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All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> War In The Pacific - Struggle Against Japan 1941 - 1945 >>

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- 4/6/2003 5:33:25 AM

Snigbert

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I think there is a lot of speculating about how alternative histories might be worked into the game. I think the player is going to be able to control production, but 'what if event x occurred in some other part of the world' scenarios wont be a part of the regular grand campaign game. Although they might be in speculative scenarios included in the game, or players may create alternate history scenarios with the editor.

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Post #: 31

- 4/6/2003 10:05:13 AM

TIMJOT

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Snigbert
[B][B]If WitP allows variable results at Pearl Harbor[/B]

There is no fixed outcome for the Pearl Harbor strike. The Japanese player doesnt have to even attack Pearl Harbor if they have other plans. [/B][/QUOTE]

Does this means the campaign game does not start on Dec 7th? I assumed if it did that the game would start with the Kudo Bhutai posititioned off Hawaii. If it does start that way. What real choice does the Japanese player have, but to attack Pearl?

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Post #: 32

- 4/6/2003 2:49:58 PM

Wallymanowar

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[QUOTE]Where does the 20% production figure come from.[/QUOTE]

Sorry, couldn't find my original source. It may have been 30% as you recall - that doesn't really affect the outcome of my point;)

If the Japanese player doesn't have to attack PH then it becomes like PacWar and opens up a lot of Stategic alternatives to the Japanese player and IMO opens the game wide open. Of course the logical move for the Japanese is to attack PH in order to remove the threat of the American fleet but can the Kudo Bhutai be used more effectively somewhere else? Like setting up an ambush for the Americans? HMMMMM!!

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Post #: 33

Correct... - 4/6/2003 3:18:45 PM

Mike Scholl

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Just over 30% of American Military Effort overall for the War
went to the Pacific (not including the A-Bomb---100% of which
wound up in the Pacific, though scheduled for the ETO). This
wasn't an even percentage throughout, as in 1942 over half
of the US effort went to the Pacific to sieze bases and shore
up Australia/New Zealand to halt the Japanese onslaught.

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Post #: 34

- 4/6/2003 5:40:32 PM

derwho

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[QUOTE]If the Japanese player doesn't have to attack PH then it becomes like PacWar and opens up a lot of Stategic alternatives to the Japanese player and IMO opens the game wide open. Of course the logical move for the Japanese is to attack PH in order to remove the threat of the American fleet but can the Kudo Bhutai be used more effectively somewhere else? Like setting up an ambush for the Americans? HMMMMM!![/QUOTE]

This should also mean that if Japan does not initiate hostilities by attacking Pearl Harbour the US might not declare war. According to most what I've read about the war in the pacific and US politics prior to Pearl Harbour, it would have been politically very difficult for Roosevelt to declare war on Japan. Most Americans ware very anti-war and isolationist before PH that actually got America to get into WW2 as Germany only declared war after Japan.

An interesting scenario would be that the US would only enter the conflict late 43, early 44 (by some political pretext) and the IJN would actually be defending a well fortified empire and co-prosperity sphere with ample supplies and resources. In my opinion the IJN didn't do a very good strategic move when they attacked Pearl. The IJN could easily have disposed of the USN Pacific fleet if they would have gone into the defence of the Philippines according to war plan orange. If that would have happened, again poilicis would have entered that game and it's quite reasonable to think that Roosevelt would have had a very hard time in convincing the American public that it was necessary to sacrifice the whole fleet in defending Philippines. Most Americans then and today couldn't put it on the map anyway.

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Post #: 35

To drwho - 4/6/2003 7:40:15 PM

Mike Scholl

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Your scenario must also include the Japanese ignoring
Guam, Wake, and the Phillipine Islands---which were already
recieving reinforcements in December of 1941. If the Philli-
pines does get turned into an "impregnable" base then the
Japanese convoys from SE Asia are "toast".

Late '43/Early '44 seems a bit optimistic from the Axis side.
The US Navy was already exchanging fire with the Germans in
the Atlantic, and American Public Opinion had swung a fair
piece since September of 1939. You need to take into account
our sympathy for the "underdog" (the Brits, being "stabbed in
the back by the Japanese" while fighting in Europe; and the
"homeless" Dutch being attacked) coupled with our irrational
sympathy for China and it's resulting antipathy for the "Rapists
of Nanking" Japanese. Mid-1942 seems more likely...

