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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 4:19:59 PM

Bullwinkle58

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

I'm not sure I'm following the point. I know the strategy wasn't a stroke of genius; I know Brad didn't take full advantage; I know that I wouldn't use it again in the same circumstances.

But...can't you say that the Allied plan at Midway worked because the Japanese let it work? Had the Japanese concentrated their carriers and fleet, it is much more likely that the Allies could have been overwhelmed and lost. A lot had to go right for the Allies to win that particular battle.

Where does that leave Fletcher?

Midway was a 360-degree fight.

In your game, Karachi wasn't moving and the wormhole rules are what they are.

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 4:50:34 PM

Canoerebel

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Bullwinkle, I'm struggling to understand your point.

It's always possible in hindsight to say the conditions were such that a successful commander got lucky and that his opponent didn't do what he should have done.

Nagumo could have done things differently and probably would have won at Midway. Brad could have done things differently and won in India. Fletcher probably got lucky at Midway, but he came up with a plan that worked. I got lucky in India, but I came up with a plan that worked.

I'm not saying I'm Fletcher - heck, I might be Pye or Kimmel or Turner - but my plan worked (to this point), so the media and the public wreaths me in laurels while astute military men and historians look closer and mutter that I got lucky.

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 6:32:08 PM

Bullwinkle58

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Bullwinkle, I'm struggling to understand your point.

It's always possible in hindsight to say the conditions were such that a successful commander got lucky and that his opponent didn't do what he should have done.

Nagumo could have done things differently and probably would have won at Midway. Brad could have done things differently and won in India. Fletcher probably got lucky at Midway, but he came up with a plan that worked. I got lucky in India, but I came up with a plan that worked.

I'm not saying I'm Fletcher - heck, I might be Pye or Kimmel or Turner - but my plan worked (to this point), so the media and the public wreaths me in laurels while astute military men and historians look closer and mutter that I got lucky.

I'm talking about the specific application of a hidden carrier strategy to the Allied defense of India. Comparing to Midway is, IMO, a poor analogy as Midway involved a lot of groping about by both sides, chance search successes, and good Allied intel. In the case of Karachi Brad knew where it was located. He knew he didn't know where your carriers were (I think). I don't think you ever gave him SigInt to that efect, BUT he did know Karachi was vital. He was told that by several players reading his AAR. He gambled that he could achieve whatever he percieved his India goals to be without taking it. (His AAR is less forthcoming about some of this than you might imagine.)

Tactically, Karachi is totally different than Midway. It has a continent at its back; the sea approach is at best probably 45 degrees wide from the northwest for a Japanese invader. Otherwise Bombay-based search will see the amphibs. Brad knew where the wormhole exit is. He knew the rough status of Socotra to the extent he knew he didn't own it. (Midway had no "helping search base" nearby.) Karachi LCU stacking is diferent than Midway's, supply stocks without spoilage are different, reinforcement possibilities are diferent. It's nothing like Midway IOW.

Overall, what I'm saying is that, had he gone for Karachi you would have had to bring your carriers in to stop him, as I argued yesterday. Failing to do so would have given him everything he needed for an auto-vic progression. In that sense the decision to continue hiding them was his to swing, not yours to make. He never put you to that test, so the decision to continue to hide them wasn't really a decision, but a default.

I'm not sure that's better, but there it is.

< Message edited by Bullwinkle58 -- 1/5/2011 6:37:59 PM >

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 6:40:34 PM

Canoerebel

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Ah, I understand better, but I think you're overlooking one thing and misconstruing another (and I'm enjoying delving into this so much, so it doesn't feel like beating a dead horse to me):

The Allied strategy from the beginning of the war was to hide the carriers, and to use them only if it became necessary to save India, Australia, or Hawaii. As Brad focused his intentions on India, I made it clear that I would use my carriers if necessary to fight for Karachi. That was never necessary. But had I done so it is possible that the Allies would have prevailed, both in the carrier battle and in the fight for Karachi. So I think I am justified in saying that my plan seemed to work (which is the position you originally took issue with).

Secondly, I wasn't comparing this situation to Midway as such; I was simply drawing on Midway as an example of a battle (any battle) where you might say the victor's plan succeeded only because the loser allowed it to succeed. Sure, but it succeeded.

So I'm saying that as with any battle, both sides made decisions that played heavily in the outcome and could have done things differently, but I don't think you can say my plan worked only because Brad allowed it to work.

< Message edited by Canoerebel -- 1/5/2011 6:41:58 PM >

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 6:56:43 PM

Canoerebel

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10/11/42

Poor Bullwinkle got ensnared in a seemingly neverending discussion that entertained me, but probably nobody else. So back to the game in the interest of moving things along:

India on the Ground: I made a snap decision to recall my armor and infantry on the road between Jalagon and Poona. They actually hadn't left the hex yet, but I've decided against chasing the stack that retreated down the yellow road. Instead, I'm sending the armor and some of the infantry down the good road towards Bombay. This will pose a threat to the outnumbered Japanese force besieging that town. I'm leaving about half my infantry in this hex to watch out for developments to the southeast, east, and northeast, if any (I don't want to leave my entire left flank underdefended).

