of someone who bemoaned why he always sabotaged relationships with his girlfriends only to be told that it was obviously because he was gay. The poor fellow wasn't prepared to hear that at that point in his therapy and got very upset, stormed out, reflected on it a bit and had hung himself within 6 hrs. That's just one extreme example but in my daily job I see time and time again that people actually have self-images which are radically different from how they actually are and one has to very carefully judge whether it would be beneficial to slowly get them to see that difference and, perhaps, close the gap between self-image and real behaviour.

Why is the above so important? Well;, it is important in and of itself but it is also important because as someone very smart once said,
quote:

we see things not as they are but as we are


If you lie to yourself about how you are then not only will you not see things as they really are but you won't even see them through the prism of how you think yourself to be ( which you could correct for ) but, instead, you'll see them through the prism of how you really are which, bring unaware of how you really are, you can't properly correct for. In the end your own distorted self-image leads you to view objective reality ( we can argue later if there really is such a thing ) in a manner so distorted that even a base level of self awareness ( which allows you to correct for how you feel yourself to be ) won't correct for the distortion.

That is why people who have lied to themselves about basic personality assets so often fall apart in survival situations. Those situations introduce dissonance which causes the construct to shatter, reveal the true self and the cognitive dissonance between the believed construct and the true self overwhelms the person.

If you look through history and read the bios of failed commanders who achieved victory for much of their life but then balked at a particularly important battle you'll often find some of these underlying issues therein. I nominate the co-consul who was in charge on the day of Cannae but not the one in charge the day before, Crassus prior to Carrhae, Ney, Goering and, my personal favourite, Darius. As a command study though you can't beat a study of the Roman side at Cannae. If you haven't read about it before you need to. It is pretty hilarious in a "Oh God, oh God, I can see a disaster coming and so can some of them but they're powerless to stop it" Greek tragedy kind of way.




Now, as to good or bad commanders or players...
Is someone who fails because cognitive dissonance ( either internal or external ) overwhelms them a poor player? No, I think they are just overwhelmed from a cognitive viewpoint and I don't think that that means it is possible to label them as "good" or "bad". They are just overwhelmed and their inappropriate decisions aren't a function of "poor" play but rather of their being overwhelmed.

< Message edited by Nemo121 -- 9/18/2010 9:03:58 PM >

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 632
Words and the constriction of thought.... - 9/18/2010 9:20:23 PM   
Nemo121


Posts: 5821
Joined: 2/6/2004
Status: offline 		So, here's a question for you all... How does the constraining of thought by the words chosen apply to discussions in-game and on the forum?

Bonus points to anyone who links in with 1984 and/or the recent expansion of Xinhua as a means of controlling not only dissent but the form dissent takes - its actually quite a brilliant and machiavellian policy really. Cold-blooded and ruthless but effective.

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 633
RE: Words and the constriction of thought.... - 9/18/2010 9:31:42 PM   
KenchiSulla


Posts: 2948
Joined: 10/22/2008
From: the Netherlands
Status: offline 		You need a turn in your inbox, dont you?

_____________________________

AKA Cannonfodder

"It happened, therefore it can happen again: this is the core of what we have to say. It can happen, and it can happen everywhere.”
¯ Primo Levi, writer, holocaust survivor

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 634
RE: Words and the constriction of thought.... - 9/18/2010 9:41:16 PM   
Grfin Zeppelin


Posts: 1515
Joined: 12/3/2007
From: Germany
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Cannonfodder

You need a turn in your inbox, dont you?

No no. this is even more interesting. Sadly my ability to express myself in English is limited so I cant add much here.

_____________________________



(in reply to KenchiSulla)
Post #: 635
RE: Words and the constriction of thought.... - 9/18/2010 10:21:36 PM   
KenchiSulla


Posts: 2948
Joined: 10/22/2008
From: the Netherlands
Status: offline 		It is part of the game. Everytime I hit a TF and do some damage, my opponent (allies) replies with: I hate losing ships, but there is more where those came from... implying he has a never ending stock of everything...

Once used the trick myself: Arnhem hit surface forces (with his carriers) covering Noumea (I was besieging it). He hurt me pretty bad but I made him believe KB was in striking range by mentioning "run forrest run" in my e-mail... KB was at Truk replenishing planes...

All is fair in love and love - or isnt it?

< Message edited by Cannonfodder -- 9/18/2010 10:25:02 PM >

_____________________________

AKA Cannonfodder

"It happened, therefore it can happen again: this is the core of what we have to say. It can happen, and it can happen everywhere.”
¯ Primo Levi, writer, holocaust survivor

(in reply to Grfin Zeppelin)
Post #: 636
RE: The Hermeneutics of Competence - 9/18/2010 11:35:47 PM   
Capt. Harlock


Posts: 5358
Joined: 9/15/2001
From: Los Angeles
Status: offline
quote:

Please stow any complaints about PsyOps. It is valid and, to be honest, if Mike fishes for info I don't see why I should be bound to give him the exact co-ordinates of my CVs etc etc. If he fishes for intel in a game he should expect a little misdirection to be sent his way. Technically though, I'm mostly using correct intel to misdirect him through creating linkages and implications which are incorrect.


I have no complaints to make about the techniques you outlined in that post. For instance, you said you would replace the lost base forces with available reserves, but nowhere did you say you had a mountain of reserves -- you just gave the impression that you did, because you didn't seem to care. Entirely legitimate.

But an Allied player seriously planning on airstrikes on Singapore and counter-invasions in May 1942 (in Scenario 2!) has clearly got the upper hand. Allied fanboy though I am, I can't help but feel a bit sorry for the sons of the Emperor.

_____________________________

Civil war? What does that mean? Is there any foreign war? Isn't every war fought between men, between brothers?

--Victor Hugo

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 637
RE: The Hermeneutics of Competence - 9/19/2010 2:50:32 PM   
Nemo121


Posts: 5821
Joined: 2/6/2004
Status: offline 		Well 22nd April Djambi reaches Size 3 airfield while KB continues to close VERY carefully on Manado - it is currently only about 3 hexes out.... I have 200 fighters on CAP over Manado and I'm killing about half of the land-based IJNAF Zeroes he sweeps with every day. Over the last 3 turns he's lost about 20+ Zeroes over Manado as I think he is prepping it.

My torpedo-bombers are in place, my dive-bombers are in place, Oosthaven has become a Level 8 airfield today ( for basing my B-17s ) and I've pretty much finished shuffling my torpedo and dive and level bombers around to have each of them operate at the appropriate range. So, Djambi can hold 150 planes, Palembang can hold 350, Lahat can hold 350 and Oosthaven can hold 400. That's a total of 1250 planes. I have too many short-ranged planes but at the very least I can hit with 120 torpedo bombers, about 200 dive-bombers and about 600 or so level bombers. Add in about 200 fighters sweeping from a range of 7 hexes or so and I think that tomorrow I can go. I'm a little concerned that Mike will notice the buildup and begin hitting me. Already he is sending in a few night bombing raids on Palembang again - something he hasn't done in a month or more - so I want to hit him before he decides to pre-empt me.

So, tomorrow or the next day, depending on fatigue I'll hit Singapore. My taskings will be as follows:
1. torpedo and divebombers will be tasked for the ships. All of the divebombers should be at the right ranges to drop 1,000 lb bombs.
2. Most level bombers will be tasked with hitting the airfields. This wll include the Dutch airforce, B-26s, Blenheims, Hudsons, B-25s and about 70 B-17s.
3. Catalinas and other floatplanes will be tasked with making torpedo runs on the shipping from Batavia.

Currently I show 34 enemy ships in the harbour in Singapore and about 300 planes on the airfields there. I'm not that worried about his CAP as I'm sure my fighters can handle that but I'll take heavy losses to his FlAK as my torpedo-bombers and dive-bombers make their attack runs. I have made the calculation that my naval strike capacity can survive being attrited for a month or two without serious damage to my strategic goals in the near future and, as I said, I want to make a symbolic heavy strike which also serves to force him to base his naval forces back in Saigon - far back from where they can interfere with the Malaysian invasion.

On another note: The Malaysian invasion won't go in until I've finished upgrading but the port at Soerabaja got a bit overloaded by all the shipping I sent there so the CAs will only finish upgrading and repairing by the end of the 1st week of May. Which means the invasion won't happen until the 3rd week of May... unless I decide to go now, irrespective of escorts... We'll see how Singapore goes. If it goes well I may just rely on LRCAP operating out of Sabang and a smaller surface escort ( 4 BBs, a couple of CA, a half-dozen CLs and about 20 DDs ).