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Post #: 36

- 4/6/2003 10:43:23 PM

mdiehl

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[QUOTE]This should also mean that if Japan does not initiate hostilities by attacking Pearl Harbour the US might not declare war.[/QUOTE]

What it should mean is that the US gets to declare war when and where it wants. Would the US have used a Japanese invasion of Borneo, Indonesia or Malaya as a causus belli? You bet they would. Americans were in 1941 generally split about the desire for war against Germany, whose "colonial" track record in the occupied nations was not well known. After 1936, many Americans assumed that an eventual war with Japan was guaranteed, and a good portion thought Japan needed to be confronted.

[QUOTE]Most Americans ware very anti-war and isolationist before PH that actually got America to get into WW2 as Germany only declared war after Japan.[/QUOTE]

That's really so simplistic as to constitute a garden variety urban legend.

[QUOTE]An interesting scenario would be that the US would only enter the conflict late 43, early 44 (by some political pretext) and the IJN would actually be defending a well fortified empire and co-prosperity sphere with ample supplies and resources.[/QUOTE]

That would be an intersting scenario. We may presume as a matter of course that Japan, not sensing the American capacity for war, would have continued it's pilot training and shipbuilding levels apace at pre-US-war levels (after all, they resisted increasing the pace of training long after the point where better strategists would have changed their policies).

The US starts the war with a larger fleet, better intel on Japanese codes and movements, ASW that is that much better, and 1st line a/c far superior to anything in the Japanese arsenal. Since US pilots will have had that much more training time, and used better tactics from the start, the loss ratios for the USN vs Kido Butai (historically about 1.3:1 in 1942 then increasing) would start at 3:1 or 4:1. All Japanese airstrikes would find their floating Allied targets equipped with vt fused shells and substantial 40mm.

Since the US economy and R&D program has the luxury of resting without severe attrition losses, the Japanese can also expect to find the US with better early jet prototypes, better torpedoes, acoustically guided ASW, and perhaps even some wire guided plane-dropped anti-ship weapons.

[QUOTE]In my opinion the IJN didn't do a very good strategic move when they attacked Pearl. The IJN could easily have disposed of the USN Pacific fleet if they would have gone into the defence of the Philippines according to war plan orange.[/QUOTE]

The problems with that analysis are multifold. First, WPO did not imagine the PacFleet sailing to the PI in a airpower vacuum. If Japan does not start the war by taking out PacFleet and US possessions in the Pacific, then by 1943 every US base in the Pac will be better prepared than any Japanese position was at any time during the war, with bigger, better airfields and radar equipped, and more, faster, and better planes. Since your premise is that the PI has three years to prepare, every Phillippine Natoinal Army unit becomes the equivalent in firepower and training to a US infantry division, and all the landing beaches are so well prepared that when the war starts the Japanese can expect to lose 50,000 men merely trying to swim ashore. Also, when the war begin, Japan immediately loses control over the supply route to the southwest, wit the only open shipping passage for them to be found in the stratits of Formosa.

Frankly the Japanese move was unquestionably the best one available. It was then or never at all.

[QUOTE] If that would have happened, again poilicis would have entered that game and it's quite reasonable to think that Roosevelt would have had a very hard time in convincing the American public that it was necessary to sacrifice the whole fleet in defending Philippines.[/QUOTE]

Non sequitur. By 1943, any "decisive battle" would have been a decisive defeat for Japan owing to the American schedule of shipbuilding and a/c production and replacement, and the complete American dominance of teh air from Hawaii all the way to the PI.

[QUOTE]Most Americans then and today couldn't put it on the map anyway.[/QUOTE]

Horse hockey.

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Post #: 37

- 4/6/2003 10:57:08 PM

Mr.Frag

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Interesting comments about the USA entering the war in late '43 being about to steam roll over Japan with no effort. With Japan not having to absorb almost 2 years worth of losses and having secured their supply chain completely, what makes you think they would have (a) no better technology to throw at the Americans and (b) would have been such a cake walk?

I would presume that an unharrassed Japan would have some pretty nice advanced U-boat clones by then and at a minimum FW/190 level of aircraft to throw against the americans, resulting in a fairly high rate of losses against the big bombers who we find to be completely invulnerable in Uncommon Valor.

Would this late entry also mean that Germany got time to gear up completely to war production, increasing the threat levels in the west? Perhaps the V3 ( :D ) would be landing in Washington DC by that point in the war had resources not been wasted elsewhere ...

A million and one possibilities ensue with a late entry by the USA. Perhaps Germany gets the first A-Bomb :(

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Post #: 38

Germany win the A-Bomb Race? - 4/7/2003 12:27:03 AM

Heeward

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Yes if the war stared in 1943 Germany would have won the A-Bomb Race....

