"Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically possible?

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"Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically poss... - 4/17/2011 5:02:41 PM

Insano

Posts: 228
Joined: 7/23/2009
From: Joplin, Missouri
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Let me start by saying that I am in the JFB camp who believes that an all out port strike on the Pacific Fleet at Manila is the best possible opening for Japan in game terms. However I cannot convince myself that it would have been possible to achieve surprise here a la Pearl Harbor. I always have these visions of British subs at Malta simply bottoming themselves to avoid serious damage. Consider:

1. The Allies knew an attack from Japan was possible, even likely, and the Philippine Islands were the most likely target. They just didn't know when. Wouldn't this imply a higher state of readiness and better alert against a surprise attack?

2. Approach by KB from any direction except from the East would have been through trafficked shipping lanes and would have likely been detected prior to the launching point. An air strike launched from the East would have had to fly overland for some miles prior to reaching Manila harbor thus allowing for time to raise the alarm.

So my question is what was the actual state of readiness for the Pacific fleet subs? Could they have been submerged at their berths or sortied with say, an hour's notice? Or were they tied up and crewed in such a way that this would not have been possible?

Post #: 1

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/17/2011 5:22:02 PM

Chickenboy

Posts: 24520
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From: San Antonio, TX
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Insano

Let me start by saying that I am in the JFB camp who believes that an all out port strike on the Pacific Fleet at Manila is the best possible opening for Japan in game terms. However I cannot convince myself that it would have been possible to achieve surprise here a la Pearl Harbor. I always have these visions of British subs at Malta simply bottoming themselves to avoid serious damage. Consider:

1. The Allies knew an attack from Japan was possible, even likely, and the Philippine Islands were the most likely target. They just didn't know when. Wouldn't this imply a higher state of readiness and better alert against a surprise attack?

2. Approach by KB from any direction except from the East would have been through trafficked shipping lanes and would have likely been detected prior to the launching point. An air strike launched from the East would have had to fly overland for some miles prior to reaching Manila harbor thus allowing for time to raise the alarm.

So my question is what was the actual state of readiness for the Pacific fleet subs? Could they have been submerged at their berths or sortied with say, an hour's notice? Or were they tied up and crewed in such a way that this would not have been possible?

Well, history (in real life) can be a fine mediator of such a discussion. Cavite had some notice and a few of the American submarines did sortie. More were in various stages of repair and refit or could not recall their crews in a timely fashion, making departure impossible. Those US Submarines (most of 'em) that survived the first day's bombings would thereafter take to submerging themselves in the harbor during daylight hours, coming to pierside at night until they could exfiltrate the Phillipines altogether.

As for being able to get underway within an hour of notice-that would suggest a war ready footing: stocked with sufficient food for the crew, fuel, armament, properly repaired and so forth. In a 'war is imminent' setting, such ready ships are generally out at sea already. If they were ready to sortie within an hour, my guess is that they're ready to be on patrol and nowhere near land.

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Post #: 2

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/17/2011 5:41:56 PM

Ddog

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There was an intresting discussion some time back in the wargamers forum (alternate history) that talked about what if the Japanese by passed Pearl, did not invade the PI, and went straight for the DEI, Malaya, and so forth. With the anti-war climate in America they may have sat it out for quite some time or even forever. Of course the search plane intel would likely find it's way to the American Allies, but the Japanese would have rolled through the PTO....once they had the resources, then turned to the US which would have been behind the bell curve. Or just never fought the US once they had what they needed.

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Post #: 3

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/17/2011 6:02:29 PM

Insano

Posts: 228
Joined: 7/23/2009
From: Joplin, Missouri
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

As for being able to get underway within an hour of notice-that would suggest a war ready footing: stocked with sufficient food for the crew, fuel, armament, properly repaired and so forth. In a 'war is imminent' setting, such ready ships are generally out at sea already. If they were ready to sortie within an hour, my guess is that they're ready to be on patrol and nowhere near land.

Thanks for the replies so far. I didn't mean to ask if they were ready to sortie, only if they could have submerged to avoid damage. They could have popped right back up and continued what they were doing after the air raid left for all I care. I'm just trying to gauge if there is any plausible scenario that could be constructed that would match the in-game destruction of 20+ submarines on day 1 of the war.

