Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: Wild


Just look in Q-ball vs.Tarhunnas AAR. The Germans pounded the Soviets hard in the summer but the Soviets were still able to have a deadly winter offensive.

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ORIGINAL: Lieste

Maybe ants is wrong too - because German losses in July/August were a hell of a lot higher than Dec/Jan. Current tempos don't match this at all.
Good tactical performance by Russian troops, but a poor strategic/operational situation, against superior tactical and operational situation of the German forces might be a closer match than inept/disgraceful tactical performance with relatively smooth running strategic options (which are largely irrelevant due to poor troops).

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ORIGINAL: arras

Can somebody point me to war or prewar time Soviet army manual, political manifesto or any other primary source which orders Soviet commanders perform "human wave" attacks? Or something which can be described as such? Newer ever in my life I saw such "doctrine" been defined in any relevant literature.

Only place where I find Soviet doctrine of "human wave" are computer games!

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ORIGINAL: arras

Can somebody point me to war or prewar time Soviet army manual, political manifesto or any other primary source which orders Soviet commanders perform "human wave" attacks? Or something which can be described as such? Newer ever in my life I saw such "doctrine" been defined in any relevant literature.

Only place where I find Soviet doctrine of "human wave" are computer games!

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ORIGINAL: Mynok


I wouldn't mind seeing the 1-1 thing go away after 42. Trust me...the Soviets don't need it after that. Indeed I do not recall it ever being a factor in  the 43 campaign with Oleg I'm playing.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mynok


I wouldn't mind seeing the 1-1 thing go away after 42. Trust me...the Soviets don't need it after that. Indeed I do not recall it ever being a factor in  the 43 campaign with Oleg I'm playing.

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ORIGINAL: Wild

I am very glad to here that this 1-1 odds thing might get changed.

I have to agree with Helio's first post. All the work to make things detailed, realistic and dare i say it "Historic" and it is all thrown away by some cheap gimmick of play balancing.
This is really my biggest complaint about the game.

In my opinion we just need to model the small things correctly and the big things will take care of themselves. No need for artificial play balancing.

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Can somebody point me to war or prewar time Soviet army manual, political manifesto or any other primary source which orders Soviet commanders perform "human wave" attacks? Or something which can be described as such? Newer ever in my life I saw such "doctrine" been defined in any relevant literature.

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ORIGINAL: gradenko_2000

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Can somebody point me to war or prewar time Soviet army manual, political manifesto or any other primary source which orders Soviet commanders perform "human wave" attacks? Or something which can be described as such? Newer ever in my life I saw such "doctrine" been defined in any relevant literature.

Just as WITE's "morale" concept can be more accurately termed as "force proficiency" (to borrow from the Operational Art of War), the concept of "human wave tactics" can probably be more accurately termed as "Soviet deep battle", wherein the Red Army attacks all across the line until one part breaks*, then hurls the second echelon into the break to hold it open, then a third echelon would exploit the break into the enemy's rear areas.

It then follows (and was historically demonstrated) that such a doctrine will be very costly in terms of casualties and resources, as you're amassing forces to attack everywhere, then doing so and hoping for a break somewhere.

* To provide a contrast, German operational doctrine was more about identifying a specific point along the line where you wanted to create a break, and concentrating your heavy forces along that point: The schwerpunkt. The key difference is in how the break is created in the first place.

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ORIGINAL: TulliusDetritus

The root of the whole thing lies in the social system of the USSR. Lenin himself had said that if the country was attacked the Red Army would be "the most agressive army of history".

In other words, the military professionals have NOTHING to do here. What they did, of course, is developing this "agressive" army theory thing. Which is why the Red Army focused on attacking, not in defending.

It's easy to see that this "agressive" thing lead to unnecessary, suicidal attacks: the waves you describe.

But again, it was about the revolutionary spirit. Not about some random military formulating this doctrine from his desk

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ORIGINAL: cookie monster

Anyway here's some info. I'm not gonna dig further I'm just gonna accept what was written in the manual.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_wave#Usage

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ORIGINAL: gradenko_2000

Just as WITE's "morale" concept can be more accurately termed as "force proficiency" (to borrow from the Operational Art of War), the concept of "human wave tactics" can probably be more accurately termed as "Soviet deep battle", wherein the Red Army attacks all across the line until one part breaks*, then hurls the second echelon into the break to hold it open, then a third echelon would exploit the break into the enemy's rear areas.

It then follows (and was historically demonstrated) that such a doctrine will be very costly in terms of casualties and resources, as you're amassing forces to attack everywhere, then doing so and hoping for a break somewhere.

quote:

ORIGINAL: gradenko_2000

* To provide a contrast, German operational doctrine was more about identifying a specific point along the line where you wanted to create a break, and concentrating your heavy forces along that point: The schwerpunkt. The key difference is in how the break is created in the first place.

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2) Battle Drill & Initiative

Probably the most enduring stereotype of the Soviet way of war is that of rigidity - attacks at all costs, orders followed slavishly, tactics by the exact diagram in the manual regardless of the situation. This is also one of the stereotypes most likely to cause heartburn - or death - in an enemy facing a Soviet-style opponent executing the doctrine properly.

Remember this: A Soviet officer is expected to display initiative. When executing a Battle Drill or a superior's order, the orders given must be altered as necessary to fit the specific situation and mission. The drills are a route to speedy communication & execution in accordance with Patton's belief that "a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week".

Thus, the expectation of an officer runs in this manner: A situation arises. The officer arrives at a decision, with the help of those norms of conduct the officer belives to be applicable. The order is given as one or more battle drills, each modified as far as necessary to meet the needs of the mission. The Soviets would not consider an officer who did something stupid by following the letter of the book to have acted properly - they would consider the officer stupid.

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ORIGINAL: arras

Deep battle is about engaging enemy in depth -tactical, operational, even strategical. There is nothing in it about throwing waves of humans on enemy lines. In fact "human wave" looks outright ridiculous from point of "deep battle". That theory was developed in USSR because WWI tactic was found insufficient.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_battle

Unless you can provide me with quotations from relevant Soviet military writers and theoreticians of course.

My impression so far is that famous soviet "human wave" tactics is just another of those Western stereotypes about Eastern front like another famous kliche of NKVD or barrier troops marching behind such "human wave" and shooting in to their backs to bolster courage.

There were of course occasions when Soviet commanders used unimaginative frontal attacks, often without support. But those are and where considered by Russians themselves as results of insufficient experience and faults of commanders doing it. Along with deficiencies in equipment and supply. It other worlds, such tactics was considered wrong! Exact opposite to it been part of established doctrine.

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ORIGINAL: gradenko_2000

If the original question is that "Where did the extra Soviet casualties and +1 modifier come from?", the answer would be that the devs looked at how the Soviets waged war/executed their operations and found that the way they did it, by their estimation, always yielded higher casualties.

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ORIGINAL: herwin

I'd suggest reading the English-language materials on Soviet Military Doctrine. The Scotts published some interesting books on the subject. If you wonder where I get some of the ideas I have about the Red Army, they date to the days when I was reading the primary Russian sources.

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ORIGINAL: herwin

I beg to differ about German operational art. In that case, you probably need to read the German primary sources. Ferdinand von Senger und Etterlin authored a number of relevant books. I remember a German-language handbook on armoured operations by him that I acquired and learned a lot from.