John 3rd
Posts: 17178
Joined: 9/8/2005 From: La Salle, Colorado Status: offline
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Chickenboy quote:
ORIGINAL: Canoerebel PnzrB: In Cap-n-Gown's AAR, PnzrB noted that as the Allies he would not engage in any major amphibious operations until 1944. There is a great deal of merit in that idea, and I began this game with a similar idea, though for particular reasons I wanted to shoot for early autumn of '43. This strategy has merit because it minimizes the times the Allies take on Japan at equal or disadvantageous odds. Meanwhile, the Japanese player feels good about things and continues to build up his front line defenses, while also working on his rear defenses. Then, in '44, the Allies can simply bypass the first line of defense and simply overwhelm an interior and critically important locale - Borneo, Luzon, Hokkaido, and Sikhalin Island come to mind. If the Allies haven't lost anything major in '42 or '43, they would have a force of ships and men so powerful that there would be no stopping them, especially if the Allied player acheived strategic surprise through deception. In this game, Brad may force me to move much earlier due to the situation in India, but I still hold out some hope that I can avoid committing to a big op until around September '43. While I agree with the logic of this approach from a strictly Allied military balance perspective, 99.9% of games where the Allies run and hide until >January 1944 will wind up dropped by the IJ player-and with good cause. PBEM is an application of tactical and strategic military principles, true enough. But it's also a game that's supposed to be fun for both players. Philosophically, how is this "no offensives until 1944" different than "I wanna wait until I get A-bombs to start an offensive"? Only different by degrees. I would probably drop a game if the latter approach was adopted. Totally concur...
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