Surface combat in the Pacific, early World War II

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Surface combat in the Pacific, early World War II - 2/17/2012 10:01:54 AM

CT Grognard

Posts: 694
Joined: 5/16/2010
From: Cape Town, South Africa
Status: offline

There have been significant complaints from Allied players about how ineffective Allied (and especially US) combat ships seem to be versus IJN surface vessels in the early part of the war.

Is there a justification for this perception? What does history indicate?

I'll try to provide a summary of real-life surface engagements in the early Pacific War:

Battle of Balikpapan
24 January 1942
Calm/moonless night. Japanese ships backlit by onshore oil fires and hidden by heavy smoke from fires/rough in approach, but calm at time of action.
USA tactical surprise.

The first US surface engagement since the Spanish-American War. DD John D. Ford, DD Pope, DD Parrot and DD Paul Jones managed to surprise a Japanese amphibious task force just off of Balikpapan during nighttime. The Japanese escort of CL Naka, DD Minegumo and DD Natsugumo had left the amphibious ships shortly before (actualling steaming right past the US destroyers, probably mistaking them for friendly forces), searching for a Dutch submarine, and took no part in the battle.

The 12 Japanese transports were perfectly lined up and silhouetted against burning oil storage tanks. 48 torpedoes were launched by the US DDs, only six struck targets. Four Japanese transports and one patrol craft was sunk. Only damage to US forces before they disengaged was a shell hit on DD Ford's aft deckhouse. Later, DesDiv 59 criticised for only 6 out of 48 torpedoes striking stationary, "sitting duck" targets - primary factors given are "lack of experience, a hasty approach and/or defective torpedoes".

Battle of Badoeng Strait
18 February 1942
Dark, cloudy, calm.
ABDA tactical surprise.

Two Japanese transports, escorted by CL Nagara, DD Wakaba, DD Hatsushimo, DD Nenohi, DD Oshio, DD Asashio, DD Arashio and DD Michishio landed troops on Bali. Allied B-17 attacks damaged both transports.

Adm Doorman devised three waves to attack this task force during nighttime: Group 1, CL De Ruyter, CL Java, DD Piet Hein, DD Pope, DD John D. Ford; Group 2, CL Tromp, DD Stewart, DD Parrott, DD John D. Edwards, DD Pillsbury; Group 3 - 9x Dutch MTBs.

The Japanese were trying to leave Bali as soon as possible. CL Nagara, DD Wakaba, DD Hatsushimo and DD Nenohi had already steamed a significant distance towards Makassar. The transport Sagami Maru escorted by DD Arashio and DD Michishio had departed Bali shortly before the action, while Sasago Maru with escorts DD Asashio and DD Oshio were just getting underway when the first ABDA strike group arrived just before midnight.

The first encounter was between CL De Ruyter, CL Java and DD Oshio and DD Asashio - the Dutch achieved tactical surprise as they steamed up the strait at high speed. All four ships lit up the night sky with searchlights and starshells, but no hits were scored as they passed each other at high speed. The two Japanese destroyers then engaged DD Piet Hein, sinking her with a Long Lance and shell hits. They next engaged the US destroyers DD Pope and DD John D. Ford, they traded shots for six minutes, no hits were scored but the Japanese gunfire was accurate enough to persuade the US destroyers to disengage to the south and fail to follow the Dutch cruisers to the northeast.

The second ABDA group of CL Tromp and four US DDs again achieved tactical surprise but failed to exploit it. No torpedo hits were scored by any of the US destroyers on the Japanese ships in the anchorage. DD Oshio and DD Asashio again sortied against them. The two Japanese destroyers replied with rapid and accurate fire against the four US destroyers, DD Stewart was hit twice. The aggressive Japanese defence caused the four US DDs to turn back to the south. The two Japanese destroyers followed them, DD Parrott and DD Pillsbury almost collided, with DD John D. Edwards forced to veer to starboard to avoid DD Parrott. DD Pillsbury fell out of the column while DD Parrott ended up off on her own north of DD Stewart and DD John D. Edwards. DD Asashio and DD Oshio cut in behind DD Stewart, DD Parrott and DD John D. Edwards, placing them between these three destroyers and CL Tromp and DD Pillsbury. DD Asashio hit CL Tromp with eleven shell hits, with Tromp scoring a hit on DD Oshio and DD Asashio each.

DD Parrott later briefly ran aground. DD Arashio and DD Michishio arrived and found themselves at close quarters between DD John D. Edward and DD Stewart on their starboard beam and CL Tromp and DD Pillsbury on their port beam. DD Michishio was hammered by DD Pillsbury, DD John D. Edwards and CL Tromp.

End result: CL Tromp badly damaged, DD Piet Hein sunk, DD Stewart badly damaged. DD Michishio badly damaged, DD Oshio moderately damaged, DD Asashio lightly damaged. Two Japanese DDs fought off first two CLs and three DDs, and then a CL and four DDs.

Battle of the Java Sea
27 February 1942
Daylight, later night. Fair weather, good visibility, moderate swells.
No surprise.

Japanese amphibious force was approaching Java, escorted by a powerful Japanese task force - CA Nachi, CA Haguro, CL Naka, CL Jintsu, DD Yudachi, DD Samidare, DD Murasame, DD Harusame, DD Minegumo, DD Asagumo, DD Yukikaze, DD Tokitsukaze, DD Amatsukaze, DD Hatsukaze, DD Yamakaze, DD Kawakaze, DD Sazanami and DD Ushio.

