mdiehl
Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
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Keeping in mind that you are an Axis Fanboy with a primitive understanding of the situation in 1941 and no interest in seeing a game that simulates reality, but instead are only interested in being argumentative and remaining uninformed, I accept the fact that none of the following evidence will be interesting to you.
For example. [QUOTE]
DECEMBER 2 1941 Diplomatic msg from the US to Japan:
The United States asked Japan for reasons for increasing its forces in Indochina.
"It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement-and there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement-between Japan and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces permitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was very considerably less than the total amount of the forces already there.
"The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that region. . . . because of the broad problem of American defense. I should like to know the intention of the Japanese Government."
(President Roosevelt in note handed to Japanese envoys by Under Secretary Welles.) Peace, p. 823 f.) See doc. Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 130, pp. 540 f.[/QUOTE]
There's plenty more of this sort of stuff at:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/
Also, in regard to US reaction to a Japanese attack only on the Netherlands East Indies, see for example the following Japanese naval signal of 27 November decrypted by the US Navy on 5 December, 1941:
[QUOTE]
(Secret)
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Washington
27 November 1941
(Purple)
#842
In the middle of your message #1280*, there is the part which mentions that the United States might make a protective occupation of the Dutch East Indies. Now this is a very important matter, and a point which we would like to know more about.
Will you please give us the reason for your mentioning this point, and any other item which might be of help to us in this matter.
25781
JD-1: 7080 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (6-AR)
[/QUOTE]
And this Japanese note on intensifying Allied preparations and scouting. Trasmitted on 3 December, decrypted by the US on 4 December. So much for fantasies about delayed decryption. My emphases added in boldface.
[QUOTE](Secret)
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#878 (In 2 parts, complete)
Re your #1225*.
Chief of Office routing.
1. Apparently, the United States is making much of the statements issued by our governmental organs, the trend of the public opinion, as well as of our troop movements in the south. They have used these as an excuse to doubt our sincerity in wanting to bring about a successful settlement in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations.
We explained the truth behind the alleged Tojo statement in my message #866**. The English translation (this was done in the offices of the Domei News agency) of that statement was very different from the original, and that was responsible for the unexpected reactions.
With regard to guiding general public opinion, this Minister himself has made considerable effort.
The State Department should be in receipt of a report from the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo regarding this point. As a matter of fact, as your report in your message #1148*** Secretary Hull has expressed his satisfaction over the change for the better along these lines.
In spite of this, the tone of some of the U. S. newspapers seem to be unduly ominous. Moreover, the radio (particularly those which are aired via short wave from San Francisco very recently) has been daily broadcasting in considerable detail, the progress being made in the negotiations. It is quite evident that persons who have access to the records of the meetings are acting as liaison agents for those broadcasts, for otherwise it would be impossible to obtain some of the information that is being aired. We feel that it is very inappropriate for the United States to criticize us without looking after her own house.
(Part 2)
2. [B]Recently, Britain, the United States, and others have been making military preparations against Japan at an every increasing tempo. At the same time, they have been acting in a more and more antagonistic. manner of late. For example, on the 20th of last month, a U. S. plane made a reconnaissance flight over Garanpi in the southern part of Formosa. (We filed a protest with the U. S. Ambassador on the 27th regarding this matter). Since then, however, the British and the United States have shown no indication of ending such activities.[/B] In view of the very critical times, we cannot help but hope that such incidents would cease.
3. Our proposal which was submitted on 20 November was based on just principles. Will you please point out again that these principles undoubtedly offer the best chance of leading to an eventual settlement. (We assume that when the United States says in their counter proposal that our terms are not in sympathy with the existing principles, they refer to the contents of Article 4 in which it is stated that the peace between Japan and China shall not be disturbed. We are insisting that all aid to Chiang cease as soon as Japanese-Chinese negotiations, at the instigation of the President of the United States, are launched. Hence, our proposal in no way conflicts with the spirit of the so-called fundamental principles being proclaimed by the United States. Please bear that in mind.
25720
JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT
*JD-1: 7042 (S.I.S. #25715).
**Available, dated 3 December.
***JD-1: 6737 (S.I.S. #25174).
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)
[/QUOTE]
Then there is this very interesting evaluation by CNO of a suggestion that the NEI declare a naval exclusion zone in addition to maintaining the already stepped up search patrols. In this case the msg illustrates some of the "ahistorical alternatives" that the Allies might have pursued.
Note that this recommendation was made on 5 December.
[QUOTE]Top Secret
5 December 1941
From: CNO
Action: Spenavo London
Info:
042230
While CNO agrees with you that November reports of a Japanese concentration in the Pelews were unfounded, the possibility of an attack by the Japanese from that region against the Philippines or Nei cannot be ruled out. This replies to your 031411 and gives CNO views as to the military aspects of the Dutch project to declare areas south and west Davao dash Waigeo dash equator line dangerous to shipping in order that Dutch forces might attack suspicious vessels entering from north and east. Were this area declared dangerous to shipping the prohibition would apply to all merchant shipping of whatever nationality and to naval vessels of the United States and United Kingdom as well as to those of Japan. Large amounts of shipping traverse this general area and it is questionable if Dutch could set up promptly a naval control system that would obviate excessive delays of shipping most important to the United States and particularly shipping carrying United States naval and army reenforcements to the Philippines as all United States shipping between west coast of United States and the far east area is now routed via Torres Strait. If NEI declares this large area closed it would be quite a different matter from the British closure of the Jahore area which is a very small one. Japan would be free to close Okhotsk Sea, the Sea of Japan, and all the western portion of the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam. Were the United States to acquiesce in the Dutch declaration it would have few grounds for objecting to a Japanese declaration of the same character. At present United States defense aid is going to Russia via the Okhotsk Sea and the Sea of Japan, and the United States, United Kingdom, and Netherlands East Indies are executing extensive reconnaissance measures in all directions considered dangerous. Shipments to Siberia and reconnaissance measures ought to continue and CNO is convinced a declaration by the Dutch closing the area in question would be most prejudicial to naval and military interests of the three powers. If Dutch authorities consider some warning should be given Japan CNO believes it should take the form of a declaration to Japan that in view of the current situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces crossing the Davao Waigeo line would be attacked. Communicate these views to the admiralty and the Dutch naval command in London.
(PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY EXHIBIT NO. 79 DESPATCHES ON DUTCH ALERT )[/QUOTE]
_____________________________
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
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