Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: calgar

Istari6

If you are really interested in getting into Deterrence Theory, or at least the basics to answer your question, I would recommend this book by Lawrence Freedman Deterrence.

This is probably the best introduction to start with this topic.

To give you a very quick answer: Noone is interested in a nuclear exchange, right? So when you have no conventional forces, and a war starts, you you have any means of escalating slowly? No, you have to resort to destroy the planet or accept to be defeated. And that is on nobody's agenda.

Regards,

A

quote:

ORIGINAL: istari6

So I'm just reaching the end of the standalone scenarios in FCRS. Last up is "Thor's Hammer", and the scenario setup is pretty sobering. The Soviets are storming towards the Dutch border & the BAOR is coming apart under repeated hammer blows. As NATO commander, I've been authorized two Lance SSMs if needed to stop the Soviets from breaking out to the Atlantic Coast.

It's a pretty depressing scenario, in part because it seems so plausible. I've also had a chance recently to read "The Chieftains", the "Red Effect" series, and some other historical web resources on what each side might have done during a Central European war in the 1980s.

What I take away from this reading is how it seems tactical nuclear weapons would have been used under almost any conceivable scenario. If NATO succeeded in stopping the Warsaw Pact cold near the IGB, the Soviets would almost certainly have used TNWs to break open the front (if they hadn't already use them at the outset in the initial opening bombardment). If the WP had torn through NATOs defenses and reached the Rhine with momentum, NATO would have turned to TNWs to stop them. Finally, if both sides were stalemated somewhere in West Germany, it seems likely the Soviets would have used TNWs to regain momentum before internal political unrest in the WP became a threat.

So no matter how the conventional fighting went (NATO winning, WP winning, NATO/WP stalemate), someone would have escalated, right?

IF this is true, why did NATO and the WP pour trillions of dollars into preparing these vast conventional armies in the first place? I find this period fascinating from a military history standpoint, and the wargamer in me loves the opportunities and challenges of weaving together all the various strands of high intensity peer-level conventional warfare (MBTs, IFVs, CAS, attack helicopters, OH, EW, etc etc).

But there does seem to be a strange futility to the entire effort in a way there wasn't in WWII. No matter what the soldiers and generals do on the battlefield, it doesn't matter. If they win, the other side likely turns to TNWs. Why not save the trillions of dollars and stick with the tripwire defense if that's where the Central European fight would have ended up anyway?

Chris

quote:

Original by ultradave

[...] it was assumed that it could not have been kept at a tactical level [...]

quote:

Original by Kissinger

The more the preassures build upagainst any use of nuclear weapons, the greater will be the gap between our deterrent policy, our military capability, and psychological readiness - a gap which must tempt aggresion. The years ahead must therefore see a substantial strentghening of the conventional forces in the world.

quote:

Original by henri51

2)The US was the only nation that had not signed the treaty agreeing to non-first-use of nuclear weapons (whether or not the Soviets would have followed the agreement is open to question), and the US official policy was to use nuclear weapons if the Soviets broke through.

quote:

Original by Angiel

In those wargames, human players wouldn't touch the nuclear option with a 10 foot crap-covered stick, even when confronted with tactical situations that screamed for their use,[...]

quote:

ORIGINAL: henri51

In the 60's and later the other four major nations (France, the UK, Russia, China)with nuclear armaments have stated a policy of no first use (whether they would respect it or not is debatable).This is well documented on the web, but I have not pinpointed a specific treaty except one of the non-proliferation treaties which I have not had time to check in detail. Newer member of the nuclear club have stated policies varying from guaranteed use in case of war (Pakistan) to non-committal silence (Israel).

A history of non-first-use policies is http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/102feiv.pdf

quote:

Original by henri51

Calgar, the US policy keeping open the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons since Eisenhower made the policy implicit in the fifties: " “In the event of
hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions." This policy was repeated a number of times by US officials including Henry Kissinger and George W. Bush.