wosung
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quote:
ORIGINAL: paullus99 Historically, given the poor overall transportation infrastructure in Russia (coupled with its almost complete destruction during the fighting), the chances of getting any significant amount of resources out of the region (the Caucausus especially) was slim - Hitler may have gain control of the oil fields, but he probably never would have gotten much back to Germany. German oil strategy was weird from the start. Like everything else it counted on a short six month Blitz in the East. The German Wehrwirtschaftsamt planned to relocate French refineries to the Caucasus. Optimistically, it planned to start a considerable oil production half a year after the Majkop oil wells had been occupied and to reach an output of 1 Mio. tons another six months later, 50% of Soviet light crude oil peace time production there. With Groznyj and Baku (the latter with a yearly peace time production of 20 Mio. tons) it was hoped to produce some 120.000 tons a month from mid 1943 onwards. This turned out to be just an illusion. Only Majkop was occupied. Only 70 barrels (about 10 tons) a day ever were produced there under German management. The German Ostheer alone needed 5.000 to 6.000 tons a day. Plus there were other oil consuments, the Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, the production and transport sector and Italy. But according to a German report, the Soviets “expertly destroyed” endangered Caucasian Oil wells and production sides in Majkop, taking years of repair: Drilling holes were filled with concrete and iron. Derricks, aggregates, power lines, infrastructure were destroyed. Road transport capacity was lacking, rails were destroyed, thus heavy equipment couldn’t be transported. Also, the kerosine refinery Kubanol in Krasnodar was destroyed “beyond repair”. The 6.500 men strong Technische Brigade Mineralöl, which in March 1942 was formed by the German Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt and which was attached to Heeresgruppe A and its 1. Panzerarmee also was delayed by air and partisan attacks – frex 40 German oil experts were killed with knives in one partisan night time raid in Majkop. German efforts also were hampered big way by the usual feuds between OKW, Göring’s Office for the 4 Year Plan, Reichswirtschaftsministerium, Ministerium Spee, Ostministerium, OKH, making it impossible for months only partly to recruit of the additional needed 2.800 drilling experts. All German oil planners were absolutely clear about one point: The only way to transport considerable amounts of Caucasian oil to Germany or to the Ukraine would be by ship, up the Danube. Thus, the Black Sea had to be secured. Additionally, first all the tankers needed had to be concentrated: by Black sea charter, by transferring French and Italian ships through the Bosporus, by rebuilding Danube river boats and by a building program for Danube boats made of concrete. And from just another telling perspective: Till Nov. 1942 up to 45% of all trains just transporting supplies for the Wehrmacht fighting in the Caucasus were blocked by partisan activities there. But the fight for the Caucasus did mean this: Not only Germany but also the Soviet Union struggled for oil. From summer 1941 onwards Caucasian oil production, from Majkop to Grosnyj was heavily reduced for a number of reasons: Drilling equipment was evacuated to the East, Azerbajan came under the threat of Luftwaffe bombing raids, the Volga and the rail net was blocked by the the Wehrmacht. Thus several Million tons of oil had to be shipped from Krasnovodsk over the Caspian Sea and the distributed through Turkmenia and Kazachtan. In autumn and winter1942 lack of fuel on both sides resulted in a esp. tough fighting in the South. Arguably, as early as in late September 1942, even Hitler himself didn’t believe anymore in the success of Operation Blau: Correcting his earlier Order No. 45 for the occupation of the Caucasus oil fields intact, now he ordered airstrikes on the oil tanks in Saratov, Kamysin and Aatrachan and in mid October on the rafinery in Groznyj. Give the extraordinary economical, strategic and discoursive meaning of the “Caucasian oil” for Nazi Germany, arguably the very matter wasn’t planned and realized particularly thoroughly. Also, possible Wally reactions weren’t taken into account: As early as in the Soviet Finnish war there were Anglo-French plannings for air strikes on Caucasian oil fields. As Richard Overy concisely has put it: Neither the German nor the Japanese occupation of oil fields in the Caucasus or in Dutch East India did move all this oil one inch closer to the German and Japanese industry. Sources: Bernd Wegner, Der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1942/43, in: Germany and the Second World War Vol. 6., pp. 942-951. Richard Overy, Why the Allies won, pp. 228-234. Regards
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