Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: Jakerson

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ORIGINAL: Encircled

Like the look of the changes, though as a Soviet player, its going to make '41 an even bigger struggle than it is already.

Time will tell at a guess

That’s it looks like and also new chances force Soviet side turtle longer all away from 41-43. It remains to be seen if losing Leningrad and Moscow at 41 in every AAR comes to new norm and not losing them rare happenings.

Soviet side has to stop doing counter attacks as many chances weaken Soviet ability to do those counter attacks they did historically. There is simply no incentive to do those as incentive to make them was weak from the beginning but that’s probably what those German players lobby for and won’t be happy until they get their I win button.

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ORIGINAL: jzardos

I'm sorry but this type of statement is purely subjective to what the Axis player has done with his 41 advance. It to me is the ROOT of many misconceptions and in differentiating my wanting a dynamic game with historical premisses rather than just a simulation of what actually did happen on the eastern front for either side.

Sure if the axis player pushed his supply line (abusive on HQ buildup) troops far from rail-heads, it would be possible to find oneself in the same issues the Germans had late in 41. But that's not what this game is about, is it?

Here it is in a nutshell. Players need to be rewarded for making good choices and not be punished on a broad level for bad historical choices that we(players) should now have control over. Case and point. The Soviets have a free-hand to retreat troops to wherever they want, when historically this was far from the case considering Stalin's demands.


Just wanted to point out that I don't agree with this thinking about having to deal with all the ISSUES a side had when a player could make choices to avoid those problems. To me that is the essence of why it's a game and makes it fun to player because of all the possibilities.

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ORIGINAL: Flaviusx

I disagree about the counterattacking. If anything, it is even more important to do this now.

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The severe winter weather was the third major reason that caused German defenders to adopt village-based strongpoints. Even by Russian standards, the 1941-42 winter was particularly harsh. From December until early March, military operations were hampered by heavy snowfall and by the few hours of winter daylight. Yet the extreme cold was by far the most significant aspect of the winter weather. During the winter battles, German and Russian forces clashed in temperatures routinely ranging from -I0°C to -30°C, with brief cold spells exceeding -40°C.47 Contrary to German belief, the cold was an impartial adversary that dogged the operations of both sides with equal intensity. However, the Germans were generally more vulnerable to the debilitating effects of the subzero temperatures due to a near-total lack of winter clothing and equipment.

Hitler blamed the Army High Command for the failure to provide winter necessities, ignoring any intimation that, he might bear some blame for the German military predicament. In a clever propaganda stroke, Nazi Party functionaries launched a massive emergency drive in late December to collect winter clothing from the German public. Direct action by the party and the people, it was implied, would rapidly correct the scandalous frontline conditions wrought by General Staff bungling.48 Coming at a time when Hitler was relieving "incompetent" and "disloyal" officers left and right, this program confirmed the popular impression that Adolf Hitler's personal intervention into the German Army's affairs was not only warranted but even overdue. So persuasive was this logic--and so thorough the propaganda effort to sell it--that even some high-ranking German military officers remained convinced after the war that slipshod General Staff planning had produced the shortage of winter equipment.49


However, the truth was far different, German soldiers fought without winter clothing or special equipment simply because the German supply system could not transport the items forward from rear depots. Normal winter-issue items (woolen vests, caps, earmuffs, scarves, and sweaters) were stocked in Germany and Poland, and General Halder had repeatedly discussed the need to provide these and other essentials to the fighting forces before the onset of winter. On 10 November, however, Halder learned that transportation difficulties would delay deliveries of winter clothing to the front until late January 1942 or even later.50

The German logistical system, already tottering from the strain of providing fuel, food, and ammunition to three army groups over the primitive Russian transportation net, was brought to the brink of total collapse by the arrival of winter. Sporadic partisan activity and an epidemic of locomotive breakdowns greatly curtailed German rail-haul capacity. (For instance, the number of German supply trains to the Eastern Front totaled only 1,420 in January 1942, compared to 2,093 in September 1941.)51 Losses of motor vehicles and draft horses further snarled supply distribution, and frantic attempts to press Russian pony-drawn panje wagons into service provided little immediate relief. Moreover, the severe cold increased the consumption rate of certain commodities. For example, German soldiers used large quantities of grenades and explosives to fracture the frozen earth in order to create makeshift foxholes. Likewise, fuel consumption did not decline in proportion to vehicle losses since drivers idled their motors round-the-clock to prevent engine freeze-up.52