(in reply to Chickenboy)

Post #: 4

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/17/2011 6:14:04 PM

Bullwinkle58

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Insano

Thanks for the replies so far. I didn't mean to ask if they were ready to sortie, only if they could have submerged to avoid damage. They could have popped right back up and continued what they were doing after the air raid left for all I care. I'm just trying to gauge if there is any plausible scenario that could be constructed that would match the in-game destruction of 20+ submarines on day 1 of the war.

The RL answer is "no." If they were under repair they almost certainly could not have dived on an hour's notice. Besides which, water at pierside usually isn't deep enough, there are issues with mooring lines and currents, "slam damage" on pilings, etc, etc. But moslty, if you're in refit you aren't capable of bring rigged for dive.

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Post #: 5

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/17/2011 6:47:03 PM

Bradley7735

Posts: 2073
Joined: 7/12/2004
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

quote:

ORIGINAL: Insano

Thanks for the replies so far. I didn't mean to ask if they were ready to sortie, only if they could have submerged to avoid damage. They could have popped right back up and continued what they were doing after the air raid left for all I care. I'm just trying to gauge if there is any plausible scenario that could be constructed that would match the in-game destruction of 20+ submarines on day 1 of the war.

The RL answer is "no." If they were under repair they almost certainly could not have dived on an hour's notice. Besides which, water at pierside usually isn't deep enough, there are issues with mooring lines and currents, "slam damage" on pilings, etc, etc. But moslty, if you're in refit you aren't capable of bring rigged for dive.

I agree with the moose. The first US sub destroyed was in Manila Harbor, and it wasn't early in the morning of the 8th. I think it happened on the 2nd day of attacks, but I don't know for sure. If Sealion couldn't get going in 24 hours, I think you could assume that most of the subs could not sortie in an hour. I bet one or two of them could. But not 20+.

(granted, Sealion's situation was drastic. She had a huge hole in her so that an engine could be removed and replaced. Not all the subs were in that condition.)

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Post #: 6

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/17/2011 10:51:17 PM

mike scholl 1

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Joined: 2/17/2010
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Insano

Let me start by saying that I am in the JFB camp who believes that an all out port strike on the Pacific Fleet at Manila is the best possible opening for Japan in game terms. However I cannot convince myself that it would have been possible to achieve surprise here a la Pearl Harbor. I always have these visions of British subs at Malta simply bottoming themselves to avoid serious damage. Consider:

1. The Allies knew an attack from Japan was possible, even likely, and the Philippine Islands were the most likely target. They just didn't know when. Wouldn't this imply a higher state of readiness and better alert against a surprise attack?

2. Approach by KB from any direction except from the East would have been through trafficked shipping lanes and would have likely been detected prior to the launching point. An air strike launched from the East would have had to fly overland for some miles prior to reaching Manila harbor thus allowing for time to raise the alarm.

So my question is what was the actual state of readiness for the Pacific fleet subs? Could they have been submerged at their berths or sortied with say, an hour's notice? Or were they tied up and crewed in such a way that this would not have been possible?

Even though a well-known AFB, I would say "YES", surprise could have been achieved in the Philippines. Two reasons. One, portions of KB had operated off the China coast for years in support of land operations..., so there presence there would actually have been a relief to most Allied planners. It would have been a "normal and expected deployment". But those "operating areas" were only one night's sail from being in range to strike Manilla at dawn.

Two..., the incredible incompetence shown by MacArthur and Bereton during the real event. More than 8 hours warning, and they still managed to get the Far East Air Force destroyed on the ground. I doubt 30 minutes would have been nearly enough time for them to get their heads out of their behinds.

(in reply to Insano)

Post #: 7

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/18/2011 12:15:08 AM

wdolson

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Ddog

There was an intresting discussion some time back in the wargamers forum (alternate history) that talked about what if the Japanese by passed Pearl, did not invade the PI, and went straight for the DEI, Malaya, and so forth. With the anti-war climate in America they may have sat it out for quite some time or even forever. Of course the search plane intel would likely find it's way to the American Allies, but the Japanese would have rolled through the PTO....once they had the resources, then turned to the US which would have been behind the bell curve. Or just never fought the US once they had what they needed.

Roosevelt knew the US would end up in the war eventually, and the isolationist sentiments were weakening thanks to propaganda done by Britain. There were live or nearly live radio broadcasts from London during the Blitz and a deliberately heart breaking program in which children evacuated to Canada could talk to their parents back home.

