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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 1/24/2017 1:45:52 PM   
MakeeLearn


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Zorch

Operation FS was to have taken Fuji, Samoa, and New Caledonia in July-August. It was cancelled after Midway.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_FS




After reading "Clash of the Titans", where I first learned of that purposed operation, I believe that a 7Dec. attack/occupation on Hawaii would have had more benefit than just the occupation of the island. It may have forced all the American Pacific carriers into a battle where they could have been destroyed.



< Message edited by MakeeLearn -- 1/24/2017 1:46:39 PM >

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 1/24/2017 2:33:17 PM   
Revthought


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quote:

ORIGINAL: General Patton

Now figure in that the Allies failed at Midway and lost the 3 CV's....GP


A complete reversal? Lost three carriers but disabled/sank one Japanese carrier? Maybe the push South would have gone better for Japan. Even if it had, their goal of cutting off Australia from the United States was a pipe dream. Maybe a slight delay in the European time table as USN forces were shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but probably not. And maybe you'd see an earlier coordination of the RN and the USN in the Pacific (Churchill might have had to "loan" his carriers to the US after all).

To be honest, I do not actually envision that radical of a departure from history.

Certainly, even under an "opposite Midway" scenario, I do not imagine that the Japanese armed forces could have agreed to take Hawaii, or actually managed it if they had agreed.

Besides, those reverse Midway scenarios are so hard to play out in one's head because SO much would have to be different. For example, you'd basically have to assume that:

1. SIGNET didn't exist
2. The Japanese had more carriers than were actually present (see point 1)
3. The Japanese somehow have intelligence on US naval movements (see point 1)



< Message edited by Revthought -- 1/25/2017 1:55:26 PM >


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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 1/25/2017 6:49:52 AM   
Barb


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Or, even without the conditions Revthought mentioned it was still possible based on the other factors:
1) Japanes submarine scouting line in place at the time (one sub was not on time and Yorktown TF had just passed by its patrol sector)
2) Better organized search, Floatplane from Tone not delayed on take off, better reporting
3) Earlier detection of the enemy = no swapping of ordonance, 2nd Wave on its way to hit allies already, would probably sunk Yorktown in the first strike.
4) 1st wave would be landed, refueled and probably in the air by the time the Dauntlesses arrived, could even clob some on their way in.
5) 2nd wave would have probably got into Hornet and Enterprise and take them out of action.
6) even if the Dauntlesses striking the KB Carriers, they would have empty decks, ammo stored, fuel lines empty... even with 2 out of action there was still plenty of place to land on remaining planes, rearm and send them to finish US crippled carriers.
7) Japanese Main Battleship force would arrive to flatten out the Midway atoll and support the invasion.

Probable outcome:
- 3 US carriers sunk, Midway in Japanese hands, most of the 429 Navy carrier crew members dead or captured (shot down, ditched, landed on Midway and captured), another about 80 Army/Marine crews with the same fate (presuming B-17s, PBYs and B-26s would be evacuated), Allied cruisers/destroyers run away with what ship crews they could pick up from the carriers.
- No Guadalcanal campaign, with just 3 carriers left (Wasp, Saratoga, Ranger) - and I presume Ranger would be retained for Atlantic duty anyway - up till November 1943
- 2-3 Jap carriers damaged, but back in action by the end of 1942, Operation SF (Fiji, Noumea, Espiritu Santo, Samoa) delayed for a month or so. Still powerful KB with Shokaku, Zuikaku, Hiyo, Junyo, Ryujo, Zuiho, Ryuho and what remained undamaged from the KB after Midway - all combat ready, or finishing repairs...
- Possible capture of Port Moresby with enlarged perimeter down south to Noumea-Fiji. Allied offensives delayed by year, or shift to some another theatre - with the supply lines to Oz cut off, Australia would hardly become a springboard to New Guinea offensives. And all the supplies would have to go either down south or around the globe to supply another Island invested by the enemy (after Britain).

