Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

Locarno represented the best opportunity for a lasting settlement.

I have centred on the 30's. Fair enough you are taking this back a step - and logically so - to the 20's.

I think the problem was that is that the Locarno Treaty came too early. If there was going to be a huge change to Versailles - and remember it would have needed a big compromise - then the French were just not going to agree only seven years after the end of the war. The wounds that caused them - and it was not just the French - to insist on Versailles in the first place, were still too raw.

Again, real world, I just think it was too big an ask to get the victor powers to shift to the extent needed that would satisfy both them and Germany and - importantly - stop the rise of an Adolf Hitler character.

But this in itself still does not mean Versailles MUST EQUAL WWII. There was no guarantee that Hitler was going to win power despite everything that had happened. There was plenty more elections, treaties, depressions, etc etc to play out before we get there. Once we get there - you cannot ignore what Hitler wanted - for the simple reason that Lebensraum was non-negotiable.

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

quote:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing
It's "The Soviets have invaded and the wheels have came off the car!"

I can't believe that having a 'diplomatic door' slammed in the face of the Japanese leadership was the cause of their surrender. Sorry. I just don't see their ignorance towards their nation burning from the inside out at the expense of the big, bad nasty Red invasion.

http://japanfocus.org/site/view/2501

Read for yourself. That's from a Japanese historian.

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

Locarno represented the best opportunity for a lasting settlement.

I have centred on the 30's. Fair enough you are taking this back a step - and logically so - to the 20's.

I think the problem was that is that the Locarno Treaty came too early. If there was going to be a huge change to Versailles - and remember it would have needed a big compromise - then the French were just not going to agree only seven years after the end of the war. The wounds that caused them - and it was not just the French - to insist on Versailles in the first place, were still too raw.

Again, real world, I just think it was too big an ask to get the victor powers to shift to the extent needed that would satisfy both them and Germany and - importantly - stop the rise of an Adolf Hitler character.

But this in itself still does not mean Versailles MUST EQUAL WWII. There was no guarantee that Hitler was going to win power despite everything that had happened. There was plenty more elections, treaties, depressions, etc etc to play out before we get there. Once we get there - you cannot ignore what Hitler wanted - for the simple reason that Lebensraum was non-negotiable.

I agree, Locarno was premature, and simply didn't do enough to settle the issue.

There was no certainty that a Hitler-type figure would get to power, but it was THE goal of German foreign policy in the 20's and 30's to undo Versailles. Stresemann made some good success at first.

The real question is if Versailles could have been undone without it coming to a shooting war.

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

quote:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

quote:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing
It's "The Soviets have invaded and the wheels have came off the car!"

I can't believe that having a 'diplomatic door' slammed in the face of the Japanese leadership was the cause of their surrender. Sorry. I just don't see their ignorance towards their nation burning from the inside out at the expense of the big, bad nasty Red invasion.

http://japanfocus.org/site/view/2501

Read for yourself. That's from a Japanese historian.

To use your words above, mind_messing, there's a difference between "a" cause and "the" cause. I don't argue that the Japanese decision to surrender included consideration of the Soviets as hostiles. But I believe that the two atomic bombs (particularly Nagasaki, interestingly enough) and-more importantly-the string of military disasters endured by Japan for 3+ years held more sway.

From the Emperor's surrender speech on the radio:

Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Note-no mention of the Reds.

The Emperor himself detailed his thoughts on the matter accordingly during a fateful meeting with the war cabinet at 2am August 10th, 1945:

I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. ...

I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be in place in fortified positions [at Kujūkuri Beach, east of Tokyo] ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. ...

There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. I do not believe that the discrepancy in the case of Kujūkuri can be rectified. Since this is also the shape of things, how can we repel the invaders? [He then made some specific reference to the increased destructiveness of the atomic bomb]

It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable. ...

I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister.

