Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: Bozo_the_Clown

It's very hard to have a discussion with someone who claims that he is stating "facts" while everyone else is stating "opinions".

I want the Soviets to attack as much as possible and be able to push back German troops. I don't see anything wrong with this. The problem is retreat losses and morale losses. None of these counterattack would be a major problem for the Axis if it weren't for retreat and morale losses. Fix this and you have an even more interesting game. In addition increase attack losses based on morale. This would limit Soviet counterattacks over time.

Just my "opinions" for making this an even better game.

quote:

ORIGINAL: rmonical

quote:

But the fact is it has not, because it does not reflex historical combat ratio.
The current system encourages turtling and running.

1941 6 to 1
1942 5 to 1
1943 4 to 1
1944-45 3 to 1

The combat engine is off way off.

standard loss ratios

1942 historical 5 to 1 / WitE 2.5 to 1
1943 historical 4 to 1 / WitE 1.5 to 1 ect ect

< Message edited by Pelton -- 1/6/2014 1:10:25 AM >

_____________________________

Beta Tester WitW & WitE

(in reply to rmonical)

quote:

The combat engine is off way off.
standard loss ratios

1942 historical 5 to 1 / WitE 2.5 to 1
1943 historical 4 to 1 / WitE 1.5 to 1 ect ect

quote:

ORIGINAL: rmonical

quote:

The combat engine is off way off.
standard loss ratios

1942 historical 5 to 1 / WitE 2.5 to 1
1943 historical 4 to 1 / WitE 1.5 to 1 ect ect

That makes sense and we are probably agreeing. So the lower loss ratio means the designers had to reduce Soviet manpower -
hence the reduced Soviet manpower discussion.
The lower loss ratio is because of the dependence on closed pockets to cause losses. The Soviets become adept at avoiding pockets.

quote:

But by not ever fixing the combat ratio the game is headed for a WW I feel instaed of a WWII feel.

quote:

ORIGINAL: chuckles

The pause before Stalingrad was I believe because the original objective was to reach (and block) the Volga, not take stalingrad. I guess they then took 2 weeks or so to build up the stores/troops required to assault a city.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Pelton

The combat engine simply does not reflex the historical non-surrender combat ratio's at all.

1941 6 to 1
1942 5 to 1
1943 4 to 1
1944-45 3 to 1

The in game ratios are 1.5 to 1 starting in September 1942 which is simply way way off historical.

quote:

ORIGINAL: chuckles

Hi Signup
That surprises me as the infantry could have walked, do you have a reference for that fuel problem?

Best Regards Chuck.

quote:


The official in charge for fuel matters in the OKH, Major Pollex, warned numerous times during the planning of "Fall Blau" that with the fuel provided the success of the offensive could be precluded with mathematical certainty (cmp. Wagner, 1977, p.219). [...] The Quartermaster-general Wagner also had concerns regarding the transportation. [...]

Already seven days after the beginning of Blau (4th July 1942) XXXX. Panzer Corps was so restricted by fuel shortages, that only parts of the corps were able to attack in order to attempt the encirclement of the Soviet forces. Four days later the leading elements of 4th Panzer Army had to halt at the Tikhaya Sozna for the same reason. Part of the reason for LSSAH's withdrawal was the doubt that the Germans could guarantee its mobility due to fuel shortages (cmp. Krumpelt, 1968, p.205). After the offensive was split up in late July the Caucasus forces had to require transportation space from Army Group B. Due to this measure alone the entire 6th Army lost its mobility for six full days in July (cmp. Wegner, 1990, p.892). So only a short time into Blau fuel shortages were a constant companion of the German forces and not only restricted freedom of operations, but also gave the Soviets valuable time. Therefore the Red Army was not only able to detach themselves from the Wehrmacht, but also strengthen defensive lines and deliver reinforcements to the front.

The fuel shortages were not only due to the problem of the initial provision of fuel, but also due to transportation.

The major rail lines in the South of the Soviet Union all converged at the bottle neck of Rostov and the lines towards Stalingrad and Caucasus were not built up very well. They were mostly single track and moreover left with significant damages needing repairs. In addition personnel and material shortages significantly reduced the performance of the German rail system. The Germans only reached 50% of the calculated capacity (cmp. Doerr, 1955, p.30). Therefore the Germans had to resupply their troops by air which provided a certain lift, but didn't correct the problem itself. The chief of transportation of the Wehrmacht, General Gercke, was asked for his opinion about the effects of the splitting of the offensive on the transportation system. His verdict was very explicit: a simultaneous supply of both spearheads was impossible. The available vehicle transportation space was not sufficient to compensate the efficiency drop of the rail system. Therefore he advised against the splitting of the offensive (cmp. Bork, 1953, p.32).

Initially 11th Army was to cross the Straits of Kerch after conclusion of the battles on the Crimea and support the drive into the Caucasus. Yet a reason for the cancellation of this operation was the capacity overload of the rail network (cmp. Doerr, 1955, p. 31).