An ABDA strike force of CA Exeter, CA Houston, CL De Ruyter, CL Java, CL Perth, DD Electra, DD Encounter, DD Jupiter, DD Kortenaer, DD Witte de With, DD Alden, DD John D. Edwards, DD John D. Ford, DD Paul Jones engaged this Japanese escort.

During the first phase of the battle, gunnery and torpedo accuracy by both sides was poor. CA Exeter was critically damaged by an 8-in shell hit in the boiler room, limping away from the battle escorted by DD Witte de With. A massive Japanese torpedo salvo (92 torpedoes) was launched, only one, a Long Lance, hit DD Kortenaer which broke in half and sank. DD Encounter picked up survivors from the Kortenaer and retired from the battle. DD Electra scored some hits on CL Jintsu and DD Asagumo, but was in turn seriously damaged to the extent that, on fire and out of ammunition, she was abandoned. DD Asagumo, damaged by several hit, retired from the battle.

The Allied fleet broke off under cover of a smokescreen, launching a torpedo attack but at too long a range to be effective. Out of torpedoes, the four US destroyers left on their own initiative to return to Soerabaja. That night, DD Jupiter hit a mine and sank. The Allied force, down to CA Houston, CL de Ruyter, CL Java, and CL Perth, encountered the Japanese task force again at 23:00 at long range. CL De Ruyter and CL Java were sunk by one devastating Long Lance torpedo salvo. The two survivors, CA Houston and CL Perth, low on fuel and ammunition, retired from the battle.

Allied losses were two light cruisers and two destroyers (excluding Jupiter sinking to a mine) against Japanese losses of one damaged destroyer. A number of factors were cited for these disparate losses:

The Japanese task force had 25% more guns of 4" or more, and 63% more guns of 5" or more, and 44% more torpedo tubes. Also, the Japanese Long Lance was a fearsome weapon that massively outranged Allied torpedoes. Japanese ships could also reload torpedoes quicker. In addition, the American torpedoes were often defective. Furthermore, morale in the Allied fleet was low due to continued air attacks, accidents, and general wear-and-tear, and in general the crews were heavily fatigued. The ships were lacking maintenance and in some cases were damaged. There were also organisational problems since the ships came from four different navies, and two different languages were spoken.

That being said, only three Japanese torpedoes out of 152 torpedoes launched hit Allied targets (DD Kortenaer, CL De Ruyter, CL Java).

Battle of Sunda Strait
28-29 February 1942
Nighttime. Clear, full moon, calm.
Japanese tactical surprise.

Following the Battle of the Java Sea, CA Houston and CL Perth, accompanied by DD Evertsen, sailed through the Sunda Strait. By chance at the same time a Japanese invasion convoy was entering Bantam Bay, near the NW tip of Java, escorted by CA Mogami, CA Mikuma, CL Natori, DD Harukaze, DD Hatakaze, DD Asakaze, DD Fubuki, DD Hatsuyuki, DD Shirayuki, DD Shirakumo, DD Murakumo and DD Shikinami.

At 23:00 the Allied ships were sighted by DD Fubuki and surreptitiously followed for a few minutes. CL Perth then spotted a ship which she challenged and turned out to be a Japanese DD which fired nine Long Lance torpedoes, none of which hit. A ferocious night action ensued over the next hour. CL Perth was sunk first by gunfire and torpedo hits. CA Houston was hit by four torpedoes after midnight, rolling over and sinking. CA Mikuma, DD Shirayuki and DD Harukaze all suffered light damage. Four Japanese transports and a minesweeper were sunk by friendly fire - some 90 Long Lance torpedoes were launched. Two of the Japanese transports were later refloated.

DD Evertsen, arriving an hour after CA Houston and CL Perth, attempted to avoid the battle but encountered DD Murakumo and DD Shirakumo on the southern side of Bantam Bay. She was engaged and tried to flee under cover of smokescreens, eventually her stern was set on fire. The captain of the DD Evertsen then decided to beach the destroyer on a coastal reef, whereafter they fired all their torpedoes and then abandoned ship before the fire reached the aft magazine, causing an explosion blowing off most of the stern.

Second Battle of Java Sea
1 March 1942
Daytime. Initially clear and sunny, then light squalls, excellent visibility.
No surprise.

The heavily damaged CA Exeter, escorted by DD Encounter and DD Pope, left Soerabaja on the evening of 28 February with the intention of making for Ceylon. The Allied task force were making 23 knots, as fast as CA Exeter could manage. In the morning of 1 March 1942, the Allied ships spotted ships and tried to avoid contact. Eventually they were boxed in by two sets of Japanese warships, comprising CA Nachi, CA Haguro, CA Ashigara, CA Myoko, DD Akebono, DD Ikazuchi, DD Kawakaze and DD Yamakaze. A long-range gunnery battle ensued. CA Myoko and CA Ashigara expended a total of 1,171 8-in shells at long range, with none hitting. CA Exeter, eventually slowed down to 4 knots by a major hit in her boiler room, was racked by gunfire and brought to a standstill, torpedoed, and sunk. DD Encounter and DD Pope tried to make a run for it, DD Encounter was hit by an 8-in shell and sank, but DD Pope reached a rain squall and was lost to sight (but was later that day spotted by Petes from CS Chitose and sunk by Kates from CVL Ryujo).