Note-no mention of the Reds, but some commentary about poor military conditions for the home islands and-tellingly-the bomb itself.

quote:

6. Conclusions

The argument presented by Asada and Frank that the atomic bombs rather than Soviet entry into the war had a more decisive effect on Japan’s decision to surrender cannot be supported. The Hiroshima bomb, although it heightened the sense of urgency to seek the termination of the war, did not prompt the Japanese government to take any immediate action that repudiated the previous policy of seeking Moscow’s mediation. Contrary to the contention advanced by Asada and Frank, there is no evidence to show that the Hiroshima bomb led either Togo or the emperor to accept the Potsdam terms. On the contrary, Togo’s urgent telegram to Sato on August 7 indicates that, despite the Hiroshima bomb, they continued to stay the previous course. The effect of the Nagasaki bomb was negligible. It did not change the political alignment one way or the other. Even Anami’s fantastic suggestion that the United States had more than 100 atomic bombs and planned to bomb Tokyo next did not change the opinions of either the peace party or the war party at all.

Rather, what decisively changed the views of the Japanese ruling elite was the Soviet entry into the war. It catapulted the Japanese government into taking immediate action. For the first time, it forced the government squarely to confront the issue of whether it should accept the Potsdam terms. In the tortuous discussions from August 9 through August 14, the peace party, motivated by a profound sense of betrayal, fear of Soviet influence on occupation policy, and above all by a desperate desire to preserve the imperial house, finally staged a conspiracy to impose the “emperor’s sacred decision” and accept the Potsdam terms, believing that under the circumstances surrendering to the United States would best assure the preservation of the imperial house and save the emperor.

This is, of course, not to deny completely the effect of the atomic bomb on Japan’s policymakers. It certainly injected a sense of urgency in finding an acceptable end to the war. Kido stated that while the peace party and the war party had previously been equally balanced in the scale, the atomic bomb helped to tip the balance in favor of the peace party.[100] It would be more accurate to say that the Soviet entry into the war, adding to that tipped scale, then completely toppled the scale itself.

quote:

As the author of these lines remains the only one whose opinion really matters, I'd say that he (the Emperor) was impressed with the poor condition of his military, the suffering of his people (and the spectre of much worse to come) and the game-changing nature of the atomic bomb. Perhaps he felt equally strongly about the Soviet entry into the war, but I've not seen quotes attributable to him regarding that issue.

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

quote:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

quote:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing
It's "The Soviets have invaded and the wheels have came off the car!"

I can't believe that having a 'diplomatic door' slammed in the face of the Japanese leadership was the cause of their surrender. Sorry. I just don't see their ignorance towards their nation burning from the inside out at the expense of the big, bad nasty Red invasion.

http://japanfocus.org/site/view/2501

Read for yourself. That's from a Japanese historian.

To use your words above, mind_messing, there's a difference between "a" cause and "the" cause. I don't argue that the Japanese decision to surrender included consideration of the Soviets as hostiles. But I believe that the two atomic bombs (particularly Nagasaki, interestingly enough) and-more importantly-the string of military disasters endured by Japan for 3+ years held more sway.

From the Emperor's surrender speech on the radio:

Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Note-no mention of the Reds.

The Emperor himself detailed his thoughts on the matter accordingly during a fateful meeting with the war cabinet at 2am August 10th, 1945:

I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. ...

I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be in place in fortified positions [at Kujūkuri Beach, east of Tokyo] ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. ...

There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. I do not believe that the discrepancy in the case of Kujūkuri can be rectified. Since this is also the shape of things, how can we repel the invaders? [He then made some specific reference to the increased destructiveness of the atomic bomb]

It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable. ...

I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister.

Note-no mention of the Reds, but some commentary about poor military conditions for the home islands and-tellingly-the bomb itself.

From the link I posted:

quote:

6. Conclusions

The argument presented by Asada and Frank that the atomic bombs rather than Soviet entry into the war had a more decisive effect on Japan’s decision to surrender cannot be supported. The Hiroshima bomb, although it heightened the sense of urgency to seek the termination of the war, did not prompt the Japanese government to take any immediate action that repudiated the previous policy of seeking Moscow’s mediation. Contrary to the contention advanced by Asada and Frank, there is no evidence to show that the Hiroshima bomb led either Togo or the emperor to accept the Potsdam terms. On the contrary, Togo’s urgent telegram to Sato on August 7 indicates that, despite the Hiroshima bomb, they continued to stay the previous course. The effect of the Nagasaki bomb was negligible. It did not change the political alignment one way or the other. Even Anami’s fantastic suggestion that the United States had more than 100 atomic bombs and planned to bomb Tokyo next did not change the opinions of either the peace party or the war party at all.