India Para-assaults: The Chindits couldn't take the dot hex near Naipur, but a Japanese 'chutes unit reclaimed the dot hex east of Poona (my other Chindit force that recently took that hex is now a hex to the southwest giving chase to a battered IJA armored unit).

Pacific: Nothing has changed here.

< Message edited by Canoerebel -- 1/5/2011 6:58:26 PM >

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 6:59:25 PM

JohnDillworth

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quote:

But had I done so it is possible that the Allies would have prevailed, both in the carrier battle and in the fight for Karachi.

But unlikely if I recall. He had the big 6 together and you had not yet upgraded to TBF's. Not even sure if you were fully loaded on Wildcats yet. Plus you were in Capetown. Assume Brad came with everything (a good assumption as he did not know where your carriers were, or if you had all the Australians at Karachi). Full KB, maybe the mini KB, bunch of BB's (and SBD's love BB's as much as CV's, except they can't sink them) and maybe 5+ good Divisions and support. How much AV did you have at Karachi? How fast could your fleet have gotten there? I suspect your only advantage would be you could take your few remaining cripples back through the wormhole. Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda. Your opponent had every advantage but failed to execute. you win

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 7:01:54 PM

Bullwinkle58

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Ah, I understand better, but I think you're overlooking one thing and misconstruing another (and I'm enjoying delving into this so much, so it doesn't feel like beating a dead horse to me):

The Allied strategy from the beginning of the war was to hide the carriers, and to use them only if it became necessary to save India, Australia, or Hawaii. As Brad focused his intentions on India, I made it clear that I would use my carriers if necessary to fight for Karachi. That was never necessary. But had I done so it is possible that the Allies would have prevailed, both in the carrier battle and in the fight for Karachi. So I think I am justified in saying that my plan seemed to work (which is the position you originally took issue with).

Secondly, I wasn't comparing this situation to Midway as such; I was simply drawing on Midway as an example of a battle (any battle) where you might say the victor's plan succeeded only because the loser allowed it to succeed. Sure, but it succeeded.

So I'm saying that as with any battle, both sides made decisions that played heavily in the outcome and could have done things differently, but I don't think you can say my plan worked only because Brad allowed it to work.

I'm not trying to mud all over your play, planning, or accomplishments, just to be clear. You're a better player than I am for sure. And it's always easier from the peanut gallery, and when you've read the other AAR.

That said, from reading this one, from memory (I haven't gone back to review months ago), it seemed to me at least that the possibility of auto-vic dawned on you fairly slowly. I don't know when, but it was after Ceylon fell and Brad had taken on Calcutta at least. Strategically, IMO he should have left Calcutta for Phase 3-4 and gone striaght for Karachi after Ceylon. (There was interesting debate on the other side long ago about whether Ceylon is even necessary to a take-India move; you'll enjoy that as will future players.)

If he had gone north right away your carriers were porked at Cape Town. Too far away to swing the battle, IMO because you didn't really think he'd be that bold, and you were hedging them into the Canal Zone agian if needed to stop a Hawaii gambit with India to that point being a grand, huge, massive deception. Or Oz. (CT makes more sense to help west-coast Oz than India, right?)

A big question for you in retrospect, and future Japanese players, is when, exactly, will the Allies be forced to throw down on an India defense, and where should the carriers be stashed to defend Karachi. It's not an easy question. Brad seemed to me to be pretty blunt. You were worried a lot about mid-Pac moves, Suva, Midway, etc, etc., and he was wielding an 11-division+ blunt instrument in India. Just when the Allied player has to commit all-in Texas Hold-Em-style to defending India, Oz, or Hawaii is a great question. Japanese deception could make it harder. I don't think Brad did that after his relatively spare Oz foray petered-out.

< Message edited by Bullwinkle58 -- 1/5/2011 7:08:30 PM >

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 7:06:15 PM

Bullwinkle58

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quote:

ORIGINAL: JohnDillworth

quote:

But had I done so it is possible that the Allies would have prevailed, both in the carrier battle and in the fight for Karachi.

But unlikely if I recall. He had the big 6 together and you had not yet upgraded to TBF's. Not even sure if you were fully loaded on Wildcats yet. Plus you were in Capetown. Assume Brad came with everything (a good assumption as he did not know where your carriers were, or if you had all the Australians at Karachi). Full KB, maybe the mini KB, bunch of BB's (and SBD's love BB's as much as CV's, except they can't sink them) and maybe 5+ good Divisions and support. How much AV did you have at Karachi? How fast could your fleet have gotten there? I suspect your only advantage would be you could take your few remaining cripples back through the wormhole. Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda. Your opponent had every advantage but failed to execute. you win

All true. Plus, for future, it has to be said and said, that the Allies should WANT a carrier battle off Karachi for auto-vic avoidance. Not only do they get a crack at troop-rich merchants sitting as ducks unloading, but carrier-to-carrier the Japanese have to sink 4 Allied carriers to every one of theirs just to not lose ground on the auto-vic. If the USN lost 3 and the IJN 1 with some others damaged, it's a huge strategic win for the Allies.