During this battle the Japanese expended 2,650 shells and 35 torpedoes to sink three American ships.

< Message edited by CT Grognard -- 2/17/2012 11:10:05 AM >

Post #: 1

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 10:14:50 AM

CT Grognard

Posts: 694
Joined: 5/16/2010
From: Cape Town, South Africa
Status: offline

Is it really that unjustified then to see results in 1941 and early 1942 where Japanese ships outclass US ships?

Or to see a result where a heavy cruiser expends its entire ammunition with absolutely no hits being scored?

(in reply to CT Grognard)

Post #: 2

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 10:16:07 AM

castor troy

Posts: 14330
Joined: 8/23/2004
From: Austria
Status: offline

so? and?

Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
November 1942

In this decisive action WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKOTA engaged a Japanese force termed around the battleship KIRISHIMA. SOUTH DAKOTA suffered extensive topside damage, but WASHINGTON's accurate fire mortally injured KIRISHIMA. Set aflame and racked by explosions, KIRISHIMA was scuttled by her crew. The last major Japanese naval thrust at Guadalcanal had been turned back, and WASHINGTON had done what she had been designed to do -- sink one of her own kind in a gunnery action. WASHINGTON was the only American fast battleship to defeat another capital ship.

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VIEW MAP OF BATTLE

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WASHINGTON ACTION REPORT
SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING EVENTS AND GENERAL COMMENT

On the night of November 14-15 WASHINGTON was flagship of Commander Task Force 64 (ComBatDiv 6). In column, with four destroyers ahead and SOUTH DAKOTA astern, she stood north between Russell and Guadalcanal, then east and southeast, passing north of Savo. Standing west from this point, first radar contact was made at 0001 with enemy ships east of Savo. From 0016 to 0019 fired 42 rounds 16", opening at 18,500 yards, at large cruiser or battleship which it is believed was sunk. From 0016 to 0017 fired 100 rounds 5" at ranges 12 to 13,000 yards at enemy cruiser or large destroyer which was also engaged by SOUTH DAKOTA and was left burning. Standing on north-westerly courses fired 133 rounds 5" from 0025 to 0034 at ranges about 10,000 yards at light craft close to south-east shore of Savo which were engaging our destroyers; all were silenced and one was left burning. From 0100 to 0107 fired 75 rounds 16'' and 107 rounds 5" at ranges from 8,400 to 12,650 yards, at battleship northwest of Savo which was firing at SOUTH DAKOTA. This battleship was silenced and was subsequently tracked by radar through a 500-degree turn. From 0100 to 0107, fired 120 rounds 5", at ranges from 7,400 to 9,500 yards, in succession at three enemy cruisers illuminating and engaging SOUTH DAKOTA.

By the time our 5" fire on light craft close to southeast shore of Savo had ceased, one of our destroyers was sunk, one was hopelessly afire (she exploded and sank a few minutes later) and the other two were put out of action (they retired southward). Subsequently, and before we opened fire on ships northwest of Savo, the SOUTH DAKOTA was seen to the eastward between this ship and Savo on a course to northward of WASHINGTON course. What appeared to be the SOUTH DAKOTA was seen at about 0121 at a considerable distance to the southeastward between this ship and Guadalcanal on a southerly course.

From radar tracking and visual observation of enemy ships, there were:

(1) Fired upon by this ship and apparently sunk:

�1 large cruiser or BB (WASHINGTON only.)
�2 large cruisers (WASH 5".)
�1 destroyer (our DD's plus WASH 5".)
(2) Fired upon by this ship and apparently damaged:

�1 14" BB silenced and out of control (WASH. only.)
�1 DD burning (WASH. 5".)
�5-9 light craft silenced (our DD's plus WASH. 5" plus S.D.)
�There was no melee. This ship was undamaged.

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COMMENT

The following comments are submitted:

�Our radar is effective for accurate gunfire at long ranges at night. Japanese radar aboard ships present, if any, is not effective for surface targets.
�Japanese are sufficiently familiar with radar and aware of our use of it to make full use of land cover both between them and ourselves and closely backing them up.
�Our optical vision is superior to Japanese.
�Our fire control and the effectiveness of our projectiles meet or exceed our expectations.

LMAO

Accordingly,

�We should seek rather than avoid night action, opening at ranges as great as satisfactory solutions can be obtained.

double LMAO

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EFFECTIVENESS OF GUNNERY

This ship was fired on only sporadically. She was not illuminated. No hits were sustained and the nearest miss noted was the splash, apparently of a major-caliber shell about 200 yards on the port quarter. Observers who witnessed other ships of our force under concentrated fire reported the Japanese gunnery to be accurate. Enemy ships close to Savo fired automatic weapons accurately at our destroyers. The Japanese ships were, apparently, not equipped with radar. Their searchlights provided excellent illumination of SOUTH DAKOTA, but attracted our fire and provided a point of aim.

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MAIN BATTERY

This ship's gunnery appeared highly effective. Fire was opened with a gun range of 18,500 yards initially by this vessel using radar ranges and optical train and hits were definitely obtained by the third salvo. It is believed target was stopped and sinking after third salvo rounds were fired.

