Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: John 3rd
B. World War One: Several officers who serve with the ASW Detachment in the Med realize that Japan MUST prepare for some sort of commerce war if she goes to war against a major power. This small faction agitates for better ASW Research, resources, and vessels. They also advocate for a Coastal Command HQ to coordinate a national response when needed.

quote:

ORIGINAL: John 3rdH. As war breaks out in Europe a large set of 'observers' travel to the region and absorb 'lessons' from what they see. For the Army and Navy this means: AIRPOWER. The ASW faction sees its fears realized with the German SS success against British Commerce. The Army...well...I am not really sure what they would see...

quote:

Historically, the German influence on Japan’s submarine force waned in the second half the 20’s, as IJN senior leadership drifted firmly into the shoals of the “Decisive Battle” doctrine, in which submarines would function as an integrated part of the battle fleet. By 1930, the last of the Germans had returned home. In my alternate history, however, things turned out differently.

In May 1922, a German called Reinhardt Fischer debarked from a steamship in Yokohama. During The Great War, he had been a U-boat commander in the Atlantic, winning some renown for a number of audacious attacks, and was an almost fanatical believer in the independent use of submarines as weapons of war. Finding Japan to his liking, Fischer assimilated rapidly, learning the Japanese language, and making a number of close connections among junior and middle-ranking IJN officers.

The charismatic and outspoken Fischer played a significant part in planting the seeds of an independent Japanese submarine arm, and by the time he died of a heart attack in the winter of 1929-30, the process was well underway.

The biggest difference between the traditionalist viewpoint of submarine operations, where the boats were part of the battle fleet, and the new independent submarine doctrine was the concept of control.

Under the control of the battle fleet, the submarines were meant to be essentially static torpedo batteries, deployed in strict patrol lines to wait for the enemy fleet to basically sail right over them. Each patrol line would be assigned a strict map position, and controlled by a flagship boat, thus requiring the individual submarines to come to the surface often in order to receive commands. This, combined with their lack of authority for independent movement or action, would doom the IJN submarine arm to playing fourth fiddle in the orchestra.

Under the Fischer scheme, individual submarines would be assigned larger patrol sectors on the map for independent operations. It was recognized that the idea of central control would be almost impossible to implement effectively, not to mention counter-productive, and potentially deadly to the flagship boats. Furthermore, it would be beaten into the heads of IJN submarine captains that there was no such thing as an “unworthy target”; their boats would be commerce raiders, attack the enemy fleet train, everything they could put in front of their torpedo tubes.

“Every enemy vessel, from the mightiest battleship to the smallest coastal steamer, supports his war machine and is a target that you must pursue with utmost aggressiveness. The only way you can fail the Emperor is by not pressing your attack home with all might. This is the way for Japan to win.”

Commander Koizo Nakamura,
senior lecturer at the Kure submarine school, to his students

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ORIGINAL: Herrbear

quote:

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

You've done a bunch of Postings this morning Stanislav! As I have been perusing the records of the Thread here are the big dates/events we've chosen to incorporate into our timeline:

A. 1904-1906 Russo-Japanese War---The Imperial Fleet realizes how near of a thing the war was. The real lessons taken from the experience is that any war will be longer (1.5-2 years), be attritional, and require different planning.

B. World War One: Several officers who serve with the ASW Detachment in the Med realize that Japan MUST prepare for some sort of commerce war if she goes to war against a major power. This small faction agitates for better ASW Research, resources, and vessels. They also advocate for a Coastal Command HQ to coordinate a national response when needed.

C. Washington Treaty allows for the Japanese to build-up to 3.5 instead of 3.0.

D. London Treaty does the same thing in 1930.

E. Manchuria is invaded but the Japanese Army is reigned in and the occupation is much more peaceful. A concerted Japanese economic investment takes place here and in Korea.

F. The Army Mutiny, spoken of on the previous page, is RUTHLESSLY put down and the middle grade of the Army Officers are forced to sit back instead of assassinate at will. A much stronger Privy Council takes hold that prepares for war as well as forces the Army and Navy to somewhat better cooperate.

G. In 1939 open war breaks out in China as the Chinese Warlords will no longer be cowed. The army deploys into the region and massed fighting takes place. Once again, the progressive elements of the Japanese Army work to make the 'peace' in China much more passive. There is no Nanking...

H. As war breaks out in Europe a large set of 'observers' travel to the region and absorb 'lessons' from what they see. For the Army and Navy this means: AIRPOWER. The ASW faction sees its fears realized with the German SS success against British Commerce. The Army...well...I am not really sure what they would see...