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 7:23:02 PM

Canoerebel

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Hmm, you guys are asking interesting questions forcing me to flail through mental cobwebs to reconstruct what happened. Here's how the campaign developed as I saw it:

1. Brad made an elaborate, complicated move on Oz. I took notice, but I wasn't convinced he was going that way because he didn't commit any big units. Had I seen divisions landing in Oz, I would have been more convinced.

2. At first, I was very worried about Hawaii, but gradually in early '42 my concern shifted more to India. I had already sent the first Aussie division on to Oz by that point, but I diverted the second to India long before Brad made a move that way.

3. I stationed the carriers in Capetown primarily to defend India, but also to move on southern Oz if that became necessary. Getting from Capetown to Hawaii is terribly long and as we went into February '42 I was nearly certain Hawaii wasn't the objective. I wasn't worried at all about Midway, Fiji, New Zealand, the Line Islands, etc., but only because I had decided I couldn't afford to do anything to defend them. All reinforcements were going to India, Oz, Hawaii and, to a much lesser extent, the Aleutians.

4. I caught wind of Brad's move on Ceylon just two or three days before his ships arrived on March 7. But I had growing suspicisions already ("spidey senses" were going gang busters by then). I had a British division there augmented by some Indian troops, but they weren't enough. The defenses held for about three weeks; I was hoping for four.

5. I wasn't positive where Brad would go next, but I was far more concerned about Karachi and Bombay than Calcutta. I kept most of my troops at the former, and what I did send to the east remained in strategic mode for a long time. I had alot of AV available to defend Karachi or Bombay against amphibious invasion. I didn't shift these untii it was clear he had fully committed to Calcutta-Chittagong. And I always left a stout garrison at both places. Given the disruption that Japanese troops suffer in amphbious assaults due to poor quality ships, I'm sure that any invasion force would have been really roughed up - failure to prep would have contributed.

6. Allied air would have been a complete non-factor in defending against an invasion. Allied air in India in early '42 is pathetic.

7. I was most worried about an IJ invasion of Surat, with a quick breakout. In my opinion, this would have succeeded, though I would have had time to get troops to Bombay or Karachi to make a stand. It was essentially impossible to adequately defend Bombay, Karachi, and Surat, so the latter was my weakest point. I also needed troops to fight on the front to slow down the enemy advance. All of this was a difficult balancing act. Very tense.

8. Brad also could have imposed a naval blockade on Karachi, coinciding with a ground campaign moving west from Calcutta and north and west from Madras. I had to get supplies and troops into Karachi, so such a move would have forced me to commit my carriers. I spent alot of time organizing little convoys to send in troops and supplies in manageable groups just in case Brad sent his carriers or battleships.

What I'm saying is that I was much more aware of the situation, where the threats were, and the possibility of auto victory than you seem to think, Bullwinkle. Go back and read through the AAR and you'll see this spelled out from December '41 through early and mid '42..

Where I find fault with my strategy was letting things reach the point where Brad had a real shot at auto victory. I probably needed to commit my carriers earlier. I came very, very close, but things never quite reached a bad enough state that I thought I had to.

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 7:37:24 PM

crsutton

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

quote:

ORIGINAL: JohnDillworth

quote:

But had I done so it is possible that the Allies would have prevailed, both in the carrier battle and in the fight for Karachi.

But unlikely if I recall. He had the big 6 together and you had not yet upgraded to TBF's. Not even sure if you were fully loaded on Wildcats yet. Plus you were in Capetown. Assume Brad came with everything (a good assumption as he did not know where your carriers were, or if you had all the Australians at Karachi). Full KB, maybe the mini KB, bunch of BB's (and SBD's love BB's as much as CV's, except they can't sink them) and maybe 5+ good Divisions and support. How much AV did you have at Karachi? How fast could your fleet have gotten there? I suspect your only advantage would be you could take your few remaining cripples back through the wormhole. Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda. Your opponent had every advantage but failed to execute. you win

All true. Plus, for future, it has to be said and said, that the Allies should WANT a carrier battle off Karachi for auto-vic avoidance. Not only do they get a crack at troop-rich merchants sitting as ducks unloading, but carrier-to-carrier the Japanese have to sink 4 Allied carriers to every one of theirs just to not lose ground on the auto-vic. If the USN lost 3 and the IJN 1 with some others damaged, it's a huge strategic win for the Allies.

I respectfull disagree. Sometimes it is not just a matter of points in the road to autovictory. For one thing in 1942 with weak fighters and functionally useless torpedo bombers, the odds are that the Allies will lose more carriers than Japan in a stand up fight. However, for arguments sake, if in early 1942 the Allied lose four carriers and Japan loses four, then the remaining KB gang will hold carrier supremacy until early 1943. At this point the Japanese player can fairly safely split his carriers or even pull off some major operations without the use of carriers. So, even with a step back in VP point gain, a trade off in carriers opens up a big opportunity for Japan to attain some major conquests in 1942 and pull out an autovictory.

The biggest stragetic counter that the Allies hold in 1942 is the "unknown." If the Japanese player knows at all times where four of your carriers are (in this case on the sea bottom) then he will hold all the cards for the next year. You can talk of Allied LBA but in scen #2, Allied LBA cannot match Japanese LBA in 42.

