Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: Footslogger

Had Operation Sealion been implememted, what were the Germans expecting for casualties?

Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!

A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE

quote:


Operation Sealion - summary of an exercise held at the Staff College, Sandhurst in 1974.





The full text is in 'Sealion' by Richard Cox. The scenario
is based on the known plans of each side, plus previously
unpublished Admiralty weather records for September 1940.
Each side (played by British and German officers respectively)
was based in a command room, and the actual moves plotted
on a scale model of SE England constructed at the School
of Infantry. The panel of umpires included Adolf Galland,
Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher
Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz
Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert.

The main problem the Germans face is that are a) the
Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy; b) the possible
invasion dates are constrained by the weather and tides
(for a high water attack) and c) it has taken until
late September to assemble the necessary shipping.

Glossary
FJ = Fallschirmjaeger (German paratroops)
MTB = Motor Torpedo Boat (German equivalent, E-Boat)
DD = Destroyer
CA = Heavy Cruiser
BB = Battleship
CV = Aircraft Carrier

22nd September - morning
The first wave of a planned 330,000 men hit the beaches
at dawn. Elements of 9 divisions landed between
Folkestone and Rottingdean (near Brighton).
In addition 7th FJ Div landed at Lympne to take the airfield.

The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs during
the night crossing, but the RN had already lost one
CA and three DDs sunk, with one CA and two DDs damaged,
whilst sinking three German DDs. Within hours of the landings
which overwhelmed the beach defenders, reserve formations
were despatched to Kent. Although there were 25 divisions
in the UK, only 17 were fully equipped, and only three
were based in Kent, however the defence plan relied on
the use of mobile reserves and armoured and mechanised
brigades were committed as soon as the main landings were
identified.

Meanwhile the air battle raged, the Luftwaffe flew 1200
fighter and 800 bomber sorties before 1200 hrs. The RAF
even threw in training planes hastily armed with bombs,
but the Luftwaffe were already having problems with their
short ranged Me 109s despite cramming as many as possible
into the Pas de Calais.

22nd - 23rd September
The Germans had still not captured a major port, although
they started driving for Folkestone. Shipping unloading
on the beaches suffered heavy losses from RAF bombing
raids and then further losses at their ports in France.

The U-Boats, Luftwaffe and few surface ships had lost
contact with the RN, but then a cruiser squadron with
supporting DDs entered the Channel narrows and had to
run the gauntlet of long range coastal guns, E-Boats
and 50 Stukas. Two CAs were sunk and one damaged. However
a diversionary German naval sortie from Norway was
completely destroyed and other sorties by MTBS and DDs
inflicted losses on the shipping milling about in the
Channel. German shipping losses on the first day
amounted to over 25% of their invasion fleet, especially
the barges, which proved desperately unseaworthy.

23rd Sept dawn - 1400 hrs.
The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters and
70 bombers), and the navy had suffered enough losses such
that it was keeping its BBs and CVs back, but large
forces of DDs and CAs were massing. Air recon showed a
German buildup in Cherbourg and forces were diverted to
the South West.

The German Navy were despondant about their losses,
especially as the loss of barges was seriously
dislocating domestic industry. The Army and Airforce
commanders were jubilant however, and preperations for
the transfer of the next echelon continued along with
the air transport of 22nd Div, despite Luftwaffe losses
of 165 fighters and 168 bombers. Out of only 732 fighters
and 724 bombers these were heavy losses. Both sides
overestimated losses inflicted by 50%.

The 22nd Div airlanded successfully at Lympne, although
long range artillery fire directed by a stay-behind
commando group interdicted the runways. The first British
counterattacks by 42nd Div supported by an armoured
brigade halted the German 34th Div in its drive on Hastings.
7th Panzer Div was having difficulty with extensive
anti-tank obstacles and assault teams armed with sticky
bombs etc. Meanwhile an Australian Div had retaken
Newhaven (the only German port), however the New Zealand
Div arrived at Folkestone only to be attacked in the
rear by 22nd Airlanding Div. The division fell back on
Dover having lost 35% casualties.