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to Capt. Harlock)
Post #: 638
Allied Counters - 9/19/2010 7:59:00 PM   
Capt. Harlock


Posts: 5358
Joined: 9/15/2001
From: Los Angeles
Status: offline
quote:

The Malaysian invasion won't go in until I've finished upgrading but the port at Soerabaja got a bit overloaded by all the shipping I sent there so the CAs will only finish upgrading and repairing by the end of the 1st week of May. Which means the invasion won't happen until the 3rd week of May...

Oh, well, not until the third week of May! I feel so much better for the Japanese.
Seriously, going forward before you have such goodies as Beauforts and F4F-4's in quantity would be bold in almost any other player. But your post makes it clear you've cast up the numbers. Good hunting!

_____________________________

Civil war? What does that mean? Is there any foreign war? Isn't every war fought between men, between brothers?

--Victor Hugo

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 639
RE: Allied Counters - 9/19/2010 8:31:23 PM   
stuman


Posts: 3907
Joined: 9/14/2008
From: Elvis' Hometown
Status: offline 		Nemo121, I have found this AAR to be both interesting and enjoyable. Thank you for taking the time writing it.

_____________________________

" Gentlemen, you can't fight in here! This is the War Room. " President Muffley


(in reply to Capt. Harlock)
Post #: 640
RE: Allied Counters - 9/20/2010 1:27:03 AM   
pws1225

 

Posts: 1166
Joined: 8/9/2010
From: Tate's Hell, Florida
Status: offline 		newbie here: hermeneutics aside - who's this nemo guy? he's got big words, but he also does everything backwards. down here in the swamp, we just call it f--k'g with your mind. he calls it psych-ops. but by whatever name, he's really onto something! this is gonna be a really good read.

(in reply to stuman)
Post #: 641
RE: Words and the constriction of thought.... - 9/20/2010 4:28:00 PM   
Galahad78

 

Posts: 386
Joined: 9/28/2009
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

So, here's a question for you all... How does the constraining of thought by the words chosen apply to discussions in-game and on the forum?

Bonus points to anyone who links in with 1984 and/or the recent expansion of Xinhua as a means of controlling not only dissent but the form dissent takes - its actually quite a brilliant and machiavellian policy really. Cold-blooded and ruthless but effective.


I always liked the way the Ministry of Truth (was it? Many years since I read 1984, and not in English ) presents the "enemy of the moment": all mention to this enemy being an ally a year ago are removed from all book, media, etc., therefore giving the impression that this enemy has been a life-long enemy. Liked how media shapes our understanding of the world that surrounds us; it is easier to digest a message cooked by someone else that taking the trouble of figuring the things oneself.

I find a similarity with some concepts or strategies in-game and the forums: Burma is untenable, whole India uncoquerable, etc. Common knowledge, they say. Always been like this. Then someone does mantain Burma (and attacks from there early in the war), or conquests whole India...Things that were unthinkable. Because no one bothered to "think" if it REALLY was doable, or not.

Never thought I would learn so much about psychology in a game-forum

< Message edited by Galahad78 -- 9/20/2010 4:29:07 PM >

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 642
RE: Allied Counters - 9/20/2010 11:32:43 PM   
vettim89


Posts: 3615
Joined: 7/14/2007
From: Toledo, Ohio
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: pws1225

newbie here: hermeneutics aside - who's this nemo guy? he's got big words, but he also does everything backwards. down here in the swamp, we just call it f--k'g with your mind. he calls it psych-ops. but by whatever name, he's really onto something! this is gonna be a really good read.


If you think back to the end of The Return of the Jedi, Emporor Palpatine's death is actually only implied. I am here to tell you he lives and is in fact Nemo. The Dark Lord of the Sith walks among us.

Another note, Nemo is not playing the same game as the rest of us. He used his Jedi mind tricks to get a special "God Mode" copy from Matrix.

_____________________________

"We have met the enemy and they are ours" - Commodore O.H. Perry

(in reply to pws1225)
Post #: 643
RE: Allied Counters - 9/21/2010 10:38:55 PM   
ChickenOfTheSea


Posts: 579
Joined: 6/7/2008
From: Virginia
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: pws1225

newbie here: hermeneutics aside - who's this nemo guy? he's got big words, but he also does everything backwards. down here in the swamp, we just call it f--k'g with your mind. he calls it psych-ops. but by whatever name, he's really onto something! this is gonna be a really good read.


Nemo is one of our most insightful and verbose (in a good way) forum members. I find his writings interesting and informative even when I think he is off base (which is not often). He does have a different way of looking at things and thinking about things which means I often get new ideas about the game and how to play it from his essays.

_____________________________

In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice, but in practice, there is. - Manfred Eigen

(in reply to pws1225)
Post #: 644
RE: The Hermeneutics of Competence - 9/21/2010 11:09:33 PM   
ChickenOfTheSea


Posts: 579
Joined: 6/7/2008
From: Virginia
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Recently there's been quite a bit of discussion about various Allied strategies on the forum. I've engaged in a couple of the discussions but, honestly, the reality is that in life most people are satisfied once they have an explanation which exonerates them from responsibility. Whether that be due to the game hating them, their opponent being ueber-awesome or some supernatural entity/deity making the crops fail --- Note to self, sacrifice more virgins next year so the rains come.

...

So, I don't think awareness is, necessarily, a guarantee of immunity. I think it comes down to the quality and depth of knowledge, usage and self-reflection. People who are used to self-reflection and objective self-reflection are usually pretty good at identifying their triggers and how someone might play on them. They can guard against those things. Most people, however, are very poor at objective self-evaluation and don't engage in it much at all.


Nemo,

As a psychiatrist, you have to deal with lack of insight in patients all the time. Some of what you describe here sounds like lack of insight. As in psychiatry, lack of insight will cause players to fail to recognize how their own actions resulted in an outcome they didn't like and, as a result, they will continue to make similar mistakes rather than learning as much from their game experience as they should. It also means that a psi-ops player like yourself can really lead them on.

On the other hand you talk about self-awareness provides some immunity to this. It also clearly helps players understand their own tendencies and how following their own instinctive tendencies cause them to go wrong. For myself, i realize that although I may want to be a Patton, by nature I am a Montgomery and I will show Montgomery-like tendencies.

However, in a game sense, couldn't an insightful and self-aware player play with a sense of irony in that they needn't be consistent with their own tendencies of which they are very much aware. Rather they could adopt a playing personality not necessarily consistent with what they might view as their identity and that they could shift at regular intervals. It seems like that would create a very tough opponent to read. The question it seems, is how many players could really do this effectively and how realistic is it to try to play this way.




_____________________________

In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice, but in practice, there is. - Manfred Eigen

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 645
RE: The Hermeneutics of Competence - 9/22/2010 12:46:25 AM   
vettim89


Posts: 3615
Joined: 7/14/2007
From: Toledo, Ohio
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: ChickenOfTheSea


quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Recently there's been quite a bit of discussion about various Allied strategies on the forum. I've engaged in a couple of the discussions but, honestly, the reality is that in life most people are satisfied once they have an explanation which exonerates them from responsibility. Whether that be due to the game hating them, their opponent being ueber-awesome or some supernatural entity/deity making the crops fail --- Note to self, sacrifice more virgins next year so the rains come.

...

So, I don't think awareness is, necessarily, a guarantee of immunity. I think it comes down to the quality and depth of knowledge, usage and self-reflection. People who are used to self-reflection and objective self-reflection are usually pretty good at identifying their triggers and how someone might play on them. They can guard against those things. Most people, however, are very poor at objective self-evaluation and don't engage in it much at all.


Nemo,

As a psychiatrist, you have to deal with lack of insight in patients all the time. Some of what you describe here sounds like lack of insight. As in psychiatry, lack of insight will cause players to fail to recognize how their own actions resulted in an outcome they didn't like and, as a result, they will continue to make similar mistakes rather than learning as much from their game experience as they should. It also means that a psi-ops player like yourself can really lead them on.

On the other hand you talk about self-awareness provides some immunity to this. It also clearly helps players understand their own tendencies and how following their own instinctive tendencies cause them to go wrong. For myself, i realize that although I may want to be a Patton, by nature I am a Montgomery and I will show Montgomery-like tendencies.