In the second phase target had been tracked by radar ranges and bearing and later by optical train. Fire was opened at 8,400 yards and a hit was probably obtained on first Salvo and certainly on the second. Fire was rapid, on one turret ready light, for about 2 minutes 39 seconds, firing about 39 rounds. It was interrupted for 1 1/2 minutes due to an erroneous report that target was sunk, and resumed for 2 minutes and 45 seconds, during which time 36 rounds were fired. A total of 75 rounds was fired on this target which was believed to be the KIRISHIMA. Star shell illumination was used on this phase after about the second salvo, 62 rounds being fired.

According to the best data available, overall SPGPM was 1.30 and 5 guns had 1.8 average. Fire discipline was excellent.

The normal fire control set-up of this vessel was used throughout, namely:

�Collective fire, Director I (Forward main-battery director) controlling in train. Group I controlling in Plot.
�Director IV (Stable Vertical I located in plotting room) controlling in continuous level and cross level.
�Director IV controlling firing circuit (Plot.)
�Radar ranges by indicating and voice.
Turret pointers were matched during phases in which the director was being trained on the visual target. During the time when the visual target was obscured, whether training by radar or generated by using previously observed relative motion of firing ship and target, a turret spread in deflection was fired.

The selected train firing key was used in plot to insure that the firing pointer could see the light that indicates when the director train is on target. It has been standard practice for this vessel to use that key at night when visual or radar train indications are accurate, shifting to generated bearing only in case of poor train indication or obscured target.

Against the first main battery target, 18,500 yards, radar range was used in conjunction with visual train. The target became obscured after the second salvo. The target was lost by all radar's after this salvo. As a result the last salvos went out in what amounted to generated. That is, the present range was let ride and the director being in automatic remained on the generated train. On the second main battery target the tracking was done entirely by radar for at least five minutes. When the target finally came into view optically, checks given by the pointer indicated that the radar was exactly on. In this connection it is noted that a considerable period of time is taken to adapt the trainer's eyes to the telescope at either night or day after looking at the radar scope (train indicator.) The reverse is also true. As a result of this difficulty, main battery Director II found it desirable to let the trainer keep track by radar and the pointer observe by telescope. Such a system is made possible by the fact that the director is trained automatically by generated bearing. Therefore small corrections only are necessary and such corrections can be made by coaching from a pointer's station.

Radar spots were used against the first target while the target echo was present. It is of interest to note that against the second target (BB) "overs" as well as "shorts" could be seen optically. Salvos were walked back and forth across the target.

The fire control switchboards on this ship provide for a secondary battery director to furnish target bearing to a main battery range keeper. Thus it can also be used to designate to a main battery director. At the time of first contact both main battery directors lost the target and the shift was made for designation, but the secondary battery director had not yet settled down and its designation was not used. In the meantime main-battery Director I had again picked up the target and target bearing was shifted back to it.

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SECONDARY BATTERY

Secondary battery fire control used radar ranges throughout. During Phase 1 radar train was used. In Phases 1A and 2 optical train was used. Level for the basis of gun elevation order was obtained from the Stable Element with dip-range being set on the synchronized elevation knob in accordance with advance range. Firing circuits were controlled by director pointers. Group 1 used rapid continuous fire. On the other hand, Group III soon shifted to Salvo fire, 4 second interval, to facilitate spotting.

In the first phase effectiveness of the Secondary Battery was undetermined. Group I and Group III each controlled two mounts in firing at surface targets at ranges between 13,000 and 15,000 yards. The control of the groups was by radar, range and training. Group III used 400-yard rocking ladder in 200-yard steps. No radar spots were obtained and there was no observation of the fall of shot.

Phase 1A consisted of shooting at what at first appeared to be shore batteries on Savo Island but later identified as surface craft. Initially both groups opened fire on these targets. In view of the fact that Group I appeared to be shooting "over," Mounts 1 and 3 were switched over to Director III which continued the fire. Group III opened fire initially at the target near the right tangent of the island, aiming at the gun flashes, using a 200-yard rocking ladder based on the closest radar range with target speed set on zero. The first target was set on fire, many observers reporting that a stream of 5" tracers poured into the target which immediately burst into flames. A range of 10,200 yards on the burning ship from the main battery coincidence range finder was within 100 yards of the range set on the computer. Fire was shifted successively to the left using gunfire flashes as points of aim, and was continued against gunfire flashes until each gun ceased firing. Apparently another target on bearing near the center of Savo Island was set on fire. These targets may have been destroyers or large MTB's.

In Phase 2 (the third secondary battery phase) the secondary battery again opened with divided fire. Group I fired on main battery target and Group III on target whose searchlights were illuminating SOUTH DAKOTA. Twice during the firing Group I was hitting, apparently starting fires in the upper works. When searchlights on another ship were seen to be turned on, secondary battery Director III used them as a point of aim. On this target, which was apparently a heavy cruiser, also engaged by the SOUTH DAKOTA's 5", Group III fired with a 200-yard rocking ladder. The first salvo landed short and was spotted "up 400." Fires were started. At about the 4th Salvo the searchlights went out. Director III continued with about eight or ten more Salvos, at which time another group of searchlights was seen to come on. The point of aim was shifted to these searchlights and fire continued until they went out. Another set of searchlights came on and fire was again shifted to them. The last searchlights were turned off about the time of cease firing. No hits were definitely observed on the last two targets.