The US was also tooling up for war, the military had a peacetime draft and the US was tooling up or in nearly full production on many war goods. The US was arming anyone who needed arms to fight the Axis. The Dutch placed a large order for American aircraft in 1941. The P-40s from that order were at sea when the war started. The Dutch already had a batch of PBYs and some Buffaloes that were sort of hand-me-downs. There was a bit of an engine shortage so the Dutch Buffaloes had to be equipped with rebuilt airliner engines which were not as good or reliable as the Navy Buffaloes. (The Buffalo was not a great fighter, but the Finns proved that it could do well in the hands of someone who knew what they were doing.)

The US Navy was also building up in a huge way. The first batch of Essex class carriers were under construction by late 1941 as well as a large number of other ships. The SB2C, TBF, and F4U all came out of a 1938 specification for new naval aircraft. The TBF program was the only one that didn't run into problems which is why the first ones were ready for combat by June of 42. The Hellcat was designed as a back up for the Corsair when it looked like that program was going to have problems. Initially the Navy wanted an improved Wildcat, but the Hellcat evolved into something new.

The Japanese knew this. The US papers were full of articles describing what was under construction and it didn't take much effort to realize that the US would be numerically superior to Japan in everything by late 1943. Meanwhile if they went to war with the British and Dutch, but left the US alone, the Philippines would be reinforced (MacArthur already had a major defensive building project going on, but it was far from complete) and it would sit astride their most critical shipping routes.

Leaving the US alone would have been a huge risk to Japan. Their gamble was to hit the US hard early and hope the US would run away and hide rather than fight back. Some in the war cabinet believed that in the US women had more say in how things were done and if they hit the US hard and fast, the women's influence would lead to the US suing for peace. When that didn't happen, most Japanese who had a clue about reality knew the gamble had failed.

As far as a Pearl Harbor type attack on the US Far East fleet in Manila, it probably would have been possible, but not as effective. The surface assets based in Manila were small, and most were at sea on 12/8 (it was the 8th in the PI due to the international date line). The sub fleet could have been destroyed in port and the facilities smashed, but Manila was a forward base. There were no capital assets there, and only one heavy cruiser. There were also many other good bases in the area the survivors of the fleet could move to, which they did when Manila became untenable.

The US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was a much more critical target. The US plans for war was to send the Pacific Fleet to defend the PI. The BBs at Pearl represented a very powerful force. If it had been committed to the PI, it would likely have been destroyed, but nobody on either side yet realized how vulnerable BBs were without air support, though some suspected. The Japanese also wanted to take out the US carriers based at Pearl, but they were happy with what they got.

In game, concentrating the KB on Manila instead of Pearl would be more satisfying in the short term, but would leave a large fleet intact on the far eastern edge of the empire. If you want to use the KB to do something other than protect the Marshall Islands, you will leave your flank open. The Marshalls can defend themselves for a short period with Netties, but once the land based air is attritted down, the region will be wide open to being taken out. Small islands are very difficult to defend from a force willing to bring enough troops and supply unless you have the mobile assets to disrupt the landings.

I think doing as much damage as possible at Pearl is Japan's best bet as an opening gambit. Smash the fleet there and the Marshalls will be safer for at least a year. Though an aggressive Allied player could still attack them.

Bill

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Post #: 8

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/18/2011 5:10:31 AM

CV 2

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quote:

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

Two..., the incredible incompetence shown by MacArthur and Bereton during the real event. More than 8 hours warning, and they still managed to get the Far East Air Force destroyed on the ground. I doubt 30 minutes would have been nearly enough time for them to get their heads out of their behinds.

Actually wasnt incompetence, it was dumb luck. They had everything they had in the air at dawn, expecting a dawn strike, Which was in fact the Japanese plan. But weather over Formosa delayed the Japanese takeoff just enough that they arrived as the planes were on the ground refueling.

(in reply to mike scholl 1)

Post #: 9

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/18/2011 1:03:23 PM

Blackhorse

Posts: 1983
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From: Eastern US
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quote:

ORIGINAL: CV 2

quote:

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

Two..., the incredible incompetence shown by MacArthur and Bereton during the real event. More than 8 hours warning, and they still managed to get the Far East Air Force destroyed on the ground. I doubt 30 minutes would have been nearly enough time for them to get their heads out of their behinds.

Actually wasnt incompetence, it was dumb luck. They had everything they had in the air at dawn, expecting a dawn strike, Which was in fact the Japanese plan. But weather over Formosa delayed the Japanese takeoff just enough that they arrived as the planes were on the ground refueling.

I think you are both right.