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 7:50:17 PM

Canoerebel

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I just went back through the early months of my AAR and confirmed that my previous post is correct.

My focus shifted from Oz and Hawaii to India pretty rapidly in January '42, despite no obvious moves in that direction. See my posts of January 15 through about the 22nd in particular, and then on through early February if you have nothing better to do.

As for auto victory possibilities, I address this several times, including the entire February 1 post.

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 8:08:11 PM

Bullwinkle58

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quote:

ORIGINAL: crsutton

I respectfull disagree. Sometimes it is not just a matter of points in the road to autovictory. For one thing in 1942 with weak fighters and functionally useless torpedo bombers, the odds are that the Allies will lose more carriers than Japan in a stand up fight. However, for arguments sake, if in early 1942 the Allied lose four carriers and Japan loses four, then the remaining KB gang will hold carrier supremacy until early 1943. At this point the Japanese player can fairly safely split his carriers or even pull off some major operations without the use of carriers. So, even with a step back in VP point gain, a trade off in carriers opens up a big opportunity for Japan to attain some major conquests in 1942 and pull out an autovictory.

Your scenario isn't a step back, it's a huge leap. The Japanese need a 1:4 sink ratio to just stay even. Three excess sunk Japanese carriers is A LOT. IJN CVs VP rates are pretty wide. A glance in my Sunk Ships list shows a range at least from 245 (Soryu) to 371 (Akagi.) Zuikaku is 306. If you call it 300 VPs per, those three represent a 3600 VP swing. To get that back the Japanese have to destroy, what, 8 full British divisions? My math might be off, but it's directional.

There are also VP pots available to the Japanese within Betty range which they can farm in the second half of 1942. The Allies haivng full carriers probably won't stop them.

The bottom line is, I think, the Japanese player has to go for auto-vic all the way or don't go. Getting close and being far out of position on 1/1/43 is the worst outcome.

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 8:10:21 PM

Bullwinkle58

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

I just went back through the early months of my AAR and confirmed that my previous post is correct.

My focus shifted from Oz and Hawaii to India pretty rapidly in January '42, despite no obvious moves in that direction. See my posts of January 15 through about the 22nd in particular, and then on through early February if you have nothing better to do.

As for auto victory possibilities, I address this several times, including the entire February 1 post.

I looked back some as well. You were highly concerned with Surat as soon as Ceylon fell (too quickly in your eyes.)

The quesiton still remians why, if you saw the main strategic threat as to the west coast, why you left the carriers so far away.

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 8:15:08 PM

JohnDillworth

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quote:

The bottom line is, I think, the Japanese player has to go for auto-vic all the way or don't go. Getting close and being far out of position on 1/1/43 is the worst outcome.

I believe we are in violent agreement. If the Japanese take Karachi they have enough for auto-victory. There is nothing the allied player can do to regain Karachi before the beginning of 1943. Heck with enough LBA at Karachi, the KB can go in for a refit and wait for the fruits of Victory to fall into their mouths.

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 8:21:01 PM

Canoerebel

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Capetown isn't very far away from India's west coast.

I felt pretty sure that I would detect a move on the west coast early on due to my picket subs, picket ships, and patrol planes.

Leaping way ahead to October 1942, Karachi is no longer as critical as it was. All my troops are ashore (the next reinforcmeents don't arrive at Aden until 1/15/43) and I have more than 700k supplies in northwestern India - much of it at Bombay, Ahmadebad, Delhi, Indore, and other "safe" bases. If Brad suprised me now by landing at Karachi, it would create problems, but it wouldn't mean an auto victory. I have the troops and supplies to handle just about anything in India now.

What really puzzles me about auto victory at this date is Noumea. Brad only has a single unit there - 2,000 men. That base is worth 1500 points in Allied hands, which means 6,000 points from an auto victory standpoint. Why hasn't he garrisoned it more heavily?

< Message edited by Canoerebel -- 1/5/2011 8:22:23 PM >

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 8:45:57 PM

Bullwinkle58

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Capetown isn't very far away from India's west coast.

I felt pretty sure that I would detect a move on the west coast early on due to my picket subs, picket ships, and patrol planes.

Leaping way ahead to October 1942, Karachi is no longer as critical as it was. All my troops are ashore (the next reinforcmeents don't arrive at Aden until 1/15/43) and I have more than 700k supplies in northwestern India - much of it at Bombay, Ahmadebad, Delhi, Indore, and other "safe" bases. If Brad suprised me now by landing at Karachi, it would create problems, but it wouldn't mean an auto victory. I have the troops and supplies to handle just about anything in India now.

What really puzzles me about auto victory at this date is Noumea. Brad only has a single unit there - 2,000 men. That base is worth 1500 points in Allied hands, which means 6,000 points from an auto victory standpoint. Why hasn't he garrisoned it more heavily?

As with I think everyone else here, I don't consider Karachi to be in the wildest realm of possibility now, hence this discussion. Brad hasn't posted in his AAR since the first part of December, so we have no idea what he's doing.

Re CT to Bombay. As usual I posted, THEN went and checked. I launched a 21-kt AP toward Bombay. It's 12 days to the western map edge, then 32 hexes straight to Bombay with no waypoints. At least three weeks. You'd need perfect pickets and some dwaddling on the Japanese unload to get there in time.