The tactical situation was greatly affected by the presence of islands and the necessity of fighting in comparatively restricted waters. As noted previously the radar screens had many land echoes. For a surface engagement under reduced visibility, and especially in restricted waters, a navigational plot should be maintained in radar plot for fully effective use of the radar. If this vessel were to keep such a plot more space would be required. An expansion of radar plot appears justified.

The picture presented by the SG radar is not a true plan view. Radar operators must be given concentrated training in areas surrounded by land in distinguishing between land and ships. During a previous sweep by this vessel around Russell Island at night, numerous false reports of surface targets were received from the fire control radar's that turned out to be land more than 100,000 yards away. During the night of the engagement only one such report was received.

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LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Radar has forced the Captain or OTIC to base a greater part of his actions in a night engagement on what he is told, rather than what he can see. This ship was not hit but examination of SOUTH DAKOTA revealed completeness with which bridge structure may be riddled by shells and splinters which penetrate 1" ST S bulkheads. The enemy may be counted upon to hit foremast superstructure.

The captain and navigator should be in Conn. An experienced officer, other than the navigator, should be FOOD and should filter for the Captain the tremendously numerous reports received at the conning station over the various telephone circuits.

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ComBatIve 6 ACTION REPORT

This action demonstrated the tremendous value of radar in a night action. Battleships obtained excellent fire control results using radar range and radar spots, combined with optical instruments.

Strong signals from enemy ships permitted quick and accurate solution and spots.

First phase opening ranges 16,000 - 18,000 yards, illumination by setting moon. Hit with second Salvo. Second phase opening range 6,000 - 9,000 yards; illumination by star shells, did not add to accuracy of fire.

No indication that enemy used radar. Enemy apparently ranged on gun flashes, but inaccurately. SOUTH DAKOTA hit after enemy searchlight illuminated her.

Own gunfire superior to Japs, particularly as range increased.

SG radar invaluable in locating surface targets and coaching fire control radar's on.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Samuel Eliot Morison,

HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II, Volume V

guess November 42 is not LATE war?

< Message edited by castor troy -- 2/17/2012 10:26:08 AM >

_____________________________

(in reply to CT Grognard)

Post #: 3

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 10:19:07 AM

castor troy

Posts: 14330
Joined: 8/23/2004
From: Austria
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: CT Grognard

Is it really that unjustified then to see results in 1941 and early 1942 where Japanese ships outclass US ships?

Or to see a result where a heavy cruiser expends its entire ammunition with absolutely no hits being scored?

and you mention the targets the CA fired upon, yeah, do you? jezzuusss

Clearly two 1920s Kamikaze destroyers outclass (as you say) a Northampton CA in daylight in your world. +1

really?

< Message edited by castor troy -- 2/17/2012 10:22:18 AM >

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(in reply to CT Grognard)

Post #: 4

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 10:39:53 AM

LoBaron

Posts: 4776
Joined: 1/26/2003
From: Vienna, Austria
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: CT Grognard

Is it really that unjustified then to see results in 1941 and early 1942 where Japanese ships outclass US ships?

quote:

ORIGINAL: castor troy

so? and?

Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
November 1942
[...]

Hm.

_____________________________

(in reply to CT Grognard)

Post #: 5

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 10:40:18 AM

EUBanana

Posts: 4552
Joined: 9/30/2003
From: Little England
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: CT Grognard

There has been significant complaints from Allied players about how ineffective Allied (and especially US) combat ships seem to be versus IJN surface vessels in the any part of the war.

Fixed. Ships that arrive in 42 are gonna suck no matter what.

And... Tell me how a ship like Mutsu can be rated higher in experience than a ship like Warspite, in 1941.

_____________________________

(in reply to CT Grognard)

Post #: 6

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 10:43:20 AM

EUBanana

Posts: 4552
Joined: 9/30/2003
From: Little England
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: CT Grognard
Or to see a result where a heavy cruiser expends its entire ammunition with absolutely no hits being scored?

Yes, when it's firing at cargo ships. Assuming it is actually firing at them and not the DDs, which could be screening the AKs and doing a good job. Hitting a DD charging straight at the cruiser would be hard (see: Glowworm).

Hitting an AK at 10,000 yards in daylight in good weather with 8 inch guns mounted on a modern (ie not WW1 or early inter war) cruiser is almost barn door stuff.

_____________________________

(in reply to CT Grognard)

Post #: 7

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 10:45:32 AM

String

Posts: 2661
Joined: 10/7/2003
From: Estonia
Status: offline

November 1942 is hardly what I'd call early 1942 now is it castor?

_____________________________

Surface combat TF fanboy

(in reply to castor troy)

Post #: 8

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 10:47:52 AM

LoBaron

Posts: 4776
Joined: 1/26/2003
From: Vienna, Austria
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: EUBanana
Fixed. Ships that arrive in 42 are gonna suck no matter what.

Not according to my experience, EU Banana.

Rob Brennan slugged it out with Mike a couple of times in mid-late �42 and dealt noticable damage
to the IJN SAGs.
As for myself, I traded shots with Mike in the battle of Ontong Java and came out equal in Dec. �42.

Didn�t notice any �42 ships sucking in battle, USN or RN. Some have bad commanders, yes, but you
don�t replace them with better ones at your own peril anyway.