Sep 23rd 1400 - 1900 hrs
Throughout the day the Luftwaffe put up a maximum effort,
with 1500 fighter and 460 bomber sorties, but the RAF
persisted in attacks on shipping and airfields. Much of
this effort was directed for ground support and air
resupply, despite Adm Raeders request for more aircover
over the Channel. The Home Fleet had pulled out of air
range however, leaving the fight in the hands of 57 DDs
and 17 CAs plus MTBs. The Germans could put very little
surface strength against this. Waves of DDs and CAs
entered the Channel, and although two were sunk by U-Boats,
they sank one U-Boat in return and did not stop. The German
flotilla at Le Havre put to sea (3 DD, 14 E-Boats) and at
dusk intercepted the British, but were wiped out, losing
all their DDs and 7 E-Boats.

The Germans now had 10 divisions ashore, but in many
cases these were incomplete and waiting for their
second echelon to arrive that night. The weather
was unsuitable for the barges however, and the decision
to sail was referred up the chain of command.

23rd Sep 1900 - Sep 24th dawn
The Fuhrer Conference held at 1800 broke out into bitter
inter-service rivalry - the Army wanted their second
echelon sent, and the navy protesting that the
weather was unsuitable, and the latest naval defeat
rendered the Channel indefensible without air support.
Goring countered this by saying it could only be done
by stopped the terror bombing of London, which in turn
Hitler vetoed. The fleet was ordered to stand by.

The RAF meanwhile had lost 97 more fighters leaving only
440. The airfields of 11 Group were cratered ruins, and
once more the threat of collapse, which had receded in
early September, was looming. The Luftwaffe had lost
another 71 fighters and 142 bombers. Again both sides
overestimated losses inflicted, even after allowing for
inflated figures.

On the ground the Germans made good progress towards Dover
and towards Canterbury, however they suffered reverses
around Newhaven when the 45th Div and Australians
attacked. At 2150 Hitler decided to launch the second wave,
but only the short crossing from Calais and Dunkirk. By
the time the order reached the ports, the second wave
could not possibly arrive before dawn. The 6th and 8th
divisions at Newhaven, supplied from Le Havre, would not
be reinforced at all.

Sep 24th dawn - Sep 28th
The German fleet set sail, the weather calmed, and U-Boats,
E-Boats and fighters covered them. However at daylight 5th
destroyer flotilla found the barges still 10 miles off
the coast and tore them to shreds. The Luftwaffe in turn
committed all its remaining bombers, and the RAF responded
with 19 squadrons of fighters. The Germans disabled two
CAs and four DDs, but 65% of the barges were sunk. The
faster steamers broke away and headed for Folkestone,
but the port had been so badly damaged that they could
only unload two at a time.

The failure on the crossing meant that the German
situation became desperate. The divisions had sufficient
ammunition for 2 to 7 days more fighting, but without
extra men and equipment could not extend the bridgehead.
Hitler ordered the deployment on reserve units to Poland
and the Germans began preparations for an evacuation as
further British arracks hemmed them in tighter. Fast
steamers and car ferries were assembled for evacuation
via Rye and Folkestone. Of 90,000 troops who landed
on 22nd september, only 15,400 returned to France, the rest
were killed or captured.

Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!

A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE

quote:

ORIGINAL: Apollo11

Hi all,

quote:

ORIGINAL: Footslogger

Had Operation Sealion been implememted, what were the Germans expecting for casualties?

Operation Sea Lion was "pipe dream"... it was not feasible and top German brass from all services knew it from the start (and they never considered it seriously)...

I will re-post my post in one other thread here from few weeks ago about Anglo - German post WWII war game dealing with it!


Leo "Apollo11"

quote:

ORIGINAL: glvaca

quote:

ORIGINAL: Apollo11

quote:

ORIGINAL: Footslogger

Had Operation Sealion been implememted, what were the Germans expecting for casualties?

Operation Sea Lion was "pipe dream"... it was not feasible and top German brass from all services knew it from the start (and they never considered it seriously)...

I will re-post my post in one other thread here from few weeks ago about Anglo - German post WWII war game dealing with it!