In several large Metropolitan Areas.

Of course we can believe that Hitler could have diverted a large amount of amount of R&D and industrial capacity to this project, but then Germany would not have army and airforce to face the USSR.

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Post #: 39

To Mr Frag - 4/7/2003 12:55:22 AM

Mike Scholl

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What portion of "never-never land" is Toronto located in?

You assume that without the US the Japanese would have had no opposition and no losses, and that all of SouthEast
Asia was going to fall undamaged into their hands. What about
the Brits and the Dutch? They're still going to fight---and more
importantly blow the hell out of all those resources you blindly
imagine getting. The first Japanese estimates for getting them
back on line after they assessed the damage historically were
at least 18 months---and they proved wildly optimistic.

True, the Japanese might have brought some better aircraft
designs (of their own---Germany's were too short ranged for a
Pacific War) on line during the intervening period. But remember,
these are the same clowns who KNEW they were going to have
to go to war at least a year before they did---and still didn't increase the volumn of their pilot training. They could have been
building U-Boat type submarines for many years---but chose instead to go their own way with a completely rediculous (in hindsight) submarine doctrine of huge boats with airplanes on
them. Nothing in your argument provides any opposition (and therefor, reason to change their thinking or doctrine), so it's hard to see WHY you should make such assumptions.

And quite frankly, the only way Germany gets a win against
the Soviets is with political efforts Hitler could never countinance.
Otherwise, the Russians are going to win (lend-lease or not---it
speeded the decision, but it didn't make it.) Germany's A-Bomb
program was a practical disaster with no likelyhood of succeeding
quicky in reality. Fiction writer's have made a "boogieman" out of
it in the West, but in reality the resources just didn't exist.

MDIEHL's analysis is a "voice of reality"....., your's is more "Hollywood" than "History".

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Post #: 40

- 4/7/2003 4:32:57 AM

mdiehl

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[QUOTE]With Japan not having to absorb almost 2 years worth of losses and having secured their supply chain completely, what makes you think they would have (a) no better technology to throw at the Americans and (b) would have been such a cake walk?[/QUOTE]

The overwhelming preponderance of Japanese losses with respect to ships and ground units occurred after mid 1943.

As to tech and production, Japan had no significant surplus capacity, was still generally starved for ferrous metals, and had a very weak capacity for generating new machine tools. Vamping up Japanse industry to levels comarable even to, for example, pre-war France's, would have been a much more complicated and difficult matter than merely securing access to bauxite, rubber and petroleum. Japan also leacked the intensive industrial training infrastructure of the western powers. Even with unfettered access to all resources desired, it would have taken Japan about a decade to meet US 1939 industrial production.

[QUOTE]I would presume that an unharrassed Japan would have some pretty nice advanced U-boat clones[/QUOTE]

Irrelevant. By 1943 the UBoat problem was largely solved. True, ship losses continued, but Allied ASW was far, far more dangerous to submarines than the latter were to surface vessels.

[QUOTE]By then and at a minimum FW/190 level of aircraft to throw against the Americans[/QUOTE]

Not even close. Japan's problem wasn't the lack of ability to design good powerplants (which is really the heart of it all when it comes to the differences between early and late war combat a/c), but in the ability to produce these to the tolerances required for high performance engines. Japan had chronic problems with all her in-line designs and all the high kW output late war radials, such that the teething problems experienced by, for example, the US B29 engines, seem like a seamless transition from design to operation. In the late war, more than 65% of high kW Japanese engines were rejected because of their inability to meet design specs and failure specs.

Then there's the matter of fuel. Japan's capacity for refining high-octane fuel was, literally, non-existant in 1941. The most that they could have hoped for was to develop a very low output for high-grade synthetics by 1944, with some help from Germans (who'd spent much more time thinking about how to get more energy from a/c powerplant designs, but who were still three years behind the US).

[QUOTE]resulting in a fairly high rate of losses against the big bombers who we find to be completely invulnerable in Uncommon Valor.[/QUOTE]

Even with something operating akin to the FW 190, Japan's ability to coordinate the operation of aircraft against inbound strikes began the war at WW1 levels. By the end of the war they'd caught up to where the UK was in early 1940.

[QUOTE]Would this late entry also mean that Germany got time to gear up completely to war production, increasing the threat levels in the west?[/QUOTE]

No. It means that the USSR would have fielded many more P40s, P47s, M3s, and M4s, and that there's a decent chance that the US would have been manufacturing T34/90s (it was after all basically a Christy designed suspension, so I figure it might be armed with the US 90mm M1). Either way, Germany loses in 1945. It's just a matter of how many more men and how much more material they lose in the USSR.

