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- 5/5/2003 2:52:27 AM   
pasternakski


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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Chiteng
[B]If the intent is to NOT want it to happen, then reasons will be found to say it could not happen. It is that simple.
If the intent is a desire to see it happen, then reasons will be found to see it happen. [/B][/QUOTE]

Oh, NOW I get it.

_____________________________

Put my faith in the people
And the people let me down.
So, I turned the other way,
And I carry on anyhow.

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Post #: 61
- 5/5/2003 3:04:23 AM   
Chiteng

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by pasternakski
[B]Oh, NOW I get it. [/B][/QUOTE]

It was obvious.
It has always been obvious.

And you can believe me, because I am always right, and I never lie.

_____________________________

“It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster.”

Voltaire

'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'

French Priest

"Statistic

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Post #: 62
- 5/5/2003 1:56:28 PM   
CynicAl


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[QUOTE]Originally posted by TIMJOT
[B]I wonder what kind of damage those special 16" armor pierceing bombs that, sank the Arizona, could have done on the cranes and dry docks. [/B][/QUOTE]
Probably not very much - the one that blew up Arizona appears to have been the only one of the 50 dropped in the first wave which a) hit a target and b) wasn't a dud. Most of them missed, as level bombing was not the most accurate way to deliver ordnance; most of the rest broke apart on impact or just failed to fuse. One hit the target and (apparently) worked as advertised. (The low success rate has actually prompted some speculation as to other possible mechanisms to explain the loss of Arizona; the reasoning being that while we don't know what happened to Arizona, we do know what happened every other time that type of bomb hit that sort of armor. So far, though, the "Golden BB" theory is still the least unsatisfactory of the available alternatives.)

Also, keep in mind that those things were in rather short supply. Since only one strike on PH was ever actually planned, Kido Butai only carried along enough of the "special" weapons - the 800kg AP bombs and the special shallow-running torpedos - to make... one strike. More would have consumed precious magazine space that was better filled with more general purpose munitions.

_____________________________

Some days you're the windshield.
Some days you're the bug.

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Post #: 63
- 5/5/2003 9:36:11 PM   
TIMJOT

 

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I guess that answers that. Any indication on why so many failed to detonate or broke up? Regarding special ordance, I agree with the AP bombs since they would be next to impossible to use against targets at sea, but were not those special torps in fact just standard torps with oversize wood fins that fit over the standard fins. Dont think keeping extra wood fins on hand would take up much space.

(in reply to Chiteng)
Post #: 64
- 5/5/2003 10:37:42 PM   
mdiehl

 

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[QUOTE]Hi it would be
USN ....[/QUOTE]

The critical damage at Midway was inflicted by fewer than 20 SBDs without air cover. Frankly, on 8 Dec it should be assumed that the readiness of the PH carriers is very low. I can't speak to how effective UV (and I assume WitP) will render CAP. The numbers I keep hearing about (50-150 a/c intercepting) are so absurd as to warrant suspension of game development until someone actually reads a few accounts of carrier battles with particular attention to the crappy nature of CAP/CAC pervasive in the Japanese fleet throughout the war and in the USN through 1942.

If the game is modeled properly, if the Jpn player has the option of any ahistorical opening move, then the possibility of surprise should not be guaranteed and the Allied player should be allowed to start his CVs wherever he wishes for them to be. All that Japan knew about the US CVs was that they were not at PH. They did not know, as the latter day 8th December 3rd wave Monday morning QBs know, that only 1 CV was in the area to do anything. *THAT* was one of the major reasons that led Nagumo to the CORRECT decision, under the given historical circumstances, to withdraw when he did.

Chiteng:

[QUOTE]And you can believe me, because I am always right, and I never lie.[/QUOTE]

Riiiiiiiight. :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes:

_____________________________

Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Didn't we have this conversation already?