And I will repeat what I said then. Read Invasion of England 1940 by Peter Schenk for a very thorough look at the preparations the Germans made.
To repeat, I'm not saying that it would have worked but to dismiss it out of hand is wrong. IF the only source you have to determine is the field exercise, I strongly suggest you explore the subject further before coming to such conclusions.

Now, concerning your field exercise. It's all very nice but considering that it was hosted by the British, who are extremely touchy on the subject. Considering it was a game, not reality and considering that the German judges were then part of NATO and particularly keen on befrinding their former adversaries, one can serious doubt that any other result would have been "possible".

War is full of uncertainty, of chance, luck and bad luck. For the ultimate "freak" result, look at Midway.

Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!

A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE

quote:

ORIGINAL: glvaca

quote:

ORIGINAL: Apollo11

Hi all,

quote:

ORIGINAL: Footslogger

Had Operation Sealion been implememted, what were the Germans expecting for casualties?

Operation Sea Lion was "pipe dream"... it was not feasible and top German brass from all services knew it from the start (and they never considered it seriously)...

I will re-post my post in one other thread here from few weeks ago about Anglo - German post WWII war game dealing with it!


Leo "Apollo11"

And I will repeat what I said then. Read Invasion of England 1940 by Peter Schenk for a very thorough look at the preparations the Germans made.
To repeat, I'm not saying that it would have worked but to dismiss it out of hand is wrong. IF the only source you have to determine is the field exercise, I strongly suggest you explore the subject further before coming to such conclusions.

Now, concerning your field exercise. It's all very nice but considering that it was hosted by the British, who are extremely touchy on the subject. Considering it was a game, not reality and considering that the German judges were then part of NATO and particularly keen on befrinding their former adversaries, one can serious doubt that any other result would have been "possible".

War is full of uncertainty, of chance, luck and bad luck. For the ultimate "freak" result, look at Midway.

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

quote:

ORIGINAL: Apollo11

Hi all,


German preparations were irrelevant... the British preparations is what mattered...

An interesting view on the matter

The British knew that for successful invasion the Germans would have to have intact harbor with certain amout of cargo capacity used for off loading.

Quite, but you fail to mention that until the last days of August, the British thought the invasion would be directed against their East Coast (directly from Germany), not in the Channel. As such most of their combat ready divisions were deployed there. Quite interesting preparations, no?

Eventually it all bears down to that - the harbor (or harbors) where the German supply ships would be unloaded!

Yes, it certainly would have had a major impact and there was a limited amount of them close to the invasion beaches. Certainly, they would have been damaged and would have to be repaired. However, the barges were scheduled to be unloaded directly on the beaches. They were modified to have a front "opening" (don't know the correct English word) and would be towed in by tuggs. Transports would be unloaded through the use of barges. This was certainly not ideal!

The RAF in 1940 (including Fighter Command and Bomber Command) was at least 1:1 vs. Luftwaffe.

I'm not sure where you got those numbers. Occording to my copy of "the defence of the United Kingdom" part of the United Kingdom official history of the Second world war series, the following numbers are printed.
Germany:
Luftflotte 2&3
Long range bombers: 1.131
Dive-bombers: 316
Single Engine fighters: 809
Twin-Engined figthers: 246

Luftflotte 5 (several of it's units were redeployed to France during the campaign)
Long range bombers: 129
Single Engine fighters: 84
Twin-Engined figthers: 34

UK:
Single engine fighters: 600, 2/3rd Hurri's, 1/3 Spitfire (defiants and Blenheim Sq. excluded).
Coastal command: around 300 mostly obsolete.
Bomber command: hardly more than 500 and also not really very capable. This includes Battle Axes which were cut to pieces over France.

I'll let you do the math yourself. If you have different sources to back up your claim then please share.

To think that Bomber Command would not be able to smash into pieces any port seized by Germans and make it useless is irresponsible - they would do it regardless of losses and they had hundreds of bombers manned with determined crews to do it!

Yes, I suppose that history is irresponsible then as bomber command tried to do just that at the embarkation harbours in France and failed, misserably. Bombing a port out of commission in 1940 was not such a straightforward thing. As the course of the strategic bombing offensive on Germany demonstrates all to well.