[QUOTE]Perhaps the V3 ( ) would be landing in Washington DC by that point in the war had resources not been wasted elsewhere ...[/QUOTE]

Perhaps Martians would have seized control of Washington or London, or maybe the V3s would have been shot down by Shrike or Sprint SAMs. Maybe the USS Nimitz would have time warped back...

[QUOTE]A million and one possibilities ensue with a late entry by the USA. Perhaps Germany gets the first A-Bomb.[/QUOTE]

Not a chance. Germany's bomb designers were barking up the wrong tree, following Heisenberg's erroneous fuel equations. As a result they needed vast quantities of DO2 (deuterium O2 or "heavy water") to do their basic research. Norwegian partisans (IIRC, nine of them) sabotaged production. When the factory was repaired, the Norwegians sank the tanker-barge along with its heavy-water cargo (which at the times was all tah Germany had).

Germany could have screwed around with Heisenberg's plan for a decade without success. More likely, however, is that after 5 years of the indordinate expense, AH realizes that his money would have been better spent on PzVs and has Heisenberg shot. Had the Germans gotten to the productoin of fissile material, they most likely would have nuked their own research facility, because Heisenberg's model demanded a lot more fissile material in the reaction than was actually needed.

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Post #: 41

- 4/7/2003 7:55:53 AM

Snigbert

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[B]Does this means the campaign game does not start on Dec 7th? I assumed if it did that the game would start with the Kudo Bhutai posititioned off Hawaii. If it does start that way. What real choice does the Japanese player have, but to attack Pearl?[/B]

At this point in time, the campaign game starts on Dec 7th 1941.

Kido Butai is not neccessarily stationed off of Hawaii, you have options on how to use them but I cant really say how because of the NDA.

There are other options, like using the to hunt down the American carriers. You know one of them is headed to Wake Is., right? Well, the Japanese didnt know that but the player does.
Another carrier is in San Francisco or San Diego, right? Along with a large number of tankers. Not a bad place to strike, if not for the distance problems.

Allied Naval forces in Singapore and the Phillipines are more of a nuisance than a real threat at the beginning of the grand campaign, so Kido Butai would most likely be wasted hunting down enemy ships in those areas.

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Post #: 42

- 4/7/2003 10:29:13 AM

TIMJOT

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Snigbert
[B][B]Does this means the campaign game does not start on Dec 7th? I assumed if it did that the game would start with the Kudo Bhutai posititioned off Hawaii. If it does start that way. What real choice does the Japanese player have, but to attack Pearl?[/B]

At this point in time, the campaign game starts on Dec 7th 1941.

Kido Butai is not neccessarily stationed off of Hawaii, you have options on how to use them but I cant really say how because of the NDA.

There are other options, like using the to hunt down the American carriers. You know one of them is headed to Wake Is., right? Well, the Japanese didnt know that but the player does.
Another carrier is in San Francisco or San Diego, right? Along with a large number of tankers. Not a bad place to strike, if not for the distance problems.

Allied Naval forces in Singapore and the Phillipines are more of a nuisance than a real threat at the beginning of the grand campaign, so Kido Butai would most likely be wasted hunting down enemy ships in those areas. [/B][/QUOTE]

Thanks for the insight snigbert. I know you are limited by the NDA, but if I am interpreting you correctly, the placement of the carrier force will be a game start option.1) being the historical north of Hawaii. 2) Somewhere in SE Asia. 3) Somwhere off the west coast???

I hope I am wrong with number 3, because IMHO I think it is totally unsupportable as a realistic option. I have no problem with number 2. But if you are implying that in option 1 the IJN player can forego the PH attack and instead set a trap for the USN CVs based on knowledge that they couldnt possibly know historically then IMO it is not supportable either. Unless the allied player has the option of varible deployment of said CVs or at the very least some sort of random generator that determines they placement of the USN CVs. That way the IJN player wouldnt know if they are at PH, Wake, Midway, SF or waiting in ambush.

Again, I dont know if my interpretation is totally off base or not. I hope it is. Any clarification without compromiseing the NDA would be greatly appreciated

Thanks

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Post #: 43

- 4/7/2003 4:02:21 PM

iceboy

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Post #: 44

- 4/7/2003 4:10:48 PM

iceboy

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by TIMJOT
[B]Thanks for the insight snigbert. I know you are limited by the NDA, but if I am interpreting you correctly, the placement of the carrier force will be a game start option.1) being the historical north of Hawaii. 2) Somewhere in SE Asia. 3) Somwhere off the west coast???