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Post #: 65
- 5/5/2003 11:52:22 PM   
Chiteng

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by TIMJOT
[B]I guess that answers that. Any indication on why so many failed to detonate or broke up? Regarding special ordance, I agree with the AP bombs since they would be next to impossible to use against targets at sea, but were not those special torps in fact just standard torps with oversize wood fins that fit over the standard fins. Dont think keeping extra wood fins on hand would take up much space. [/B][/QUOTE]

Actually I dont see that that answers anything.
What I do see, is that Cynical Al believes that the shells
did nothing. But that is all I see.

_____________________________

“It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster.”

Voltaire

'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'

French Priest

"Statistic

(in reply to Chiteng)
Post #: 66
- 5/5/2003 11:53:38 PM   
Chiteng

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]The critical damage at Midway was inflicted by fewer than 20 SBDs without air cover. Frankly, on 8 Dec it should be assumed that the readiness of the PH carriers is very low. I can't speak to how effective UV (and I assume WitP) will render CAP. The numbers I keep hearing about (50-150 a/c intercepting) are so absurd as to warrant suspension of game development until someone actually reads a few accounts of carrier battles with particular attention to the crappy nature of CAP/CAC pervasive in the Japanese fleet throughout the war and in the USN through 1942.

If the game is modeled properly, if the Jpn player has the option of any ahistorical opening move, then the possibility of surprise should not be guaranteed and the Allied player should be allowed to start his CVs wherever he wishes for them to be. All that Japan knew about the US CVs was that they were not at PH. They did not know, as the latter day 8th December 3rd wave Monday morning QBs know, that only 1 CV was in the area to do anything. *THAT* was one of the major reasons that led Nagumo to the CORRECT decision, under the given historical circumstances, to withdraw when he did.

Chiteng:



Riiiiiiiight. :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: [/B][/QUOTE]

Obviously Mdiehl has no knowledge of Firesign theater

_____________________________

“It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster.”

Voltaire

'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'

French Priest

"Statistic

(in reply to Chiteng)
Post #: 67
- 5/6/2003 2:01:31 AM   
showboat1


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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]To do anything to the strategic sub war, you need to find out where the torpedoes are stored and hit them. Ten times as effective as bombing the subs themselves. [/B][/QUOTE]

The loss of torpedoes, machining equipment, and spare parts at Cavite hurt the US sub effort in the Phillippines badly.

_____________________________

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Post #: 68
- 5/6/2003 2:15:51 AM   
madflava13


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Loss of the torpedos was the most important accomplishment of the Japanese destruction and eventual capture of Cavite. As late as 1944, US Subs were sent out on patrol with less than full compliments of torpedos. Early in the war, US fleet type subs often used Mk. 10s, which were intended for use on the old S-Boats. I know of one occasion (Tang's final patrol in late 1944) where the sub wouldn't have left with a full compliment of torps had another sub not come down with a mechanical failure, allowing her compliment to be given to Tang. Unfortunately, those were Mk. 18-1s, which were prone to circular runs. One did just that, sinking Tang in the Formosa Strait.

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Post #: 69
- 5/6/2003 11:23:02 AM   
TIMJOT

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]

If the game is modeled properly, if the Jpn player has the option of any ahistorical opening move, then the possibility of surprise should not be guaranteed and the Allied player should be allowed to start his CVs wherever he wishes for them to be. All that Japan knew about the US CVs was that they were not at PH. They did not know, as the latter day 8th December 3rd wave Monday morning QBs know, that only 1 CV was in the area to do anything. *THAT* was one of the major reasons that led Nagumo to the CORRECT decision, under the given historical circumstances, to withdraw when he did.

[/B][/QUOTE]

In this particular instance I disagree. The opening move is still historical ie; the attack on PH. Simply adding a third attack would not have changed the circumstances of the attack ie; early dectection of the attack force, allowing for redeployment of carriers for an ambush. Whatever Nagumo decided at that point would not have allowed the USN to redeploy its carriers where ever he wished them to be.