BTW, in 1944 and Allied invasion the weakest link for Allies were the harbors (again ) - if the storm wrecked the 2nd Mullbery there would be some dire troubles for them because Cherbourg (and any other near-by ports) were not ready - they were totally smashed!

Not quite. Certainly, the US lost their Mullbery but is generally accepted that the unloading of supplies did not suffer, in fact, it might have been easier without the Mullbery which fuled the debate about the resources put into building them. Granted, the Allies had much better speciallized equipment to unload directly on the beaches, but still, the principle is the same AND the UK forces were nothing of the order of the defences in Normandy 1944.

Also in 1944 Luftwaffe was 1:100 vs. Allied air power - they had no chance to stop allied supply offloading...

Quite true, but also totally irrelevant



Leo "Apollo11"

quote:

ORIGINAL: kg_1007
... the British were not capable of defeating the Germans on the ground, as they had already seen in France, in Crete, and in Greece. They might have fought harder with their own homes at their backs, but it certainly was not a guarantee they would win. It would take another couple of years for the British to really be capable of defeating German troops on the ground, in Africa.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Howard Mitchell

There was an interesting debate at the RUSI a few years back on the Royal Navy and the Battle of Britain. You can read it here:

http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4538DAE3AB61C/
http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4538E2591AE95/


There are also two recent books which look at the naval aspects of Sealion:

- Hitler's Armada, by Geoff Hewett

- The Royal Navy and the Battle of Britain, by Anthony J Cumming

Hewett's analysis is particularly damning, and shows just how much of a long shot a German invasion was. The chances of it succeeding were very, very small, the chances of it being a disaster almost complete.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Howard Mitchell

quote:

ORIGINAL: kg_1007
... the British were not capable of defeating the Germans on the ground, as they had already seen in France, in Crete, and in Greece. They might have fought harder with their own homes at their backs, but it certainly was not a guarantee they would win. It would take another couple of years for the British to really be capable of defeating German troops on the ground, in Africa.

The British army lacked the proficiency of the Germany army in 1940 without a doubt, but remember that in the examples you quote the British were usually heavily outnumbered and often operating at the end of a long supply line. The situation would have been reversed for the most likely outcome of Sealion, fragmented German forces ashore cut off from easy supply by the Royal Navy.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Apollo11

Hi all,

War is won by logistics!

Germans could have trid the Sealion invasion and they might have succesfull landing in England - but they would be doomed there because the landed troops would eventually run out of ammo, fuel and supplies...

The Germans never had Mullbery harbours - they simply had to rely on capturing some ports in England - and to think that such port would be able to be defended agianst everything British would have thrown against it is impossible dearm for Germans!

BTW, there is one nice war game conducted in the, I think 1970's...

quote:


Operation Sealion - summary of an exercise held at the Staff College, Sandhurst in 1974.





The full text is in 'Sealion' by Richard Cox. The scenario
is based on the known plans of each side, plus previously
unpublished Admiralty weather records for September 1940.
Each side (played by British and German officers respectively)
was based in a command room, and the actual moves plotted
on a scale model of SE England constructed at the School
of Infantry. The panel of umpires included Adolf Galland,
Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher
Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz
Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert.

The main problem the Germans face is that are a) the
Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy; b) the possible
invasion dates are constrained by the weather and tides
(for a high water attack) and c) it has taken until
late September to assemble the necessary shipping.

Glossary
FJ = Fallschirmjaeger (German paratroops)
MTB = Motor Torpedo Boat (German equivalent, E-Boat)
DD = Destroyer
CA = Heavy Cruiser
BB = Battleship
CV = Aircraft Carrier

22nd September - morning
The first wave of a planned 330,000 men hit the beaches
at dawn. Elements of 9 divisions landed between
Folkestone and Rottingdean (near Brighton).
In addition 7th FJ Div landed at Lympne to take the airfield.

The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs during
the night crossing, but the RN had already lost one
CA and three DDs sunk, with one CA and two DDs damaged,
whilst sinking three German DDs. Within hours of the landings
which overwhelmed the beach defenders, reserve formations
were despatched to Kent. Although there were 25 divisions
in the UK, only 17 were fully equipped, and only three
were based in Kent, however the defence plan relied on
the use of mobile reserves and armoured and mechanised
brigades were committed as soon as the main landings were
identified.