However, in a game sense, couldn't an insightful and self-aware player play with a sense of irony in that they needn't be consistent with their own tendencies of which they are very much aware. Rather they could adopt a playing personality not necessarily consistent with what they might view as their identity and that they could shift at regular intervals. It seems like that would create a very tough opponent to read. The question it seems, is how many players could really do this effectively and how realistic is it to try to play this way.



Well said. In fact the more self aware a player becomes, the more adept he/she becomes at playing the game. If a player approaches the game in a cetain way over a extending period of game time that person's opponent will eventually begin to form an image of how the game will play out. If the player is truly self aware, he can use his own tendencies against his opponent. In fact that is actually a viable strategy that would require patience to complete but could result in substantial gains for little cost/risk. By acting a certain way over a long period of time you can mold your opponents expectations of what is coming next. Then by acting "out of character" the player can make a move in an unsuspected direction or set a trap for his opponent by basically shaping his opponents moves to his will. Easier said then done but it happens all the time.

_____________________________

"We have met the enemy and they are ours" - Commodore O.H. Perry

(in reply to ChickenOfTheSea)
Post #: 646
RE: The Hermeneutics of Competence - 9/22/2010 12:57:10 AM   
Nemo121


Posts: 5821
Joined: 2/6/2004
Status: offline 		Just a quick update to let you know the good and the bad regarding Operation Sink Everything in Singers....

Basically despite the fact that torpedoes were highlighted in yellow when I had the torpedo-bombers set to training missions and naval attack it wouldn't allow me to select torpedoes for the port attack mission. I'm not sure what this means, is it just something I can't select or are they really unavailable for these missions?

In any case I decided to go ahead with the attacks on the basis that Mike seems to be getting a bit suspicious and attacking Singers will be a good counter-point to KB and the multiple BB and CA TFs he has loitering off Manado.

So, the attacks are on. 134 fighters will sweep Singers while 199 dive-bombers and 145 torpedo bombers ( about 8,000 feet ) will attack the port. In addition 75 Catalinas are also tasked to the port attack mission. They may or may not carry torpedoes. I'm not sure.

75 B-17s will lead the airfield attack with another 252 medium bombers also tasked to this msision.

I show some 100 enemy fighters and another 200 additional enemy planes ( bombers etc ) operating out of Singers.


So, it'll all depend on how the four airfields co-ordinate their strikes and how well the sweeps work before all those lovely, vulnerable medium bombers, torpedo bombers and dive-bombers work.





ChickenOfTheSea,

Theoretically speaking a sufficiently self-aware player might choose to play in such a way that his goals might not, necessarily, be consistent over time either within the one game or multiple games. Such a player could, for example, set themselves a different task in each game - hold x, attack merchant shipping to the exclusion of all else etc. Those tasks would create an external drive which could cause inconsistent play over time both within the game and through the metagame ( the series of games one strings together ) whilst being consistent within the shorter time frame ( the task set for that particular time ).

Of course that would only really come to fruition if you had someone who thought of the meta-game ( the series of games they played within a single computer game or over a series of computer games ) and who either enjoyed toying with the concept of expectation, image and suchlike or who felt that manipulating ( or at least introducing an element of doubt into ) those areas was either interesting or worthwhile.

The two motivations I could see would be either:
a) an enjoyment of toying with those concepts ( in which someone who was self-aware would from time to time do things purely to play with an opponents perception/expectation of their approach ) or
b) a really serious approach to wargaming with a really long-term approach.


For my side I certainly wouldn't have the time or energy to take a multi-year approach to creating a persona and then playing with that in a serious manner. I would, however, find it amusing and interesting to play with those concepts a little bit from time to time and allow people to draw their own, incorrect, conclusions. I'm very much from the school of thinking that the acme of strategy is not to defeat one's opponent but to allow one's opponent's thoughts, expectations and actions lead to their own defeat with just sufficient nudging occurring in-game to guide them to self-defeat.

This harks back to what jrcar said about casualties and killing being, primarily, ways to influence the opposing commander's mind. We have to realise that all action ( and even inaction - although that's a bit more complicated of a concept ) is communication. Capturing a village and crucifying every man, woman and child within it is not only a war crime and crime against humanity but it is also a form of communication to the other villages in the area. Perhaps it says, "You don't want to resist our forces when we move through your area" or perhaps it says, "Even if you are helpful we hate you so much we'll kill you all, escape and leave this area to our ethnic group... or die." The message varies based on the context and interpretation but the basic point is that murder communicates concepts, warnings etc just as all other actions do ( including, rather more humanely, mercy ).

So, killing enemy forces in-game ( and in real life ) is a means of communicating with the enemy soldiers and their chain of command and one component of the attempt to influence their leaders' thought processes. My strike on Singapore is not really viewed, by me, as an attritional ploy but rather as a way of communicating, "These are not the ports you seek. The ports you should base your ships at should be no closer than Saigon. Those are lovely ports... and safe. You should go there." I'm willing to bet that Mike will get the message and redeploy appropriately.

So, in real life hundreds of people, perhaps thousands, would be about to die tomorrow but their deaths wouldn't really be the goal. They'd simply be the way I'd communicate with the IJN high command that they needed to redeploy, said redeployment resulting in a more favourable strategic situation for my forces.


E.g. in Afghanistan right now one can be sure that the current strategy is highly focussed on:
a) gathering intel on the chain of command within the Taliban and discerning which commanders are highly motivated and aligned with Al Qaeda goals, which commanders are aligned with Taliban religious goals, which are more motivated by booting the foreigner out, which are motivated by gaining power for their own family and which just want the freedom to grow poppies again. It would be, from my understanding, a mistake to lump all the Taliban in together. It seems clear there are multiple motivations and levels of committment therein. Some are amenable to discussion with Allied powers etc, some are utterly opposed and will only end their opposition through either withdrawal of western forces or their own death.

b) the targetted assasination by drones and deniable/low visibility assets of those commanders who are felt to be aligned with AQ and Taliban religious goals

c) while seeking to negotiate and negate the campaigns of those with other goals. E.g. If someone wants to become powerful in his region then why not just buy him off and make him part, nominally, of the local police force. Things will go back to the rather dysfunctional way they were 30 years ago but that's better than those guys actively opposing Allied forces and the local government ( if that ineffective bunch of "friends of Hamid" can be called a government ).

Killing the resistance leaders ( or whatever you want to label them as ) who were most aligned with AQ or the really religious factions within the Taliban not only removes them as roadblocks but also serves as the stick in the carrot and stick communication. "Here's a nice bit of what you want ( power, money etc ). If you don't take it you might end up like Ahmed. It was terribly sad what happened to his entire walled compound last week wasn't it? That's 500lber bombs for you. So, let's talk about you and your men signing up to the local police force and taking a monthly wage from Karzai in return for there being no more attacks in this village/valley."



Even for professionals I think there isn't much point in such an investment as, once they enter combat, their methods and tendencies will tend to out. Of course by the same token maintaining some element of unpredictability is useful. Again though, for a professional, it'd be inappropriate to set a different "task" in every combat situation as that isn't, necessarily, conductive to taking the least casualties etc.

With those caveats though I do tend to set different tasks so as to amuse myself. Winning the game isn't, to me, the challenge. The challenge, for me, is to play well and achieve varied tasks with the minimal forces possible. I think that may lead to unpredictability but it is really up to others to judge whether or not that is so.



As to insight..... Very, very few people, in my experience, care to actually know who they really are and form an objective opinion of themselves. Most people prefer to engage in comfort myths to make themselves feel better about themselves... "I'm super-aggressive and I never hold back" is the comfort myth. The reality is, "I don't have a strategic long-term plan and can't hold back from action". "I like writing AARs" could really be "I crave adulation" and so on and so forth. None of the above is all that bad in and of itself but not knowing what REALLY drives you as opposed to what you would like to think drives you is a problem since you can only monitor your decisions for appropriateness once you know your subconscious motivations.

So, do most people have insight? No. Do most people think they do? Yes. Do most people like to be challenged by the dichotomy between what they think and what is? No. That's fine though as most of the time, in life, situations don't arise which will challenge them sufficiently to create a breaking point which cracks along the faultline of who they think they are vs who they actually are. When such a situation does arise though they are very vulnerable.