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 1/25/2017 7:35:36 AM   
witpqs


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Shattered Sword showed that Tone's scout plane would not have seen the USN carriers even had it been on time, there was no rearming, the IJN carrier decks were busy cycling fighters (the LBA and later piecemeal carrier attacks mattered). Also, it is quite likely that the invasion force was not adequate for the job.

Shattered Sword is really quite a work of analysis. Give it a read.

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 1/25/2017 11:34:13 AM   
dave sindel

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Shattered Sword showed that Tone's scout plane would not have seen the USN carriers even had it been on time, there was no rearming, the IJN carrier decks were busy cycling fighters (the LBA and later piecemeal carrier attacks mattered). Also, it is quite likely that the invasion force was not adequate for the job.

Shattered Sword is really quite a work of analysis. Give it a read.


I actually started reading this book last night. From just the Introduction and Foreword, I can tell that it is going to be quite an interesting read...

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 1/25/2017 1:53:05 PM   
Revthought


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quote:

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

The game was Between the Storms with Michael. The Japanese IJN get some additional ships AND the Allies ALSO get additional ships. Since it is based on the Treaty Years of 5:5:3, the Allies are actually STRONGER then the Japanese in 1941.


It was a complete blast.



Well, that's all relative. Maybe in raw numbers, but not in quality of say, trained pilots, nor quantity of say, fleet carriers.

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 1/25/2017 2:20:08 PM   
jwolf

 

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IMHO the biggest difference between the game and history is the incredible level of arrogance the Japanese had at the time of Midway, and which Japanese players avoid (well, most of them ). In brief, the IJN in June 1942 was so dismissive of Allied, particularly USN, capabilities that they were a disaster waiting to happen. This is detailed very well in Shattered Sword (great book BTW; I read it last fall). Out of all the dysfunction of IJN planning, what struck me as most amazing was the description of their wargaming sessions. When the Japanese officers who "played" the Americans tried anything other than the most abject, passive defense, the referee intervened and reset things according to what the Japanese casually assumed would be true. One session in particular played out much like the actual battle, with US CVs striking from unknown positions against the unprepared Japanese. The referee's response was simply to dismiss this scenario as impossible and they resumed with their optimistic planning.

For this reason among others, I would say it was historically impossible for the Japanese to take Hawaii without a complete change of culture within the IJN. In game, Japanese players do this automatically, of course, so much more is possible.

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 1/25/2017 2:23:07 PM   
Revthought


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Barb

Or, even without the conditions Revthought mentioned it was still possible based on the other factors:
1) Japanes submarine scouting line in place at the time (one sub was not on time and Yorktown TF had just passed by its patrol sector)
2) Better organized search, Floatplane from Tone not delayed on take off, better reporting
3) Earlier detection of the enemy = no swapping of ordonance, 2nd Wave on its way to hit allies already, would probably sunk Yorktown in the first strike.
4) 1st wave would be landed, refueled and probably in the air by the time the Dauntlesses arrived, could even clob some on their way in.
5) 2nd wave would have probably got into Hornet and Enterprise and take them out of action.
6) even if the Dauntlesses striking the KB Carriers, they would have empty decks, ammo stored, fuel lines empty... even with 2 out of action there was still plenty of place to land on remaining planes, rearm and send them to finish US crippled carriers.
7) Japanese Main Battleship force would arrive to flatten out the Midway atoll and support the invasion.



So taking for granted that some of these things would have had a positive result, like Tone's search plane actually finding and correctly identifying the USN carrier force or a submarine picket actually spotting the USN carrier force if it were in place, I think this actually makes my point as to why it is difficult to imagine "opposite Midway."

Because all of these things would have been required for Japan to have chance at success; AND, that is not even taking into account the human factors. For example, identifications of "carriers" and the like has to be believed (remember the Japanese thought the Americans had either one, or possibly two, carriers battle capable) and then acted on immediately.