Yes, Nagumo did not know if all three CVs were in the area, but he did know no more than three COULD be in the area. I am not one who thinks a third attack would have been worth the effort (with the possible exception of a concentrated attack on the oil farms) heck, I dont even think the first or second attack was worth the effort, but Nagumo's mission was to Destroy the US PacFleet. Yamamoto was prepared to lose up to 1/2 his carrier force to that end. IMO with the foreknowledge of at LEAST 2:1 odds, his mission mandated he conduct a search and destroy mission for those carriers. The USN had been surprised, bloodied and knocked off balanced. Unlike Midway, PH LBA had been effectively nuetralized. IMO the USN was lucky a more astute airminded Adm. like a Ozawa or Yamaguchi was not in command. For we know now that Halsey was looking for a fight and did NOT wait to link up with the Lex, before he set out to find and attack the enemy fleet. Had Nagumo obliged, he would have face 1:6 odds and CERTAIN defeat.

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Post #: 70
- 5/6/2003 9:57:54 PM   
mdiehl

 

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The heart of your premise is that the Jpn player should reap full immediate tactical benefit from 60 years of historical hindsight, and tactical information (where the Allied CVs will be at set up is a known characteeristic of the OOB, as is knowledge of the likelihood of success at PH) without risk. It's a poor idea for a strategy simulation, but ok if you change the name of the game to "War in the Pacific on Planet Xenon."

In reality, Japan had no sureties that the PH attack would achieve tactical surprise and no knowledge of the location of the US CVs. A GOOD game will force the Jpn player to confront these realities. An AXIS FANBOY FANTASY will simply allow the Jpn player to skip over these realities and make complete use of knowlegde that was not available to Jpn at the time.

_____________________________

Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Didn't we have this conversation already?

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Post #: 71
- 5/6/2003 11:11:49 PM   
TIMJOT

 

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I third attack scenerio is a perfectly legitamate "what if scenerio" If it presupposes for whatever reason the decision had been made. You are correct that it is not a legitamate scenerio if it portends to simulate the circumstances of that decision. In that case you would have to allow for variable deployment of all three carriers, but would aslo have to include for variable deployment of the IJN TF becuase the USN had no confirmation from where the attacks came. the hindsite thing is really a wash IMO.

Regarding hindsite, since we were discussing actions on the 8th, the IJN benifits no more from hindsite than the USN player. Yes he knows they are in the general area west of Hawaii on turn one, but on turn two he has no idea if the USN player has sent them NE for an direct attack, East to take advantage of whatever assetts Hawaii can offer. South out of harmsway. North in an attempt to cut off IJN withdrawl. Or east in an end around and possible ambush. He knows he is faceing 2 CVs but he doesnt know if they are being combined or operating independently. Correspondingly the USN player knows the general location of the IJN TF NW of Hawaii, the composition of that fleet, there effective attack range ect... The USN player does not have to worry that another IJN TF is going to pop-up from the west or south on the 8th. The hindsite thing is really a wash IMO.

Regarding the search and destroy mission, that is just my opinion what Nagumo should have done in the context of his mission and what he did know about the USN strengths. It was not a suggestion of a Alt History scenerio. However if it was going to be a scenerio then I agree it would have to allow for variable deployment of the Lex and Enterprise, but NOT the Saratoga. Including the Sara would be an altogether different what if option.

(in reply to Chiteng)
Post #: 72
repairs - 5/22/2003 10:09:51 PM   
wpurdom

 

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"PH is low on supply because of what? The bombing? What sort of supply is lacking? Engineers? Does the game model assume that all the engineers in PH are sitting around a table in abuilding with a sign on the roof that says "Civil Engineering Division: Bomb Here?"