Meanwhile the air battle raged, the Luftwaffe flew 1200
fighter and 800 bomber sorties before 1200 hrs. The RAF
even threw in training planes hastily armed with bombs,
but the Luftwaffe were already having problems with their
short ranged Me 109s despite cramming as many as possible
into the Pas de Calais.

22nd - 23rd September
The Germans had still not captured a major port, although
they started driving for Folkestone. Shipping unloading
on the beaches suffered heavy losses from RAF bombing
raids and then further losses at their ports in France.

The U-Boats, Luftwaffe and few surface ships had lost
contact with the RN, but then a cruiser squadron with
supporting DDs entered the Channel narrows and had to
run the gauntlet of long range coastal guns, E-Boats
and 50 Stukas. Two CAs were sunk and one damaged. However
a diversionary German naval sortie from Norway was
completely destroyed and other sorties by MTBS and DDs
inflicted losses on the shipping milling about in the
Channel. German shipping losses on the first day
amounted to over 25% of their invasion fleet, especially
the barges, which proved desperately unseaworthy.

23rd Sept dawn - 1400 hrs.
The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters and
70 bombers), and the navy had suffered enough losses such
that it was keeping its BBs and CVs back, but large
forces of DDs and CAs were massing. Air recon showed a
German buildup in Cherbourg and forces were diverted to
the South West.

The German Navy were despondant about their losses,
especially as the loss of barges was seriously
dislocating domestic industry. The Army and Airforce
commanders were jubilant however, and preperations for
the transfer of the next echelon continued along with
the air transport of 22nd Div, despite Luftwaffe losses
of 165 fighters and 168 bombers. Out of only 732 fighters
and 724 bombers these were heavy losses. Both sides
overestimated losses inflicted by 50%.

The 22nd Div airlanded successfully at Lympne, although
long range artillery fire directed by a stay-behind
commando group interdicted the runways. The first British
counterattacks by 42nd Div supported by an armoured
brigade halted the German 34th Div in its drive on Hastings.
7th Panzer Div was having difficulty with extensive
anti-tank obstacles and assault teams armed with sticky
bombs etc. Meanwhile an Australian Div had retaken
Newhaven (the only German port), however the New Zealand
Div arrived at Folkestone only to be attacked in the
rear by 22nd Airlanding Div. The division fell back on
Dover having lost 35% casualties.

Sep 23rd 1400 - 1900 hrs
Throughout the day the Luftwaffe put up a maximum effort,
with 1500 fighter and 460 bomber sorties, but the RAF
persisted in attacks on shipping and airfields. Much of
this effort was directed for ground support and air
resupply, despite Adm Raeders request for more aircover
over the Channel. The Home Fleet had pulled out of air
range however, leaving the fight in the hands of 57 DDs
and 17 CAs plus MTBs. The Germans could put very little
surface strength against this. Waves of DDs and CAs
entered the Channel, and although two were sunk by U-Boats,
they sank one U-Boat in return and did not stop. The German
flotilla at Le Havre put to sea (3 DD, 14 E-Boats) and at
dusk intercepted the British, but were wiped out, losing
all their DDs and 7 E-Boats.

The Germans now had 10 divisions ashore, but in many
cases these were incomplete and waiting for their
second echelon to arrive that night. The weather
was unsuitable for the barges however, and the decision
to sail was referred up the chain of command.

23rd Sep 1900 - Sep 24th dawn
The Fuhrer Conference held at 1800 broke out into bitter
inter-service rivalry - the Army wanted their second
echelon sent, and the navy protesting that the
weather was unsuitable, and the latest naval defeat
rendered the Channel indefensible without air support.
Goring countered this by saying it could only be done
by stopped the terror bombing of London, which in turn
Hitler vetoed. The fleet was ordered to stand by.

The RAF meanwhile had lost 97 more fighters leaving only
440. The airfields of 11 Group were cratered ruins, and
once more the threat of collapse, which had receded in
early September, was looming. The Luftwaffe had lost
another 71 fighters and 142 bombers. Again both sides
overestimated losses inflicted, even after allowing for
inflated figures.