I want to be clear though that this isn't really a situation of A is right and B is wrong. These things just are different ways of being and it is important to have a tolerance for people who draw the line in a very different place than one would oneself.

< Message edited by Nemo121 -- 9/22/2010 1:16:44 AM >

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to ChickenOfTheSea)
Post #: 647
Sun Bin and Self-Awareness - 9/22/2010 1:19:58 AM   
Nemo121


Posts: 5821
Joined: 2/6/2004
Status: offline 		Speaking of knowing thyself... Anyone know the relevant Sun Bin quote here? ( you might know him as Sun Tzu but I refuse to refer to him as such as I think Sun Tzu was a gestalt - its a little oddity of mine ;-) ).

< Message edited by Nemo121 -- 9/22/2010 1:20:48 AM >

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 648
RE: Sun Bin and Self-Awareness - 9/22/2010 2:55:18 AM   
stuman


Posts: 3907
Joined: 9/14/2008
From: Elvis' Hometown
Status: offline 		I like this quote :

"To be victorious against the major opposition, one must possess the strong character of quietly maintaining the deceptive state of shaping and influencing the opposition by avoiding direct conflicts and confrontations until the primary weak point of their opposition is pinpointed. At that stage, he or she focuses on conquering the opposition via one major battle with great speed and precision amount of force."



_____________________________

" Gentlemen, you can't fight in here! This is the War Room. " President Muffley


(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 649
RE: Sun Bin and Self-Awareness - 9/22/2010 7:30:51 AM   
Galahad78

 

Posts: 386
Joined: 9/28/2009
Status: offline 		If you know yourself and your enemy, you will be victorious in one hundred battles; if you know yourself but not your enemy, you will win one battle and lose the next one; if you neither know yourself nor your enemy, you will be in danger in all your battles (freely translated from Spanish).

Another quote which I think suits you fine, Nemo : If you use the enemy to defeat the enemy, you'll be powerful wherever you go (again, free translation).

(in reply to stuman)
Post #: 650
Operation Singers - 9/22/2010 8:29:18 PM   
Capt. Harlock


Posts: 5358
Joined: 9/15/2001
From: Los Angeles
Status: offline
quote:

Basically despite the fact that torpedoes were highlighted in yellow when I had the torpedo-bombers set to training missions and naval attack it wouldn't allow me to select torpedoes for the port attack mission. I'm not sure what this means, is it just something I can't select or are they really unavailable for these missions?


I remember a controversy about anti-torpedo netting when Admiral's Edition was being worked on. Is it possible that after the Pearl Harbor raid, ships in port are considered to be protected against torpedo attacks, and only vulnerable to bombs?

(Historical note: the battleships at Pearl were not covered by anti-torpedo nets because the water was considered to be too shallow for air-dropped torpedoes. And it would have been, if the Japanese hadn't been aware of the water depth, and modified their torps with wooden fins. The otherwise lamentable "Pearl Harbor" movie with Ben Affleck does at least show this detail.)

_____________________________

Civil war? What does that mean? Is there any foreign war? Isn't every war fought between men, between brothers?

--Victor Hugo

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 651
RE: Operation Singers - 9/22/2010 9:15:40 PM   
Nemo121


Posts: 5821
Joined: 2/6/2004
Status: offline 		Well, today was a bit of a disaster... I hit the IJN at Singers but my forces went in in the wrong order - sweeping Hurris last, dive-bombers first.

Harlock,
If the mission hadn't flown ur renaming of the thread could have given the game away. Fortunately it had flown so no harm done.


AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR Apr 23, 42--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASW attack near Singapore at 50,84

Japanese Ships
DD Yukaze
DD Kyukaze

Allied Ships
SS Grayling, hits 11

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Time Surface Combat, near Manado at 76,99, Range 10,000 Yards

Japanese Ships
BB Mutsu
BB Ise
CA Ashigara
CA Suzuya
CA Furutaka
CA Kako
CL Nagara
CL Abukuma
CL Kiso
CL Kitakami
CL Tenryu
DD Yukikaze
DD Hayashio
DD Amatsukaze
DD Tokitsukaze
DD Murasame
DD Harusame
DD Samidare
DD Umikaze
DD Yugure
DD Ayanami
DD Tadeshiwa

Allied Ships
xAK Bandra, Shell hits 8, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
xAK Barpeta, Shell hits 3, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
xAK Ho Kiang, Shell hits 2, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
xAK Matiana, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
xAK Penrith Castle, Shell hits 19, and is sunk
xAK Tanda, Shell hits 4, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
xAK Admiral Chase, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
xAK Pasha, Shell hits 14, and is sunk
xAK Varela, Shell hits 8, and is sunk
xAK City of Manchester, Shell hits 6, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
xAK Jalapalaka, Shell hits 14, and is sunk
PC Zeeman, Shell hits 8, and is sunk
TK Buccinum, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
TK British Trader, Shell hits 5, and is sunk

These ships were escaping and seem to have retreated TOWARDS the IJN bombardment TF... A questionable decision at best. Still, such is life.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Naval bombardment of Manado at 75,99 - Coastal Guns Fire Back!

Allied aircraft
no flights

Allied aircraft losses
PBY-5 Catalina: 1 destroyed on ground
P-40E Warhawk: 3 destroyed on ground

16 Coastal gun shots fired in defense.

Japanese Ships
BB Ise
CA Kako
CA Furutaka
CA Suzuya
CA Ashigara
CL Tenryu
CL Kitakami
CL Kiso
CL Abukuma, Shell hits 1
CL Nagara
DD Tadeshiwa
DD Ayanami
DD Yugure
DD Umikaze
DD Samidare
DD Harusame
DD Murasame
DD Tokitsukaze
DD Amatsukaze
DD Hayashio
DD Yukikaze


Allied ground losses:
226 casualties reported
Squads: 0 destroyed, 3 disabled
Non Combat: 0 destroyed, 27 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 6 disabled


Airbase hits 11
Airbase supply hits 6
Runway hits 98

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASW attack near Onnekotan-jima at 136,48

Japanese Ships
AMC Awata Maru
xAP Palau Maru
xAP Kanzyu Maru
DD Matsukaze
DD Harukaze

Allied Ships
SS Cachalot


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 29 NM, estimated altitude 28,300 feet.
Estimated time to target is 10 minutes

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 12
Ki-43-Ib Oscar x 15
Ki-43-Ic Oscar x 51



Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 26


Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 2 destroyed
Ki-43-Ib Oscar: 1 destroyed
Ki-43-Ic Oscar: 3 destroyed

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat: 4 destroyed


A nice start with 26 F4F4s. But where are the 60+ Hurri IIs from the same base?



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 23 NM, estimated altitude 34,200 feet.
Estimated time to target is 5 minutes

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 5
Ki-43-Ib Oscar x 11
Ki-43-Ic Oscar x 43



Allied aircraft
Sea Hurricane Ib x 13


Japanese aircraft losses
Ki-43-Ic Oscar: 1 destroyed

Allied aircraft losses
Sea Hurricane Ib: 3 destroyed


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 26 NM, estimated altitude 34,550 feet.
Estimated time to target is 7 minutes

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 4
Ki-43-Ib Oscar x 10
Ki-43-Ic Oscar x 38



Allied aircraft
B-339D x 9

Japanese aircraft losses
Ki-43-Ic Oscar: 2 destroyed

Allied aircraft losses
B-339D: 3 destroyed



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 33 NM, estimated altitude 37,550 feet.
Estimated time to target is 10 minutes

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 4
Ki-43-Ib Oscar x 7
Ki-43-Ic Oscar x 30



Allied aircraft
B-339D x 9


No Japanese losses

No Allied losses


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Kanhsien , at 81,57

Weather in hex: Severe storms

Raid spotted at 37 NM, estimated altitude 13,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 10 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-27b Nate x 6
Ki-30 Ann x 17



No Japanese losses



Airbase supply hits 1
Runway hits 2

Aircraft Attacking:
17 x Ki-30 Ann bombing from 10000 feet
Airfield Attack: 1 x 250 kg GP Bomb



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Langsa , at 46,74

Weather in hex: Overcast

Raid spotted at 35 NM, estimated altitude 17,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 10 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-21-IIa Sally x 24
Ki-30 Ann x 25
Ki-43-Ic Oscar x 12