How terrible the logistical situation was, is reflected in the fact that in the course of the offensive the trains were backed up to Silesia. That's around 2000 kilometres to the west (cmp. Philippi; Heim, 1962, p.163). Over 1.000 trains were affected by these hold-ups, a record number at that time (cmp. Rhode, 1971, p.158). The train lines beyond Rostov meanwhile had a capacity of 12 trains per day (cmp. Bork, 1953, p.33).

General Doerr, during Blau Chief of Staff of LII. AK, came to the conclusion that the hold-ups of the fuel supply alone was enough to wreck the campaign (cmp. Doerr, 1955, p.31).

The catastrophic supply situation led to Major Weinknecht, quartermaster of Army Group B at that time, demanding the withdrawal of 6th Army and 3rd Rumanian Army to a position around Don - Donets. His concerns were rebutted and a month later he was relieved of duty (cmp. Krumpelt, 1968, p. 206).

Especially problematic in all this is, that already in 1941 the demands of the logistical planners to adjust the operations to the capabilities of the supply system was ignored. A year later the Germans till hadn't learned out of this experience and the consequence were borne by the ordinary soldiers.

Literature:

Bork, Max: Comments on Russian Railroads an Highways, USAREUR, 1953

Doerr, Hans: Der Feldzug nach Stalingrad, Frankfurt/Main 1955

Halder, Franz: Kriegstagebuch. Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939-1942. Hrsg. v. Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung. Bearb. v. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Band III, 1964

Hartmann, Christian: Halder. Generalstabschef Hitlers 1938-1942, Paderborn 2010

Krumpelt, Ihno: Das Material und die Kriegführung, Frankfurt/Main 1968

Philippi, Alfred; Heim, Ferdinand: Der Feldzug gegen Sowjetrussland 1941 bis 1945 - ein operativer Überblick, Stuttgart 1962

Rhode, Horst: Das deutsche Wehrmachttransportwesen im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Stuttgart 1971

Wagner, Elisabeth: Meine Erlebnisse nach dem 20. Juli 1944. Die Zeit von Juli 1944 bis September 1945, in Erinnerung an den Generalquartiermeister Eduard Wagner. München 1977

Wegner, Bernd: Hitlers zweiter Feldzug. Militärische Konzeption und strategische Grundlagen, in: Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 6, S. 761-1102

quote:

ORIGINAL: SigUp

You misunderstood my post. I'm only not sure whether Glantz mentioned it. On the other hand I'm close to 100% positive that they were mentioned in the first work I cited. If you wish I can try to get this book at the library and look for the passage in order to cite it.

EDIT: I found a nice post in a forum with many citations etc. Do you understand German? If not I'll translate / paraphrase the main points quickly.

quote:

ORIGINAL: SigUp

Well, nevertheless I've quick translated that informative post for interested people to see:

quote:


The official in charge for fuel matters in the OKH, Major Pollex, warned numerous times during the planning of "Fall Blau" that with the fuel provided the success of the offensive could be precluded with mathematical certainty (cmp. Wagner, 1977, p.219). [...] The Quartermaster-general Wagner also had concerns regarding the transportation. [...]

Already seven days after the beginning of Blau (4th July 1942) XXXX. Panzer Corps was so restricted by fuel shortages, that only parts of the corps were able to attack in order to attempt the encirclement of the Soviet forces. Four days later the leading elements of 4th Panzer Army had to halt at the Tikhaya Sozna for the same reason. Part of the reason for LSSAH's withdrawal was the doubt that the Germans could guarantee its mobility due to fuel shortages (cmp. Krumpelt, 1968, p.205). After the offensive was split up in late July the Caucasus forces had to require transportation space from Army Group B. Due to this measure alone the entire 6th Army lost its mobility for six full days in July (cmp. Wegner, 1990, p.892). So only a short time into Blau fuel shortages were a constant companion of the German forces and not only restricted freedom of operations, but also gave the Soviets valuable time. Therefore the Red Army was not only able to detach themselves from the Wehrmacht, but also strengthen defensive lines and deliver reinforcements to the front.

The fuel shortages were not only due to the problem of the initial provision of fuel, but also due to transportation.

The major rail lines in the South of the Soviet Union all converged at the bottle neck of Rostov and the lines towards Stalingrad and Caucasus were not built up very well. They were mostly single track and moreover left with significant damages needing repairs. In addition personnel and material shortages significantly reduced the performance of the German rail system. The Germans only reached 50% of the calculated capacity (cmp. Doerr, 1955, p.30). Therefore the Germans had to resupply their troops by air which provided a certain lift, but didn't correct the problem itself. The chief of transportation of the Wehrmacht, General Gercke, was asked for his opinion about the effects of the splitting of the offensive on the transportation system. His verdict was very explicit: a simultaneous supply of both spearheads was impossible. The available vehicle transportation space was not sufficient to compensate the efficiency drop of the rail system. Therefore he advised against the splitting of the offensive (cmp. Bork, 1953, p.32).