I hope I am wrong with number 3, because IMHO I think it is totally unsupportable as a realistic option. I have no problem with number 2. But if you are implying that in option 1 the IJN player can forego the PH attack and instead set a trap for the USN CVs based on knowledge that they couldnt possibly know historically then IMO it is not supportable either. Unless the allied player has the option of varible deployment of said CVs or at the very least some sort of random generator that determines they placement of the USN CVs. That way the IJN player wouldnt know if they are at PH, Wake, Midway, SF or waiting in ambush.

Again, I dont know if my interpretation is totally off base or not. I hope it is. Any clarification without compromiseing the NDA would be greatly appreciated

Thanks [/B][/QUOTE]

The game would really be great if we were given a month to place our forces (both sides) and then on Dec 7 war is declared but your forces are set up the way you want them and not in a forced fixed position. Options only make a game better and more fun!!!! In other words the game doesnt start out the same every time!!!

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Post #: 45

SOUNDS GOOD..... - 4/7/2003 5:11:00 PM

Mike Scholl

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by iceboy
[B]The game would really be greatl if we were given a month to place our forces and then on Dec 7 war is declared but your forces are set up the way you want them and not in a forced fixed position. Options only make a game better and more fun!!!! In other words the game doesnt start out the same every time!!! [/B][/QUOTE]

....JUST MAKE CERTAIN IT APPLIES TO BOTH SIDES! Japanese
will be able to strike anywhere they want---and the Allies will be
able to make certain that there is nothing for them to attack.

On the side of realism, it took the Japanese months to plan
their opening attacks, and they were based on the allies being
in more-or-less "fixed" positions. If the carriers weren't in P.H.,
then the carriers wouldn't be attacked! Almost every portion of
their opening phase of offensives was interlocked..., each step
leading to the next. It was very flexible in terms of speeding up
or slowing down depending on the results---but did not provide
much ability to switch objectives in mid-stride.

Let's hope that 2by3 doesn't get too generous with just
letting ONE side re-design their starting position. The Japanese
will already be getting a lot of flexibility of action based on a
level of hindsight their historical counter-parts could never have.
If you give them total ability to "fiddle" with their starting positions as well, then they should at least have to deal with
the possibility of losing suprise. Like if they decide to "wait
until the Enterprise arrives back in P.H." before attacking on
Monday Morning, they also risk having Kido Butai "spotted on
Sunday" and flying into fully aroused and deployed CAP and
AAA defensives---and the possibility of a counter-strike! Or
flying in Monday AM and finding the Pacific Fleet sortied Sunday
Night. Be interesting to see how bold the Japanese player
would be if everytime he "diddled" with history he ran the risk of
history "diddling" him!

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Post #: 46

Re: REALITY REARS IT'S HEAD - 4/7/2003 5:58:42 PM

Raverdave

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Mike Scholl
[B]To return from the realms of the silly to the actual subjects
of this thread..., DON'T FORGET THE POLITICS OF COLONIALISM.
Britian in Malaya and Burma; and America in the Phillippines had
a problem. The colonial and native populations might forgive
them for being defeated---but "running away without a fight" is
another story. This kind of thing was a very real consideration
at the time---and might have triggered greater support of the
Japanese invaders (at least until the true nature of the "Greater
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere revealed itself).

[/B][/QUOTE]

Well the politics of colonialism sure as hell didn't come into Churchills mind when it came to Australia in 1942. He was more than prepared to sacrifice Australia for India.

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Post #: 47

Re: Re: REALITY REARS IT'S HEAD - 4/7/2003 6:38:03 PM

Mike Scholl

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Raverdave
[B]Well the politics of colonialism sure as hell didn't come into Churchills mind when it came to Australia in 1942. He was more than prepared to sacrifice Australia for India. [/B][/QUOTE]

TRUE. But in 1941, India was still a COLONY.., while Australia
was a COMMONWEALTH. Actually, Churchill ( a very 19th Century
Man in a 20th Century Job) was willing to risk Australia to try
and save Singapore. A far dumber act from which the Australians dissued him by refusing to let their troops be sent.

My point was that those powers who still had Colonial Holdings in East Asia didn't feel that they could afford to let
the "native" populations see them give up without a fight---
no matter how much sense in made militarily.

