el cid again
Matrix Legion of Merit

Posts: 16922
Joined: 10/10/2005 Status: offline
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Stringbag I've moved this over from the war room... One thing struck me. Since WiTP begins on 7th Dec, we tend to focus very much on the IJN initial strategy - but in real life there was years of thinking about this and planning for this, so changing it is a bit silly - and it worked a treat anyway. However the real crunch came in early '42 - go south or go Midway or go north. A sort of naval equivalent of the German dilemma in Russia of the same period. Would not a scenario beginning just before or after coral sea offer much more interesting and realistic strategic options than one beginning at PH? As it stands, to have a more historical game one really needs to play out moves much as they occurred in reality until the Spring of '42, when those options opened up and could have gone in any direction - for both sides. This is both true and untrue, depending on what counts. Japanese planning to invade and occupy Hawaii dated from 1910 - but it was also not implemented. War Plan Orange dates from WWI - and although related to what was done in the USN Central Pacific offensive - it also was not implemented as such. So it is true that general planning had gone on for decades. On the other hand, in spite of Allied wartime and postwar propaganda, Japan did not intend to or plan to "wage aggressive war" and it did not "fortify the Mandated Islands in violation of the rules." [Fortification began after the Makin Island raid] The best account we have is by the head of the most effective - and probably longest constituted - planning unit - Col Tsuji's Japans Greatestl Victory, Britains Worst Defeat - in re Malaya. He says the Formosa Special Planning Unit (informally the "robber rope" unit - which makes sense in Japanse as "too late brigade" or "barn door brigade" might in English) - was formed AFTER the decision for mobilization. Mobilization occurred in July, 1941 - not years before - and required agonizing decisions because the Army high command (that more or less dominated the regime) was wedded to "strike North" - for which purpose JAAF planes were designed for cold weather and short ranges suitable to fighting in the North. Mobilization occurred after the embargo of iron ore, rubber and oil by US, UK and NEI - putting Japan in a bind - it had about 30 months stockpile of oil - and no easy way to get more sans taking some oil sources. Sakhalin did have oil - but not enough (at least with then knowledge and technology - offshore it probably DID have enough!) Tsuji briefly went to the general staff - witnessed the agonizing decision process - and describes it in his book (one of only two he wrote - the other is almost impossible to get - only 26 copies in the USA - one at the Library of Congress - but it is about late war and post war things mostly in Thailand and China). Tsuji is widely discounted and ignored - but should not be. He was a fanatic nationalist who never lies - he just believes truths from a very different point of view than is comfortable for Western readers - starting with it is wrong for Asia to be colonized and exploited. In spite of this, when it serves Japan's interests, and when ordered to do so, he serves US intelligence in the early Cold War era. And we trusted him to do that - because trusting him was never an issue. Anyway - better planning is certainly more interesting - and the basis of several games and mods I myself have done. But generally, it should be assumed that (a) detail planning starts about July 1941 and (b) longer term planning (e.g. for a Grand Escort Command) is simply folded in (instead of delayed for years as IRL). A 1938 vintage 3 inch gun was almost not produced - one cruiser gets four guns - eight more go ashore at Maizuru - but if you build it INSTEAD of the older 3 inch - you almost change the war - it is so superb. It uses the same fire control system (different cams) as the 4 inch gun - which itself should be even more produced (it went to sea on one class of AA destroyers, was intended for several larger classes - and 114 eventually were mounted ashore). One might focus on Kaidai type submarines - faster to build and cheaper - instead of long range fleet boats - and dozens of other concepts in place but not given priority. Certainly more production of fewer plane types would make sense, more widespread production of certain systems, and a focus on efficiency (do not let the Navy rob Army factories of specialists, and vice versa) would go a long way.
< Message edited by el cid again -- 8/12/2011 12:41:36 AM >
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