Dumb luck: the planes were up before dawn, and unfortunately landed to refuel before the strike arrived.

Incompetence: MacArthur and Sutherland dismissing Brereton's plan to send the B-17s to bomb Taiwan at daybreak. Brereton allowing all the fighters and all the bombers to be on the ground refueling at the same time; officers' duty stations vacated for lunch break that delayed reacting to the warning that the Japanese strike was coming.

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RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/18/2011 2:09:53 PM

Panther Bait

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Blackhorse

quote:

ORIGINAL: CV 2

quote:

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

Two..., the incredible incompetence shown by MacArthur and Bereton during the real event. More than 8 hours warning, and they still managed to get the Far East Air Force destroyed on the ground. I doubt 30 minutes would have been nearly enough time for them to get their heads out of their behinds.

Actually wasnt incompetence, it was dumb luck. They had everything they had in the air at dawn, expecting a dawn strike, Which was in fact the Japanese plan. But weather over Formosa delayed the Japanese takeoff just enough that they arrived as the planes were on the ground refueling.

I think you are both right.

Dumb luck: the planes were up before dawn, and unfortunately landed to refuel before the strike arrived.

Incompetence: MacArthur and Sutherland dismissing Brereton's plan to send the B-17s to bomb Taiwan at daybreak. Brereton allowing all the fighters and all the bombers to be on the ground refueling at the same time; officers' duty stations vacated for lunch break that delayed reacting to the warning that the Japanese strike was coming.

I'd have to agree on the incompetence piece. If you're expecting an attack, the planes should be shuttled down in groups to limit what is on the ground all at once. Or perhaps dispersed to secondary airfields if they are available.

Mike

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RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/18/2011 2:17:25 PM

CV 2

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Well, didnt mean to imply that the campaign was handled with the most effective strategy

As for a B-17 strike at dawn, most likely the weather that prevented the Japanese takeoffs would have prevented the bombers from finding their targets.

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Post #: 12

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/19/2011 2:13:16 PM

Cyber Me

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MacArthur had ordered the B17s to be moved to Del Monte Field on Mindanao to keep them out of harms way. But as the secondary a/f for the B17s was still under construction. Brereton had decided to keep the bulk of his bomber force at Clark Field for the time being.

The difficulty of launching a raid from Clark Field to Formosa was that the island had twenty a/f and Sutherland had zero recon/intelligence on the first day of the war. Where are the fields? He had no target data. General Brereton had no notion of what he would attack and he would almost certainly lose some of his planes. Also a bombing mission over Formosa with B17s hitting targets of opportunity was ruled out by MacArthur's order not to attack until we're fired on dated 27th Nov, 1941.Only a single B17 left on a photo-recon mission. (A similar thing the Luftwaffe did during the Battle of Britain, they had little recon/intelligence of the a/f they attacked and so wasted much effort attacking Bomber Command, Coastal Command, training bases, unused a/fs, abandoned a/fs, etc- they only saw the a/f not really knowing if their bombs were attacking Fighter Command a/fs.)

Also the American leaders didn't know of the capabilities of their enemy's aircraft. Of course only the Nell and Bettys could fly from Formosa to Clark and Iba Fields and Cavite Naval Base. The shorter ranged IJA planes could only attack targets in northern end of Luzon. When there was no sign of Japanese aircraft anywhere near Manila, which seems to have confirmed MacArthur's view that they would be left alone. Brereton received a phone call from General Arnold at 07:15am who described the carnage at Pearl Harbour and he warned Brereton not to leave his planes on the ground. Not until 08:00 were the B17s ordered into the air without bombs. The west coast of Formosa was blanketed in a heavy fog that grounded the IJN planes that were scheduled to attack Clark and Iba Fields at dawn. The east coast of Formosa was fog-free and the IJA planes took-off at 06:30 and started attacking targets in northern Luzon by 09:30. Around 09:00 the fog had cleared on western Formosa and the 192 naval bombers took off. By 11:30 all sixteen B17s were on the ground again and the P40s had returned to Clark or Iba for refueling. At 11:40 the radar station at Iba showed a large formation of planes heading south. By 12:20 bombs were falling among the neatly parked planes. Some P40s managed to take off and attack their tormentors, but many of the interceptors that were already airbourne were already short of fuel and could not achieved as much as their numbers might have achieved. The 17th and 21st Pursuit Squadrons (already on patrol over Bataan) made no attempt to engage the Japanese. 18 B17s, 53 fighters, and 25 other planes were lost, while only seven enemy planes were destroyed.