On the ground the Germans made good progress towards Dover
and towards Canterbury, however they suffered reverses
around Newhaven when the 45th Div and Australians
attacked. At 2150 Hitler decided to launch the second wave,
but only the short crossing from Calais and Dunkirk. By
the time the order reached the ports, the second wave
could not possibly arrive before dawn. The 6th and 8th
divisions at Newhaven, supplied from Le Havre, would not
be reinforced at all.

Sep 24th dawn - Sep 28th
The German fleet set sail, the weather calmed, and U-Boats,
E-Boats and fighters covered them. However at daylight 5th
destroyer flotilla found the barges still 10 miles off
the coast and tore them to shreds. The Luftwaffe in turn
committed all its remaining bombers, and the RAF responded
with 19 squadrons of fighters. The Germans disabled two
CAs and four DDs, but 65% of the barges were sunk. The
faster steamers broke away and headed for Folkestone,
but the port had been so badly damaged that they could
only unload two at a time.

The failure on the crossing meant that the German
situation became desperate. The divisions had sufficient
ammunition for 2 to 7 days more fighting, but without
extra men and equipment could not extend the bridgehead.
Hitler ordered the deployment on reserve units to Poland
and the Germans began preparations for an evacuation as
further British arracks hemmed them in tighter. Fast
steamers and car ferries were assembled for evacuation
via Rye and Folkestone. Of 90,000 troops who landed
on 22nd september, only 15,400 returned to France, the rest
were killed or captured.

Leo "Apollo11"

quote:

ORIGINAL: glvaca

quote:

ORIGINAL: Apollo11

German preparations were irrelevant... the British preparations is what mattered...

An interesting view on the matter

quote:


The British knew that for successful invasion the Germans would have to have intact harbor with certain amout of cargo capacity used for off loading.

Quite, but you fail to mention that until the last days of August, the British thought the invasion would be directed against their East Coast (directly from Germany), not in the Channel. As such most of their combat ready divisions were deployed there. Quite interesting preparations, no?

quote:


Eventually it all bears down to that - the harbor (or harbors) where the German supply ships would be unloaded!

Yes, it certainly would have had a major impact and there was a limited amount of them close to the invasion beaches. Certainly, they would have been damaged and would have to be repaired. However, the barges were scheduled to be unloaded directly on the beaches. They were modified to have a front "opening" (don't know the correct English word) and would be towed in by tuggs. Transports would be unloaded through the use of barges. This was certainly not ideal!

quote:


The RAF in 1940 (including Fighter Command and Bomber Command) was at least 1:1 vs. Luftwaffe.

I'm not sure where you got those numbers. Occording to my copy of "the defence of the United Kingdom" part of the United Kingdom official history of the Second world war series, the following numbers are printed.
Germany:
Luftflotte 2&3
Long range bombers: 1.131
Dive-bombers: 316
Single Engine fighters: 809
Twin-Engined figthers: 246

Luftflotte 5 (several of it's units were redeployed to France during the campaign)
Long range bombers: 129
Single Engine fighters: 84
Twin-Engined figthers: 34

UK:
Single engine fighters: 600, 2/3rd Hurri's, 1/3 Spitfire (defiants and Blenheim Sq. excluded).
Coastal command: around 300 mostly obsolete.
Bomber command: hardly more than 500 and also not really very capable. This includes Battle Axes which were cut to pieces over France.

I'll let you do the math yourself. If you have different sources to back up your claim then please share.

quote:


To think that Bomber Command would not be able to smash into pieces any port seized by Germans and make it useless is irresponsible - they would do it regardless of losses and they had hundreds of bombers manned with determined crews to do it!

Yes, I suppose that history is irresponsible then as bomber command tried to do just that at the embarkation harbours in France and failed, misserably. Bombing a port out of commission in 1940 was not such a straightforward thing. As the course of the strategic bombing offensive on Germany demonstrates all to well.

Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!

A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE

quote:

ORIGINAL: glvaca

War is always a case of action and reaction. I fail to see why in this particular case everything would be decided by the British reaction and the Germans would have no say in the outcome. Please, could you ellaborate on this further?