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Post #: 48

- 4/7/2003 9:21:16 PM

Wallymanowar

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Allowing too many starting options opens up way too many variables. As an example, I once played a game of Global War (an old boardgame depicting WW2 on a Global scale) with a friend. The entry of the US into the war was predicated by a strike by the Japanese on the US or by a certain date (Jan/42 IIRC). I was playing the Axis forces. I had my Japanese waiting until Dec/41 to make their move. My German forces had invaded the USSR in May/41 and by Dec/41 had almost brought about their collapse. What does my friend do? In Nov/41 he attacks Japan with the Soviet forces in Siberia and uses the Soviet sub fleet in Vlad to launch a Pearl Harbor of his own against me. A desperate move by the Soviets but it sure surprised me:D

Speculating about keeping the USA out of the war is interesting but from a Japanese POV is impossible. Politically, the main instigator of all the actions against Japan was the US and her support of China. A move by Japan to sieze the Oil Fields in the NEI would almost certainly have triggered an American declaration of War and thus the Philippines had to be taken in order to secure the LOC from NEI to Japan. The attack on PH is actually a very good option; if the Japanese ensure they render the base inoperable for at least six months and force the Americans to redeploy their Navy to the West Coast.:)

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Post #: 49

- 4/7/2003 9:36:49 PM

TIMJOT

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Post #: 50

- 4/7/2003 9:41:40 PM

mdiehl

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If the Jpn player opts for anything other than a historical first turn in all respects, the Allied player should have the option of redploying all at-start units. Allied HQ readiness, support, morale, and fortification levels should be increased by 50%. The hard-coded guarantee of surprise in 1st turn attacks should be eliminated.

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Post #: 51

Re: SOUNDS GOOD..... - 4/7/2003 10:05:43 PM

TIMJOT

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Mike Scholl
[B]....JUST MAKE CERTAIN IT APPLIES TO BOTH SIDES! Japanese
will be able to strike anywhere they want---and the Allies will be
able to make certain that there is nothing for them to attack.

On the side of realism, it took the Japanese months to plan
their opening attacks, and they were based on the allies being
in more-or-less "fixed" positions. If the carriers weren't in P.H.,
then the carriers wouldn't be attacked! Almost every portion of
their opening phase of offensives was interlocked..., each step
leading to the next. It was very flexible in terms of speeding up
or slowing down depending on the results---but did not provide
much ability to switch objectives in mid-stride.

Let's hope that 2by3 doesn't get too generous with just
letting ONE side re-design their starting position. The Japanese
will already be getting a lot of flexibility of action based on a
level of hindsight their historical counter-parts could never have.
If you give them total ability to "fiddle" with their starting positions as well, then they should at least have to deal with
the possibility of losing suprise. Like if they decide to "wait
until the Enterprise arrives back in P.H." before attacking on
Monday Morning, they also risk having Kido Butai "spotted on
Sunday" and flying into fully aroused and deployed CAP and
AAA defensives---and the possibility of a counter-strike! Or
flying in Monday AM and finding the Pacific Fleet sortied Sunday
Night. Be interesting to see how bold the Japanese player
would be if everytime he "diddled" with history he ran the risk of
history "diddling" him! [/B][/QUOTE]

I think the point of the Nov 41 start option would be if a player did not want to attack PH. So I dont think many of your concerns apply, but of course if a Japanese player does decide to attack PH when chooseing the Nov start option, then standard recon rules should apply. If that strike TF is sited approaching PH then the allied should be free to attack or disperse or whatever.

According to Wilmont the Japanese were on the verge of radically switching objectives as late as November 41. When an impass between the combined fleet (Yamamoto) and the IJN/IJA general staffs regarding the number of carries to be used in the PH strike. The general staffs wanted to keep two of the 6 CVs to support the southern operations, when it became apparent that the planned use of CVLs to support the PI operation was unworkable. Yamamoto was adamant that it would be all 6 CVs or nothing. The impass was only settled when zero pilots flying from Formosa proved that flying techinique could effectivly extend the range of the zero far enough to operate against the PI from Formosa.

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Post #: 52

- 4/7/2003 10:10:17 PM

mdiehl

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If Japan delays the PH raid by 2 or 3 days there should be a very good chance that if they show up in HI waters they lose half their carriers to an American CV tf ambush.