Then of course there are other factors, like the fact that Midway had been reinforced. Even had everything gone perfectly it is less than clear that the Japanese invasion force was actually adequate to take the reinforced island (SIGNET again).

quote:

Probable outcome:


By what metric? If everything goes absolutely perfectly? Maybe. I also think it is a mistake to just assume that the Japanese lose no carriers in return, because that is going to effect the projections you are making for the strategic outcomes.

quote:

- 3 US carriers sunk, Midway in Japanese hands, most of the 429 Navy carrier crew members dead or captured (shot down, ditched, landed on Midway and captured), another about 80 Army/Marine crews with the same fate (presuming B-17s, PBYs and B-26s would be evacuated), Allied cruisers/destroyers run away with what ship crews they could pick up from the carriers.


Again, I do not think the historical facts bear out that the actual capture of Midway was the likely result--50/50 at best. In addition, as I said above, you're not accounting for any potential Japanese losses.

quote:

- No Guadalcanal campaign, with just 3 carriers left (Wasp, Saratoga, Ranger) - and I presume Ranger would be retained for Atlantic duty anyway - up till November 1943


The ranger is a big maybe, but that's using historical hindsight I think it's fair to say that Torch could have happened without her. Maybe the USN navy figures that out, maybe not.

The Guadalcanal campaign is a smaller maybe. You need to account for the disposition of the RN in this scenario and the American intelligence advantage. What seems certain to me is, again based on intelligence advantages, somewhere else would have been chosen for a counter offensive is the Allies felt the Solomons were untenable.

A "counter attack," no matter how small, was going to happen somewhere. It had to for political reasons as much as military ones.

quote:

- 2-3 Jap carriers damaged, but back in action by the end of 1942, Operation SF (Fiji, Noumea, Espiritu Santo, Samoa) delayed for a month or so. Still powerful KB with Shokaku, Zuikaku, Hiyo, Junyo, Ryujo, Zuiho, Ryuho and what remained undamaged from the KB after Midway - all combat ready, or finishing repairs...


You are assuming no Japanese losses at Midway. Again, I think this is a mistake. And since we're projecting to mid-1943 we need to modify the utility of those Carriers, weighed against the Allied intelligence advantage, the submarine campaign, and Japanese fuel oil supply issues.

quote:

Possible capture of Port Moresby with enlarged perimeter down south to Noumea-Fiji. Allied offensives delayed by year, or shift to some another theatre - with the supply lines to Oz cut off, Australia would hardly become a springboard to New Guinea offensives. And all the supplies would have to go either down south or around the globe to supply another Island invested by the enemy (after Britain).


There is one thing that gets reality right in WiTPAE. Even if Japan accomplished all of this, they still would not be able to cut American convoys off from OZ. Make them longer? Sure. Cut them off? Not a chance.
Even the value of making them longer is reduced to something that is almost negligible, unless we make another huge departure from reality and assume the Japanese use submarines in a sea denial role on a large scale.

Japan certainly did not have the fuel or the desire to try to interdict a great Southern route supply line with the KB or capital ships--and in reality the KB was the only option because the Allies still have carriers.

AND just assuming everything you predict would have happened, did happen. This buys IJ months at most, because of... wait for it... the Soviet Union. The Allies would have gone from, iffy at best about Soviet involvement, to arguing with Stalin about an accelerated timetable for Soviet entry into the war.

And the Japanese were completely unprepared--couldn't have been prepared and done all of the above--to face the Red Army in mainland Asia.

Finally Hawaii still wouldn't have been invaded, nor successfully taken and held if invaded. That just isn't possible, even if we stretch reality and give the Japanese every historically possible advantage.

< Message edited by Revthought -- 1/25/2017 2:33:18 PM >


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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 1/25/2017 4:00:14 PM   
bradfordkay

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Shattered Sword showed that Tone's scout plane would not have seen the USN carriers even had it been on time, there was no rearming, the IJN carrier decks were busy cycling fighters (the LBA and later piecemeal carrier attacks mattered). Also, it is quite likely that the invasion force was not adequate for the job.

Shattered Sword is really quite a work of analysis. Give it a read.



Shattered Sword correctly pointed out that there wasn't the re-arming going on on the flight deck but admitted that it was happening on the hangar deck (with ordnance all strewn about). Since the bombs had penetrated to that hangar deck, this caused all the mayhem. To me, that's a wash...