Initially 11th Army was to cross the Straits of Kerch after conclusion of the battles on the Crimea and support the drive into the Caucasus. Yet a reason for the cancellation of this operation was the capacity overload of the rail network (cmp. Doerr, 1955, p. 31).

How terrible the logistical situation was, is reflected in the fact that in the course of the offensive the trains were backed up to Silesia. That's around 2000 kilometres to the west (cmp. Philippi; Heim, 1962, p.163). Over 1.000 trains were affected by these hold-ups, a record number at that time (cmp. Rhode, 1971, p.158). The train lines beyond Rostov meanwhile had a capacity of 12 trains per day (cmp. Bork, 1953, p.33).

General Doerr, during Blau Chief of Staff of LII. AK, came to the conclusion that the hold-ups of the fuel supply alone was enough to wreck the campaign (cmp. Doerr, 1955, p.31).

The catastrophic supply situation led to Major Weinknecht, quartermaster of Army Group B at that time, demanding the withdrawal of 6th Army and 3rd Rumanian Army to a position around Don - Donets. His concerns were rebutted and a month later he was relieved of duty (cmp. Krumpelt, 1968, p. 206).

Especially problematic in all this is, that already in 1941 the demands of the logistical planners to adjust the operations to the capabilities of the supply system was ignored. A year later the Germans till hadn't learned out of this experience and the consequence were borne by the ordinary soldiers.

Literature:

Bork, Max: Comments on Russian Railroads an Highways, USAREUR, 1953

Doerr, Hans: Der Feldzug nach Stalingrad, Frankfurt/Main 1955

Halder, Franz: Kriegstagebuch. T�gliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939-1942. Hrsg. v. Arbeitskreis f�r Wehrforschung. Bearb. v. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Band III, 1964

Hartmann, Christian: Halder. Generalstabschef Hitlers 1938-1942, Paderborn 2010

Krumpelt, Ihno: Das Material und die Kriegf�hrung, Frankfurt/Main 1968

Philippi, Alfred; Heim, Ferdinand: Der Feldzug gegen Sowjetrussland 1941 bis 1945 - ein operativer �berblick, Stuttgart 1962

Rhode, Horst: Das deutsche Wehrmachttransportwesen im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Stuttgart 1971

Wagner, Elisabeth: Meine Erlebnisse nach dem 20. Juli 1944. Die Zeit von Juli 1944 bis September 1945, in Erinnerung an den Generalquartiermeister Eduard Wagner. M�nchen 1977

Wegner, Bernd: Hitlers zweiter Feldzug. Milit�rische Konzeption und strategische Grundlagen, in: Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 6, S. 761-1102

Source

quote:

Having read Paul Carells "Hitler's war on Russia" It is interesting to note that it contains no references to supply problems.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Flaviusx

Pelton, I strongly suspect that the problems I have with the combat model are not the same ones you have.

You keep talking about these "ratios." Me, I'm wondering where the attacker losses are. That includes losses the Germans don't incur as attackers, btw.

The ratios you are looking for can be met and indeed wildly exceeded so long as your pet Germans are the only ones ever attacking. The combat system is wildly biased in favor of the attacker. I am doubting you are troubled by this. Your real issue is that both sides can abuse this. You'd probably be completely okay with it if it was just the Germans.

Basically, you've got this incredible axe to grind and it makes it hard to take your position here very seriously.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Bozo_the_Clown

quote:

Having read Paul Carells "Hitler's war on Russia" It is interesting to note that it contains no references to supply problems.

Isn't Paul Carell a pseudonym for Paul Carl Schmidt who was a high ranking Nazi? I haven't read his book but because an author doesn't mention supply problems on the eastern front doesn't necessarily mean that they didn't existed.

quote:

ORIGINAL: chuckles

Hi SignUp

Point taken
But I should say Pelton is correct that using logistic constraints in place of 'correct' Combat engine modelling to
achieve a 'historical' result is the major issue.

For my part I think refining the battle algorithm as I suggested above would go a long way towards giving the 'correct'
combat ratios Pelton mentions.

I actually stopped playing when I discovered that the soviet first turn rail movement could be used to 'port'
units into blocking positions making a mockery of the soviet first turn movement restrictions.
For me it was the 'final' straw
For now I just look in at the forum occasionally.
I hope wite2 addresses these problems.
I remain hopeful largely because of the quality of the forum contributors.

Best Regards Chuck

quote:

ORIGINAL: Flaviusx

Pelton, you are being totally unrealistic about this.

The combat model is done. At least for WITE 1.0. So in fact is the rest of the game. Forget it. It's over. If you really want to improve it, get cracking on your WITW testing.

It is the combat model in WITW that will be the basis for future improvements and evolution going into WITE 2.0. What you do over there is a million times more important than any grousing you do here.