Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: Footslogger

What was it that went wrong for the Germans? Was it Hitler not letting Paulus retreat or something else?

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ORIGINAL: Ostwindflak

Just wanted to point out a really good book I finished about 6 months ago now. It is called "Stalingrad: How the Red Army Triumphed". The author is Michael K. Jones. It was a great read and a good honest accounting from the perspective of the commanders and soldiers of the Russian 62nd Army.

The one thing which sticks out in my mind from that book is an excerpt from Chuikov's memoirs after the war which said that even though his army was backed up to the Volga and taking enormous casualties, he and his subordinates felt as though they could beat the German 6th Army as long as Paulus stayed in command. They knew how Paulus fought and were okay with that. Chuikov also said the thing he feared the most was that Hitler or OKH would replace Paulus with someone like Rommel who could grasp the tactics and adapt to the house to house and street by street fighting which the Soviets excelled in during the battle of Stalingrad.

It is a great book and worth the read.

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ORIGINAL: timmyab

Purely from my (very dodgy) memory, Paulus was primarily a staff officer who got promoted when the 6th army commander Reichenau died, or was taken ill possibly. I don't know what his reputation was based on but it does seem an odd decision not to have placed a tried and tested commander in charge of 6th army at such a critical time and place.

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ORIGINAL: Gabriel B.

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ORIGINAL: timmyab

Purely from my (very dodgy) memory, Paulus was primarily a staff officer who got promoted when the 6th army commander Reichenau died, or was taken ill possibly. I don't know what his reputation was based on but it does seem an odd decision not to have placed a tried and tested commander in charge of 6th army at such a critical time and place.

He was 6th army Chef of Generalstaf since formation .

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ORIGINAL: SigUp

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ORIGINAL: Gabriel B.

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ORIGINAL: timmyab

Purely from my (very dodgy) memory, Paulus was primarily a staff officer who got promoted when the 6th army commander Reichenau died, or was taken ill possibly. I don't know what his reputation was based on but it does seem an odd decision not to have placed a tried and tested commander in charge of 6th army at such a critical time and place.

He was 6th army Chef of Generalstaf since formation .

Slight correction, he was Reichenau's chief of staff from September 1939 till the end of the France campaign. Afterwards he was named Oberquartiermeister I. As such he was Halder's deputy and also responsible for working out the Barbarossa plan. After von Reichenau's promotion to Army Group South's commander he was named head of 6th Army. His promotion was not free from criticism due to him not having commanded an unit before, but that criticism was muted after the Kharkov battle in May 1942, only to flare up again after Stalingrad.

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ORIGINAL: Footslogger

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ORIGINAL: rrbill

Maybe Germany's original goal of Grozny/Baku (to shut down Soviet supply sources) might have had better results, but same supply line & force ratios would apply.

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ORIGINAL: SigUp

Well, nevertheless I've quick translated that informative post for interested people to see:

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The official in charge for fuel matters in the OKH, Major Pollex, warned numerous times during the planning of "Fall Blau" that with the fuel provided the success of the offensive could be precluded with mathematical certainty (cmp. Wagner, 1977, p.219). [...] The Quartermaster-general Wagner also had concerns regarding the transportation. [...]

Already seven days after the beginning of Blau (4th July 1942) XXXX. Panzer Corps was so restricted by fuel shortages, that only parts of the corps were able to attack in order to attempt the encirclement of the Soviet forces. Four days later the leading elements of 4th Panzer Army had to halt at the Tikhaya Sozna for the same reason. Part of the reason for LSSAH's withdrawal was the doubt that the Germans could guarantee its mobility due to fuel shortages (cmp. Krumpelt, 1968, p.205). After the offensive was split up in late July the Caucasus forces had to require transportation space from Army Group B. Due to this measure alone the entire 6th Army lost its mobility for six full days in July (cmp. Wegner, 1990, p.892). So only a short time into Blau fuel shortages were a constant companion of the German forces and not only restricted freedom of operations, but also gave the Soviets valuable time. Therefore the Red Army was not only able to detach themselves from the Wehrmacht, but also strengthen defensive lines and deliver reinforcements to the front.