Japanese aircraft losses
Ki-21-IIa Sally: 3 damaged


Allied ground losses:
6 casualties reported
Squads: 0 destroyed, 1 disabled
Non Combat: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled


Airbase hits 2
Runway hits 13

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Kukong , at 79,57

Weather in hex: Severe storms

Raid spotted at 32 NM, estimated altitude 12,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 10 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-27b Nate x 9
Ki-51 Sonia x 21



No Japanese losses



Airbase hits 1
Airbase supply hits 1
Runway hits 14

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Kweilin , at 76,54

Weather in hex: Severe storms

Raid spotted at 25 NM, estimated altitude 15,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 11 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-27b Nate x 8
Ki-36 Ida x 17



No Japanese losses



Airbase hits 3
Runway hits 20

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Kukong , at 79,57

Weather in hex: Severe storms

Raid spotted at 17 NM, estimated altitude 11,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 5 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-48-Ib Lily x 14



No Japanese losses



Airbase supply hits 1
Runway hits 10

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Sian , at 83,41

Weather in hex: Thunderstorms

Raid spotted at 34 NM, estimated altitude 16,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 10 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-21-IIa Sally x 17
Ki-27b Nate x 9
Ki-48-Ib Lily x 8



Allied aircraft
I-16-III x 2
I-15-III x 3
Hawk 75M x 1


No Japanese losses

No Allied losses



Airbase hits 1
Airbase supply hits 1
Runway hits 2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 38 NM, estimated altitude 18,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 14 minutes

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 4
Ki-43-Ib Oscar x 7
Ki-43-Ic Oscar x 27



Allied aircraft
SBD-2 Dauntless x 7
SBD-3 Dauntless x 74


No Japanese losses

Allied aircraft losses
SBD-2 Dauntless: 1 destroyed, 5 damaged
SBD-3 Dauntless: 25 destroyed, 15 damaged

Japanese Ships
BB Haruna, Bomb hits 6, on fire

FlAK was rough but about 17 or 18 SBDs were downed by the Oscars. Ouch !!!

The 1000lbers didn't penetrate but they did take out AAA mounts and start fires. Over the day this damage added up.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 21 NM, estimated altitude 11,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 11 minutes

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 1
Ki-43-Ib Oscar x 1
Ki-43-Ic Oscar x 4



Allied aircraft
Albacore I x 6
Swordfish I x 5
TBD-1 Devastator x 29


No Japanese losses

Allied aircraft losses
Swordfish I: 1 destroyed, 2 damaged
TBD-1 Devastator: 1 damaged

Japanese Ships
BB Haruna, Bomb hits 2, on fire

Port hits 1

No torpedo attacks at all.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on 22nd/A Division, at 86,56

Weather in hex: Clear sky

Raid spotted at 43 NM, estimated altitude 10,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 14 minutes


Allied aircraft
A-29A Hudson x 3
SB-III x 8


No Allied losses

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 44 NM, estimated altitude 12,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 15 minutes

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 1
Ki-43-Ic Oscar x 1



Allied aircraft
DB-3M x 3
Hudson IIIa x 15
139WH-3 x 9
B-25C Mitchell x 27
Hudson III (LR) x 16
B-17E Fortress x 16


Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 1 damaged
A6M2 Zero: 1 destroyed on ground
Ki-43-Ic Oscar: 1 destroyed on ground
Ki-21-Ic Sally: 3 destroyed on ground
Ki-43-Ib Oscar: 1 destroyed on ground

I estimate that these results mean about 12 Japanese planes destroyed on the ground.


Japanese ground losses:
6 casualties reported
Squads: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled
Non Combat: 0 destroyed, 2 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled



Airbase hits 11
Airbase supply hits 1
Runway hits 33

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 12 NM, estimated altitude 8,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 6 minutes

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 1
Ki-43-Ic Oscar x 1



Allied aircraft
Swordfish I x 12
PBY-5 Catalina x 3
TBD-1 Devastator x 8


No Japanese losses

Allied aircraft losses
PBY-5 Catalina: 1 damaged

Japanese Ships
BB Haruna, Bomb hits 2, heavy fires

Again no torpedoes launched but by this time in the day Haruna was shrouded in flames. Damage wasn't heavy.... yet but the day is yet young.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 10 NM, estimated altitude 17,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 4 minutes


Allied aircraft
SB2U-3 Vindicator x 13


Allied aircraft losses
SB2U-3 Vindicator: 1 destroyed, 9 damaged

Japanese Ships
BB Haruna, Bomb hits 1, heavy fires

By this stage of the day the CAP is exhausted and the airfield damaged enough that replacement fighters aren't being launched. SO far, apart from the lack of torpedoes and the Hurris not flying their sweep mission things were going according to plan.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 11 NM, estimated altitude 13,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 4 minutes

Japanese aircraft
no flights


Allied aircraft
Albacore I x 18
139WH-3 x 6
Do-24K-1 x 5
B-17D Fortress x 6
B-17E Fortress x 12


Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 1 destroyed on ground
Ki-43-Ib Oscar: 1 destroyed on ground
Ki-21-Ic Sally: 1 destroyed on ground

Another 6 planes destroyed on the ground


Japanese Ships
BB Haruna, Bomb hits 3, heavy fires
DD Hakaze, Bomb hits 1, on fire
xAP Koan Maru, Bomb hits 2, on fire
xAP Asama Maru, Bomb hits 1, on fire
xAP Baikal Maru, Bomb hits 1, heavy fires
AK Tosan Maru, Bomb hits 1, on fire

By this stage Haruna had taken enough damage that the bombs started to be spread around to other targets.

Japanese ground losses:
5 casualties reported
Squads: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled
Non Combat: 0 destroyed, 1 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled

Airbase hits 7
Runway hits 9
Port hits 1


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 48 NM, estimated altitude 10,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 11 minutes


Allied aircraft
DB-7B x 14


Allied aircraft losses
DB-7B: 1 destroyed

Airbase hits 1
Runway hits 5

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 12 NM, estimated altitude 11,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 7 minutes


Allied aircraft
Albacore I x 12
PBY-4 Catalina x 6


Allied aircraft losses
Albacore I: 1 damaged

Japanese Ships
xAP Hakozaki Maru, Bomb hits 1, on fire, heavy damage
xAP Hakusan Maru, Bomb hits 1, on fire

At this stage the stragglers are making their runs. Fortunately the CAP is long gone by this stage of the morning.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 15 NM, estimated altitude 38,550 feet.
Estimated time to target is 4 minutes


Allied aircraft
B-339D x 6


No Allied losses

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 39 NM, estimated altitude 11,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 23 minutes


Allied aircraft
PBY-4 Catalina x 4


No Allied losses

Japanese Ships
xAP Kokuryu Maru, Bomb hits 1
E Kunashiri, Bomb hits 1, on fire

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 17 NM, estimated altitude 38,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 4 minutes


Allied aircraft
Hurricane IIb Trop x 55

Ah here are the Hurris... Well done boys, firing squads are waiting on your return.


No Allied losses


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 41 NM, estimated altitude 11,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 24 minutes


Allied aircraft
PBY-5 Catalina x 3


No Allied losses

Japanese Ships
AK Kyushu Maru, Bomb hits 1, on fire

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 47 NM, estimated altitude 11,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 14 minutes

Japanese aircraft
no flights


Allied aircraft
B-17E Fortress x 6


Japanese aircraft losses
Ki-21-Ic Sally: 1 destroyed on ground

So far at least 20 planes are destroyed on the ground.