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 1/25/2017 4:47:23 PM   
witpqs


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quote:

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay


quote:

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Shattered Sword showed that Tone's scout plane would not have seen the USN carriers even had it been on time, there was no rearming, the IJN carrier decks were busy cycling fighters (the LBA and later piecemeal carrier attacks mattered). Also, it is quite likely that the invasion force was not adequate for the job.

Shattered Sword is really quite a work of analysis. Give it a read.



Shattered Sword correctly pointed out that there wasn't the re-arming going on on the flight deck but admitted that it was happening on the hangar deck (with ordnance all strewn about). Since the bombs had penetrated to that hangar deck, this caused all the mayhem. To me, that's a wash...

Not really, as I recall they concluded that it might have barely gotten started. So aircraft were not clogging the flight deck ready to take off but either way there were armed aircraft in those hanger decks...

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 1/25/2017 5:24:35 PM   
starsis

 

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How likely were Japanese to actually capture Midway? From what I understand, they brought about 5,000 troops (only half were SNLF and the rest were from construction units) and the landings would had been opposed by 3000+ Marines from the local defense Bt + Raider reinforcements well armed with an array of MG and DP guns (and a couple of tanks to top it off) and a sizeable number of support troops. Force/firepower levels suggest costly defeat for the original landing force IMHO

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 1/25/2017 6:32:54 PM   
Lecivius


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The Japanese never would have taken Midway. They barely took Wake, which was less heavily defended, less fortified, and less well supplied. There is even speculation the Wake garrison would not have surrendered except for certain things the local marine commander got wrong (Japanese don't like prisoners), making it more problematic. I wasn't there, I will not second guess the poor b@st@rd in charge of that ugly situation. But it does bear consideration in The Grand Scheme Of Things.

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 1/26/2017 1:45:09 AM   
Mike Dubost

 

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Even assuming the Japanese took Midway and Hawaii both, I don't think the had a prayer of holding them. I am strongly of the belief that the civilian population would have starved.

One of my Great Aunts got a war job as a secretary at the shipyard. Several years ago, she got out the scrap book and was reminiscing about her experiences. She had a picture of her husband, and talked about how they met and on the first date "He was so sweet, he brought me a can opener." I was quite puzzled by this statement, until she explained that due to supply ship space limits, some goods were very hard for civilians to obtain, so the can opener was a gift that was both rare and useful. The point of this story is that the US had limitations on supply to Hawaii, even without a commerce raiding strategy by Japan. Granted, the US subs would have had to operate from the West Coast, but they were both designed and intended for long range operation.

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 1/26/2017 2:16:47 PM   
spence

 

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quote:

Maybe in raw numbers, but not in quality of say, trained pilots, nor quantity of say, fleet carriers.


In the real war, NOBODY had any experience in carrier vs carrier battles. Each side relied on their doctrines to fight the battles. Japanese doctrine had evolved into mass employment of aircraft hence the greater limit of aircraft that may be employed without penalty in a given task force in the game however Japanese doctrine is NOT reflected when every strike aircraft in the KB is combined into a single strike force. That happened only once and resulted from the very close range (~100 miles) of the engagement combined with considerable prior losses. Japanese doctrine was to launch the dive bombers from one carrier/carrier division while the accompanying carrier/division launched its torpedo/attack bombers. Thus all Japanese strikes should actually consist of two+ waves rather than the one overwhelming strike force usually seen in the game.

Also in the real war, the IJN fleet defense doctrine was practically non-existent. Due to the dispersal of the IJN ships the carriers themselves received nearly no AAA support from any other ship in the TF. Due to a complete lack of any coordinating authority in the KB CAP pilots basically did their own thing once they took off. They could stay in the air a long time if they did not fight but it turned out that they really needed their cannons to attack USN aircraft (because of their armor). They landed in the midst of the action whenever they needed to replenish that ammo (thus the strike aircraft stranded in the hangars at Midway). In addition they fought relying on their Mk 1 Mod 0 eyeballs sometimes assisted by hand signals (almost never radio instructions) from their section leader. Thus, as occurred at Midway. virtually the entire CAP of 40+/- fighters engaged the twelve TBDs and six F4Fs of the Yorktown's combined strike completely ignoring the 17 SBDs of that same strike (resulting directly in the unopposed bombing of the Soryu)(to say nothing of the second group of Enterprise bombers approaching from a different direction).

