takman
Posts: 4
Joined: 1/26/2011 Status: offline
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Hello gents, I have just finished reading "Wounded Eagle" The bombing of Darwin and Australia's air defence scandal by Dr Peter Ewer The book is highly critical of decisions made by Air Vice Marshal Charles Burnett(who was in charge of the RAAF in the 1930's and the Menzies government. I will provide some quotes from the book that might make for an interesting mod. "On 27th October 1941, Canberra received an offer of new American fighters, the twin engined Lockeed Lightning II. With supercharged Allison engines, the Lightning II was capable of 410mph at 25,000ft, and with a long maximum range of 1240 miles, it was both well-suited to australian operating conditions and capable of maintaining a technical edge over the latest Japanese machines. And the response from Burnett? the Australian trade mission in New York was bluntly told on 31 October,'Lightning aircraft not repeat not required'. from page 187 "With the east coast of Australia now exposed to enemy attack, Burnett attempted to turn back time and basr RAAF planning on the principles enunciated by Williams four years before........The 'new' RAAF would be ready with 24 fighter squadrons (a capability Burnett first cancelled in April 1940), four heavy bomber squadrons (a role dismissed by Burnett in September 1940), and 12 dive bomber squadrons(for which no aircraft existed)." from pages 209 and 210 "In September 1940, the British air ministry had 20 4-engined B17 heavy bombers on order from America. this was the soon-to-be famous 'Flying Fortress, but the RAF was no great fan of daylight bombing, and thought so little of the role, that these machines were offered to Canberra. Here was the opportunity to establish a long-range strike and reconnaissance capability to fear. However, Burnett's RAAF quickly rejected the British offer:'it is considered that Boeing Flying Fortresses would not only be unsuitable for RAAF operational requirements but capital cost, housing and maintenance would be very expensive'. In the RAAF's view, the B17 was too expensive, too vulnerable to ship-borne anti-aircraaft and designed in any case for log-range night bombing, a role, a role for which the RAAF had no local application. Burnett was wrong. In fact, the B17 was designed as a long range precision day bomber, partly to fulfil an anti-shipping role, just the capability required by the RAAF. True, the Model C offered to the Australians did not boast the power operated gun turrets that later warranted the 'fortress' tag, but its range and bombload capability were exponentially greater than anything the RAAF(or the Japanese) could command. ........ It did not apparently dawn on Burnett, Bostock or the government, that the alleged expense of the boeings could be paid for by cutting back the monies allocated to squadrons that could never be formed for want of aircraft" from pages 175,176,177 "Alongside the Boeing debacle, Burnett tragically missed another opportunity to strengthen his command in September 1940. with the fate of the Western world hinging on Fighter Command's radar defence system during the Battle of Britain, the RAAF might have digested the lesson and looked again at ground-controlled interception. While the Radiophysics Board was preoccupied building gun-laying radars for thye army, 3 british air defence radars were delivered to Australia. The first of these arrived that crucial september, but amazingly, 'no special practical use' could be found for it, so it languished at the University of Sydney as an object of research curiosity" from page 177 "From the sidelines, Williams made one last effort to ensure his service selected the best equipment for the tasks confronting it. his 1938 preference for an amphibious type to fill the RAAF's requirement for a long-range flying boat evolved within months into a conviction that Australia would best be served by the Consolidated PBY, later known as the'Catalina" from pages 140,141 Imagine a RAAF in December 1941, with P-38 Lightning II fighters,radar and gound controlled-interception, 20 B-17Cs, Catalina flying boats!!!!!!! There are other quotes about the location of airfields in Malaya and flaws in Australia air crew training that led there to be few aircrew with combat experience especially leaders in December 1940. But this should enogh to get the ball rolling. I look forward to your comments.
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