Repair teams don't work that way. The Civil Engineers whose specialty is substrate, rail lines and runways are not going to be involved in ship damage control because they're not going to know anything about it. For that sort of stuff you'd need mechanical engineers that specialize in naval design (like my cousins). "

I certainly am glad that supply is low in Pearl on the first day, since according to Mogami, that's the constraint on repairs. mdiehl's hypotheticals on repairs I think would apply to the [I]second[/I] hypothetical attack on Pearl. As Morrison points out, the Navy probably had the frogmen, etc., on hand to keep the California from sinking but couldn't get its act together. (The California finished sinking on 12/10). That has to be one of the highest priorities in the whole facility. What makes anyway think the repair ingrediates or even the command responsibility to undertake these simple repairs is available in Pearl on 12/7? You're not going to fly any rails out to Pearl in the couple of weeks after the attack if they are not on hand. Why do we think there were any military civil engineers with these specialties available or that you will be able to quickly mobilize civilian contractors to do the work. They're probably not even authorized to single-source the contract, so that they have to put it out on bid until someone gets around to authorizing new emergency war-time measures - probably not before Nimitz arrives. IIRC, when the attack on Wake came, the civilian contractors were useless.
I think Cavite Naval yard in the Phillipines is the best model for the effectiveness of an air attack on naval facilites [B]in December 1941[/B] and that example suggests a large prolonged-temporary impact. mdiehl's evaluations may be more typical of what would have occurred after March, 1942.

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Post #: 73
Re: repairs - 5/22/2003 10:16:50 PM   
Chiteng

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by wpurdom
[B]"PH is low on supply because of what? The bombing? What sort of supply is lacking? Engineers? Does the game model assume that all the engineers in PH are sitting around a table in abuilding with a sign on the roof that says "Civil Engineering Division: Bomb Here?"

Repair teams don't work that way. The Civil Engineers whose specialty is substrate, rail lines and runways are not going to be involved in ship damage control because they're not going to know anything about it. For that sort of stuff you'd need mechanical engineers that specialize in naval design (like my cousins). "

I certainly am glad that supply is low in Pearl on the first day, since according to Mogami, that's the constraint on repairs. mdiehl's hypotheticals on repairs I think would apply to the [I]second[/I] hypothetical attack on Pearl. As Morrison points out, the Navy probably had the frogmen, etc., on hand to keep the California from sinking but couldn't get its act together. (The California finished sinking on 12/10). That has to be one of the highest priorities in the whole facility. What makes anyway think the repair ingrediates or even the command responsibility to undertake these simple repairs is available in Pearl on 12/7? You're not going to fly any rails out to Pearl in the couple of weeks after the attack if they are not on hand. Why do we think there were any military civil engineers with these specialties available or that you will be able to quickly mobilize civilian contractors to do the work. They're probably not even authorized to single-source the contract, so that they have to put it out on bid until someone gets around to authorizing new emergency war-time measures - probably not before Nimitz arrives. IIRC, when the attack on Wake came, the civilian contractors were useless.
I think Cavite Naval yard in the Phillipines is the best model for the effectiveness of an air attack on naval facilites [B]in December 1941[/B] and that example suggests a large prolonged-temporary impact. mdiehl's evaluations may be more typical of what would have occurred after March, 1942. [/B][/QUOTE]

I think it is fairly obvious that Mdeihl simply does NOT wish to see
an option to strike a paralyzing blow at Pearl that immobilizes
the Fleet for a significant period of time(say 6 months).

In his case, not even 3 months.

His argument was slanted with specific intent to attempt to prevent that idea. He very likely believes it also.

Just like another poster spits nails when it is suggested that
ahistorical ship builds be allowed (like the Montana)

Some people simply are only confortable with re-plays of
former events.

_____________________________

“It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster.”