Rather, what decisively changed the views of the Japanese ruling elite was the Soviet entry into the war. It catapulted the Japanese government into taking immediate action. For the first time, it forced the government squarely to confront the issue of whether it should accept the Potsdam terms. In the tortuous discussions from August 9 through August 14, the peace party, motivated by a profound sense of betrayal, fear of Soviet influence on occupation policy, and above all by a desperate desire to preserve the imperial house, finally staged a conspiracy to impose the “emperor’s sacred decision” and accept the Potsdam terms, believing that under the circumstances surrendering to the United States would best assure the preservation of the imperial house and save the emperor.

This is, of course, not to deny completely the effect of the atomic bomb on Japan’s policymakers. It certainly injected a sense of urgency in finding an acceptable end to the war. Kido stated that while the peace party and the war party had previously been equally balanced in the scale, the atomic bomb helped to tip the balance in favor of the peace party.[100] It would be more accurate to say that the Soviet entry into the war, adding to that tipped scale, then completely toppled the scale itself.

Emphasis mine.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

quote:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

quote:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing
It's "The Soviets have invaded and the wheels have came off the car!"

I can't believe that having a 'diplomatic door' slammed in the face of the Japanese leadership was the cause of their surrender. Sorry. I just don't see their ignorance towards their nation burning from the inside out at the expense of the big, bad nasty Red invasion.

http://japanfocus.org/site/view/2501

Read for yourself. That's from a Japanese historian.

To use your words above, mind_messing, there's a difference between "a" cause and "the" cause. I don't argue that the Japanese decision to surrender included consideration of the Soviets as hostiles. But I believe that the two atomic bombs (particularly Nagasaki, interestingly enough) and-more importantly-the string of military disasters endured by Japan for 3+ years held more sway.

From the Emperor's surrender speech on the radio:

Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Note-no mention of the Reds.

The Emperor himself detailed his thoughts on the matter accordingly during a fateful meeting with the war cabinet at 2am August 10th, 1945:

I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. ...

I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be in place in fortified positions [at Kujūkuri Beach, east of Tokyo] ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. ...

There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. I do not believe that the discrepancy in the case of Kujūkuri can be rectified. Since this is also the shape of things, how can we repel the invaders? [He then made some specific reference to the increased destructiveness of the atomic bomb]

It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable. ...

I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister.

Note-no mention of the Reds, but some commentary about poor military conditions for the home islands and-tellingly-the bomb itself.

From the link I posted:

quote:

6. Conclusions

The argument presented by Asada and Frank that the atomic bombs rather than Soviet entry into the war had a more decisive effect on Japan’s decision to surrender cannot be supported. The Hiroshima bomb, although it heightened the sense of urgency to seek the termination of the war, did not prompt the Japanese government to take any immediate action that repudiated the previous policy of seeking Moscow’s mediation. Contrary to the contention advanced by Asada and Frank, there is no evidence to show that the Hiroshima bomb led either Togo or the emperor to accept the Potsdam terms. On the contrary, Togo’s urgent telegram to Sato on August 7 indicates that, despite the Hiroshima bomb, they continued to stay the previous course. The effect of the Nagasaki bomb was negligible. It did not change the political alignment one way or the other. Even Anami’s fantastic suggestion that the United States had more than 100 atomic bombs and planned to bomb Tokyo next did not change the opinions of either the peace party or the war party at all.

Rather, what decisively changed the views of the Japanese ruling elite was the Soviet entry into the war. It catapulted the Japanese government into taking immediate action. For the first time, it forced the government squarely to confront the issue of whether it should accept the Potsdam terms. In the tortuous discussions from August 9 through August 14, the peace party, motivated by a profound sense of betrayal, fear of Soviet influence on occupation policy, and above all by a desperate desire to preserve the imperial house, finally staged a conspiracy to impose the “emperor’s sacred decision” and accept the Potsdam terms, believing that under the circumstances surrendering to the United States would best assure the preservation of the imperial house and save the emperor.