It all depends on how well you set up the battle and on your love for details.

< Message edited by LoBaron -- 2/17/2012 10:48:53 AM >

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Post #: 9

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 10:49:55 AM

CT Grognard

Posts: 694
Joined: 5/16/2010
From: Cape Town, South Africa
Status: offline

What would the response be to a combat report like the following?

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Time Surface Combat, near Denpasar

Japanese Ships
DD Asashio, Shell hits 1
DD Oshio, Shell hits 1
DD Arashio
DD Michishio, Shell hits 3, heavy damage
xAP Sagami Maru, heavy damage
xAP Sasago Maru

Allied Ships
CL De Ruyter
CL Java
CL Tromp, Shell hits 11, heavy damage
DD John D. Ford
DD Pope
DD Piet Hein, Torpedo hits 1, Shell hits 3, sunk
DD John D. Edwards
DD Parrott
DD Pillsbury
DD Stewart, Shell hits 2, heavy damage

(in reply to castor troy)

Post #: 10

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 10:50:28 AM

EUBanana

Posts: 4552
Joined: 9/30/2003
From: Little England
Status: offline

That said...

quote:

Maximum visibility in Partly Cloudy Conditions: 28,000 yards
CONTACT: Japanese lookouts spot Allied task force at 20,000 yards
CONTACT: Allied lookouts spot Japanese task force at 20,000 yards
CA Louisville engages PB Nagata Maru at 20,000 yards
Range closes to 14,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 14,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 14,000 yards
Range closes to 12,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 12,000 yards
Range closes to 11,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 11,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 11,000 yards
Range closes to 10,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 10,000 yards
Range closes to 8,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 8,000 yards
DD Yunagi engages CA Louisville at 8,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 8,000 yards
Range increases to 10,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 10,000 yards
Range closes to 9,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 9,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 9,000 yards
Range increases to 11,000 yards
Range closes to 9,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 9,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 9,000 yards
Range increases to 10,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 10,000 yards
CA Louisville engages xAK Kamikaze Maru at 10,000 yards
CA Louisville engages xAK Tenyo Maru at 10,000 yards
Range closes to 8,000 yards
xAK Kamikaze Maru screened from combat
- escorted by DD Yunagi
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 8,000 yards
CA Louisville engages xAK Tenyo Maru at 8,000 yards
Range increases to 9,000 yards
xAK Kamikaze Maru screened from combat
CA Louisville engages xAK Tenyo Maru at 9,000 yards
Jensen L. orders Allied TF to disengage
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 9,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 9,000 yards
CA Louisville engages xAK Kamikaze Maru at 9,000 yards
Range increases to 13,000 yards
xAK Kamikaze Maru screened from combat
- escorted by DD Asanagi
CA Louisville engages PB Nagata Maru at 13,000 yards
CA Louisville engages xAK Tenyo Maru at 13,000 yards
Range increases to 19,000 yards
xAK Kamikaze Maru screened from combat
- escorted by DD Yunagi
CA Louisville engages PB Nagata Maru at 19,000 yards
CA Louisville engages xAK Tenyo Maru at 19,000 yards
Range increases to 24,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 24,000 yards
Range increases to 29,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 29,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 29,000 yards
Task forces break off...

There weren't all that many shots fired at anything other than a DD in that particular fight.

That said (x2). I dislike bringing up caveats like that because there's always a smegging caveat. You can explain just about anything with enough imagination. Allied ships consistently suck. Aside from the USN, Allied commanders are mostly naval 55 mooks who are just going to get sunk, I found it particularly noticeable with British submarines in 44. They got better durability than a Gato yet they get slaughtered, because their commanders are not up to scratch. And experience trumps hardware (not necessarily inaccurately) but experience isn't actually "experience" in the sense that it actually goes up over time. It's effectively a hardcoded, permanent competence rating.

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Post #: 11

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 10:51:17 AM

CT Grognard

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There I'll agree, and it's a problem with the Order of Battle (the database).

I'm actually not sure if that's been fixed in DaBigBabes, but yes, Mutsu should have significantly less crew experience than say HMS Warspite.

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Post #: 12

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 10:53:14 AM

EUBanana

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quote:

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

quote:

ORIGINAL: EUBanana
Fixed. Ships that arrive in 42 are gonna suck no matter what.

Not according to my experience, EU Banana.

Rob Brennan slugged it out with Mike a couple of times in mid-late �42 and dealt noticable damage
to the IJN SAGs.
As for myself, I traded shots with Mike in the battle of Ontong Java and came out equal in Dec. �42.

Didn�t notice any �42 ships sucking in battle, USN or RN. Some have bad commanders, yes, but you
don�t replace them with better ones at your own peril anyway.

It all depends on how well you set up the battle and on your love for details.

*shrug* mine says otherwise. Yes, you can do some damage, I've seen 'fair exchanges', as in just attritional beating on each other. Not once have I seen Allied ships really lay the smack down though, as Japanese ships sometimes do. Quite often Allied ships barely even open fire, they just sit there getting blasted.

As for commanders, aside from Arbuthnot and a couple of others the British don't have any competent ones.

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RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 10:54:05 AM

CT Grognard

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In the case I'm referring to, two Japanese heavy cruisers (Myoko and Ashigara) were trying to hit the already-damaged Exeter at long range and fired off over 1,100 shells with not a single one hitting.