Allied aircraft losses
B-17E Fortress: 1 damaged

Japanese ground losses:
Guns lost 1 (1 destroyed, 0 disabled)

Airbase hits 2
Runway hits 7





--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 25 NM, estimated altitude 14,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 14 minutes


Allied aircraft
PBY-5 Catalina x 3


Allied aircraft losses
PBY-5 Catalina: 1 damaged

Japanese Ships
E Kunashiri, Bomb hits 1, heavy fires, heavy damage

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 10 NM, estimated altitude 11,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 2 minutes

Japanese aircraft
no flights


Allied aircraft
B-17E Fortress x 6


Japanese aircraft losses
No Japanese losses

No Allied losses



Airbase hits 1
Runway hits 15

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 22 NM, estimated altitude 12,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 13 minutes


Allied aircraft
PBY-5 Catalina x 3


Allied aircraft losses
PBY-5 Catalina: 1 damaged

Japanese Ships
xAP Huzi Maru, Bomb hits 1, on fire
xAP Hakusan Maru, Bomb hits 1, heavy fires

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 17 NM, estimated altitude 12,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 9 minutes


Allied aircraft
PBY-5 Catalina x 3


Allied aircraft losses
PBY-5 Catalina: 1 damaged

Japanese Ships
xAP Kobe Maru, Bomb hits 1
xAK Kiyozumi Maru, Bomb hits 1
xAP Baikal Maru, and is sunk

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 45 NM, estimated altitude 9,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 20 minutes


Allied aircraft
Do-24K-1 x 2


No Allied losses

Japanese Ships
xAP Kokuryu Maru, Bomb hits 1, on fire, heavy damage
xAP Brazil Maru, Bomb hits 1, on fire
DMS W-13, Bomb hits 1, heavy fires, heavy damage

By this stage of the day some 20 other ships had also taken hits... Not nearly enough for my liking but combined with the planes destroyed on the ground it is likely that overall Allied losses will be roughly the same as the Japanese aerial losses and on top of that the Allies got quite a few ship hits, including Haruna shrouded in flames and, possibly, in trouble.

Japanese ground losses:
5 casualties reported
Squads: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled
Non Combat: 0 destroyed, 1 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled

Port hits 1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Kwajalein Island , at 132,115

Weather in hex: Heavy cloud

Raid spotted at 29 NM, estimated altitude 13,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 6 minutes


Allied aircraft
A-20A Havoc x 12
A-29 Hudson x 6


Allied aircraft losses
A-20A Havoc: 4 damaged
A-29 Hudson: 1 damaged

Japanese Ships
SSX Ha-25, Bomb hits 1, heavy damage



Runway hits 3
Port hits 2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 43 NM, estimated altitude 9,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 13 minutes


Allied aircraft
B-17E Fortress x 6


Allied aircraft losses
B-17E Fortress: 2 damaged

Runway hits 3


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 24 NM, estimated altitude 13,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 14 minutes


Allied aircraft
PBY-5 Catalina x 3


Allied aircraft losses
PBY-5 Catalina: 2 damaged

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 12 NM, estimated altitude 9,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 6 minutes


Allied aircraft
PBY-5 Catalina x 3


No Allied losses

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on TF, near Obi at 76,105

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 17 NM, estimated altitude 13,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 6 minutes

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 6
D3A1 Val x 4



No Japanese losses

Allied Ships
xAKL Luzon, Bomb hits 1, heavy fires

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 41 NM, estimated altitude 10,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 24 minutes


Allied aircraft
PBY-5 Catalina x 3


No Allied losses

Repair Shipyard hits 3

I've no idea how this strike happened. I didn't order attacks on the repair shipyard.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 38 NM, estimated altitude 8,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 22 minutes


Allied aircraft
Catalina I x 3


No Allied losses

Japanese Ships
AK Kinka Maru, Bomb hits 1, on fire
xAP Buenos Aires Maru, Bomb hits 1, on fire
xAK Kiyozumi Maru, Bomb hits 1, heavy fires

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 31 NM, estimated altitude 12,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 18 minutes


Allied aircraft
Catalina I x 2


Allied aircraft losses
Catalina I: 1 damaged

Japanese Ships
xAP Hakozaki Maru, and is sunk

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 12 NM, estimated altitude 12,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 6 minutes


Allied aircraft
Catalina I x 3


Allied aircraft losses
Catalina I: 1 damaged

Japanese Ships
xAK Kiyozumi Maru, Bomb hits 1, heavy fires, heavy damage
AK Kyushu Maru, Bomb hits 1, heavy fires

Port hits 2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 43 NM, estimated altitude 11,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 25 minutes


Allied aircraft
Catalina I x 3


Allied aircraft losses
Catalina I: 1 damaged

Japanese Ships
E Hachijo, Bomb hits 1, heavy fires, heavy damage
BB Haruna, Bomb hits 1, heavy fires, heavy damage

Hmm, heavy fire and heavy damage. Looks to me like Haruna just might be in danger.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Afternoon Air attack on Manado , at 75,99

Weather in hex: Thunderstorms

Raid spotted at 33 NM, estimated altitude 19,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 10 minutes

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 12



Allied aircraft
P-40E Warhawk x 12
F2A-3 Buffalo x 3
F4F-3A Wildcat x 4
F4F-3 Wildcat x 4


Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 1 destroyed

Allied aircraft losses
P-40E Warhawk: 1 destroyed
F4F-3A Wildcat: 1 destroyed

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub attack near Tandjoengbalai at 47,78

Japanese Ships
xAK Toyama Maru, Torpedo hits 1, on fire, heavy damage
E Omae

Allied Ships
SS S-39, hits 1


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pre-Invasion action off Onnekotan-jima
Defensive Guns engage approaching landing force

210 Coastal gun shots fired in defense.

Japanese Ships
CL Yura
DD Harukaze
DD Ariake
DD Shigure
AMC Awata Maru
DD Matsukaze

Japanese ground losses:
225 casualties reported
Squads: 0 destroyed, 19 disabled
Non Combat: 0 destroyed, 20 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amphibious Assault at Onnekotan-jima

TF 59 troops unloading over beach at Onnekotan-jima, 136,48

Japanese ground losses:
65 casualties reported
Squads: 4 destroyed, 0 disabled
Non Combat: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled



17 troops of a IJA Infantry Squad accidentally lost during unload of 62nd Infantry Group /2
17 troops of a IJA Infantry Squad lost in surf during unload of 62nd Infantry Group /4
17 troops of a IJA Infantry Squad lost overboard during unload of 62nd Infantry Group /5
17 troops of a IJA Infantry Squad lost overboard during unload of 62nd Infantry Group /6


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ground combat at Onnekotan-jima (136,48)

Japanese Deliberate attack

Attacking force 19615 troops, 149 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 888

Defending force 5389 troops, 116 guns, 153 vehicles, Assault Value = 141

Japanese engineers reduce fortifications to 0

Japanese adjusted assault: 475

Allied adjusted defense: 177

Japanese assault odds: 2 to 1 (fort level 0)

Japanese forces CAPTURE Onnekotan-jima !!!

Well, this was expected. I have cadres of all these units so they'll rebuild quickly enough.

Combat modifiers
Defender: terrain(+), preparation(-), experience(-)
Attacker:

Japanese ground losses:
1266 casualties reported
Squads: 4 destroyed, 32 disabled
Non Combat: 3 destroyed, 51 disabled
Engineers: 4 destroyed, 18 disabled


Allied ground losses:
4639 casualties reported
Squads: 263 destroyed, 0 disabled
Non Combat: 364 destroyed, 0 disabled
Engineers: 97 destroyed, 0 disabled
Guns lost 85 (85 destroyed, 0 disabled)
Vehicles lost 200 (200 destroyed, 0 disabled)
Units destroyed 10


Assaulting units:
48th Engineer Regiment
63rd Naval Guard Unit
61st Infantry Group
64th Naval Guard Unit
67th Naval Guard Unit
Guards Mixed Brigade
62nd Naval Guard Unit
65th Naval Guard Unit
62nd Infantry Group /1

Defending units:
201st(Sep) Infantry Regiment
161st Infantry Regiment
1st Marine Raider Battalion
1st/102nd Infantry Bn /1
205th Field Artillery Battalion
Bobcats USN Naval Construction Battalion
111th USN Base Force /9
42nd Construction Regiment
47th Construction Regiment
C Det USN Port Svc /1


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ground combat at Wuchang (84,51)

Japanese Shock attack

Attacking force 7740 troops, 79 guns, 3 vehicles, Assault Value = 281

Defending force 14552 troops, 77 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 449

Japanese adjusted assault: 167

Allied adjusted defense: 335

Japanese assault odds: 1 to 2

Bad choice, that'll remove a lot of the defenders from the front lines and give me a chance to shock attack tomorrow. It won't take the town but it is worth it to just keep the pressure on.

