Leandros
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Joined: 3/5/2015
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Dear Mac, I’d like very much to discuss the subject but I’m just about to close the campaign. It has taken much longer than hoped for, so I do not have much time – there are other aspects to life, too….
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...but my question is what have you concluded ??
In fairness I will share an amateur historian observation of my own.
No problem with that, you’re welcome.
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1) Could the Allies have invested more heavily in the PI in 1941/42 to forestall Imperial Japan's expansion?
I doubt it. Equally true of Singapore. In addition to a less aggressive stance by Allied Command - the Allies underestimated Japanese military capability and were not prepared and supplied strongly enough to accomplish even limited counter attacks and or stale mates in early 1942. Aggressively deploying a few B17's, or a few British Warships with air cover could not have reversed the outcomes significantly in my opinion. The Japanese empire was on a war footing, prepared, with strong in field commanders and clear objectives. They were also willing to pay any cost in lives to accomplish their goals.
If the Japanese attack had started in April ’42, as Marshall and MacArthur hoped for (expected), things would probably have been quite different.
My impression is not that the Allies under-estimated the Japanese, on the contrary, the first encounters – Pearl Harbour, The Philippines and the Prince of Wales/Repulse incidence created a sort of chock.
In my opinion the question isn’t what the Allies could have done before, but what they didn’t do after the war was a fact. There was a time window, but it was wasted. This applies particularly to the US, her leadership panicked in a way and was totally over-ruled by the Navy on every corner (as Eisenhower put it). Roosevelt tried to speed things up but was not able to over-rule the Navy. Even the Army’s transports were forbidden by the Navy to start, or continue, on their way to The Philippines. The Philippines were an Army responsibility.
The Japanese may have been war-ready, but their strategy was flawed. Allied analysis before the war showed that they were seriously over-stretched, and they expected a much tougher allied resistance from the start. The result was that they could soon speed up their operations
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2) Was there a better way -
For the British I don’t know, except that they declined an offer for Chinese assistance in Burma, but for the Americans, yes, there was - just my opinion;
Firstly, they should not have stopped the mass of personnel and materiel that was already on its way, or about to leave the West Coast for The Philippines. Enormous quantities of stores/equipment and much personnel were ready or on its way.
Secondly, the US leadership should not have put themselves under the ABDA command. This resulted in much of its resources being used for other than US purposes, among them most of Admiral Hart’s Asiatic Fleet.
Thirdly, the US should have established its own Command and politically pressured the Dutch and the Anzacs to set off a part of their military resources for the purpose of relief and defense of The Philippines. This is what I do in the actual game.
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However many AARs ~ and Allied players ~ have made me reconsider the Joint Chief of Staff approval of MacArthur's and Nimitz war plans i.e. the New Guinea and Central Pacific advances.
I agree, this was later, and a naval “doing”, MacArthur had to go along with it to get any naval support at all. Not to have done it would have made it impossible for the two parties to cooperate and support each other.
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While the AARs are far more 'game than simulation' a few very revealing facts seem to suggest themselves. Perhaps the invasion corridor through the DEI would have been more effective and potentially less costly.
I agree. This was also the route Eisenhower in early January recommended for the relief transports to The Philippines (which never materialized in any meaningful sense). A combined Army/Navy effort along this axis could have secured a Philippines relief route. As an example, Ambon, the central island/city in The Moluccas was not attacked by the Japanese until the end of January. In the mean-time the Japanese landing force advancing westwards from Davao on Mindanao had been beaten back by the local Philippine forces. Ambon was already defended by Dutch and Australian forces.
Much of the US forces that landed on Guadalcanal August 7th, and/or fought in The Solomons, could have been in this area before the Japanese made Ambon. Some were about to leave and other had left the West Coast on December 7th. The 2nd Marine Brigade was escorted to Samoa by carrier Yorktown in January, followed by some raids by Yorktown against Japanese bases, but the Navy would not cater to MacArthur’s request for carrier transport of Army planes. His reinforcements were dropped off along the way or turned around.
I recommend Glen Williford’s book: “Racing the Sunrise”. It is rather depressing to see the opportunities lost, as regards available transports, units and equipment.