Voltaire

'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'

French Priest

"Statistic

(in reply to Chiteng)
Post #: 74
P.S. - 5/22/2003 10:16:50 PM   
wpurdom

 

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Compare Eisenhower's remarks in Crusade in Europe about the lack of a war-time mentality in North Africa a year later. After the general comments once example he specifically mentions is that military personnel wouldn't authorize driving the combat vehicles to the front due to peace-time procedures designed to protect the effective life of the vehicles. That's after a year of war and a contested invasion. In December 1941 at Pearl its going to take weeks to get orgnaized on a proper war footing particularly with the distraction of dealing with the damaged ships, planes and the feared invasion.

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Post #: 75
- 5/22/2003 10:27:59 PM   
Doug Olenick

 

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During the war is it was a very common practice for capital ships to fuel destroyers, as can be in done in Pacwar.

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Post #: 76
- 5/22/2003 10:45:41 PM   
mdiehl

 

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[QUOTE]You're not going to fly any rails out to Pearl in the couple of weeks after the attack if they are not on hand. Why do we think there were any military civil engineers with these specialties available or that you will be able to quickly mobilize civilian contractors to do the work.[/QUOTE]

Because rolling stock, rails, ties and civil engineers were available in plenty stateside. The difference between PH and cavite is the length of the logistical train, and the ability to get stuff there. Unless Japan invades the HI, there is absolutely nothing to stop the full brunt of US logistical power from bring PH up to capacity very quickly. And, the engineers, rails, alls sorts of stuff ALREADY EXISTED in hundreds of idled rail lines, factories, and industrial towns throughout the US. The only question is the speed and quantity with which they can be moved to Hawaii, and that question is entirely a matter of transport capacity.

[QUOTE]IIRC, when the attack on Wake came, the civilian contractors were useless.[/QUOTE]

Useless for what? They weren't trained to operate AAA or coastal artillery. And they were in the middle of nowhere at the end of a non-existent logistical rope. Put these same guys in Hawaii (rather than some isolated sand bar with few tools and no supplies) and in a week they'd have built another 3000 foot runway almost anywhere you wanted one.

IMO that's one of the problems with PW. Can't say for WitP. The speed with which US engineers can improve positions and build runways in forward areas is greatly underestimated. In rear areas -- major towns and urban centers in the HI, Australia and continental US, runways and improved positions ought to spring up almost "on demand."



I think Cavite Naval yard in the Phillipines is the best model for the effectiveness of an air attack on naval facilites in December 1941 and that example suggests a large prolonged-temporary impact. mdiehl's evaluations may be more typical of what would have occurred after March, 1942.

_____________________________

Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Didn't we have this conversation already?

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Post #: 77
- 5/23/2003 12:53:29 AM   
TIMJOT

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]
IMO that's one of the problems with PW. Can't say for WitP. The speed with which US engineers can improve positions and build runways in forward areas is greatly underestimated. [/B][/QUOTE]

I dont think you have to worry about that in WitP. In UV US Eng. units, especially the ones with engineering vehicles can put up airfiields in no time. The relative large number of these units make it almost impossible to incapacitate a major allied airbase for anything but the briefest time.

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Post #: 78
- 5/26/2003 11:39:40 AM   
showboat1


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On a side note, since it was brought up, I must spring to the defense of the civilian engineers on Wake Island. After a short period of adjustment they performed amzing work with little to work with. They built bombshelters, repaired the runway, built revetments for the aircraft, helped move and camoflage and build defenses for gun emplacements. They served as ammunition handlers, passing shells from the makeshift magazines they had built tot he guns. Some even learned how to crew the guns themselves and several actually pitched in during battle when Marines fell and needed replacing. In the end they fought side by side with the Marines, using the weapons of the dead and wounded and even in some cases simply throwing rocks. They were most assuredly NOT useless. They were described as indispensable assets to the defense of Wake Island. They fought and died and endured the captivity, torture, and torment. They were not useless.