This is, of course, not to deny completely the effect of the atomic bomb on Japan’s policymakers. It certainly injected a sense of urgency in finding an acceptable end to the war. Kido stated that while the peace party and the war party had previously been equally balanced in the scale, the atomic bomb helped to tip the balance in favor of the peace party.[100] It would be more accurate to say that the Soviet entry into the war, adding to that tipped scale, then completely toppled the scale itself.

Emphasis mine.

That's unacceptably parsimonious. "There is no evidence that the Hiroshima bomb led...to accept the Potsdam terms." Of course not. Know why? Because they didn't accept the Potsdam terms in the three days between Hiroshima and Nagasaki. By that same logical extension, there's no evidence that the entry of the Soviet Union into the war on August 8 led the military leadership to accept the Potsdam terms. Know why? Because they didn't then. It was later.

The assertions about neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki being meaningful or impressive upon the only Imperial leadership that mattered are also bunk. Witness the Emperor's words himself. Pivotal speeches and decisions wherein the bombs were noted as causal. No mention of the Soviets.

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I agree, Locarno was premature, and simply didn't do enough to settle the issue.

There was no certainty that a Hitler-type figure would get to power, but it was THE goal of German foreign policy in the 20's and 30's to undo Versailles. Stresemann made some good success at first.

The real question is if Versailles could have been undone without it coming to a shooting war.

quote:

ORIGINAL: DD696

Perhaps you need to look at it from a different perspective.

If the bombs had not been dropped on Japan, would Japan still have surrendered when it did? Or would there have had to have been the unthinkable causalities that would have been sustained had Japan had to be invaded? What was the less costly in terms of human life?

Again I say, thank you Harry S. Truman for doing what you did and ending that war.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I agree, Locarno was premature, and simply didn't do enough to settle the issue.

There was no certainty that a Hitler-type figure would get to power, but it was THE goal of German foreign policy in the 20's and 30's to undo Versailles. Stresemann made some good success at first.

The real question is if Versailles could have been undone without it coming to a shooting war.

You need to go back much earlier than Locarno. Austria, Hungary, and Turkey were released from reparations duties, essentially. Bulgaria as well. Germany was not. How much they would pay was in flux all through the 20s: The London Schedule, the Dawes Plan, the other Plan I can't recall now. A, B, and C bonds, where the C bonds were a fiction for British public consumption. The occupation of the Ruhr by France and Italy (!) when Germany didn't deliver coal they were ordered to deliver, even as some of their best coal fields in Silesia had been given to Poland. The hyperinflation of the Weimar period. The vast loans Germany took out in the war and during the Weimar period to try to buy social peace. It goes on and on.

Could Germany have paid the London Schedule? Economists then and now disagree. They didn't though. But they did pay billions of gold marks in the 1920s and that helped generate the conditions that applied when the banks crashed in 1931. Hitler gained power through this morass of bad decisions, no decisions, and vengeance. And over a war Germany certainly didn't "start" on its own, and GB and France didn't end on theirs.

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing
He doesn't even mention the atomic bomb in his rescript to the soldiers. Yet he mentions the Soviet invasion.

quote:


It's going to be the hardline elements of the Army and Navy that MUST accept the surrender to end the war. Hirohito needs to persuade them. If he fails, he'll end up being overthrown - or at least taken into "protective custody". Yet Hirohito makes no mention of the atomic bomb in his rescript to his soldiers.

quote:


Regarding the Emperor in a leadership capacity, he was, by 1945, an expert at going with the flow. He was but one figure in the government. In theory, the foremost figure, but that wasn't the reality of his position. He was smart enough to know that going against the wishes of his cabinet was a surefire way to see himself isolated away as his father was. The Emperor's thoughts on the issues of the atomic bombs and Soviet involvement mattered a great deal less than those of his cabinet when it came to the actual decision to end the war.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Justus2