I was thinking, for future Allied players facing a Karachi question, there are a couple of other ways to go.

1. Split the carriers. Put several up the wormhole, the rest at Perth or CT or both as a reaction force. I include the RN guys too.

2. Sneakier, unload the Devastators at CT, and sneak them into Karachi on xAKs early. You don't need carriers off Karachi, you need ship-killing planes off Karachi. If he doesn't bring the KB it's OK. Devastators can kill unloading transports just fine at Range=0.

3. On that, look at anything anti-ship on the WC, even the junk, that can be bought out and shipped to CT (don't even need ships once you move them to the EC.) Then ship those into Karachi, or Karachi/Socotra, on merchants and reassemble. You can get this done by the end of January, and not really invest your carriers.

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 8:59:52 PM

Canoerebel

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That's durn good thinking, Bullwinkle. Very, very good ideas worthy of the most careful consideration.

Back to my early '42 strategy to clarify a point.

It doesn't take long for a fast carrier force to make the spring from Capetown to the Arabian Sea; once I thought there was a real threat of a blockade of Karachi, I moved my carriers to Mombasa, where they remained for a month or two. The time from Mobasa is about six days shorter.

My carriers really weren't meant to deal with an amphibious invasion. I thought it unlikely that Brad would invade Karachi due to the reinforcements it would trigger. My main concern was getting my reinforcements from Aden to Karachi. If Brad had parked the KB or combat ships right outside Karachi, I would have held my transports at Abadan until my carriers and combat ships could arrive, so Capetown and Mombasa were fine for my purposes.

< Message edited by Canoerebel -- 1/5/2011 9:02:18 PM >

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 9:03:34 PM

Bullwinkle58

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Yeah, those reinforcements and the Line of Death.

Good times . . .

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/5/2011 9:36:30 PM

paullus99

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I do agree that the Japanese player needs to fully commit to auto-victory, or not at all. Chances are, if they go with half or 3/4 measures, they will lose some pretty valuable assets that will hurt them in 1943 when things start to really turn against them in the material category (their forces could also be very much out of position when the allies start advancing as well).

There are almost only two types of objectives - the ones the Japanese need to get & the ones they should ignore, when it comes to auto-victory.

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RE: One Weird Battle - 1/6/2011 12:21:42 AM

Nemo121

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Canoerebel,

I think that where the issues arises in assessing the impact of your planning is in the interaction between your planning and the enemy's planning.

Personally ( and this is a personal opinion which, of course, people are happy to ignore ) I think that in your game you chose a plan which fortuitously was a good counter to your enemy's plan and, more importantly than that, fortuitously exposed your enemy's lack of detailed planning/conception regarding his strategic end-point. In short when you pulled back and back and back he didn't know, in his own mind, clearly enough what HE wanted to do unto you in order to achieve his strategic end-point on December 31st 1942. I'm quite certain that if I'd asked him in March 1942 just what he needed to hold ( and at what cost ) by December 31st 1942 he wouldn't have been able to tell me precisely what he needed to hold to get his autovictory. Sure he had a vague idea that taking most of India whilst avoiding huge losses would be enough but that's simply not a good enough understanding of the situation for planning purposes. So when he couldn't list exactly what he needed and when you didn't lead him on through a gradually falling back line of hard resistance he simply didn't have enough of a plan to say - "Well, irrespective of CR's actions the next target I need to take on my "Must have by December 31st 1942" list is X". As a result he floundered and never fully committed.

In that sense your opponent did hand you the win since he didn't actually KNOW what he needed to do to gain the win for himself.

I think what you did well was resist the temptation to commit too much forward. You could have committed less forward but this game is a learning experience for you so that's a lesson for next time. I think that in your situation a lot of people would have thrown victory away by fighting too far forward with too much and wouldn't have retained the discipline to hold their forces back. I think you did that very well.

I think though that the fact that that totally flummoxed QBall wasn't something you intentionally created or shaped or took advantage of. It was fortuitous. In my games I always intentionally try to shape the perception and evaluation of the in-game situation my opponent makes. To me that's where the skill lies as that's much more difficult than just massing x CVs at base y where you know he's going to attack.

So, overall:
1. You had a good plan and stuck to it.

2. I think you were fortunate that that plan was precisely the plan which would mess Q-Ball up most. I don't think you ever really thought through just how your plan could interact with his thoughts. You continually thought he was up to something sneaky when, really, he was just dithering because he didn't know what he wanted to do.

3. A lot of people would have thrown the advantage of having a good plan away by giving in to the temptation to "do something". You stuck to your plan and for that you are to be commended.

I think where some people are saying "QBall lost it..." rather than " Canoerebel won it" is that the interaction of your plan with QBall's lack of strategic focus was fortuitous and not something you recognised and strove to increase. If you had recognised that and tried to play the man by actively seeking to lead him in the wrong direction through ( resistance-led advances into worthless areas etc etc ) then I think people would be saying that you "won it".

So, I don't think you won it and I do agree QBall lost it but CRUCIALLY you did succeed in NOT losing it yourself. I happen to think most players on the forum WOULD have lost the game in your situation since they wouldn't have had the discipline to stick to the plan.