Because the supply lines could not handle all the supplies that the Germans needed, the limited transportation space was devoted to such vital cargoes as ammunition and medical supplies. Since winter clothing is inherently bulky and therefore relatively inefficient to transport, it remained, for the most part, crated in warehouses in Poland and Germany, awaiting a lull in the logistical crisis when it could be shuttled forward without displacing other commodities.53 In the meantime, German soldiers had to fend for themselves as best they could.54

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ORIGINAL: Jakerson

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ORIGINAL: Encircled

Like the look of the changes, though as a Soviet player, its going to make '41 an even bigger struggle than it is already.

Time will tell at a guess

That’s it looks like and also new chances force Soviet side turtle longer all away from 41-43. It remains to be seen if losing Leningrad and Moscow at 41 in every AAR comes to new norm and not losing them rare happenings.

Soviet side has to stop doing counter attacks as many chances weaken Soviet ability to do those counter attacks they did historically. There is simply no incentive to do those as incentive to make them was weak from the beginning but that’s probably what those German players lobby for and won’t be happy until they get their I win button.

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ORIGINAL: janh
What I am curious about is Flavius comment: Why will it be even more important to counterattack early? My impression of the spring 1942 and early summer offensives of the Russians was that they pretty much achieved nothing except delaying the jump of for "Fall Blau" but resulted heavy losses of men and equipment for the Russians? It would rather seem prudent not to act too offensively as a Russian at least until late 1943? With the new moral rules, anything like the carefully executed, very local counter-pushes that for example Q-ball did in his AAR against Axis mobile units would also be less useful now?

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ORIGINAL: Bletchley_Geek

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ORIGINAL: janh
What I am curious about is Flavius comment: Why will it be even more important to counterattack early? My impression of the spring 1942 and early summer offensives of the Russians was that they pretty much achieved nothing except delaying the jump of for "Fall Blau" but resulted heavy losses of men and equipment for the Russians? It would rather seem prudent not to act too offensively as a Russian at least until late 1943? With the new moral rules, anything like the carefully executed, very local counter-pushes that for example Q-ball did in his AAR against Axis mobile units would also be less useful now?

I think Flavius refers to summer/autumn 1941. Since fortified lines will take some time to get ready, one will have to be more proactive in the defense, mixing counterattacks and well-timed operational retreats. You'll need to do a lot of effort to give those defense lines a chance to be ready when the time comes for The Stand (wherever the Soviet player decides to make it).

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ORIGINAL: Captain

interesting discussion. I will wait until I have had a chance to play 1.05 before reaching a conclusion.

On another point, since this issue keeps coming up, the German Army had pleny of winter clothing/gear in december 41, all of it safely stored in warehouses, the problem was getting it to the front:

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ORIGINAL: jzardos
*KEY POINT*
- had the Germans used the rail capacity in early fall for winter prep stuff and not for resources to continue a late fall/winter offensive on Moscow, German units would have been in much better shape to handle the winter. But Hitler wanted to keep pushing for Moscow, even when most generals wanted to pause and prepare for winter.

Thus, if an axis player chooses to play more cautious and refrain from major offensives in Oct/Nov they should be able to gain some level of winter prep for their units. Just my opinion and seems to follow the historical flow of possibilities for an axis player.

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ORIGINAL: jzardos

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ORIGINAL: Captain

interesting discussion. I will wait until I have had a chance to play 1.05 before reaching a conclusion.

On another point, since this issue keeps coming up, the German Army had pleny of winter clothing/gear in december 41, all of it safely stored in warehouses, the problem was getting it to the front:

Yes, thanks for finding some documentation to this.

My critical point to this entire winter prep discussion is straightforward and logical.