_____________________________

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(in reply to Chiteng)
Post #: 79
- 5/26/2003 2:59:32 PM   
Mike Scholl

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]

In reality, Japan had no sureties that the PH attack would achieve tactical surprise and no knowledge of the location of the US CVs. A GOOD game will force the Jpn player to confront these realities. An AXIS FANBOY FANTASY will simply allow the Jpn player to skip over these realities and make complete use of knowlegde that was not available to Jpn at the time. [/B][/QUOTE]

While they had no sureties, they did have a reasonable
expectation of achieving suprise do to their planning. History
shows that US errors and attitudes made it an even better
chance than the Japanese themselves thought. A third Jap
airstrike in the afternoon of the 7th is not an outrageous idea
and would still leave a significant "reserve" aboard Kido Butai
should Enterprise decide to fight (Yorktown wouldn't be in
range). It's "gamey" in the sense that the primary targets
would be the oil tanks and Submarine Shops, neither of which
were the kind of targets the IJN was historically drawn to---
but part of the purpose of a game is to see what might have
happened had the original participants in the affair been as
"clever" as the game-players.

It would (and should) include the chance that Enterprise
MIGHT get in a strike with the kind of lucky timing that occurred
at Midway. Of course, the US search could "miss", and leave
the Enterprise "hung out to dry" as well. And everything in
between. A GOOD game would have all these possibilities.
If 2by3 comes up with a game that makes all of this possibile,
they'll have succeeded in my book.

(in reply to Chiteng)
Post #: 80
- 5/26/2003 10:41:09 PM   
mdiehl

 

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[QUOTE]While they had no sureties, they did have a reasonable
expectation of achieving suprise do to their planning. History
shows that US errors and attitudes made it an even better
chance than the Japanese themselves thought. A third Jap
airstrike in the afternoon of the 7th is not an outrageous idea
and would still leave a significant "reserve" aboard Kido Butai
should Enterprise decide to fight (Yorktown wouldn't be in
range). It's "gamey" in the sense that the primary targets
would be the oil tanks and Submarine Shops, neither of which
were the kind of targets the IJN was historically drawn to---
but part of the purpose of a game is to see what might have
happened had the original participants in the affair been as
"clever" as the game-players.[/QUOTE]

"History" does not "show" anything. People writing about historical events make claims, some of which logically follow from that which is known, and some of which does not. In re "expectations" we're talking about how the game should work from the perepsective of people at the time. The Japanese could not in any way "know" what the alert state of the HI would be, nor could they "expect" surprise. All that they could accomplish was to do the best they could to achieve it.

Had they known that their diplomatic and some naval codes were being read, they'd probably have turned back. As it was, only a very wierd set of coincidences allowed them to pull off the surprise raid. Decrypts in translation on 5 December (and there were multiple decrypts) pointed to a high-priority interest in the Pacfleet and ships at anchor in PH. The convergence was strong enough that the in-the-lab codebreakers saw the consistency and red flagged a bunch for immediate review. Alas, a Friday afternoon and a couple of lax superiors resulted in these being shelved "until Monday" (8 Dec. see Stanley Weintraub "A Long Day's Journey Into War").

Throw in any of another slightly altered decisions on 6 Dec in HI and 7 Dec (at the radar station CO level) and tactical surprise is lost. I think a realistic WW2PTO game should begin with the IJN player NOT KNOWING whether or not his strike is going to gain surprise. Of course, most IJN players would cave if the PH raid did not get surprise and was met with substantial opposition, so for the sake of a game that runs until 1945 it's probably better that "surprise" is hard coded.

[QUOTE]It would (and should) include the chance that Enterprise
MIGHT get in a strike with the kind of lucky timing that occurred
at Midway. Of course, the US search could "miss", and leave
the Enterprise "hung out to dry" as well.[/QUOTE]

This is a fundamental misunderstanding of the events at Midway. The timing of the Midway strikes was deliberately calculated to hit the Japanese fleet when they were recovering a/c and otherwise fully maxxed on their command and control.