I am very interested in this debate, I've read some on the final days of the war, and recently signed up for a course at our local university on this topic (looked like an interesting elective):

History 440: WMD and Hiroshima in History and Memory
This course will examine the first and only use of what would later be called a “weapon of mass destruction,” namely the atomic bombs that President Harry S. Truman used to end the Second World War against Japan. Drawing on original source documents, and essays by a diverse assortment of leading scholars, we will examine the military and political context surrounding Truman’s decision to drop the bombs. We will also consider alternative strategies for ending the war, look at how historians have debated those strategies, and examine how Americans, and the Japanese, have remembered the atomic bombings in the years since the war ended. After reviewing and discussing the relevant literature, students will have a chance to put themselves in place of one of Truman’s colleagues in 1945, review all alternative strategies for the president, and give their own recommendation for the best way to bring the war to a conclusion.

I am hoping for an unbiased look, but I am interested in hearing the perspectives that the other students bring to the course. For those interested, here's the reading list:

Hiroshima in History and Memory by Michael J. Hogan (the instructor for the course)
Hiroshima by John Hersey
Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan, Revised Edition by J. Samuel Walker

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

quote:

ORIGINAL: Justus2

I am very interested in this debate, I've read some on the final days of the war, and recently signed up for a course at our local university on this topic (looked like an interesting elective):

History 440: WMD and Hiroshima in History and Memory
This course will examine the first and only use of what would later be called a “weapon of mass destruction,” namely the atomic bombs that President Harry S. Truman used to end the Second World War against Japan. Drawing on original source documents, and essays by a diverse assortment of leading scholars, we will examine the military and political context surrounding Truman’s decision to drop the bombs. We will also consider alternative strategies for ending the war, look at how historians have debated those strategies, and examine how Americans, and the Japanese, have remembered the atomic bombings in the years since the war ended. After reviewing and discussing the relevant literature, students will have a chance to put themselves in place of one of Truman’s colleagues in 1945, review all alternative strategies for the president, and give their own recommendation for the best way to bring the war to a conclusion.

I am hoping for an unbiased look, but I am interested in hearing the perspectives that the other students bring to the course. For those interested, here's the reading list:

Hiroshima in History and Memory by Michael J. Hogan (the instructor for the course)
Hiroshima by John Hersey
Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan, Revised Edition by J. Samuel Walker

quote:

ORIGINAL: swatter555

quote:

ORIGINAL: Justus2

I am very interested in this debate, I've read some on the final days of the war, and recently signed up for a course at our local university on this topic (looked like an interesting elective):

History 440: WMD and Hiroshima in History and Memory
This course will examine the first and only use of what would later be called a “weapon of mass destruction,” namely the atomic bombs that President Harry S. Truman used to end the Second World War against Japan. Drawing on original source documents, and essays by a diverse assortment of leading scholars, we will examine the military and political context surrounding Truman’s decision to drop the bombs. We will also consider alternative strategies for ending the war, look at how historians have debated those strategies, and examine how Americans, and the Japanese, have remembered the atomic bombings in the years since the war ended. After reviewing and discussing the relevant literature, students will have a chance to put themselves in place of one of Truman’s colleagues in 1945, review all alternative strategies for the president, and give their own recommendation for the best way to bring the war to a conclusion.

I am hoping for an unbiased look, but I am interested in hearing the perspectives that the other students bring to the course. For those interested, here's the reading list:

Hiroshima in History and Memory by Michael J. Hogan (the instructor for the course)
Hiroshima by John Hersey
Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan, Revised Edition by J. Samuel Walker

That sounds like a very interesting course. Unfortunately, during my time in school the history department viewed military history as a bastard child and for the most part wouldn't soil themselves by teaching courses about it.