The foibles of the Japanese system/doctrine are not reflected in the game mechanics.

A complete lack of an enemy air threat during the China Incident never put them to thinking about defense. So they didn't. And on the attack deck capacity combined with the construction of their carriers limited the manner in which they could project the power of their air concentration and that is not reflected in the game mechanics either.

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 2/1/2017 7:56:25 PM   
Revthought


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quote:

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn

quote:

ORIGINAL: Zorch

Operation FS was to have taken Fuji, Samoa, and New Caledonia in July-August. It was cancelled after Midway.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_FS




After reading "Clash of the Titans", where I first learned of that purposed operation, I believe that a 7Dec. attack/occupation on Hawaii would have had more benefit than just the occupation of the island. It may have forced all the American Pacific carriers into a battle where they could have been destroyed.




Would forcing a carrier battle with the Americans, or even the carriers themselves, be worth the minimum of 5 divisions it would have taken to wrest the islands from the Americans? You would have to have canceled the Philippine operation, the Malaya operation, or both just for the chance to be successful.

And even if Japan were successful, American carriers sunk, Hawaii in Japanese hands, the divisions involved would have to be left to wither and die (as we've discussed).

Think about it like this:

1. The Japanese probably did not have the logistical capacity to move that many men that far, then make a contested and adequately supported landing.

1a. Assuming Japan scrounged up the merchant capacity (and can actually provide adequate support to a contested landing), so they set sail for Hawaii! Unfortunately, they are now risking 5 or more divisions in transports, sailing across the Pacific to land on the 7th. What's the likelihood they get caught? A giant merchant fleet is much harder to hide than the KB. What happens if they are caught? Japan now has 60,000 men, in the open ocean, on vulnerable transports... with an unsurprised USN trying to kill them.

2. Assuming they aren't caught, successfully land, and take the Hawaiian islands:
Congratulations, Japan, you have taken Hawaii! American carriers sunk! However, see points 1-1a! How exactly does Japan plan on keeping 60,000 IJN soldiers fed, clothed, and armed over a very vulnerable and very unsecured 3600 nautical mile open ocean supply line?

All of this is to say that to imagine that the Japanese could have ever captured and held Hawaii requires imagining more than just minor alterations to the past. You've got to assume that Japan, in December of 1941, was something she wasn't in life. Or you have to take an incredible leap and imagine Japan winning overwhelmingly at Midway... by which time the American garrison of Hawaii was nearly 120,000 men. Which brings us back to assuming that Japan was something she was not.

< Message edited by Revthought -- 2/1/2017 8:05:49 PM >


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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 2/2/2017 4:18:57 PM   
bradfordkay

 

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It is the idea of landings on Oahu that I have to question. The north shore would be quite difficult to land on without very specialized landing craft (even more so in winter when the surf is even higher). Even with very specialized landing craft the operational losses due to the surf would be quite high. So this means that they would have to try to force a landing on the heavily fortified south shore. I believe that in order to effect this, they would have to have first captured outlying islands and built up major airbases so that their bombers could neutralize those defenses. We all know how slow the Japanese were at building up airbases (the PI, Malaya and DEI campaigns went smoothly because they captured pre-built airbases of sufficient size and there was only one of those on outlying islands in the Hawaiian chain), so this would have required a good bit of staying power with their logistical train. Could they have done this? Highly questionable.

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 2/2/2017 10:09:27 PM   
MakeeLearn


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Revthought, bradfordkay


Both good points. Who knows what the fates would have weaved if given different thread. Historical battle plans that did succeed canbe shown to have not a chance. Hannibal's battles for instance, or the American Revolution. Would it have mattered what Japan did at the start when theoretical rationalization could unravel any plan for war.

