Bullwinkle58
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ORIGINAL: Revthought
quote:
ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58
Any surface ship is vulnerable to SSNs. In the BB era the submarine was not seen as a threat; now it is. We have only had one, minor war where SSNs we employed in combat against surface ships. We know how that ended for the heavy.
Shore bombardment/amphibious landing support is the most-often cited reason for having BBs or BB-like assets. But the USMC doesn't do those kinds of landings anymore. They go vertical, or they move down the coast to a better spot, supported by satcon. If they absolutely must have a bunker-type installation removed it's a cruise missile, or a 1-man tactical aircraft with smart weapons. Not a billion-dollar asset with 1500 lives at stake.
In ship vs. ship, if that is really an issue (and it hasn't been for decades really), the name of the game is mission kill, not sinking. Battering on armor is not the way to go when any naval asset is useless without its sensors. Wishing for floating castles is like knights ranting against the crossbow. Their time is over.
Taking on surface combatants really should be a concern if we are being honest, well if we are discussing the USN.
In 2002 the USN determined that a massed brown water navy--they used the Iranian navy in their war game--could take out an entire carrier task force pretty easily. I believe during the Millennium Challenge challenge USN exercise, the red (Iranian) team was able to, in the first day, sink 15 warships, including 10 cruisers and a super carrier--a real life analog of which would kill 25,000 sailors and marines, destroy American morale, not to mention reduce American naval power by significant percentage.
Similarly, if we look at the new Virginia class submarine, we see a sub designed to engage land targets and fight "the war on terror," not to sink surface vessels. And while countries like Russia and China continue to grow their anti-ship capabilities both in terms of SSNs and surface engagement ordinance, the United States does not even have a sub launched anti-ship missile--the anti surface capability of US submarines is exclusively the M48 torpedo. This seriously impacts the range and lethality of American submarines.
The same is true of surface ships. The USN is still using the harpoon missile, from the 1970s, as it's only surface-to-surface and air-to-surface anti-ship missile. Meanwhile Russia and China have new modern anti-ship missiles, submarine launched anti-ship missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, super caveating torpedoes...
So, in world with a resurgent and defiant Russian military and China (so many things can go wrong with them), its my opinion that thinking of anti-surface capabilities of the navy as a thing we don't have to worry about anymore is a recipe for future disaster.
Let's see what I can respond.
Millennium Challenge. Yes, a wake-up call. A lot of things have been done since that event over a decade ago to buff up TF defenses to swarm attacks. Some as simple as lots of .50 cal MG emplacements to deal with suicide boats. Other things, some discussed in the press, some not. But the wargame began with a set of premises and played those out. It was a tactical exercise on a local level. It posited that Iran could have a huge number of coastal cruise missiles that were left alone before the TF transited constricted water. It posited a large number of small boats swarming that TF in a surprise attack. It posited a complete lack of OPSEC by Blue, giving Red a time-on-target estimate they would not have in a hot war.
In reality, should the US ever fight Iran, the Iranian coast from end to end would be on fire before anything transited the Straits. B-2s from CONUS alone can do that, and Iran has no counter. The carrier in the TF also contributes there, with Tomahawk help on AA. A lot of brown-water doomsayers forget that the easiest place to sink a vessel is at the pier. Surface or DE sub. Take out the boats, take out their magazines, take out their maintenance, kill their crews in barracks and you don't have to sink them at 500 yards off the bow. We know how to do that and have the assets to do it. Same applies to North Korea BTW.
The Virginia-class sub is not "designed" for land attack or the WOT, except that any USN SSN can contribute to those. It's designed to be an SSN. It has Mk 48 ADCAP, and that makes it a threat to any and all surface and submerged targets.
Sub-launched anti-surface missiles are a bad trade-off. Several navies are investing in them because they don't have better alternatives. We don't need them. The USN in my day used encapsulated Harpoon, but it's small, it's short-range, it's slow, and it doesn't have a big warhead. It also, as any anti-ship missile does, takes up precious magazine space, but can only target surface ships. The Mk 48, from its earliest model, is good for both dimensions. The Chinese navy is STILL trying to develop a dual-role submarine torpedo, despite having a stolen Mk 48 for over 30 years to copy.
Why are torpedoes better than anti-ship missiles? Lots of reasons.
1. They are stealthy. The run-in phase is quiet, and recent mods have emphasized this, lowering reaction time.
2. They are steerable. This not only closes the gap on bad firing solutions, but also allows for reaction to target maneuvers. Most importantly for the firing sub, it allows deception of the firing vector. By inserting steers the fish can go out laterally, do a dogleg or three, and run in at the target dozens of degrees off the reciprocal bearing to the sub. Multiple fish can be fired in succession to cover target evasions.
3. They have huge warheads. One Mk 48 will sink or at least cripple pretty much anything afloat. Missiles sacrifice either speed or range if they go big warhead. And missiles don't break keels. There is no good DC solution to a broken back. Fires can be fought.
4. As I said above, dual role for one slot.
5. When a Mk 48 misses it re-attacks. A missile usually keeps going to fuel exhaustion and crashes. Mk 48 re-attack code is devious.
6. Simplification of FC electronics, training, maintenance.
7. Biggest one for the sub--no huge, flaming arrow pointing right at the launch position. Missiles are visible instantly as soon as they break the surface, and the sub is RIGHT THERE. Yes, it will clear datum, but it can't run as fast as helos. Torpedoes go out in secret, like many ex-wives.
8. Employing missiles OTH takes external sensors and comms by the sub. Torpedo FC is organic to the sub; no need to go to PD, raise a mast, etc. An enemy surface TF can be engaged from very deep depths.
Are torpedoes range-limited? Yes. But not enough that it matters. Way back in the early 80s when we did tactical problems the enemy was usually started at around 30,000 yards. 15 NM. That was pre-ADCAP, and with sonar that was basically 1960s with a few tweaks. The MK 48 ADCAPs ranges are classified. But they're big. From the target's POV swing a circle at even 15 NM and then try to provide 24/7 passive coverage of very, very quiet SSNs. No navy in the world can do that, not even ours with a high degree of reliability. And 15 NM isn't the number.
Then make it three Virginias operating in concert.
Someday the SSN may be countered. Speculating that Russia or China can do it in the next 30 years is fanciful. IMO, any surface ship, big, small, rail guns or brass cannons, is obsolete in an open ocean environment in a total war scenario. It's never happened, so maybe I'm wrong. But I'd put my money on the subs.
< Message edited by Bullwinkle58 -- 5/19/2016 1:22:22 PM >
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RE: Time to Bring Back the Battleships? - 
In my book this war is a draw.
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