As for the topic at hand, I don't want to get too deep in the muck here except to say that certainly the Allies forged links in the chain of events that brought about WWII. At the same time, I would hope everyone could agree the moral responsibility for starting the wars lies with the Axis powers. After all, it was overt acts of aggression that kicked off the wars in both the east and the west. No doubt weakness emboldened Adolf Hitler in his aggression, but I don't begrudge world leaders who were hesitant to once again see the horrors of the Great War played out. And I certainly don't hold Roosevelt responsible for the Pacific war by withholding oil and other supplies that fueled Japanese aggression in the Pacific. The Japanese had a choice and they choose to hold onto the fruits of their aggression in China and attack the Allies.

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

quote:

ORIGINAL: Alfred

This thread is dealing with two quite separate subjects.

Chickenboy is putting the position that the serious historians writing for their peers generally put.  Good academic historians take into account all relevant sources which usually have different nuanced emphases.  Very rarely is it a simple binary choice, human motivation is usually much more complex than that.  There is no single "smoking gun" which establishes "x" as being the reason why Japan surrendered on the day it did on the terms it surrendered on.  What can be said was the following factors were involved.

1.  The Soviet entry meant that the only offer on the table from its enemies was the Potsdam Declaration.
2.  The A-bomb meant that over time the entire Japanese race could be exterminated without the need for any enemy invasion of the Home Islands....

Alfred

quote:

ORIGINAL: rogueusmc

The Japanese took Manchuria. They had to take China to secure Manchuria. The Philippine Islands were necessary to secure China. To secure the Philippine Islands, the US Pacific Fleet had to be neutralized.

My question is: if Japan were to have taken China and the Philippines, they would have had to garrison them just like the had to Manchuria. How long could they have sustained that? I mean, that's ALOT of territory to have hostile rule over...

WitP AE - Test team lead, programmer

quote:

“This thread is dealing with two quite separate subjects”.

quote:

1. I read AJP Taylor's work on the outbreak of WWII many years ago….. he came to the conclusion that it was the British March 1939 declaration to guarantee Poland which made WWII inevitable. From that point in time there were two set in concrete forces in play and only if one completely backed down, which was completely inconceivable, could a future WWII be averted.

quote:

2. "Lebensraum" is a term which usually gets thrown about far too loosely. Hitler had a much more sophisticated view of what it meant. Firstly, there was the recovery of the Versailles imposed lost eastern territories. This objective was not really lebensraum to Hitler. What Hitler initially really meant by the term was that Germany needed, for economic reasons, an equivalent of the C19th American western expansion and the benefits that brought to the American economy. Due to geography and politics, for Germany this meant that the increase in market for German product was only possible to the east.

quote:

3. Western opposition to Versailles was much less than is being presented. There were some misgivings about elements of it from some of the elites but overall there was no opposition to it. Lloyd George won an election on the slogan of making the Huns pay until the pips squeak. Clemenceau and the French nation saw it as being the equivalent, in effect, of what they had suffered in 1871 at Bismarck's hands. What fundamentally made the Germans so resentful of it was that it bore no resemblance to Wilson's 14 Points which was the basis upon which the October 1918 government of Prince Max had come to power seeking an armistice.

quote:

“Whether the 1919 Versailles Treaty had been made harsher or more lenient would not have made any difference to the German viewpoint. To them Versailles was simply a traditional European power peace treaty, albeit harsher than many but not unusual”.

quote:

4. It is just wrong to say that Versailles was not enforced.

quote:

- he became Chancellor in January 1933 of a coalition government, and even then only because Hindenburg was assured he would be kept under control by his non Nazi partners.

quote:

- That the Reichstag fire came……….out maneouver his coalition partners, can in no way at all be attributable to the Versailles Treaty.
- Nor can the 1934 SA purge be similarly blamed on Versailles.

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Justus2

I am very interested in this debate, I've read some on the final days of the war, and recently signed up for a course at our local university on this topic (looked like an interesting elective):

History 440: WMD and Hiroshima in History and Memory
This course will examine the first and only use of what would later be called a “weapon of mass destruction,” namely the atomic bombs that President Harry S. Truman used to end the Second World War against Japan. Drawing on original source documents, and essays by a diverse assortment of leading scholars, we will examine the military and political context surrounding Truman’s decision to drop the bombs. We will also consider alternative strategies for ending the war, look at how historians have debated those strategies, and examine how Americans, and the Japanese, have remembered the atomic bombings in the years since the war ended. After reviewing and discussing the relevant literature, students will have a chance to put themselves in place of one of Truman’s colleagues in 1945, review all alternative strategies for the president, and give their own recommendation for the best way to bring the war to a conclusion.

