Tazak
Posts: 1452
Joined: 9/3/2011 Status: offline
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quote:
ORIGINAL: TheWombat Indeed. Also, I'd challenge the assumption that all Arab forces in these wars were poorly trained and had low morale. The Egyptians, for instance, in 1973 started the war with a very well prepared assault, with well-trained troops who had good morale. Things went south when, for political reasons, they pushed out beyond the SAM umbrella. Until then, though, they fought well and it was the Israelis that had doctrinal and leadership issues; Sharon's insubordination for instance, and the lack of adaptability to ATGMs and heavy, integrated air defenses were issues early on. Also, even the Syrians attacked with some elan on the Golan, at least initially. Maybe not earning points for skill, but they were quite brave and determined at first. Having 'good or high' morale when all the chips are stacked in your favor is one thing, morale really comes into play when the chips are not in your favor or when your plan is not going well. As you rightly point out both the Egyptians and Syrians had good morale at the start of their offensives but, when things didn't go their way then the men's morale levels really become apparent. With the Israeli army there are countless reports of single platoons of tanks holding back entire tank brigades, or the manned forts some kms apart holding out for days despite overwhelming numbers with little to no support and seeing their air support being blotted from the skies, these types of scenarios are key indicators of having high morale. There are differences in various reports concerning Egyptian commando's, with some crediting them with good training/high morale and pushing on to their objectives despite their losses incurred when IAF shot down their transport helicopters on route, whereas other reports suggesting they surrender very quickly, personally I'd expect that their commando training would have been better than the average Joe's which in turn would normally see a marked difference in morale. One of the main problems for Israel was the near total surprise due to incorrect assessments of when the attack was likely to come, the IAF was expecting 24-48 hours notice of an attack which would allow them a pre-emptive strike against airfields and to carry out SEAD missions as they did during the 6 day war, as it turned out it took around 4 days before their command order no flights within 15km of the Suez canal due to SAM coverage, while in the north it took them a few days to figure out that flying through Lebanon airspace would 'flank' the SAM sites allowing the IAF time to carry out ground support before the SAMs could get a lock-on. In the first few days the Israeli armored forces were counter attacking piecemeal without proper infantry or artillery support leaving tanks open to ATGM fire, later attacks that were properly supported had little trouble in suppressing ATGM teams allowing tanks the freedom of movement.
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