I'm a firm believer that more wars are won through simply not making as many major mistakes as your opponent and outlasting THEM while they ACTIVELY do stupid stuff which harms their own cause. I certainly play that way... I create situations and mental mindsets which invite mistakes ( that's the active part of the maskirovka, mindgames etc ) and then passively sit back and let the enemy use their initiative to impale themselves on the punji sticks I've laid out.

So, you did two out of three and that's one more than most people here normally do so you should congratulate yourself on a good game. I think though that you should also strive to do the 3rd bit in your next game.I think if you do that you'll move from being competent to being devastating. I think also it'll act to protect you from having the same sorts of mental games played against you. Your lack of insight into QBall's dithering ( seriously read over your AAR and look how often you speculate about his plans and obsess about what he might be planning.... Then realise that 9 times out of 10 since the invasion of India any pauses or lack of activity wasn't really due to him prepping a major, nasty surprise but much more due to him dithering cause he didn't know what to do next. ) leads me to think that you'd be very open to having mind-games played on you. I think that's something you might benefit from fixing.

With all of the above said QBall just needs to spend 10% more time thinking about his strategic end-goal in a bit more detail. If he had done that then I think this game would have gone differently. As it was he didn't know what he wanted so he didn't know how to go about achieving it and he paid the price. Your success is in being disciplined enough not to do something stupid ( which I think most others WOULD have done ) which could have helped him get back on track.

And yeah I know that the whole, play the man not the ball thing is boring to some but success is a pretty good indicator that it works.

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Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to paullus99)

Post #: 1190

RE: One Weird Battle - 1/6/2011 1:04:28 AM

Canoerebel

Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline

Nemo's right about what I did wrong, what Brad did wrong, what I did right, and what little improvement Brad needed to make to achieve a different outcome. (As to whether I did more things right than most experienced players might have, I don't know about that, but I'll leave that alone and move on to other things).

In particular, Nemo's comments resoundingly registered with me in two ways: (1) I never thought about how my plan would interact with Brad's thoughts. Mostly, that's because I didn't know his thoughts. As to whether I could have or should have, I'm not sure. I don't think I'm good at deducing things ahead of time; I'd be better at playing a person and gradually developing a feel for his style; Nemo's way, if you can do it, would be far more efficient). (2) I was truly flummoxed by Brad's moves, "dithering" (as Nemo accurately describes it) from one possibilty to another. To my credit, I focused on India pretty quickly (just five weeks into the war), and to my credit even when uncertain I erred on the side that he was coming full bore, but I really was dealing with a great deal of uncertainty and fears that resulted in less than optimum play (there's a classic Nemo phrase). Had I been better at evaluating my opponent and what he was up to, I could have organized a more effective and efficient (meaning fewer losses) defense in India. Also, I would have come up with a better way of taking advantage of Brad's absence in the Pacific to create some consternation for him there.

Overall, I'm pretty pleased with where I stand today as the game heads into mid October 1942. I rated Q-Ball as a topnotch opponent from the outset - his experience playing both sides, and his reputation for planning and boldness, really worried me. I've learned alot in the game to date and need to learn more before I tackle another good opponent.

(in reply to Nemo121)

Post #: 1191

RE: One Weird Battle - 1/6/2011 1:41:59 AM

Nemo121

Posts: 5821
Joined: 2/6/2004
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Canoerebel,

I'm glad you took it the way you did. I've held off writing that assessment for a few days because I was concerned about how it might be received so I'm relieved. As to not playing the man as well as the game at this stage. Well, maybe that just points the way forward to an area you can improve? It is all about continual improvement, about where you want to end up skill-wise not about where one is right now.

< Message edited by Nemo121 -- 1/6/2011 1:45:27 AM >

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to Canoerebel)

Post #: 1192

RE: One Weird Battle - 1/6/2011 2:27:55 AM

Cribtop

Posts: 3890
Joined: 8/10/2008
From: Lone Star Nation
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CR,

I don't have a lot to add to the analysis here other than to say it's a great AAR and congrats on what appears to be a fine victory over a quality opponent.

Maybe next time you'll man up and play Japan.

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(in reply to Nemo121)

Post #: 1193

RE: One Weird Battle - 1/6/2011 3:09:43 AM

Canoerebel

Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline

Just to clarify for folks unable to filter through about 40 posts today:� The game is still on.

We just got into a lengthy analysis of my grand strategy and my developing awareness and evaluation of Brad's moves as the game progressed.� It was an interesting discussion to me, but very few readers will want to wade through all that chaff to find the wheat.

< Message edited by Canoerebel -- 1/6/2011 3:12:04 AM >

(in reply to Cribtop)

Post #: 1194

RE: One Weird Battle - 1/6/2011 6:39:36 AM

JeffroK

Posts: 6391
Joined: 1/26/2005
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Now we can start posting on how you should win the war

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(in reply to Canoerebel)

Post #: 1195

RE: One Weird Battle - 1/6/2011 7:51:07 PM

Canoerebel

Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline

10/12/42

India on the Ground: Allied armor covered about 60 miles down the road toward Bombay. These units could arrive in two days. Meanwhile, the IJA 1st Division is still one hex north of Bombay, but could make it any day. I feel sure Brad will try to evacuate Bombay as soon as 1st Div. arrives. That's the stack I'm going to try to punish.