I am hoping for an unbiased look, but I am interested in hearing the perspectives that the other students bring to the course. For those interested, here's the reading list:

Hiroshima in History and Memory by Michael J. Hogan (the instructor for the course)
Hiroshima by John Hersey
Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan, Revised Edition by J. Samuel Walker

warspite1

Hi Justus2. Sounds interesting! I've just had a look for the books on Amazon but sadly only one (top one) has any reviews. Would be good if you could post how the course is going (starts September?) and what the conclusions of the class are.

quote:

ORIGINAL: T Rav

Justus2,

"Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire" by Richard B. Frank is a very interesting read about this topic. Lots of military discussion which probably won't apply in your class, but there is a lot of talk about the staffing involved actually invading the home islands. Very daunting indeed.

One of the things that jumped out at me and may apply to your class discussion, was that Frank states that approximately 200,000 people in Asia were dying each month due to what was effectively a war-induced famine. Not to mention that winter was approaching that would likely boast those numbers. If true, those numbers are rarely discussed in the historical calculus of whether Truman was right or not.

Good luck with your class!
T Rav

quote:

ORIGINAL: Justus2

I am very interested in this debate, I've read some on the final days of the war, and recently signed up for a course at our local university on this topic (looked like an interesting elective):

History 440: WMD and Hiroshima in History and Memory
This course will examine the first and only use of what would later be called a “weapon of mass destruction,” namely the atomic bombs that President Harry S. Truman used to end the Second World War against Japan. Drawing on original source documents, and essays by a diverse assortment of leading scholars, we will examine the military and political context surrounding Truman’s decision to drop the bombs. We will also consider alternative strategies for ending the war, look at how historians have debated those strategies, and examine how Americans, and the Japanese, have remembered the atomic bombings in the years since the war ended. After reviewing and discussing the relevant literature, students will have a chance to put themselves in place of one of Truman’s colleagues in 1945, review all alternative strategies for the president, and give their own recommendation for the best way to bring the war to a conclusion.

I am hoping for an unbiased look, but I am interested in hearing the perspectives that the other students bring to the course. For those interested, here's the reading list:

Hiroshima in History and Memory by Michael J. Hogan (the instructor for the course)
Hiroshima by John Hersey
Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan, Revised Edition by J. Samuel Walker

quote:

ORIGINAL: wegman58

quote:

ORIGINAL: Justus2

I am very interested in this debate, I've read some on the final days of the war, and recently signed up for a course at our local university on this topic (looked like an interesting elective):

History 440: WMD and Hiroshima in History and Memory
This course will examine the first and only use of what would later be called a “weapon of mass destruction,” namely the atomic bombs that President Harry S. Truman used to end the Second World War against Japan. Drawing on original source documents, and essays by a diverse assortment of leading scholars, we will examine the military and political context surrounding Truman’s decision to drop the bombs. We will also consider alternative strategies for ending the war, look at how historians have debated those strategies, and examine how Americans, and the Japanese, have remembered the atomic bombings in the years since the war ended. After reviewing and discussing the relevant literature, students will have a chance to put themselves in place of one of Truman’s colleagues in 1945, review all alternative strategies for the president, and give their own recommendation for the best way to bring the war to a conclusion.

I am hoping for an unbiased look, but I am interested in hearing the perspectives that the other students bring to the course. For those interested, here's the reading list:

Hiroshima in History and Memory by Michael J. Hogan (the instructor for the course)
Hiroshima by John Hersey
Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan, Revised Edition by J. Samuel Walker

I'd be leery about this course. "First and only use of what would later be called a weapon of mass destruction..."

Normally I see poison gas (and biological weapons) in the 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' category. WW I, the Iran/Iraq war both featured chemical weapons. Just saying.

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805