- the Germans had the means to help winterize a majority of their units
- the rail capacity wasn't there late into fall/winter due to the weather and other factors

*KEY POINT*
- had the Germans used the rail capacity in early fall for winter prep stuff and not for resources to continue a late fall/winter offensive on Moscow, German units would have been in much better shape to handle the winter. But Hitler wanted to keep pushing for Moscow, even when most generals wanted to pause and prepare for winter.

Thus, if an axis player chooses to play more cautious and refrain from major offensives in Oct/Nov they should be able to gain some level of winter prep for their units. Just my opinion and seems to follow the historical flow of possibilities for an axis player.

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*KEY POINT*
- had the Germans used the rail capacity in early fall for winter prep stuff and not for resources to continue a late fall/winter offensive on Moscow, German units would have been in much better shape to handle the winter. But Hitler wanted to keep pushing for Moscow, even when most generals wanted to pause and prepare for winter.

Thus, if an axis player chooses to play more cautious and refrain from major offensives in Oct/Nov they should be able to gain some level of winter prep for their units. Just my opinion and seems to follow the historical flow of possibilities for an axis player.

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ORIGINAL: Encircled

16 AP to build forts + no motorised divisions into Static mode looks like the best the Russian player can do due to a massive shortage of AP points is just survive.

This might, (and I stress the word might) mean that the Russians take a lot longer (due to shortage of AP points) to sort out their army, which might result in a much weaker Soviet army in '42 than is currently the case.

Of course, the downside is that a lot of Russian players are going to get creamed in '41 and '42

However, this might well work, and if it results in backhand blows, massive sweeping encirclements and less moaning about the 1:1 rule, its got to be good!

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ORIGINAL: Joel Billings

Our games are no stranger to skeptical looks and strongly worded opinions. We seem to bring out the passion in wargamers (at least the grognards), and will hopefully continue to do so.

Your list of problems is long, which argues that we can't deal with everything on your list at once as there would be too many moving parts (and of course we don't agree with all your points and as you say many of the items were intentionally designed a certain way). I will say that the way that morale recovery is being done now, that German Motorized units can have their morale recover to as high as 90 (although it's not likely to go that high, and for infantry it could theoretically recover to 85 -- originally German units wouldn't recover past 75, although at some point recently tthat was changed to 85, but I'm not sure exactly when that was done). Only time and testing will show us whether this provides enough recovery after the first winter. As for the first winter, the lower Soviet recovery rate of disabled troops will help keep their army size down for the first winter, along with the lower manpower rate in early 42. Of course there are so many changes that we can't say yet exactly how things will work out, but we think the changes go a long way to improving 1942.

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ORIGINAL: PeeDeeAitch

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ORIGINAL: jzardos
*KEY POINT*
- had the Germans used the rail capacity in early fall for winter prep stuff and not for resources to continue a late fall/winter offensive on Moscow, German units would have been in much better shape to handle the winter. But Hitler wanted to keep pushing for Moscow, even when most generals wanted to pause and prepare for winter.

Thus, if an axis player chooses to play more cautious and refrain from major offensives in Oct/Nov they should be able to gain some level of winter prep for their units. Just my opinion and seems to follow the historical flow of possibilities for an axis player.

The debate has never been that there were winter uniforms, but rather getting them there. The Germans did not use all all their supply transport for offensives (they didn't, actually - looking at the supply rates they were on a shoestring and offensives were rather stupid), they didn't have more than basic supply to spare at all.

The issue was how to rationalize the system so that it wasn't in continual crisis and such things as winter clothing could become part of the routine...

Given that supply is abstracted to a good extent now, such issues really don't have a place in the game, unless there is a release of the "Rails East!" expansion.

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ORIGINAL: PeeDeeAitch
The debate has never been that there were winter uniforms, but rather getting them there. The Germans did not use all all their supply transport for offensives (they didn't, actually - looking at the supply rates they were on a shoestring and offensives were rather stupid), they didn't have more than basic supply to spare at all.

The issue was how to rationalize the system so that it wasn't in continual crisis and such things as winter clothing could become part of the routine...