Combat modifiers
Defender: terrain(+), leaders(+), preparation(-), experience(-)
Attacker: shock(+)

Japanese ground losses:
1574 casualties reported
Squads: 5 destroyed, 87 disabled
Non Combat: 3 destroyed, 72 disabled
Engineers: 1 destroyed, 5 disabled


Allied ground losses:
264 casualties reported
Squads: 1 destroyed, 23 disabled
Non Combat: 0 destroyed, 25 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled


Assaulting units:
61st Infantry Brigade
Kyuko Naval Guard Unit
22nd/B Division
22nd AA Regiment
17th JAAF Base Force

Defending units:
74th Chinese Corps


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ground combat at Canton (77,59)

Japanese Bombardment attack

Attacking force 29800 troops, 295 guns, 32 vehicles, Assault Value = 1018

Defending force 20719 troops, 119 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 677

Japanese ground losses:
3 casualties reported
Squads: 0 destroyed, 1 disabled
Non Combat: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled



Assaulting units:
Yokosuka 3rd SNLF
10th Garrison Unit
66th Infantry Regiment
20th RGC Division
1st Ind.Inf.Group
Yokosuka 1st SNLF
21st Division
68th Ind.Infantry Battalion
1st Sasebo SNLF Coy
47th JAAF AF Bn
1st JAAF AF Coy
Canton Special Base Force
20th Ind. Mtn Gun Battalion
31st Special Base Force
2nd JAAF AF Coy

Defending units:
25th Chinese Corps
4th Chinese Corps
49th Chinese Corps


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ground combat at Canton (77,59)

Allied Bombardment attack

Attacking force 20719 troops, 119 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 677

Defending force 31021 troops, 305 guns, 32 vehicles, Assault Value = 1017



Assaulting units:
4th Chinese Corps
25th Chinese Corps
49th Chinese Corps

Defending units:
21st Division
Yokosuka 3rd SNLF
68th Ind.Infantry Battalion
1st Ind.Inf.Group
10th Garrison Unit
20th RGC Division
66th Infantry Regiment
Yokosuka 1st SNLF
1st Sasebo SNLF Coy
20th Ind. Mtn Gun Battalion
47th JAAF AF Bn
1st JAAF AF Coy
31st Special Base Force
Canton Special Base Force
2nd JAAF AF Coy


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ground combat at 86,42

Allied Bombardment attack

Attacking force 25126 troops, 110 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 975

Defending force 17689 troops, 132 guns, 32 vehicles, Assault Value = 649



Assaulting units:
9th Chinese Corps
15th Chinese Corps
5th New Chinese Corps
43rd Chinese Corps
27th Chinese Corps
93rd Chinese Corps
8th New Chinese Corps
14th Group Army
15th Group Army

Defending units:
35th Division
3rd Ind.Mixed Brigade


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ground combat at Wuchang (84,51)

Allied Bombardment attack

Attacking force 14322 troops, 77 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 432

Defending force 7413 troops, 115 guns, 21 vehicles, Assault Value = 188



Assaulting units:
74th Chinese Corps

Defending units:
61st Infantry Brigade
Kyuko Naval Guard Unit
22nd/B Division
22nd AA Regiment
17th JAAF Base Force


So, overall, about 40 Allied planes lost in return for about 20 Japanese planes in the air and another 20 on the ground. In addition the Haruna looks like she might be in trouble and quite a few APs and AKs were hit. I think the Hurri sweep going in late doomed the day though as a lot of planes aborted due to lack of escorts. I had calculated that it was better to sweep with the Hurris than escort with them as the sweep would be more likely to remove all the Japanese planes. I think the decision was still right but the dice just didn't fall right for me.

Still, any day you remove a BB from the equation isn't all bad.

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to Capt. Harlock)
Post #: 652
RE: Operation WhatsamataU - 9/22/2010 9:27:54 PM   
paullus99


Posts: 1985
Joined: 1/23/2002
Status: offline 		This should provoke just the kind of response you're looking for - perhaps cause him to move rashly against you into the teeth of your prepared defenses.

At minimum, he'll think twice before staging more ships into Singapore for a while. Haruna may be in trouble - maybe not of sinking, but that kind of system damage should keep her in the yards for quite some time (and away from the front lines).

_____________________________

Never Underestimate the Power of a Small Tactical Nuclear Weapon...

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 653
lalalala - 9/22/2010 10:53:23 PM   
Walloc

 

Posts: 3141
Joined: 10/30/2006
From: Denmark
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

The 1000lbers didn't penetrate but they did take out AAA mounts and start fires. Over the day this damage added up.

No torpedo attacks at all.
Again no torpedoes launched but by this time in the day Haruna was shrouded in flames. Damage wasn't heavy.... yet but the day is yet young.


I've no idea how this strike happened. I didn't order attacks on the repair shipyard.



Dont think i've ever seen a 1000lbs penetrate a BB.

About torps as other have said. Other than first few days with KB i've never seen a torp attack on a port so i think its hard coded not to happen or the chance is extremly slim.

U ordered port attack, it always have a chance of hitting the repair yard.

Kind regards,

Rasmus

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 654
RE: Operation Singers - 9/23/2010 8:28:10 PM   
Capt. Harlock


Posts: 5358
Joined: 9/15/2001
From: Los Angeles
Status: offline
quote:

Harlock,
If the mission hadn't flown ur renaming of the thread could have given the game away. Fortunately it had flown so no harm done.


I'd forgotten that the subject shows up without having to go into the thread itself . Many apologies.

Interesting that all of the fighter groups except the land Hurricanes went in on schedule. (Even the Sea Hurricanes.) How bad is the damage to your Dauntless pilots?

_____________________________

Civil war? What does that mean? Is there any foreign war? Isn't every war fought between men, between brothers?

--Victor Hugo

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 655
RE: Operation Singers - 9/24/2010 3:42:32 PM   
wpurdom

 

Posts: 476
Joined: 10/27/2000
From: Decatur, GA, USA
Status: offline
quote:

Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Heavy rain

Raid spotted at 29 NM, estimated altitude 28,300 feet.
Estimated time to target is 10 minutes

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 12
Ki-43-Ib Oscar x 15
Ki-43-Ic Oscar x 51



Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 26


Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 2 destroyed
Ki-43-Ib Oscar: 1 destroyed
Ki-43-Ic Oscar: 3 destroyed

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat: 4 destroyed


A nice start with 26 F4F4s. But where are the 60+ Hurri IIs from the same base?


I infer you put all you're fighters on sweep? Seems risky on a first surprise attack on a base - that you were asking for what in fact happened. Given the concurrent attack on the air bases, it seems that it would have been more in line with your strategic purpose to escort the bombers at 10,000 ft. with your F4F's and Buffaloes.

(in reply to Capt. Harlock)
Post #: 656
RE: Operation Singers - 9/25/2010 10:54:28 AM   
Nemo121


Posts: 5821
Joined: 2/6/2004
Status: offline 		Stuman,
I'm glad you enjoy it. I write to stimulate interesting ( to me ) discussions and I'm glad some seem to find the AAR and discussions interesting also.

The quote you provided wasn't actually the one I was thinking of but it is strikingly appropriate isn't it? I had utterly forgotten about that one, kudos to you.


Galahad,
Yep, the first quote is the one I was thinking of while the 2nd is also quite true. As I think I've said before one of the challenges I've set myself in recent games is to have my opponent take an active part in defeating themselves through being guided into/ guiding themselves into inappropriate actions.



paullus99,
Aye... The more I think about it the more I think Haruna might be in trouble.
A) Mike made a joke about "you sunk my battleship" in his email reply
B) Heavy fires lead to significant minor flooding ( from the water used in firefighting )
C) Heavy fires can only be fought at pierside and while Singapore is a major port that BB was hit with a lot of bombs and there were significant fires as well as significant system damage ( it had heavy damage and heavy fires by the end of the day )
D) I show 2 x E8N2 floatplanes as being destroyed on the ground. Wouldn't that be a possible complement of the Haruna?

Either way I think the Singers squadron will be pulled back eastward or his fighter strength will be spread even more thinly. Right now it is so thin he can't properly defend most points, if he spreads it even more thinly it'll aid me more in the long run.


Walloc etc,
A nice bit of programming. That's the way it would work in real life.

I also checked about the torpedoes not being used. If I set the torpedo bombers to naval attack etc then torpedoes are used so it seems like it is definitely a hard-coded port attack issue.


Harlock,
No sweat, it didn't matter this time but it is best to try to be aware of these things at all times, just in case.

Dauntless pilots - Well, in the end I lost 42 Dauntlesses which is 2 months of replacements. That means my Dauntless squadrons are now significantly under strength. By the end of the month I'll have two SBD3 squadrons at full strength and the rest will have 5 or 6 planes each and be deployed behind the lines as pure training squadrons.