(in reply to CV 2)

Post #: 13

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/19/2011 2:34:19 PM

GaryChildress

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Blackhorse

quote:

ORIGINAL: CV 2

quote:

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

Two..., the incredible incompetence shown by MacArthur and Bereton during the real event. More than 8 hours warning, and they still managed to get the Far East Air Force destroyed on the ground. I doubt 30 minutes would have been nearly enough time for them to get their heads out of their behinds.

Actually wasnt incompetence, it was dumb luck. They had everything they had in the air at dawn, expecting a dawn strike, Which was in fact the Japanese plan. But weather over Formosa delayed the Japanese takeoff just enough that they arrived as the planes were on the ground refueling.

I think you are both right.

Dumb luck: the planes were up before dawn, and unfortunately landed to refuel before the strike arrived.

Incompetence: MacArthur and Sutherland dismissing Brereton's plan to send the B-17s to bomb Taiwan at daybreak. Brereton allowing all the fighters and all the bombers to be on the ground refueling at the same time; officers' duty stations vacated for lunch break that delayed reacting to the warning that the Japanese strike was coming.

It's amazing how big a role luck played in the war. Think if the US Torpedo bombers hadn't arrived first at Midway. I wonder if the American air attack would have been repelled by the Japanese CAP.

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Post #: 14

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/19/2011 3:02:06 PM

Sardaukar

Posts: 9847
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From: Finland/Israel
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Gary Childress

quote:

ORIGINAL: Blackhorse

quote:

ORIGINAL: CV 2

quote:

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

Two..., the incredible incompetence shown by MacArthur and Bereton during the real event. More than 8 hours warning, and they still managed to get the Far East Air Force destroyed on the ground. I doubt 30 minutes would have been nearly enough time for them to get their heads out of their behinds.

Actually wasnt incompetence, it was dumb luck. They had everything they had in the air at dawn, expecting a dawn strike, Which was in fact the Japanese plan. But weather over Formosa delayed the Japanese takeoff just enough that they arrived as the planes were on the ground refueling.

I think you are both right.

Dumb luck: the planes were up before dawn, and unfortunately landed to refuel before the strike arrived.

Incompetence: MacArthur and Sutherland dismissing Brereton's plan to send the B-17s to bomb Taiwan at daybreak. Brereton allowing all the fighters and all the bombers to be on the ground refueling at the same time; officers' duty stations vacated for lunch break that delayed reacting to the warning that the Japanese strike was coming.

It's amazing how big a role luck played in the war. Think if the US Torpedo bombers hadn't arrived first at Midway. I wonder if the American air attack would have been repelled by the Japanese CAP.

Shattered Sword debunks the myth that Waldrons torpedo bombers brought Japanese CAP to low level. They actually had plenty of time to climb back to position after TBs were shot down (20 mins between that and when SBDs arrived). More important was that continuous stream of attacks gave Japanese no time to get organized, because they were reacting to those attacks.

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Post #: 15

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/19/2011 8:48:30 PM

Insano

Posts: 228
Joined: 7/23/2009
From: Joplin, Missouri
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

... One, portions of KB had operated off the China coast for years in support of land operations..., so there presence there would actually have been a relief to most Allied planners. It would have been a "normal and expected deployment". But those "operating areas" were only one night's sail from being in range to strike Manilla at dawn.
...

Mike this was a particularly thought provoking comment to me, a viewpoint I had not considered. I think you are right though.

Thanks for the input from all!

It seems there is a consensus that surprise in the Philippines could have been achieved sufficient to justify the wholesale slaughter of the Far East submarines that is possible if Japan goes "all in" on this objective. Therefore I conclude that a massive port strike on Manila is a valid opening move in game.

(in reply to mike scholl 1)

Post #: 16

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/19/2011 9:06:57 PM

Bradley7735

Posts: 2073
Joined: 7/12/2004
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Insano

quote:

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

... One, portions of KB had operated off the China coast for years in support of land operations..., so there presence there would actually have been a relief to most Allied planners. It would have been a "normal and expected deployment". But those "operating areas" were only one night's sail from being in range to strike Manilla at dawn.
...

Mike this was a particularly thought provoking comment to me, a viewpoint I had not considered. I think you are right though.

Thanks for the input from all!