It was an issue, we were talking about preparations. Well, since the British thought the invasion would be on their East Coast, they put much effort into building beach defences and fortifications at a spot that would not see any action. Secondly, transfering divisions takes time and means of transportation that was already stretched because shipping in the Channel was seriously disrupted and the rail net was insufficient to replace it completely.

I do not underestimate the British resolve, I'm sure they would have fought determinedly as they did the entire war. But if you're going as far as to suggest that the home guard would have been able to make an impression on the German troops at the peak of their efficiency, we will just have to agree to disagree. Resolve is one thing, fighting with rifles against tanks and machine guns operated by elite troops is quite another.

Do you have any idea how badly equipped the British were?

quote:


The 300 tons is a figure that is taken from the needs of a UK infantry division. I'll not debate whether or not the Brits needed that much on a daily basis, but it is well known that the Whermacht could do with far less than the Allied divisions. So, anything from upwards 150 tons would certainly have been more than sufficient for a German division.

Besides, and I do admit surprisingly, a Panzer division actually needed less supplies per day than an infantry division. The horse fodder having something to do with it.

How can you be so sure that the Germans would not have captured one or more small harbours reasonably soon? Even a simple peer would have helped a lot and there were plans to construct peers themselves and timber was taken along in the barges.

I agree with your list of problems, but I fail to see why that would have been too much for the Germans. From Calais to Dover is a quick crossing and the Germans did have a considerable amount of transports.

quote:


Hold on a second Leo, first you say the British had a 1:1 regarding planes. when I prove the contrary, you start about radar. I'm sure we can agree that the Germans did have a considerable numerical superiority.

Now let's consider you new position, you now claim that the British were able to concentrate superior strength when and were they were necessary because of radar. Wrong!

If anything, the Brits fought constantly at a numerical disadvantage. That's fact. If you don't believe me, buy some books

Even when the Germans shifted their attention to London, which was a grave error, the Germans still had numerical superiority.

As long as they stayed South of London and over the Channel itself (which is were the fight would have been if the invasion was attempted), the Germans not only had the advantage of numbers but also of equality when it came to distance of _OPERATIONAL_ air bases. The RAF had abandonned the use of the forward airbases for anything other than emergency landings and refueling in the South-East of England.

Before they shifted to daylight attacks on London, the Germans had air superiority in the Channel, were it mattered. Did they manage to break the RAF, no, certainly not. Would they have had to fight for the crossing, certainly, but it would have been quite a different situation than daylight raids on London.

Lastly, those 600 RAF fighters where actually spread out over different Groups covering the whole of Britain. Only approx. 300-350 were ever in a position to be used against German raids. And then part of those where part of 12 Group who, with their big Wing, always turned up late, except during the London attacks.

Off course the barges where in the ports. In fact a good number were lost or damaged.
Transports: 21 lost of total 170
Barges: 214 lost of total 1918
Tugs: 5 lost of total 386

quote:


You are seriously over rating the capabilites of Bomber Command this early in the war. If they had 250 operational bombers at this time they would have been very happy. Most of them were Wellingtons and Blenheim, only a few were Whitleys and Hampdons. This was not the force that would mount 1000 bomber raids later in the war!

Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!

A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE

quote:

ORIGINAL: glvaca

Well, I have yet to see your position supported by anything more than your gut feeling and personal opinion. Everytime you make a statement that I can disprove you just shift your opinion to something else. Not quite the way I'm used to discussing anything.
We'll just have to agree to disagree then.

Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!

A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE

quote:

ORIGINAL: Apollo11

Hi all,

quote:

ORIGINAL: glvaca

Well, I have yet to see your position supported by anything more than your gut feeling and personal opinion. Everytime you make a statement that I can disprove you just shift your opinion to something else. Not quite the way I'm used to discussing anything.
We'll just have to agree to disagree then.

I can say the very same thing about your position...

BTW, my support is based on history - the Germans DID lose the "Battle of Britain" whilst you keep claiming that they were numerically superior...


Leo "Apollo11"

quote:

ORIGINAL: Footslogger

Had Operation Sealion been implememted, what were the Germans expecting for casualties?