Walloc
Posts: 3141
Joined: 10/30/2006 From: Denmark Status: offline
|
quote:
ORIGINAL: janh I don't know whether that implies that bombing and CAS losses are too small in the model (I recall Helpless making a statement regarding tank kills by Ju-87 and IL-2, which are low but according to his numbers also ought to be that low), or whether it is just because Soviet LCU are too inferior numbers-wise or quality wise so that combined arms isn't necessary, or whether it is the lack of competition and bickering between Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht regarding usage privileges, pilot's ambitions etc. I would bet Luftwaffe would have rebelled against such a use, a misuse from their perspective certainly. SigUp's idea to use APs for bombers on supply missions would mimic the latter well? If one looks into the statiscal analytic work that for example Nicklas Zetterling among others have made on the both the eastern and western front, i think its safe to say that the claim made during the war and the perception of the ability for airforces to destroy AFV tends to be grossly over stated and vehicles in general if less so. I havent seen Pavels statement in this particular instance but i would prolly agree with him. I provide a file(Ok, to large to attach but ill happilly send to any1 interrested) with a PH.D dissertation on 83rd TAG in the normany era among others claimed to one of the feasts of the TAC airforces. Using some of the same sources as Niklas Zetterling, in particular a british investagive team that exams every tank on the battlefield right after normandy. For example at the height of the Mortain counter attack in a single day 2nd TAC and 9th AF claims 450 ish AFV destroyed which is funnily more than the german total AFV that participated and the british invetigative teams find 8 tank destroyed through air delivered weapons in the entire area which in all likelyhood would be from more than 1 day. Is this the whole story, no. A number of tank this from german sources are abandoned by own crews. The moral factor of "Jabo's" most certainly have a factor in this. If so then and how do one represent that in games. Another grey area is the like at start and beginning of Barbarossa. Luftwaffe claims of tank destroyed are very high. Problem when looking at these tank from russian side is in many if not the fact most cases are tank vehicles that have runned out of fuel and may or may not alrdy have been abandoned by its crews. So while u might in fact have lots of instaces of AFVs attack/"destroyed" by aircrafts, in reality it wasnt the luftwaffe's doing, but inability for soivet to resupply/ german heers advance blocking / making that ability to an inability and surrouding the soviet forces that is the reason behind the loss. How do u represent such in games. Which also brings to light another problem. According to the Luftwaffe this was a magnificent time. Simplistic said why would u stop attacking all these tanks when u think ur succesfull. Hench why use teh med bombers to bring fuel to teh heer when ur so succesfull. Question of perception and reality. Ofc if u in game follow the above and make the attacks of airforces on ground units X strong/ or not so strong as the case might be. Players will know this through learning the game. U get information u in real life didnt. U dont get to suffer from the "false" perception of succes. So why not in the case of the game use Medium bombers as the Heer's supply truck number one, while wouldnt be a reality in history except in special cases, cuz the perception is the the med bomber is being used on others thigns with great effect. How do u deal with that design wise. Again the statiscal analytics made around Kursk, where the german percetion of for example the Ju 87G ability to destroy soviet tanks simply doesnt match up too the reality of losses. quote:
ORIGINAL: janh I beg to disagree. There are people who always have been using Luftwaffe almost solely in that role, and been saying so for a while. That hasn't changed. Saper's recent feat to couple it with more force-economic measures like focusing it more on fuel-efficient Mot. Divisions to get more "unit-miles(hexes)" and, hence, pockets, makes it more clearly felt now. You can't blame him so, it is really logical and straight-forward. I somehow never thought of the idea to do so right from turn one and forget about bombing airfields filled with obsolete frames, but why not also try that? However, maybe the larger factor that makes the impact of this air supply focus felt much clearer now is that all the other "extra supply" means have been toned down. With the early HQ-build-up tricks that were quite powerful, the "little" air supply added on top was in the noise. I tend to agree with Jan, maybe the effecienty of this has been upped/improved seening greater results, but it has always been there. quote:
ORIGINAL: janh The direct combat impact of LW CAS is rather small and really unnecessary for most (esp. fluid) situations in 1941 since Wehrmacht is qualitatively so far superior and Axis altogether numerically mostly on par wit the Red Army until late 41, which makes it almost a no-brainer to use it to haul stores. Exactly. The reality of the combat system ( and ubah soviet CC system according to some) is that one of the most importand factors in the succes of the Barbarrossa campaign is the use of GS/airpower, but u dont need the german tactical airpower too be succesfull at Barbarossa in game. If u dont need it for that, why not use it as the Heer's supply truck number one. I actually agree on the design decision made that GS disrupts and can make a huge impact in combats and not destroying much cuz that in self IMO is highly historic. Problem is u dont need the GS to be succesfull, and if u dont ppl will ofc use it on some thing else. Hench Heer''s supply truck number one. Coupled with the fact as fuel delivers is highly overstated in its efficency. Many times when fuel was deliver and it was often in history it was most of the times to "survive" tacticaly by the tank/units not being totally immoblile. Not to facilitate an advance to Kharkov in turn 3. Problem is ofc that distinction isnt made in game and prolly would be hard to do in a weekly turned game. Im not saying it never was use to facilitate advances but certainly not in the degree its possible in game. 12.5 JU 52 to fuel a fully mobilized division, right.... quote:
ORIGINAL: el hefe The aspect that isn't considered is the psychological impact of aerial attacks on surrounded units. Historically isolated units can fight for a long time. The difference is the impact of air power and when combatants in effective close air support combined with ground attacks on isolated units is when morale begins to crumble and lead to mass surrenders. WitE doesn't take this into consideration as isolated units immediately lose a lot of effectiveness just because they are isolated. Because of this, air power isn't needed to crush the pockets and it can be diverted to unrealistically run fuel missions. It took sustained and combined ground-air operations to reduce pockets. Without significant air support for the attackers, the pockets end up looking like Stalingrad and Demansk rather than Kiev in 41. The only significant reason why the Germans held out so effectively at Stalingrad and Demansk was because of their ability to conduct aerial supply and prevent the Soviets from gaining air superiority in the area. Had the Soviets had gained air superiority, been able to mass aerial attacks on ground units, and deny aerial resupply, the results would have been much different. In short, close air support, should be a requirement to effectively eliminating isolated units. Trey I would go futher and say u should rely much more than currently on GS in combat to be succesfull than as is now. U as attacker in my experience dont really need it in many situasion. IMO u should much more rarely been succesfull with out it than currently. This to both sides and through out the war. Kind regards, Rasmus
< Message edited by Walloc -- 1/4/2013 6:36:28 PM >
|