It seems there is a consensus that surprise in the Philippines could have been achieved sufficient to justify the wholesale slaughter of the Far East submarines that is possible if Japan goes "all in" on this objective. Therefore I conclude that a massive port strike on Manila is a valid opening move in game.

FYI, a lot of players will say that port attacks at PH AND Manila were not possible. You can't achieve surprise at both locations because of the time difference. Hitting Manila and Singapore at the same time seems to be a possibliity, though (they are close enough in time zones)

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Post #: 17

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/19/2011 9:10:43 PM

Insano

Posts: 228
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From: Joplin, Missouri
Status: offline

yeah I like the house rule that you can't do both. I see that in a lot of AARs and would support that fully in my games.

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Post #: 18

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/19/2011 9:23:18 PM

wdolson

Posts: 10398
Joined: 6/28/2006
From: Near Portland, OR
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Gary Childress
It's amazing how big a role luck played in the war. Think if the US Torpedo bombers hadn't arrived first at Midway. I wonder if the American air attack would have been repelled by the Japanese CAP.

At Midway, the Japanese considered torpedo bombers to be a bigger threat because their own strike power core was torpedo centered. The Val could only carry a 250 Kg bomb (a little over 500 lbs). They assumed American capability was the same. They didn't realize until later American torpedoes were poor and SBDs could carry a bigger load than Vals could. In later battles of 1942 they did a better job of defending against dive bombers. Or at least they positioned CAP better.

Bill

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Post #: 19

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/19/2011 10:49:52 PM

vettim89

Posts: 3615
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From: Toledo, Ohio
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I think a number of factors should be in play that are not because of limitations in the system

1. When we talk about "ships in port" at Manila on 7/8 December 1941, that speaks to a lot of things. Some were actually tied up at Cavite Naval Base. Some were at anchor in Manila Bay. Some were actually at locales other than Cavite but still within the Manila "hex". Unlike PH, we are talking about a much larger geographic area. Unfortunately the game views in port in Manila as everything being all bunched together. While that was true of PH, it would not be true of Manila

2. THe USN subs started to sortie as soon as news of the PH attack reached Asiatic fleet HQ. I posted the actual locations a while back but the search function has a time limit. IIRC, 15 were at sea by midnight on the first day of the war. The rest trickled out over the next week but two were damaged as well as an AS sunk on the 15th by a raid by Netties. IIRC, all were gone by the 21st. So if the initial attack was just Manila/Singers then yes the USN would have been just as flat footed at Manilla as they were at PH. However duel raids at PH and Manila would be taking advantage of the system

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Post #: 20

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/20/2011 3:31:42 AM

GaryChildress

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Sardaukar

quote:

ORIGINAL: Gary Childress

quote:

ORIGINAL: Blackhorse

quote:

ORIGINAL: CV 2

quote:

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

Two..., the incredible incompetence shown by MacArthur and Bereton during the real event. More than 8 hours warning, and they still managed to get the Far East Air Force destroyed on the ground. I doubt 30 minutes would have been nearly enough time for them to get their heads out of their behinds.

Actually wasnt incompetence, it was dumb luck. They had everything they had in the air at dawn, expecting a dawn strike, Which was in fact the Japanese plan. But weather over Formosa delayed the Japanese takeoff just enough that they arrived as the planes were on the ground refueling.

I think you are both right.

Dumb luck: the planes were up before dawn, and unfortunately landed to refuel before the strike arrived.

Incompetence: MacArthur and Sutherland dismissing Brereton's plan to send the B-17s to bomb Taiwan at daybreak. Brereton allowing all the fighters and all the bombers to be on the ground refueling at the same time; officers' duty stations vacated for lunch break that delayed reacting to the warning that the Japanese strike was coming.

It's amazing how big a role luck played in the war. Think if the US Torpedo bombers hadn't arrived first at Midway. I wonder if the American air attack would have been repelled by the Japanese CAP.

Shattered Sword debunks the myth that Waldrons torpedo bombers brought Japanese CAP to low level. They actually had plenty of time to climb back to position after TBs were shot down (20 mins between that and when SBDs arrived). More important was that continuous stream of attacks gave Japanese no time to get organized, because they were reacting to those attacks.

Interesting. I guess historians felt sympathy for all those poor young men who died in those Torpedo squadrons that day and decided to give them some credit for the victory so as to say they had not died in vain.

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RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/20/2011 5:42:37 AM

DivePac88

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Gary Childress

Interesting. I guess historians felt sympathy for all those poor young men who died in those Torpedo squadrons that day and decided to give them some credit for the victory so as to say they had not died in vain.