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Post #: 53

- 4/7/2003 10:41:11 PM

TIMJOT

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]If the Jpn player opts for anything other than a historical first turn in all respects, the Allied player should have the option of redploying all at-start units. Allied HQ readiness, support, morale, and fortification levels should be increased by 50%. The hard-coded guarantee of surprise in 1st turn attacks should be eliminated. [/B][/QUOTE]

I agree that the allied player should be free to redeploy at start units, just not attack unless Jap forces are sited within the allied ZOC. I think an automatic 50% increase in readiness, morale, support and fortification is too arbitrary. It would be much more realistic to increase them imcrementally for each turn past the historic start date, all the way up to 100%. The surprise modifier should only be eliminated if the enemy TF is sited prior to attack. Admittedly though, if UV is any indication, the chance of a TF will not be sited is almost ZERO. So the distinction is probably moot.

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Post #: 54

- 4/7/2003 10:52:53 PM

mdiehl

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[QUOTE]I agree that the allied player should be free to redeploy at start units, just not attack unless Jap forces are sited within the allied ZOC. I think an automatic 50% increase in readiness, morale, support and fortification is too arbitrary. It would be much more realistic to increase them imcrementally for each turn past the historic start date, all the way up to 100%. The surprise modifier should only be eliminated if the enemy TF is sited prior to attack. Admittedly though, if UV is any indication, the chance of a TF will not be sited is almost ZERO. So the distinction is probably moot.[/QUOTE]

It seems like you are saying that the Allied player after all should not be allowed to redeploy anything or have any readiness increase in an ahistorical start. That which you have proposed is simply that which the Allies should already be able to do. Once the war begins, the Allies should be allowed to attempt to redeploy anything they want, regardless of the presence of detected TFs in the area.

The redeployment in an ahistorical game should happen [I]prior to the start of the game[/I] if the Jpn player selects anything other than a historical first move. That means readiness increases occur [I]before[/I] any Jpn TFs are sighted, because readiness affects search. If the Jpn player selects an ahistorical start, the Allied player's search should be more effective, resulting in a much greater chance of an at-start lack of surprise, and generally all around greater mystery, for the Jpn player, regarding the locations, quality and strengths of the opposition.

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Post #: 55

- 4/7/2003 11:37:22 PM

Snigbert

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I'm not sure how the location of the Japanese attack would affect the readiness of Allied forces. It seems to me, if you're unprepared for war when PH is attacked, at the same time you would be equally unprepared for war if the PI were attacked, or anywhere else.

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Post #: 56

- 4/8/2003 12:17:42 AM

mdiehl

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The moment you posit an ahistorical start you are in the land of "alternative history." In that event, assumptions regarding the historical readiness of Allied forces are obviated. As a matter of game balance, if you give the Jpn player the option of starting the war quite differently, it makes sense to give the Allied player the option of starting the war quite differently. It is manifestly illogical to assume or allow flexibility for the Jpn at start deployment and attacks without allowing comparable flexibility among the Allied pools.

Secondly, the low readiness of the Allied at start historical game in PW was the de facto way of hard-coding the historical effectiveness of the surprise attacks. In the two major events, the strike on Clark Field and on PH, the difference between surprise and lack thereof, success and lack thereof, came down to very fine, almost serependipitous points of detail that had nothing to do with general readiness.

Frankly, I see no reason why even with a historical first move it should be presumed that either the Clark or PH strikes should be presumed to have achieved surprise.

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Post #: 57

- 4/8/2003 12:26:59 AM

panda124c

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PH was the major naval base for the Pacific, if the Allies (US) are allowed to re deploy their heavy naval units the only bases capable of handeling these units would be the West Coast. Also note that if the Allies redeploy and Japan strikes at PH they could possibly so damage PH that it would be un-useable as a forward base thus forcing the US to deploy from the west coast.
Also with no major naval forces based at PH the possiblility of an invasion becomes a very real threat to PH. Which would create an ideal situation for Japan, the US having to retake PH to stage out of to drive Japan out of the Pacific.
So there are very good reasons for the US to NOT redeploy their PH Fleet. Japan was very aware of the US Fleet locations but were under radio silence so the news of the CV's leaving port was not avaiable just before the attack.

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Post #: 58

- 4/8/2003 12:44:23 AM

mdiehl

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[QUOTE]PH was the major naval base for the Pacific, if the Allies (US) are allowed to re deploy their heavy naval units the only bases capable of handeling these units would be the West Coast.[/QUOTE]

Correct.