All the land/resource grabbing in others areas of the Pacific failed to win the war for Japan. Where would a different walked path have lead?

Midway was Pearl 2, as Yamamoto seems to have seen something that was missed in the first play.


< Message edited by MakeeLearn -- 2/3/2017 1:15:07 AM >

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 2/3/2017 11:20:47 AM   
spence

 

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quote:

All the land/resource grabbing in others areas of the Pacific failed to win the war for Japan.


Since the Midway Operation used up a whole years worth of fuel for the IJN what would Japan have fueled the follow-on convoys to Hawaii with given that they had to cancel the DEI capture to have the troops for Hawaii Operation and therefore had no resupply of fuel?

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 2/3/2017 1:23:06 PM   
MakeeLearn


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quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

quote:

All the land/resource grabbing in others areas of the Pacific failed to win the war for Japan.


Since the Midway Operation used up a whole years worth of fuel for the IJN what would Japan have fueled the follow-on convoys to Hawaii with given that they had to cancel the DEI capture to have the troops for Hawaii Operation and therefore had no resupply of fuel?


The two are being confused. If Hawaii Operation was part of 7Dec then Midway would not have happened. And Japan would have been open to take what they wanted anyway.

Iam aware of Japan's fuel situation. My original comment was a larger effort on 7Dec by Japan on Hawaii, in order to force the US to commit more forces, at a disadvantage, that the Japanese could destroy. Also destruction of repair yards, fuel depots, etc. A occupation of Hawaii, even for a short time, would be the means to accomplish this not the goal itself. A initial attack that leads to a month or more of battles around Hawaii. Not a sucker punch to the face and then run off, as 7Dec was. Instead, a toe to toe fight from the start resulting in the destruction of America's Pacific forces. The Kantai Kessen.
Midway Operation blooms as Japan's second attempt -continuation of the first- to do this.


A larger "Hawaii effort " on 7Dec could have still left enough forces to get the oil. The bigger destruction of US Naval forces at the beginning could have given Japan more time to take what they wanted and to prepare/build up for the Allied response.
There is also the nonmilitary response to a larger US defeat. It could have been less or more war responsive from the American civilian population. A bigger West Coast panic. Such retribution on Asians, living in US that they are forced to fight a guerrilla war.

History Lab is a capricious form of chemistry

I make no claims as to the success. Would it have given Japan a extra year? I dont think they had the defeat of and occupation of US as goal but rather the defeat of and sue for peace by the US.

< Message edited by MakeeLearn -- 2/3/2017 4:42:10 PM >

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 2/3/2017 2:25:00 PM   
BBfanboy


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An IJ months long campaign in the Hawaiian Islands has the same fatal flaw that Japan's plans suffered IRL - the Allies would have to react as they expected and keep trying to relieve the islands.

IRL the Allies evacuated what they could but were careful not to waste military assets where they could make no difference. They abandoned HK, Singapore, Malaya, the Philippines, the DEI, most of New Guinea, Guam, Wake, etc. when they knew they could not make a fight of it.

Once they got their forces concentrated the Allies started coming back at places of their choosing.

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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 2/3/2017 2:51:12 PM   
Revthought


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quote:

aware of Japan's fuel


Sure, but, like I said, a "larger" effort on December 7th would involve:

1. Roughly 5 divisions to be sure of success.
----Where do these men come from?
----What does Japan give up in order to do this?
----What happens to these men if they "take" the island chain?
2. A significant investment of their merchant marine.
----Does the Japan have the transport capacity to move at least 50,000 IJA soldiers across the ocean?
----Can Japan still achieve surprise?
3. They have to make a contested landing on the heavily fortified South Shore of Oahu.
(a) This is a complex amphibious undertaking rivaling D-Day operations
----Do the IJA and IJN have the experience to pull this off?
(b) There will be no LBA support
(c) Battleships and Carriers supporting the landings will be far away from friendly port
----How does the IJN guarantee the constant support such a landing would need?

All of this is an interesting thought experiment, but it's a bit like thinking about Germany successfully invading the United Kingdom in the summer of 1943 (yes 1943).