The fuel shortages were not only due to the problem of the initial provision of fuel, but also due to transportation.

The major rail lines in the South of the Soviet Union all converged at the bottle neck of Rostov and the lines towards Stalingrad and Caucasus were not built up very well. They were mostly single track and moreover left with significant damages needing repairs. In addition personnel and material shortages significantly reduced the performance of the German rail system. The Germans only reached 50% of the calculated capacity (cmp. Doerr, 1955, p.30). Therefore the Germans had to resupply their troops by air which provided a certain lift, but didn't correct the problem itself. The chief of transportation of the Wehrmacht, General Gercke, was asked for his opinion about the effects of the splitting of the offensive on the transportation system. His verdict was very explicit: a simultaneous supply of both spearheads was impossible. The available vehicle transportation space was not sufficient to compensate the efficiency drop of the rail system. Therefore he advised against the splitting of the offensive (cmp. Bork, 1953, p.32).

Initially 11th Army was to cross the Straits of Kerch after conclusion of the battles on the Crimea and support the drive into the Caucasus. Yet a reason for the cancellation of this operation was the capacity overload of the rail network (cmp. Doerr, 1955, p. 31).

How terrible the logistical situation was, is reflected in the fact that in the course of the offensive the trains were backed up to Silesia. That's around 2000 kilometres to the west (cmp. Philippi; Heim, 1962, p.163). Over 1.000 trains were affected by these hold-ups, a record number at that time (cmp. Rhode, 1971, p.158). The train lines beyond Rostov meanwhile had a capacity of 12 trains per day (cmp. Bork, 1953, p.33).

General Doerr, during Blau Chief of Staff of LII. AK, came to the conclusion that the hold-ups of the fuel supply alone was enough to wreck the campaign (cmp. Doerr, 1955, p.31).

The catastrophic supply situation led to Major Weinknecht, quartermaster of Army Group B at that time, demanding the withdrawal of 6th Army and 3rd Rumanian Army to a position around Don - Donets. His concerns were rebutted and a month later he was relieved of duty (cmp. Krumpelt, 1968, p. 206).

Especially problematic in all this is, that already in 1941 the demands of the logistical planners to adjust the operations to the capabilities of the supply system was ignored. A year later the Germans till hadn't learned out of this experience and the consequence were borne by the ordinary soldiers.

Literature:

Bork, Max: Comments on Russian Railroads an Highways, USAREUR, 1953

Doerr, Hans: Der Feldzug nach Stalingrad, Frankfurt/Main 1955

Halder, Franz: Kriegstagebuch. Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939-1942. Hrsg. v. Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung. Bearb. v. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Band III, 1964

Hartmann, Christian: Halder. Generalstabschef Hitlers 1938-1942, Paderborn 2010

Krumpelt, Ihno: Das Material und die Kriegführung, Frankfurt/Main 1968

Philippi, Alfred; Heim, Ferdinand: Der Feldzug gegen Sowjetrussland 1941 bis 1945 - ein operativer Überblick, Stuttgart 1962

Rhode, Horst: Das deutsche Wehrmachttransportwesen im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Stuttgart 1971

Wagner, Elisabeth: Meine Erlebnisse nach dem 20. Juli 1944. Die Zeit von Juli 1944 bis September 1945, in Erinnerung an den Generalquartiermeister Eduard Wagner. München 1977

Wegner, Bernd: Hitlers zweiter Feldzug. Militärische Konzeption und strategische Grundlagen, in: Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 6, S. 761-1102

Source

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ORIGINAL: Michael T

Boardgames still rule

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ORIGINAL: british exil


The soviets had lost thousands of men, tens of thousands were POW's. High command believed that the soviets could not field any more men. Russia was on the verge of collapse.
Stalingrad was another city like Kiev. It would fall after a few weeks of fighting.

The German soldiers believed their leaders. They had all reason to trust them, had they not been lead from victory to victory?

Mat

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ORIGINAL: Terminus

Quelle surprise. It was released in the anniversary year of the Soviet victory at Stalingrad, under the current Russian government. Propaganda was an inevitability.