India in the Air: IJ bombers hit an 1st Marine Tanks east of Jalagon. Allied bombers faced opposition targeting the IJA stack southeast of Jalagon, disrupting runs, which meant little damage inflicted. Bombers hitting 1st Div. did better. Tomorrow, most 4EB will target the stack SE of Jalagon, about 20 will target the airfield at Goa, and all 2EB will target 1st Div.

India at Sea: The RN bombardment TF will hit 1st Div. in two days (or, if that unit has made it to Bombay, will target the IJA stack at Bombay).

Pacific: Quiet.

Noumea: The Noumea invasion troops will begin loading aboard transports in about three days. ETA for D-Day is probably twelve days. I have picket ships on both sides of New Caledonia. In a week I'll slide them a bit north. If I don't pick up any hint of major IJN ships concentrations in the area, I will try to hit Noumea by surprise and without carrier cover. As noted previously, the base is very lightly held.

Wake/Marcus: Originally, I had intended to use Noumea plus the presence of Allied carriers as a feint to draw the KB away from CenPac. With picket ships indicating that New Caledonia isn't well-patrolled or defended, I prefer to strike quickly without using my carriers. I will, however, need to use my carriers to draw Brad's full attention somewhere far from CenPac. So, if Noumea proceeds as outlined, I will use my carriers as part of a feint towards either Darwin or New Guinea. If successful, that would permit me to invade Wake and/or Marcus without opposition from carriers.

< Message edited by Canoerebel -- 1/7/2011 2:26:48 PM >

(in reply to JeffroK)

Post #: 1196

RE: One Weird Battle - 1/6/2011 10:19:52 PM

crsutton

Posts: 9590
Joined: 12/6/2002
From: Maryland
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Capetown isn't very far away from India's west coast.

I felt pretty sure that I would detect a move on the west coast early on due to my picket subs, picket ships, and patrol planes.

Leaping way ahead to October 1942, Karachi is no longer as critical as it was. All my troops are ashore (the next reinforcmeents don't arrive at Aden until 1/15/43) and I have more than 700k supplies in northwestern India - much of it at Bombay, Ahmadebad, Delhi, Indore, and other "safe" bases. If Brad suprised me now by landing at Karachi, it would create problems, but it wouldn't mean an auto victory. I have the troops and supplies to handle just about anything in India now.

What really puzzles me about auto victory at this date is Noumea. Brad only has a single unit there - 2,000 men. That base is worth 1500 points in Allied hands, which means 6,000 points from an auto victory standpoint. Why hasn't he garrisoned it more heavily?

As with I think everyone else here, I don't consider Karachi to be in the wildest realm of possibility now, hence this discussion. Brad hasn't posted in his AAR since the first part of December, so we have no idea what he's doing.

Re CT to Bombay. As usual I posted, THEN went and checked. I launched a 21-kt AP toward Bombay. It's 12 days to the western map edge, then 32 hexes straight to Bombay with no waypoints. At least three weeks. You'd need perfect pickets and some dwaddling on the Japanese unload to get there in time.

I was thinking, for future Allied players facing a Karachi question, there are a couple of other ways to go.

1. Split the carriers. Put several up the wormhole, the rest at Perth or CT or both as a reaction force. I include the RN guys too.

2. Sneakier, unload the Devastators at CT, and sneak them into Karachi on xAKs early. You don't need carriers off Karachi, you need ship-killing planes off Karachi. If he doesn't bring the KB it's OK. Devastators can kill unloading transports just fine at Range=0.

3. On that, look at anything anti-ship on the WC, even the junk, that can be bought out and shipped to CT (don't even need ships once you move them to the EC.) Then ship those into Karachi, or Karachi/Socotra, on merchants and reassemble. You can get this done by the end of January, and not really invest your carriers.

I will say that altough I like to run and hide with my carriers. I will look for any chance to offload all of my carrier planes to fight for any critical location. I just won't put the carriers in situation where there will be a catfight with KB. Not in 42 anyways. Not in scen #2.

I can also add that I hate auto victory and think the whole concept should be banished from the game. It can distort a game and cause the Japanese player to take heavy risk, and if lost many will just quit the game early on. The Japanese player should have an equal chance for a win but that chance should be balanced out with victory points in 1945.

As said earlier, I don't think I will ever accept a scen #2 challenge where autovictory is in play. It is just a given that those "sneaky" JFBs will figure out how to do it.....

How does the old saying go?

"If you take an infinite number of Japanese fanboys playing an infinite number of AE campaigns, sooner or later somebody will come up with a surefire plan for autovictory."