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RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 11:00:35 AM

EUBanana

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quote:

ORIGINAL: CT Grognard

In the case I'm referring to, two Japanese heavy cruisers (Myoko and Ashigara) were trying to hit the already-damaged Exeter at long range and fired off over 1,100 shells with not a single one hitting.

At least they fired.

I mean, thats a good start. Quite often the Allies don't actually get that far...

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RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 11:13:02 AM

Miller

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A lot of the problems with poor surface combat results are down to TF composition. Some players throw in ships of every kind of shape, size, speed and nationality together in 25 ship TFs and hope for the best. It all depends on the circumstances of course but in general the IJN will defeat the Allies in the vast majority of fights until mid 42, just as in real life. Once Allied radar comes into play then things even out.

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Post #: 16

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 11:35:07 AM

EUBanana

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Miller
Once Allied radar comes into play then things even out.

I havn't really noticed Allied radar doing anything much. Certainly '42/early '43 radar seemed to do nothing at all in my experience. I know radar got nerfed as it was wiping the floor with the IJN in 1942 originally.

I've not got much experience of late war Allied radar on battle as the only actions I've seen with such airpower everywhere are destroyer fights. However even in 1944 Allied destroyers seem either the same or marginally less effective than IJN ones. Which is kinda weird in itself as the late war American DDs are very heavily armed.

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Post #: 17

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 11:37:30 AM

spence

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quote:

Mutsu should have significantly less crew experience

Why are you picking on Mutsu? That one just suffered the most common fate of all BBs (a catastrophic accident). There's a really old S&T that detailed the proximate causes of all BB losses (for all nations) and catastrophic accidents involving either boilers or ammunition led the list.

A review of the surface actions of the IJN BBs at any time in the war doesn't do them, their crews or especially their leadership much credit.

The cruisers and DDs are another matter.

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RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 11:38:33 AM

EUBanana

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quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

quote:

Mutsu should have significantly less crew experience

Why are you picking on Mutsu? That one just suffered the most common fate of all BBs (a catastrophic accident). There's a really old S&T that detailed the proximate causes of all BB losses (for all nations) and catastrophic accidents involving either boilers or ammunition led the list.

A review of the surface actions of the IJN BBs at any time in the war doesn't do them, their crews or especially their leadership much credit.

The cruisers and DDs are another matter.

Well, no particular reason, just the name that always springs to mind.

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Post #: 19

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 11:48:06 AM

HansBolter

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quote:

ORIGINAL: String

November 1942 is hardly what I'd call early 1942 now is it castor?

The title of the thread isn't "early '42" it's "early WAR" which Nov '42 certainly qualifies as.

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Post #: 20

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 11:51:30 AM

CT Grognard

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He was referring to my second post:

"Is it really that unjustified then to see results in 1941 and early 1942 where Japanese ships outclass US ships?"

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Post #: 21

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 12:17:34 PM

sandman455

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Aaah. . .

In this thread we find the war gaming experts trying to compare real naval gunnery and surface actions from one day to another.

Shhh, let's quietly move along while the men make their plans.

Alright! Who is that laughing?

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AOCS 1985, VT10 1985-86, VT86 1986, VS41 1986-87
VS32 1987-90 (NSO/NWTO, deployed w/CV-66, CVN-71)
VS27 1990-91 (NATOPS/Safety)
SFWSLANT 1991-93 (AGM-84 All platforms, S-3 A/B systems)

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Post #: 22

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 12:20:24 PM

CT Grognard

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As von Moltke said: "No plan survives contact with the enemy."

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RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 12:41:07 PM

Canoerebel

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I think the OP's premise is wrong. I don't think most Allied player's are really concerned about early-war naval combat results. Rather, I think the attention is given to the fact that Allied naval crew experience improves slowly or not at all, so that a ship like BB Washington is terrible even in 1943 or 1944, while in comparison the Japanese sailors are terrific. That's where the concern lies.

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Post #: 24

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 12:56:10 PM

castor troy

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quote:

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

quote:

ORIGINAL: CT Grognard

Is it really that unjustified then to see results in 1941 and early 1942 where Japanese ships outclass US ships?

quote:

ORIGINAL: castor troy

so? and?

Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
November 1942
[...]

Hm.

quote:

There have been significant complaints from Allied players about how ineffective Allied (and especially US) combat ships seem to be versus IJN surface vessels in the early part of the war.

picking out what suits him as always, hello my friend. You sure have missed the FIRST LINE of the original poster:

There have been significant complaints from Allied players about how ineffective Allied (and especially US) combat ships seem to be versus IJN surface vessels in the early part of the war.

using your phrasing: November 1942... Hm

get it?

Or do you now want to convince anybody here saying November 42 isn't early part of the war? 11 months after start, war going for how long? 1/43 or what?

< Message edited by castor troy -- 2/17/2012 12:58:49 PM >

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Post #: 25

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 1:00:14 PM

castor troy

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quote:

ORIGINAL: String

November 1942 is hardly what I'd call early 1942 now is it castor?

show me the line when I said that? The op referred to early war and I definitely think 42 is early war. Just like I would say 45 is late war. Draw the line whereever you like. Besides that, the engagement the op referred to I guess is happening in 1/42 but could as well be in 11/42 with the same ships (in the game) and the result would/could be absolutely the same.