I think that the lack of Japanese fighter opposition to the start of the USN dive bomber attacks, was more about the lack of radar, and a poor fighter direction doctrine that the USN torpedo bomber attacks.

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Post #: 22

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/20/2011 10:32:50 AM

Ddog

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From: Cincinnati, OH
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quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Roosevelt knew the US would end up in the war eventually, and the isolationist sentiments were weakening thanks to propaganda done by Britain. There were live or nearly live radio broadcasts from London during the Blitz and a deliberately heart breaking program in which children evacuated to Canada could talk to their parents back home.

Now I don't claim to be a historian of any type, but keep in mind that America did not jump into the war even when the Battle of Britain was in full swing. The isolationist had a strong backing. Even Charles Lindburgh gave an anti-war speech.

quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

The US was also tooling up for war, the military had a peacetime draft and the US was tooling up or in nearly full production on many war goods. The US was arming anyone who needed arms to fight the Axis. The Dutch placed a large order for American aircraft in 1941. The P-40s from that order were at sea when the war started. The Dutch already had a batch of PBYs and some Buffaloes that were sort of hand-me-downs. There was a bit of an engine shortage so the Dutch Buffaloes had to be equipped with rebuilt airliner engines which were not as good or reliable as the Navy Buffaloes. (The Buffalo was not a great fighter, but the Finns proved that it could do well in the hands of someone who knew what they were doing.)

The US Navy was also building up in a huge way. The first batch of Essex class carriers were under construction by late 1941 as well as a large number of other ships. The SB2C, TBF, and F4U all came out of a 1938 specification for new naval aircraft. The TBF program was the only one that didn't run into problems which is why the first ones were ready for combat by June of 42. The Hellcat was designed as a back up for the Corsair when it looked like that program was going to have problems. Initially the Navy wanted an improved Wildcat, but the Hellcat evolved into something new.

I agree that the US was selling arms to it's allies. However the dutch may have placed the orders, but it still did not stop the Japanese from taking the DEI.

The comment on the Essex Class carriers is a little missleading. 1 hull had been laid prior to Dec 41. 2 more were laid in Dec. of 41. This was out of total 32 ordered, 26 or 27 actually built.

quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

The Japanese knew this. The US papers were full of articles describing what was under construction and it didn't take much effort to realize that the US would be numerically superior to Japan in everything by late 1943. Meanwhile if they went to war with the British and Dutch, but left the US alone, the Philippines would be reinforced (MacArthur already had a major defensive building project going on, but it was far from complete) and it would sit astride their most critical shipping routes.

America could have reinforced the PI. But keeping it supplied would have been another matter.

I am not a historian, but I like these types of discussions. What if.......?? There is no correct answer, just opinion and speculation. :)

Thanks for your perspective Bill!

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Post #: 23

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/20/2011 3:49:21 PM

mike scholl 1

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Ddog

quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Roosevelt knew the US would end up in the war eventually, and the isolationist sentiments were weakening thanks to propaganda done by Britain. There were live or nearly live radio broadcasts from London during the Blitz and a deliberately heart breaking program in which children evacuated to Canada could talk to their parents back home.

Now I don't claim to be a historian of any type, but keep in mind that America did not jump into the war even when the Battle of Britain was in full swing. The isolationist had a strong backing. Even Charles Lindburgh gave an anti-war speech.

No..., but if you look at the trend of the poll results between the outbreak of the war in Sept. of 1939 and December of 1941 you will find a steadily decreasing number of Americans supporting the "isolationist" cause and a steady increase in those accepting that "we're going to have to get involved". Churchill and Roosevelt knew what HAD to be done, and were doing a good job of doing it.

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Post #: 24

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/21/2011 7:34:51 AM

Pascal_slith

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quote:

ORIGINAL: DivePac88

quote:

ORIGINAL: Gary Childress

Interesting. I guess historians felt sympathy for all those poor young men who died in those Torpedo squadrons that day and decided to give them some credit for the victory so as to say they had not died in vain.

I think that the lack of Japanese fighter opposition to the start of the USN dive bomber attacks, was more about the lack of radar, and a poor fighter direction doctrine that the USN torpedo bomber attacks.

Plus Japanes fighters did not have radios....