One should not assume that only Enterprise is available to counterattack. If one is going to take away the uncertainty about surprise on PH, and if one is going to allow the IJN player the option to mount successive raids on PH, then the game should force the IJN player to deal with the historical realities of the moment: managing a mission-overtasked bloated TF of 6 CVs in the face of great uncertainty as to the locations of two American CVs who might, even as that "3rd wave" begins to head off to bomb those oil farms, arrive overhead and sink 6 Japanese CVs at the outset of the game.

_____________________________

Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Didn't we have this conversation already?

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Post #: 81
.... - 5/27/2003 12:50:58 AM   
Highlander

 

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For the IJN 6 carriers it would be easy to sunk the two US carriers, because they had much more and better planes. The IJN only needs a good timing of their CAP.

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Post #: 82
- 5/27/2003 12:59:12 AM   
Chiteng

 

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From: Raleigh,nc,usa
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]The heart of your premise is that the Jpn player should reap full immediate tactical benefit from 60 years of historical hindsight, and tactical information (where the Allied CVs will be at set up is a known characteeristic of the OOB, as is knowledge of the likelihood of success at PH) without risk. It's a poor idea for a strategy simulation, but ok if you change the name of the game to "War in the Pacific on Planet Xenon."

In reality, Japan had no sureties that the PH attack would achieve tactical surprise and no knowledge of the location of the US CVs. A GOOD game will force the Jpn player to confront these realities. An AXIS FANBOY FANTASY will simply allow the Jpn player to skip over these realities and make complete use of knowlegde that was not available to Jpn at the time. [/B][/QUOTE]

It is odd that Mdiehl is perfectly willing to complain in this instance
when it 'might' favor the Japs. Yet you see no such complaints from him about a player extending the use of Coastal Subs
simply because a player knows that the Coastal Subs are more
effective, when in reality, the Commanders didnt know that.

So which is it? Effective 100% hindsight or reality?
Or is it a case of 'anything that favors the USN is good'?

_____________________________

“It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster.”

Voltaire

'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'

French Priest

"Statistic

(in reply to Chiteng)
Post #: 83
- 5/27/2003 1:18:53 AM   
mdiehl

 

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[QUOTE]For the IJN 6 carriers it would be easy to sunk the two US carriers, because they had much more and better planes. The IJN only needs a good timing of their CAP.[/QUOTE]

Almost every word in those two sentences, save the articles and prepositions, is incorrect. Assuming that two US CVs launch a coordinated strike (which they did off the coast of New Guinea in Spring 1942, and again, twice, at Coral Sea), and times it such that the strike arrives when the IJN TF is heavily involved in plane handling (as they did at Midway), then the US would have roughly 75 strike aircraft and 30 escorts facing maybe 30 Japanese fighter in a poorly coordinated CAP. Since USN CV based wildcats shot down 1.5 Zekes per Wildcat shot down, and since US aircraft had superior team coordination, it is reasonable to assume that most of the US strike a/c would make it through the IJN CAP. It takes approximately 2x1000lb bomb hits to sink a vulnerable IJN CV, if the target is as vulnerable as the ones at Midway. Maybe 5 hits to do for one in a proper state of damage control readiness. IMO there's enough dauntlesses in the hypothetical strike to EASILY do the job.

As to "better" planes, much of that is dependent on what you mean by better. If you're talking about divebombing, the SBDs were far superior to Vals. If you're talking about fighters, it helps to know that the F4F had a greater roll rate, and could beat an A6M in a 180 degree direction change at speeds in excess of around 320 mph. Only at speeds lower than 250 knots did the A6M excel at maneuver combat. And the other vulnerabilities of Japanese a/c are well-known.

_____________________________

Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Didn't we have this conversation already?