< Message edited by crsutton -- 1/6/2011 10:21:24 PM >

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(in reply to Bullwinkle58)

Post #: 1197

RE: One Weird Battle - 1/7/2011 2:44:24 PM

Canoerebel

Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline

10/13/42

India: Armored units totalling 750 AV will arrive at Bombay from the NE tomorrow. 27th USA Div. is about three days away. The Allies have 2700 AV at Bombay. Japan has four divisions (about 1800 AV) with 1st Division (roughed up, but still a force of probably at least 300 to 350 AV) to arrive any day now. The question for me will be whether to chance an attack. The enemy will benefit from 4x urban bonus, but they may have some supply problems. I think the Japs will be retreating as soon as 1st Div. arrives, so perhaps I'm better off waiting and then pursuing and using bombers to slow down the enemy. Decisions, decisions.

Indian Ocean: I've begun prepping some rearguard troops for Diego Garcia and Addu Atoll.

Sumatra: I'm still collecting troops in Oz for a possible move on Sumatra in 1943. Several combat engineers, infantry, and Marine units are enroute and currently between Tahiti and Melbourne. A new US Army Division is in San Diego awaiting transports (once it makes Oz that will give me five full diviisons (four US and One Aussie) plus another two division equivalents there. At some point, I will probably divert 27th US Division from India and move her to Capetown to participate in the eventual move on Sumatra. The move on Sumatra is still a big question, but I want to be ready to pull the trigger if I can orchestrate a big and successful diversion in the Pacifc in early or mid 1943.

Pacific: The quiet continues. Loading for the Noumea invasion commences in about three days.

(in reply to crsutton)

Post #: 1198

RE: One Weird Battle - 1/7/2011 4:02:16 PM

Chickenboy

Posts: 24520
Joined: 6/29/2002
From: San Antonio, TX
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: crsutton

quote:

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Capetown isn't very far away from India's west coast.

I felt pretty sure that I would detect a move on the west coast early on due to my picket subs, picket ships, and patrol planes.

Leaping way ahead to October 1942, Karachi is no longer as critical as it was. All my troops are ashore (the next reinforcmeents don't arrive at Aden until 1/15/43) and I have more than 700k supplies in northwestern India - much of it at Bombay, Ahmadebad, Delhi, Indore, and other "safe" bases. If Brad suprised me now by landing at Karachi, it would create problems, but it wouldn't mean an auto victory. I have the troops and supplies to handle just about anything in India now.

What really puzzles me about auto victory at this date is Noumea. Brad only has a single unit there - 2,000 men. That base is worth 1500 points in Allied hands, which means 6,000 points from an auto victory standpoint. Why hasn't he garrisoned it more heavily?

As with I think everyone else here, I don't consider Karachi to be in the wildest realm of possibility now, hence this discussion. Brad hasn't posted in his AAR since the first part of December, so we have no idea what he's doing.

Re CT to Bombay. As usual I posted, THEN went and checked. I launched a 21-kt AP toward Bombay. It's 12 days to the western map edge, then 32 hexes straight to Bombay with no waypoints. At least three weeks. You'd need perfect pickets and some dwaddling on the Japanese unload to get there in time.

I was thinking, for future Allied players facing a Karachi question, there are a couple of other ways to go.

1. Split the carriers. Put several up the wormhole, the rest at Perth or CT or both as a reaction force. I include the RN guys too.

2. Sneakier, unload the Devastators at CT, and sneak them into Karachi on xAKs early. You don't need carriers off Karachi, you need ship-killing planes off Karachi. If he doesn't bring the KB it's OK. Devastators can kill unloading transports just fine at Range=0.

3. On that, look at anything anti-ship on the WC, even the junk, that can be bought out and shipped to CT (don't even need ships once you move them to the EC.) Then ship those into Karachi, or Karachi/Socotra, on merchants and reassemble. You can get this done by the end of January, and not really invest your carriers.

I will say that altough I like to run and hide with my carriers. I will look for any chance to offload all of my carrier planes to fight for any critical location. I just won't put the carriers in situation where there will be a catfight with KB. Not in 42 anyways. Not in scen #2.

I can also add that I hate auto victory and think the whole concept should be banished from the game. It can distort a game and cause the Japanese player to take heavy risk, and if lost many will just quit the game early on. The Japanese player should have an equal chance for a win but that chance should be balanced out with victory points in 1945.

As said earlier, I don't think I will ever accept a scen #2 challenge where autovictory is in play. It is just a given that those "sneaky" JFBs will figure out how to do it..... How does the old saying go?

"If you take an infinite number of Japanese fanboys playing an infinite number of AE campaigns, sooner or later somebody will come up with a surefire plan for autovictory."

I think you've found an important touchstone for AFBs there too, crsutton. I would paraphrase it as follows:

"If you take an infinite number of AFBs playing an infinite number of AE campaigns, sooner or later somebody will come up with a surefire way to forestall a Japanese autovictory."

_____________________________

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Post #: 1199

RE: One Weird Battle - 1/7/2011 4:24:54 PM

Canoerebel

Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
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As I've said before, I LIKE the element of "danger" and excitement that auto victory adds to the game. I would NOT play if auto victory was off the table (unless there was an absolutely air tight way of achieving it). To this point, an airtight method hasn't been discovered, though many of us wonder if Oz or India are possibilities. Alot of games will have to be played before we'll know. And a more aggressive Allied defense will have to be employed to try to prevent it.

< Message edited by Canoerebel -- 1/7/2011 4:25:06 PM >

(in reply to Chickenboy)

Post #: 1200