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Island landing in the DEI - due to shear mass / size - were likely possible - and potentially less lethal in terms of Allied casualties. More tank and artillery space to land. No coral reefs (or fewer). Further their ability to supply and support through Australia equally had advantages. Not Darwin per see but there are a variety of northern ports in Australia that could have been build up with sufficient engineering and air force support.
Early island bases in DEI would have allowed an aggressive Allied Command to bomb oil early. Thereby further crippling the Japanese ability wage war. Simply bombing the refineries. Bombing the shipping.
Dead on! Knowing what the Japanese were after in the first place such a strategy from the start not only could have saved The Philippines but simultaneously threatened the Japanese supply lines through the South China Sea and, as you write, demolish those resource centers they had already captured. With such a strategy I can hardly see the Japanese using resources for a Solomon or Papua New Guinea campaign. They would have to take care of this threat first.
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ABDA command could have been more effective if the Allied command moved in this direction. ABDA is mostly famous for its shortcomings and what it taught the Allies about unified chain of command in the later war. None the less a targeted focus on DEI counter attacks would have engaged Dutch and British Leadership more effectively. American leadership would have had to cede some decision making in the early years...
Mixing up with the ABDA system did incredible damage to the US cause. They ought to know it, too, “everybody” participating in the early discussions and planning of this organisation knew that the British put their own perceived needs before the other members’. Admiral Hart mentions it in his “report” after returning to The States. His “Asiatic Fleet”, that was originally meant to support MacArthur in the defense of The Philippines was practically “given” to the British. Instead of escorting supply ships to The Philippines they were used for escorting British troops and supplies to Singapore. The situation was further complicated, delayed, by the intricate political proceedings of the Arcadia Conference. The problem was that every party expected the other to do more than they did themselves.
Just to have said it, the “Germany-first” strategy, which was an important subject during the conference did not retract from what was sent to the Pacific, on the contrary. While the “Germany-first” strategy was agreed upon in principle, in practice it was not adhered to. Eventually, and for the time being, the Pacific was given priority. Previous US troop assignments to Europe were cut down on, and delayed. Of three divisions promised to Europe, only one went there. The two others went to The Pacific. The North African operation (Gymnast/Magnet/Torch), so desperately promoted by Churchill, first hoped for to start in the Winter/Spring 1942, was delayed to May. Eventually it did not happen until November - because the US leadership prioritized shipping for The Pacific.
In the mean-time nobody listened, or catered to, MacArthur. For him, this resulted in nothing.
To stop the Japanese onslaught was one thing, the other was to save MacArthur. Why was this so important, apart from the fact that the country could be used as a future base for offensive operations?
In the Philippines were 120.000 US and Philippine troops that, with a proper injection of more US troops, advisory officers and materiel, could have been developed into a viable fighting force. This is proven by Bataan. Bataan was defended by a core of US, and Philippine manned units, mainly Philippine. These held out for three months with virtually no relief from the outside. The rest of The Philippines was left almost untouched by the Japanese until April, after Bataan had fallen, and then with quite weak forces. All the major islands had US garrisons which were preparing for receiving reinforcements from the outside. None came.
If the US leadership had been more politically aggressive they could also have made better use of the Anzac forces returning from the Middle East. This coupled with a combined US Army/Navy offensive along the lines indicated by you would have been a formidable force.
One thing that surprises me when studying this part of the war is the US negligence on what the Dutch could have contributed with in this area – The Moluccas. The Dutch had an extensive basing and communications system that could well have withstood the rather weak Japanese offensive forces, given some proper reinforcements. As a matter of fact, the Japanese plan for this advance route was weak in the extreme and was already shook up in their first landing in Davao, Mindanao. Their advance westwards from Davao had to be broken off because some of those forces were needed elsewhere, Tarakan, Menado, Kendari and Ambon. Tarakan and Menado were invaded beginning of January, Kendari and Ambon beginning of February.
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Anyway - I am not an accredited historian - but it is an aspect of this 'hobby I enjoy' - I am curious on your views.
Well, those are my views. And, from one un-accredited historian to another – I have to run – Tokyo is about to fall!
Fred
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RE: Saving MacArthur - Rookie AAR - 
... 
Never the less I found it very interesting. 
(but I will) 
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