< Message edited by castor troy -- 2/17/2012 1:16:00 PM >

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Post #: 26

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 1:03:06 PM

castor troy

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quote:

ORIGINAL: EUBanana

That said...

quote:

Maximum visibility in Partly Cloudy Conditions: 28,000 yards
CONTACT: Japanese lookouts spot Allied task force at 20,000 yards
CONTACT: Allied lookouts spot Japanese task force at 20,000 yards
CA Louisville engages PB Nagata Maru at 20,000 yards
Range closes to 14,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 14,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 14,000 yards
Range closes to 12,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 12,000 yards
Range closes to 11,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 11,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 11,000 yards
Range closes to 10,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 10,000 yards
Range closes to 8,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 8,000 yards
DD Yunagi engages CA Louisville at 8,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 8,000 yards
Range increases to 10,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 10,000 yards
Range closes to 9,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 9,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 9,000 yards
Range increases to 11,000 yards
Range closes to 9,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 9,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 9,000 yards
Range increases to 10,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 10,000 yards
CA Louisville engages xAK Kamikaze Maru at 10,000 yards
CA Louisville engages xAK Tenyo Maru at 10,000 yards
Range closes to 8,000 yards
xAK Kamikaze Maru screened from combat
- escorted by DD Yunagi
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 8,000 yards
CA Louisville engages xAK Tenyo Maru at 8,000 yards
Range increases to 9,000 yards
xAK Kamikaze Maru screened from combat
CA Louisville engages xAK Tenyo Maru at 9,000 yards
Jensen L. orders Allied TF to disengage
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 9,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 9,000 yards
CA Louisville engages xAK Kamikaze Maru at 9,000 yards
Range increases to 13,000 yards
xAK Kamikaze Maru screened from combat
- escorted by DD Asanagi
CA Louisville engages PB Nagata Maru at 13,000 yards
CA Louisville engages xAK Tenyo Maru at 13,000 yards
Range increases to 19,000 yards
xAK Kamikaze Maru screened from combat
- escorted by DD Yunagi
CA Louisville engages PB Nagata Maru at 19,000 yards
CA Louisville engages xAK Tenyo Maru at 19,000 yards
Range increases to 24,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 24,000 yards
Range increases to 29,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Yunagi at 29,000 yards
CA Louisville engages DD Asanagi at 29,000 yards
Task forces break off...

There weren't all that many shots fired at anything other than a DD in that particular fight.

That said (x2). I dislike bringing up caveats like that because there's always a smegging caveat. You can explain just about anything with enough imagination. Allied ships consistently suck. Aside from the USN, Allied commanders are mostly naval 55 mooks who are just going to get sunk, I found it particularly noticeable with British submarines in 44. They got better durability than a Gato yet they get slaughtered, because their commanders are not up to scratch. And experience trumps hardware (not necessarily inaccurately) but experience isn't actually "experience" in the sense that it actually goes up over time. It's effectively a hardcoded, permanent competence rating.

when Allied cruisers can't hit IJ DD at 8-10000 yards using hundreds of shells (abstracted to whatever in the game), how can IJ ships hit Allied PT at 20000 yards in daylight? Could dig up dozens of combat reports showing this.

Like I've said before, I don't have a problem seeing my cruiser being kept off the transports but seeing a cruiser spending 1500 shells on two enemy DD sounds quite a lot of shells, for one hit. Going with this theory, the way to go would have been building DDs only as they can't be hit but have the potential to sink any ship with their torps.

I also don't have a problem if two TFs engage, fire some shells and one (or both) TF think they should break off, but if they fire all their main armament's ammo for no hits I start to grumble as that is quite some tons of ammunition flying around.

< Message edited by castor troy -- 2/17/2012 1:14:08 PM >

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Post #: 27

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 1:29:18 PM

CT Grognard

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I was always under the impression that you could, with a bit of extra effort, increase the crew experience of a ship.

This increase will go up quicker the less it is, up to a cap. The trick is to not leave your battleships hidden away disbanded in a safe port. You need to have them actively sailing about and engaging in some sort of action.

I believe somebody once posted that with multiple bombardment runs (reloaded by nearby AEs) he saw his early-war US BBs gain about 1 experience point per bombardment, so that they increased from the low 50s to the low 60s.

And I respectfully submit my premise was not wrong, it was aimed at people who in this very thread still complain about early-war naval combat results.

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Post #: 28

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 1:33:59 PM

CT Grognard

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Furthermore, you can substitute the ship's leaders for ones with really high Leadership ratings that help increase experience gain while you bombard a relatively safe Japanese outpost (or for that matter just go sailing around the West Coast).

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Post #: 29

RE: Surface combat in World War II - 2/17/2012 1:38:33 PM

CT Grognard

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quote:

ORIGINAL: castor troy
Like I've said before, I don't have a problem seeing my cruiser being kept off the transports but seeing a cruiser spending 1500 shells on two enemy DD sounds quite a lot of shells, for one hit. Going with this theory, the way to go would have been building DDs only as they can't be hit but have the potential to sink any ship with their torps.

I refer you to this line in my original post (Second Battle of Java Sea, 1 March 1942): "During this battle the Japanese expended 2,650 shells and 35 torpedoes to sink three American ships."

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Post #: 30