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Post #: 25

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/21/2011 7:45:45 AM

Ddog

Posts: 230
Joined: 2/17/2005
From: Cincinnati, OH
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ddog

quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Roosevelt knew the US would end up in the war eventually, and the isolationist sentiments were weakening thanks to propaganda done by Britain. There were live or nearly live radio broadcasts from London during the Blitz and a deliberately heart breaking program in which children evacuated to Canada could talk to their parents back home.

Now I don't claim to be a historian of any type, but keep in mind that America did not jump into the war even when the Battle of Britain was in full swing. The isolationist had a strong backing. Even Charles Lindburgh gave an anti-war speech.

No..., but if you look at the trend of the poll results between the outbreak of the war in Sept. of 1939 and December of 1941 you will find a steadily decreasing number of Americans supporting the "isolationist" cause and a steady increase in those accepting that "we're going to have to get involved". Churchill and Roosevelt knew what HAD to be done, and were doing a good job of doing it.

I read up on some of the opinion polls today. Some cool stuff.

So, what if the Japanese had a 3-6 month head start? If the Pearl Harbor attack did not take place, then would America have experienced a slower build up of forces? Dec. 7 gave America a battle cry and riled up America....if it did not take place there may have been a slower build up along with a later start into the war.

Would this have made a difference?

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Post #: 26

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/21/2011 11:20:43 AM

Blackhorse

Posts: 1983
Joined: 8/20/2000
From: Eastern US
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Gary Childress

quote:

ORIGINAL: Sardaukar

Shattered Sword debunks the myth that Waldrons torpedo bombers brought Japanese CAP to low level. They actually had plenty of time to climb back to position after TBs were shot down (20 mins between that and when SBDs arrived). More important was that continuous stream of attacks gave Japanese no time to get organized, because they were reacting to those attacks.

Interesting. I guess historians felt sympathy for all those poor young men who died in those Torpedo squadrons that day and decided to give them some credit for the victory so as to say they had not died in vain.

I think historians sincerely believed that the unsuccessful torpedo attacks set the stage for the dive bombers that crippled the Japanese carriers. As Sardaukar says, Shattered Sword challenges that consensus among western historians (and takes a swipe at their allegedly lazy group-think). Time will tell if the SS view becomes the new conventional wisdom, or if it will be challenged in turn.

Regardless, nothing detracts from the selfless sense of duty exhibited by the young men flying and manning the torpedo planes. In Herman Wouk's magnificent Winds of War -- a pair of 'historical novels' covering WWII through the eyes of a Navy Captain and his family -- the author "changes his voice" during the account of the Battle of Midway and speaks, as the author, directly to the reader: in the manner of the ancient greeks he lists the roll of the men who flied and died in the doomed torpedo attacks. It is chilling, moving, and an enormously effective literary technique.

I've only cried twice in my adult life: when I read that scene, and watching Brian's Song. Well, when Old Yaller died, too. So three. But that's it. 'Tho my eyes might mist a little when the French National Anthem is played is Casablanca . . .

< Message edited by Blackhorse -- 4/21/2011 11:30:02 AM >

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Post #: 27

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/21/2011 12:01:42 PM

GaryChildress

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From: The Divided Nations of Earth
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Pascal

quote:

ORIGINAL: DivePac88

quote:

ORIGINAL: Gary Childress

Interesting. I guess historians felt sympathy for all those poor young men who died in those Torpedo squadrons that day and decided to give them some credit for the victory so as to say they had not died in vain.

I think that the lack of Japanese fighter opposition to the start of the USN dive bomber attacks, was more about the lack of radar, and a poor fighter direction doctrine that the USN torpedo bomber attacks.

Plus Japanes fighters did not have radios....

Did Japanese fighters ever get radios at any point in the war? I remember seeing "God Is My Co-Pilot" where the sadistic and sinisterly evil Japanese pilot talks to Robert Scott via radio while they are in their air duel to the death. I'm sure that was probably a bit of Hollywood glitz added to make the movie more interesting.

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Post #: 28

RE: "Pearl Harbor-ing" Manila - historically ... - 4/21/2011 12:46:46 PM

CV 2

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Gary Childress

Did Japanese fighters ever get radios at any point in the war? I remember seeing "God Is My Co-Pilot" where the sadistic and sinisterly evil Japanese pilot talks to Robert Scott via radio while they are in their air duel to the death. I'm sure that was probably a bit of Hollywood glitz added to make the movie more interesting.

I read the book (many many moons ago) and there was nothing of this in there.

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Post #: 29