I. In 1940 the Japanese sense opportunity and throw themselves in with Germany and Italy.

The die is cast...

Did I miss anything? Thoughts?

Not that you have missed it, but just curious, regarding in building up the Mandated Islands. The agreement by Japan on 5:5:3 was accepted requiring the islands of the Pacific not being built up. In winning the 5:5:3.5 agreement is that corollary still in or are you looking at the ability of islands such as Guam, Carolines and so forth being able to be built up?

Member: Treaty, Reluctant Admiral and Between the Storms Mod Team.

Reluctant Admiral Mod:
https://sites.google.com/site/reluctantadmiral/

quote:

ORIGINAL: Terminus

quote:

Historically, the German influence on Japan’s submarine force waned in the second half the 20’s, as IJN senior leadership drifted firmly into the shoals of the “Decisive Battle” doctrine, in which submarines would function as an integrated part of the battle fleet. By 1930, the last of the Germans had returned home. In my alternate history, however, things turned out differently.

In May 1922, a German called Reinhardt Fischer debarked from a steamship in Yokohama. During The Great War, he had been a U-boat commander in the Atlantic, winning some renown for a number of audacious attacks, and was an almost fanatical believer in the independent use of submarines as weapons of war. Finding Japan to his liking, Fischer assimilated rapidly, learning the Japanese language, and making a number of close connections among junior and middle-ranking IJN officers.

The charismatic and outspoken Fischer played a significant part in planting the seeds of an independent Japanese submarine arm, and by the time he died of a heart attack in the winter of 1929-30, the process was well underway.

The biggest difference between the traditionalist viewpoint of submarine operations, where the boats were part of the battle fleet, and the new independent submarine doctrine was the concept of control.

Under the control of the battle fleet, the submarines were meant to be essentially static torpedo batteries, deployed in strict patrol lines to wait for the enemy fleet to basically sail right over them. Each patrol line would be assigned a strict map position, and controlled by a flagship boat, thus requiring the individual submarines to come to the surface often in order to receive commands. This, combined with their lack of authority for independent movement or action, would doom the IJN submarine arm to playing fourth fiddle in the orchestra.

Under the Fischer scheme, individual submarines would be assigned larger patrol sectors on the map for independent operations. It was recognized that the idea of central control would be almost impossible to implement effectively, not to mention counter-productive, and potentially deadly to the flagship boats. Furthermore, it would be beaten into the heads of IJN submarine captains that there was no such thing as an “unworthy target”; their boats would be commerce raiders, attack the enemy fleet train, everything they could put in front of their torpedo tubes.

“Every enemy vessel, from the mightiest battleship to the smallest coastal steamer, supports his war machine and is a target that you must pursue with utmost aggressiveness. The only way you can fail the Emperor is by not pressing your attack home with all might. This is the way for Japan to win.”

Commander Koizo Nakamura,
senior lecturer at the Kure submarine school, to his students

The above is a quote from a little paper I wrote for my own amusement on the issue of submarine warfare in our game. The point is turning the brains of the IJN away from seeing the submarine as a fleet weapon. On the materiél side, it has the IJN turning away from the giant fleet boats in 1935 and building medium-sized boats instead for use from forward bases. The subs also shift from the control of the numbered fleets to a single HQ.

Member: Treaty, Reluctant Admiral and Between the Storms Mod Team.

Reluctant Admiral Mod:
https://sites.google.com/site/reluctantadmiral/

quote:

ORIGINAL: Terminus
The above is a quote from a little paper I wrote for my own amusement on the issue of submarine warfare in our game. The point is turning the brains of the IJN away from seeing the submarine as a fleet weapon. On the materiél side, it has the IJN turning away from the giant fleet boats in 1935 and building medium-sized boats instead for use from forward bases. The subs also shift from the control of the numbered fleets to a single HQ.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Terminus

I think an Escort Command HQ should be created before war breaks out and spend a few years training alongside the submariners.

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ORIGINAL: John 3rd
I meant this to mean the Japanese would prepare to fight AGAINST a commerce war.

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ORIGINAL: Terminus

Speaking of IJN convoy escorts, a pre-war escort command should lead to the consideration of a standard class of escort ship.

In my mod, I call it the Sakikata ("Companion") class. This is essentially an IJN Flower-class corvette, meant for ease of construction above all else. About 1,000 tons, 16 knots, 4,000-mile range, 1*10cm gun and 1*2pdr gun with 2 DC rails and 18 DCs. Space for an additional Y-Gun and up-arming to about 50 DC's upon start of the war.