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(in reply to MakeeLearn)
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RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 2/3/2017 4:29:10 PM   
Skyros


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There is no at sea replenishment except for fuel. The longer the operation drags on the KB is forced to withdraw to replenish. Losses of ships and aircraft start in 41 and early 42 instead of late 42 putting a further drag on limited IJN resources.

(in reply to Revthought)
Post #: 52
RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 2/3/2017 4:41:28 PM   
MakeeLearn


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Revthought

quote:

aware of Japan's fuel


Sure, but, like I said, a "larger" effort on December 7th would involve:

1. Roughly 5 divisions to be sure of success.
----Where do these men come from?
----What does Japan give up in order to do this?
----What happens to these men if they "take" the island chain?
2. A significant investment of their merchant marine.
----Does the Japan have the transport capacity to move at least 50,000 IJA soldiers across the ocean?
----Can Japan still achieve surprise?
3. They have to make a contested landing on the heavily fortified South Shore of Oahu.
(a) This is a complex amphibious undertaking rivaling D-Day operations
----Do the IJA and IJN have the experience to pull this off?
(b) There will be no LBA support
(c) Battleships and Carriers supporting the landings will be far away from friendly port
----How does the IJN guarantee the constant support such a landing would need?

All of this is an interesting thought experiment, but it's a bit like thinking about Germany successfully invading the United Kingdom in the summer of 1943 (yes 1943).



Iam also aware of your requirements. My statement was in direct response to spence. And a futher explanation of the hypothesis of Hawaii as bait, not as the goal.

quote:

All of this is an interesting thought experiment, but it's a bit like thinking about Germany successfully invading the United Kingdom in the summer of 1943 (yes 1943).


Yes, is it.

"Why Japan Won World War II : An Application of the Operational Factors of War"
Chris Kennedy Lieutenant Commander U. S. Navy
PDF



< Message edited by MakeeLearn -- 2/5/2017 1:07:44 AM >

(in reply to Revthought)
Post #: 53
RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 2/3/2017 5:36:45 PM   
Jellicoe


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In terms of forces used that would otherwise be used elsewhere, olorin did exactly this when he took the Hawaiian chain from jocmeister. He essentially, if I recall, ignored the Philippines beyond limited landings and blockade


(in reply to MakeeLearn)
Post #: 54
RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 2/3/2017 5:56:31 PM   
bradfordkay

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Jellicoe

In terms of forces used that would otherwise be used elsewhere, olorin did exactly this when he took the Hawaiian chain from jocmeister. He essentially, if I recall, ignored the Philippines beyond limited landings and blockade




That to me seems to be the only operation whose troops could be safely diverted in Dec '41 to an Hawaiian invasion. The troops and shipping destined for Malaya and the DEI are involved in the crucial campaign for the Japanese in this war - without the oil from the DEI being brought online as soon as possible their war effort will collapse under its own weight.

EDIT: it is the only operation with sufficient force whose troops could be safely diverted...

< Message edited by bradfordkay -- 2/3/2017 5:58:49 PM >


_____________________________

fair winds,
Brad

(in reply to Jellicoe)
Post #: 55
RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 2/3/2017 10:46:08 PM   
spence

 

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quote:

My statement was in direct response to spence.


Those silly Japanese didn't realize they could have burned coconuts instead of fuel

(in reply to bradfordkay)
Post #: 56
RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 2/4/2017 12:39:27 AM   
MakeeLearn


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quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

quote:

My statement was in direct response to spence.


Those silly Japanese didn't realize they could have burned coconuts instead of fuel


Pine roots

X-38(N)-4 Japanese Fuels and Lubricants-Article 4, Pine Root Oil Program


11 lbs. of sweet potatoes gave them 1 lb. of ethyl alcohol

REPORTS OF THE U. S. NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION TO JAPAN



< Message edited by MakeeLearn -- 2/4/2017 12:47:44 AM >

(in reply to spence)
Post #: 57
RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 2/4/2017 2:59:36 AM   
BBfanboy


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quote:

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn

quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

quote:

My statement was in direct response to spence.