[QUOTE]Also note that if the Allies redeploy and Japan strikes at PH they could possibly so damage PH that it would be un-useable as a forward base thus forcing the US to deploy from the west coast.[/QUOTE]

Incorrect. Assuming even that the Japanese hit the fuel facilities (which they can do with or withut PacFleet there and which history shows them unable or unwilling to fathom since they did not do so), you're looking at an immediate limitation on the number of ships that can be fueled from PH based on the number of auxiliary tankers that can be brought to service in the area. Fuel tanks are, of themselves, notoriously difficult to set alight; it'd require extensive use of both HE and incendiaries, so any Jpns strike aimed at the fuel tanks loses all anti-ship capability against armored vessels. Even then, all that has been accomplished is essentially to destroy some gigantic fuel drums. Fuel storage tanks could have been completely replaced and refilled withing three months.

There were no other strategically vulnerable assets at PH. About the only way that Japan could have shut down PH for a significant period of time would have been to scuttle Yamato and Musashi at the harbor entrance.

[QUOTE]Also with no major naval forces based at PH the possiblility of an invasion becomes a very real threat to PH. Which would create an ideal situation for Japan, the US having to retake PH to stage out of to drive Japan out of the Pacific.[/QUOTE]

Incorrect. For Japan to contest the HI (which was heavily garrisoned) they'd need to cancel all ops against the PI and Malaya in order to have sufficient transports and supply train to sustain such an operation. Even then, that does not guarantee a successful conquest of Honolulu, never mind any of the other islands in the HI island chain. If the Jpns get a foothold in the HI, what they then have is an isolated outpost of Japanese units that have to rely on having 6 Jpn carriers permanently stationed en location in order to provide air cover. In these circumstances the US merely has to ramp up other airbases in the region (a matter of a few weeks tops), move in US air units, and let the attrition begin. It'd be the worst sort of tar baby the Japanese could possibly stick their hands or feet into. It'd be like Guadalcanal, except that there would be forty "Henderson Fields" rather than just one, and no Japanese land based air would be able to operate in the area. In these circumstances, none of the 6 PH strike carriers would likely live past February 1942.

[QUOTE]So there are very good reasons for the US to NOT redeploy their PH Fleet. Japan was very aware of the US Fleet locations but were under radio silence so the news of the CV's leaving port was not avaiable just before the attack.[/QUOTE]

Japan had no idea of where the US CVs were and had no guarantee that the rest of PacFleet would be, for example, in harbor on 7 December rather than smashing into their flank. Frankly, most of the people who fantasize about what more Japan might have accomplished near the HI during the first week of the war seem to lack any real grasp of the extreme risk that Japan assumed.

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Post #: 59

To pbear - 4/8/2003 1:02:32 AM

Mike Scholl

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by pbear
[B]PH was the major naval base for the Pacific, if the Allies (US) are allowed to re deploy their heavy naval units the only bases capable of handeling these units would be the West Coast. Also note that if the Allies redeploy and Japan strikes at PH they could possibly so damage PH that it would be un-useable as a forward base thus forcing the US to deploy from the west coast.
Also with no major naval forces based at PH the possiblility of an invasion becomes a very real threat to PH. Which would create an ideal situation for Japan, the US having to retake PH to stage out of to drive Japan out of the Pacific.
So there are very good reasons for the US to NOT redeploy their PH Fleet. Japan was very aware of the US Fleet locations but were under radio silence so the news of the CV's leaving port was not avaiable just before the attack. [/B][/QUOTE]

Off in the clouds again.... San Diego was THE Major base
of the Pacific Fleet, and had been for years. It had only been
moved forward to Pearl Harbor about 18 months before the
attack (At Roosevelt's insistance and over the Navy's objections).
It was at this juncture that a "suprise attack" first occured to
the Japanese High Command. Until then, they had NO plans
to attack Hawaii in the event of war---it was too far away to
either invade or support, and heavily garrisoned (by the standards of the time) to boot. Not having the Fleet "exposed"
at Pearl Harbor doesn't make it an easy target. Oahu isn't that
large (the Army's 16" Coast Defense Guns could drop fire on
every inch of the coastline completely around the island from
their emplacements near Pearl. Older (Taft Board Period) Coast
Artillery covered all the decent invasion sites as well. Both the
Navy and the Army had a considerable air presence on the island,
and a large "excess" of base capacity. And the 24th and 25th
Infantry Divisions were there (not totally equiped---but much
more capible than the Filipino Militia) along with plenty of additional military personel.

Meanwhile, you propose that the Japanese sail a huge convoy
of troopships and support vessels undiscovered all the way there
and make an opposed landing against odds and a hostile population with plenty of arms and ammo like it's a "walk in the park". They simply did not possess such capability! Raid? Yes!
IInvade? Never! It's like the "Nazi A-Bomb"..., all Hollywood and no History.

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Post #: 60