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ORIGINAL: FatR

quote:

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Speaking of IJN convoy escorts, a pre-war escort command should lead to the consideration of a standard class of escort ship.

In my mod, I call it the Sakikata ("Companion") class. This is essentially an IJN Flower-class corvette, meant for ease of construction above all else. About 1,000 tons, 16 knots, 4,000-mile range, 1*10cm gun and 1*2pdr gun with 2 DC rails and 18 DCs. Space for an additional Y-Gun and up-arming to about 50 DC's upon start of the war.

Rather too big, short-legged and underarmed compared to any of RL Japanese escorts. The idea of changes in the escort construction program, though, is sensible and logical, if the Escort Command exists before the war and tries to get its own slice of the budget pie. IRL, Shimushu-class escorts were not actually meant for escort duty, but for keeping tabs on the Soviets across the naval borders and economic zones in the north. They had rather complicated construction, simplyfing which took time on the following models. If there is a branch of the navy, clamoring for a mass-produced dedicated convoy escort, it might instead be developed separately before the war, with small test series already built.

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ORIGINAL: JWE

I would be very judicious about any technology transfers from Germany. Germany wouldn't do it in the first instance, and the Japanese doctrine was so vastly different that technology transfer would be non compos mentos. What you want to avoid is IJA SS Panzer Armies scouring the map. There wasn't much beyond electronics that Germany could offer, anyway. And even electronics she held close to the chest.

So, Metox, cool. Japan had a cavity magnetron way before Germany (or anybody else, for that matter), so what's the point in German radar technology? Perhaps German operational use would open some eyes, but not German radar technology in 1941. So forget tech transfer of uber, ober Nazi radar; it wasn't.

Aircraft engine technology was about the same, and I dare say Japan's was better, for radials. Germany perhaps had better fairing tech and aerodynamic modelling, but engines ? No! Airframes? No! Japan just didn't have the facilities to crack enough of the really high octane additives to make things go faster. So forget tech transfer of uber, ober Nazi airplanes; they weren't.

As to subs, everybody knew that wall thickness equated to diving depth. And everybody know about the moduli of T and S grade steel. Japanese ship designers weren't stupid. Japan had a bunch of german War-I boats to evaluate and decided .. nah .. not what we want for our purposes. So forget tech transfer of uber, ober Nazi sub tech; it wasn't.

Could go on and on, but this uber, ober, Nazi technology, wasn't. So please, oh please, don't go there.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Terminus
Fourth, the whole idea of the Sakikatas is to give the IJN an EARLY-WAR escort ship, something to hold the line. Later in the timeline, you can build something similar to IRL escorts. It's not terribly realistic to start out with an escort type carrying 100+ DCs (nobody had that), but you can certainly justify it from 1943 onward.

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ORIGINAL: Terminus

A case could be made that the IRL Jap escorts were overarmed, but that's neither here nor there. The IJN escort command needs hulls in the water, ships that can be built quickly and cheaply in yards that would otherwise be lying idle.

Secondly, the Sakikata is indeed relatively short-ranged, but the Jap convoy routes to the SRA are littered with ports that can be used as bases for escort groups, and my scheme envisions a sort of "relay race" where one group hands off a set of merchies to another on the way to the home islands.

Third, I wasn't clear enough about the "standard" escort: the IJN is to have three groups of early-war ASW ships:

- Old destroyers and torpedo boats with extra DC's.

- The Sakikata class.

- Small picket boat type classes, for doing point-defence ASW around ports.

Fourth, the whole idea of the Sakikatas is to give the IJN an EARLY-WAR escort ship, something to hold the line. Later in the timeline, you can build something similar to IRL escorts. It's not terribly realistic to start out with an escort type carrying 100+ DCs (nobody had that), but you can certainly justify it from 1943 onward.

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ORIGINAL: Terminus

Kobe, right down the road from the submarine school. Helps to inculcate proper cooperation between the branches.

Member: Treaty, Reluctant Admiral and Between the Storms Mod Team.

Reluctant Admiral Mod:
https://sites.google.com/site/reluctantadmiral/

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ORIGINAL: oldman45

FatR- they may not quit building the large SC's because they can be built at any yard and they are cheap and easy to build.

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ORIGINAL: Terminus

Are you replacing or supplementing older classes, because I could see this as a Kongo replacement class.

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ORIGINAL: Terminus
46-48,000 tons and 29 knots.