Those silly Japanese didn't realize they could have burned coconuts instead of fuel


Pine roots

X-38(N)-4 Japanese Fuels and Lubricants-Article 4, Pine Root Oil Program


11 lbs. of sweet potatoes gave them 1 lb. of ethyl alcohol

REPORTS OF THE U. S. NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION TO JAPAN



Shoot, marines with a still could probably get twice that amount of alcohol from sweet potatoes - and it would taste better too!

_____________________________

No matter how bad a situation is, you can always make it worse. - Chris Hadfield : An Astronaut's Guide To Life On Earth

(in reply to MakeeLearn)
Post #: 58
RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 2/5/2017 11:20:39 AM   
spence

 

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quote:

Shoot, marines with a still could probably get twice that amount of alcohol from sweet potatoes - and it would taste better too!


+1

There's an interesting analysis of why the IJN did not commit their BBs to the Guadalcanal Campaign on Combinedfleet.com. It has a lot to do with fuel and it ought to be mentioned that the distance involved was that between Rabaul and Guadalcanal rather than the much longer one from Micronesia to Hawaii. It should also be mentioned that at that time the DEI was producing for the Japanese rather than the Allies.

(in reply to BBfanboy)
Post #: 59
RE: Invasion of Hawaii - 2/5/2017 12:37:29 PM   
MakeeLearn


Posts: 4278
Joined: 9/11/2016
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quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

quote:

Shoot, marines with a still could probably get twice that amount of alcohol from sweet potatoes - and it would taste better too!


+1

There's an interesting analysis of why the IJN did not commit their BBs to the Guadalcanal Campaign on Combinedfleet.com. It has a lot to do with fuel and it ought to be mentioned that the distance involved was that between Rabaul and Guadalcanal rather than the much longer one from Micronesia to Hawaii. It should also be mentioned that at that time the DEI was producing for the Japanese rather than the Allies.


This link? http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm

"...the Japanese eventually did risk their BBs in the waters off of Guadalcanal after they had become convinced of the necessity of doing so."

They had the fuel, it was a matter of deciding if it was worth the use.




At the battle of Okinawa , The Yamato was running on soy bean fuel.

My organic chem teacher always drooled when talking about the German and Japanese chemistry in ww2.


Even though they captured the oil fields the producton/refineries were never at 100%


The oil fields at Balikpapan, Miri, and Brunei, on the island of Borneo, plus those on the island of Tarakan, all produce "sweet crude" that may be burned in ship's boilers as bunker fuel. But is also high in sulfur content. Burning unrefined oil in ship's boiler had a serious negative effect on the boiler tubes (not the engines). The high sulfur content of Indonesian and Borneo crude oil fouled the tubes and cut their efficiency by more than half after only a few hours steaming.


Aviation fuel in New Guinea was of poor quality and resulted in engine problems. Because the army and navy did not cooperate, army aircraft on New Guinea had to fly 1,500 miles to Manila for engine changes even though the navy had major maintenance facilities at Rabaul.



Naval Fuel Depot Tokuyama(Japan's Largest):
Japan consumed the last of their California Crude(226,000 Kiloliters) in 1944.
While consuming 240,000KL of East Indies Crude in 1944. And only 12,000KL in 1945

41-44 California Crude - 1,528,000 KL
43-45 East Indies Crude - 542,000 KL none consumed 41-42. Yet Refining was taking place at Kudumatsu.
HMMMMMMMMM!!!!!




Methods - fermentation, distillation, cracking.
fuel and byproducts.

The sweet potato was surprisingly good aviation fuel. Though most ethanol was used in training.
The hydrocracking of coconut oil yield 80-100 octane diesel. Used in boilers.
Pine root resin gummed the engines.
Soy bean fuel did well.

What about the rice??? multiple types of sake production.



Popcorn Sutton may have just gotten in the way, except for "The Last Run"

< Message edited by MakeeLearn -- 2/5/2017 5:46:35 PM >

(in reply to spence)
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