I do have a two full-strength SB2C ( I forget the full designation ) squadrons and about 2 full-strength SBC4 Helldiver squadrons ( the biplanes ) as well as about 50 to 60 A-24 Banshees which didn't fly yesterday so, overall, I still have about 160 dive-bombers I can hurl at him if the need arises.

Dauntlesses etc are good for killing merchies etc but for anti-warship work I much prefer torpedo bombers. They don't really hit CLs and DDs but I figure I can simply mob IJN DDs and CLs and am much more interested in killing the BBs and CAs which are the only ship types which he can realistically expect to cause me to abort an amphibious invasion.

Additionally for anti-merchie duty I have loads ( literally hundreds ) of B-26s, B-25s, Hudsons and suchlike with pilots with >70 naval attack skill who can fly out to 10 or so hexes and reliably get hits. So, the SBD-3s were expendable. I had hoped to concentrate losses on the level bombers as they are more expendable but such is life.


wpurdom,

quote:

Seems risky on a first surprise attack on a base - that you were asking for what in fact happened.


I think that's probably putting it a bit too strongly. I tested and retested the escort plan with the various strikes from Balikpapan and other southern DEI bases. If you remember back about a month ago I tested escorting using sweeps and also mixing fighters and strikeplanes from different services and nationalities. From my memory it worked perfectly about 90% of the time and failed once.... So, it looked like a pretty good escorting method.

I attempted to allow for failure to join up by putting the Hurricanes at the base closest to the enemy so that even if they didn't escort the torpedo bombers they'd still arrive, as a mass sweep, before the level bombers coming from twice as far.

So, was it a chance being taken? sure. Had I tested it for feasability and taken precautions that even moderate levels of bad die rolls ( failure to join up to escort the torpedo bombers etc ) would be recoverable? Yes. Did the die rolls just overwhelm the safety margin built into the plan? Yes.

Sometimes you can make a good plan and it still all falls to pieces. That's life and the fact that the game models that is one reason I like it.







Attachment (1)

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John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

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Post #: 657
RE: Operation Singers - 9/25/2010 11:47:56 AM   
KenchiSulla


Posts: 2948
Joined: 10/22/2008
From: the Netherlands
Status: offline 		Coordination is a hard thing to achieve, especially when you are using so many different nationalities and allegiances (navy/army)... Food for thought: if you need the sweep to go in first it will go in last....

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"It happened, therefore it can happen again: this is the core of what we have to say. It can happen, and it can happen everywhere.”
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(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 658
RE: Operation Singers - 9/25/2010 1:11:36 PM   
Nemo121


Posts: 5821
Joined: 2/6/2004
Status: offline 		Well, it is and it isn't.... I found few problems getting co-ordination around the southern DEI but it looks like I was just unlucky here... And I think the problem wasn't so much basic co-ordination as the fact that I was going for co-ordination and then adding an extra layer of difficulty in co-ordinating with the sweeps so the sweeps would go in at the same time as the bombers and act as escorts.

I tested it and it worked the vast majority of the time. It just failed this time. C'est la vie but it doesn't mean it was a bad plan. It just failed for the largest raid run.

In any case for an excess of 37 plane losses I got bombs into some 20 IJN ships, have definitely sunk a few high value APs and have put Haruna out of the war - possibly in sinking condition so it isn't all bad.



In other news: Since I forgot to mention this in the AAR. KB is now 92 miles from Manado and probing westward a hex or two a day. I think Mike is getting more ambitious. His big BB bombardment last night killed 5 P40s which leaves 171 fighters to defend Manado so, fingers crossed he goes for Manado or sprints in to hit Kendari. Either way I am shifting torpedo bombers and suchlike into the area to give him something to think about if he gives me an opening.

I doubt I will hit him though as my primary view of this foray of his is that it is to close the SLOCs so he can bring reinforcements into Mindanao to capture Cagayan and Davao. To be fair that's not a bad plan but it does put KB out of position and accruing system damage at a time when I'm planning a major amphibious assault ( it should come in at about 250 transports and merchants with about 40 subs tasked to creating a barrier in the waters between Malaysia and northern Sumatra). My take is that he'll either hit something I care about ( Manado ) in which case we'll each lose 50 fighters and he'll lose a significant portion of KB's strike groups. That's a strategic win for me. OR he'll hit Kendari or some other small base I don't even bother to have fighters at in which case he'll kill some PBYs, some transport planes and a few xAKLs etc. That's a strategic win for me as that's a waste of KB's time and effort. Either way I win.

I'm trying to evacuate the last 20 xAKLs which I ported in Manado tonight. With a little luck they'll get clean away. They'd make nice amphibious transports for the first wave to hit Malaysia ( 1,000 ton xAKLs will unload pretty quickly ) but if they die they die. I have enough other transports ( a shade under 200 ) available to make up the difference.

Mostly though I've just activated the first phase of the invasion of Malaysia - moving all of the assigned ground troops to Oosthaven. It looks like I should be landing some 3,000 AV ( including 1,000+ AV of armoured forces ) in Malaysia as part of the first wave. I can follow that with another 1,000 AV two weeks later. I'm confident that should be enough to take me into Singapore and Bangkok ( especially when you add the 1500 AV moving on Bangkok from Burma.

I'm also beginning to CAP Sabang again after making the judgement that his fighters will concentrate on CAPing Singapore tomorrow as I've told him |I'm going to hit it with B-17s ( which I am ). If he has few escorts for his bombers I might be able to kill another 20 or 30 over Sabang tomorrow, if not, well that's life.

In other news, 2 additional regiments of Marines and a US Army infantry regiment are loading up at San Fran and moving into the Pacific where they'll be shuttled into the southern DEI. Next is an unrestricted US infantry division. I plan to use those troops to spearhead the US drive through the Phillipines while the British and Indian units fight through Thailand and into China and the Australians mop up Borneo to give me good SLOCs straight through to the Formosa straits.

At that stage the plan is to raid what I can, pin the Japanese back and use the Chinese coastal bases I'll be taking in the near future to threaten amphibious exploitation into Korea. That will draw KB in at which point in time my airforce should be strong enough to overwhelm it and then I'll nip across to Korea.

If the game continues past that point I'll hit the fighter factories first, then supply generating factories and constrict Japan.


Ideally I'd like to run the rest of the game without committing Allied or USN carriers to any major operations as that'll be challenging, interesting and different. It'll push up my losses somewhat but it'll give a very different flavour to the game - land advances alternating with amphibious advances into the teeth of a fully functional KB and IJN/IJA land bases stacked with aircraft in late 1942/early 1943 while the Allies still don't have numerical or technical superiority ( they may have some technical parity aerially though ). So itll be a constant juggle to win the air battle and anti-KB battle despite a lack of carriers and air. This juggling will become more difficult as KB's area of operations becomes more and more constrained as I close in on Japan. After all a single day's sprint from Tokyo brings KB in range of the invasion beaches on Formosa. So strategic misdirection loses much of its appeal then.

Lastly, I'd like to try invading Japan. I've never done it before as games have always finished prior to that. Alternately whenever the game is called I'd be interested in swapping sides and trying to see how long Japan can survive. It would require a couple of weeks of ceasefire and a bit of a rollback of time but it would probably prove pretty interesting to adopt a purely defensive strategy +/- early kami activation.

< Message edited by Nemo121 -- 9/25/2010 1:33:23 PM >

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to KenchiSulla)
Post #: 659
Thoughts Here and There - 9/26/2010 4:53:02 AM   
Capt. Harlock


Posts: 5358
Joined: 9/15/2001
From: Los Angeles
Status: offline 		That ought to be a neutral subject name. Incidentally, the thread name at the bottom of the page still shows up as "The Hermeneutics of Competence" for me. Not sure why.

For what my opinion is worth, the last paragraph of your post is in contradiction to the second to the last. An invasion of Japan without American CV support wouldn't have any chance until and unless the 4E's had closed all of the airfields in the invasion area -- which would make your landing site too obvious.

The much greater effectiveness of torpedo bombers at sinking large warships is very true. The trouble is that in early '42, there are no useful American torpedo bombers (and American air-dropped torpedoes are lousy.) If you can collect sufficient Commonwealth torpedo bombers, bravo.

< Message edited by Capt. Harlock -- 9/26/2010 4:54:12 AM >

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