Given that supply is abstracted to a good extent now, such issues really don't have a place in the game, unless there is a release of the "Rails East!" expansion.

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ORIGINAL: glvaca
To be clear, first winter has to give the Russian some sort of advantage, preferably a big one. The big bummer is that the Germans are not allowed to come back to the same quality as they did historically. I think a strong point can be made that the Germans of 1942 where just as good as in 1941, so why put all those scripted limitations to artificially knock them down regardless of how well the German player is doing? As the German you're being forced down a road, a spiral you cannot get out of even if you're doing great. The argument supporting this: "because it happened historically" is the design decision being questioned.
It's not easy though, either way. But it would be very nice if the Germans have a t least a chance to avoid the historical traps by good play.

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ORIGINAL: Bletchley_Geek

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ORIGINAL: glvaca
To be clear, first winter has to give the Russian some sort of advantage, preferably a big one. The big bummer is that the Germans are not allowed to come back to the same quality as they did historically. I think a strong point can be made that the Germans of 1942 where just as good as in 1941, so why put all those scripted limitations to artificially knock them down regardless of how well the German player is doing? As the German you're being forced down a road, a spiral you cannot get out of even if you're doing great. The argument supporting this: "because it happened historically" is the design decision being questioned.
It's not easy though, either way. But it would be very nice if the Germans have a t least a chance to avoid the historical traps by good play.

You're sort of contradicting in the highlighted portions.

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ORIGINAL: glvaca

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ORIGINAL: Bletchley_Geek

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ORIGINAL: glvaca
To be clear, first winter has to give the Russian some sort of advantage, preferably a big one. The big bummer is that the Germans are not allowed to come back to the same quality as they did historically. I think a strong point can be made that the Germans of 1942 where just as good as in 1941, so why put all those scripted limitations to artificially knock them down regardless of how well the German player is doing? As the German you're being forced down a road, a spiral you cannot get out of even if you're doing great. The argument supporting this: "because it happened historically" is the design decision being questioned.
It's not easy though, either way. But it would be very nice if the Germans have a t least a chance to avoid the historical traps by good play.

You're sort of contradicting in the highlighted portions.

Why?
the point is that even while suffering a very big setback during historical winter 1941, the Germans were still as good, or very good, come historical 1942. I see no contradiction as that is history. We'll see if it's fixed with 1.05

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ORIGINAL: Bletchley_Geek

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ORIGINAL: glvaca

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ORIGINAL: Bletchley_Geek

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ORIGINAL: glvaca
To be clear, first winter has to give the Russian some sort of advantage, preferably a big one. The big bummer is that the Germans are not allowed to come back to the same quality as they did historically. I think a strong point can be made that the Germans of 1942 where just as good as in 1941, so why put all those scripted limitations to artificially knock them down regardless of how well the German player is doing? As the German you're being forced down a road, a spiral you cannot get out of even if you're doing great. The argument supporting this: "because it happened historically" is the design decision being questioned.
It's not easy though, either way. But it would be very nice if the Germans have a t least a chance to avoid the historical traps by good play.

You're sort of contradicting in the highlighted portions.

Why?
the point is that even while suffering a very big setback during historical winter 1941, the Germans were still as good, or very good, come historical 1942. I see no contradiction as that is history. We'll see if it's fixed with 1.05

First Winter rules are - in my understanding - such a "scripted limitation". My point was such a "scripted event" doesn't decisively cripple the Axis (provided other things elsewhere in the game are well oiled and tuned).

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ORIGINAL: glvaca

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ORIGINAL: Bletchley_Geek
First Winter rules are - in my understanding - such a "scripted limitation". My point was such a "scripted event" doesn't decisively cripple the Axis (provided other things elsewhere in the game are well oiled and tuned).

Well, I certainly can agree with that. And, isn't that what I and others have been saying the whole time? Sure, have a harsh winter. Have it scipted but at least allow the German army to regain it's former quality IF the German player does a good job.

I don't see a difference in what you're saying and others and myself have been saying all along.