(in reply to Chiteng)
Post #: 84
.... - 5/27/2003 2:03:11 AM   
Highlander

 

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From: Germany
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The Mitsubishi A6M outperformed the F4F, OK the US planes are well-armed and reliable, but the elite IJN pilots are simply better.
This elite pilots are a very good an coordinated in their fighting aginst the US planes.
You must read some books, the SBD was a small aircraft, slow and vulnerable, and already considered obsolete when it entered service. At Pearl Harbor the 129 'Vals' launched from six carriers (37 percent of the plans in the two attack waves) struck at Army and Navy airfields as well as the U.S. warships. In the subsequent Japanese carrier sweep of the Pacific the 'Vals' were highly effective; in the Indian Ocean on April 5, 1942, an attack of fifty-three 'Vals' sank two British heavy cruisers in just nineteen minutes - every bomb released at the radically maneuvering warships was a hit or near miss.
A fact is that the crack pilots of the first month could easily handle a 1:1 fight against a US carrier fleet.

(in reply to Chiteng)
Post #: 85
- 5/27/2003 2:29:35 AM   
mdiehl

 

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[QUOTE]The Mitsubishi A6M outperformed the F4F, OK the US planes are well-armed and reliable, but the elite IJN pilots are simply better.[/QUOTE]

This is factually incorrect on both counts. The A6M's relative strengths were as follows: Greater climb rate. Greater maximum level flight speed (by about 8mph, so the advantage was very small). Lower time required to complete a 180 degree reversal of direction at airspeeds lower than about 280 mph. The A6M's major flaws included: The famous lack of defensive armor or self-sealing fuel tanks. Crappy armament, including rifle caliber MGs (almost useless) and low rof, low-velocity cannons. Poor structural strength. Near complete lack of maneuverability at speeds in excess of 350 mph, so it could not follow any opponent diving out of combat, nor could it dive out of combat to avoid being destroyed.

The F4Fs advantages were: Heavier, more reliable armament (four .50 MGs, six MGs in F4F-4 series). Heavy armor and extremely durable construction (for which Grumman was legendary). Very rapid acceleration in a dive. Greater roll rate at all speeds (meaning that an overtaking A6M would often overshoot an F4F rolling out of the way). Greater maximum speed dive (in excess of 400 mph. Japanese A6Ms, by comparison, tended to break up at speeds in excess of 370 mph). The F4Fs' only relative weaknesses were lower climb rate and, at slow speeds, poor acceleration and inferior low-speed (less than 280-300 mph approximately) time-to-turn (180 degree) as compared with the Zero.

As to pilot quality. It is an established fact that in direct confrontations between USN VM (carried based) F4F pilots shooting at or being shot at by A6Ms, in 1942, the US pilots shot down roughly 1.5 Zeros per Wildcat lost. Japanese naval pilots were not superior in any way. Their particular weaknesses included the use of an outdated 3-plane section in combat, and poor mutual support doctrine. Japanese sources complain, as late as 1943, that pilots were being encouraged to fight as individuals rather than as mutually supporting teams. in contrast, the USN used 2x2-plane sections based on the German innovations of 1938-1940, gleaned by studying the Battle of Britain. USN fighter pilot combat doctrine was superior, even before particular maneuvers like the "beam defense" (a.k.a. "Thach-weave" a.k.a. "Thach-Flatley weave") were in vogue.

Most people who believe in the elite status of IJN naval pilots can only grasp air time and in-theater combat experience in China. To that I can only respond that the evidence proves that USN pilots were better, regardless of the amount of time in training, and that combat experience in China probably taught the Japanese all the wrong lessons in attempting to go up against a 1st line opposition.

[QUOTE]A fact is that the crack pilots of the first month could easily handle a 1:1 fight against a US carrier fleet.[/QUOTE]

That's not a fact, that's your opinion. Based on the actual engagements with verified unit records (not pilot claims), one would expect an equal number of USN fighters and IJN fighters to fight to a draw, or else have the US win by a margin of 1.2:1 to 2:1. IMO, an a 1:1 fight of US aircraft vs. Japanese ones, the fighter loss ratio will be about 1:1-2:1 favoring the US, and the losses in strike aircraft will be 2:1 - 3:1 favoring the US (because US strike aircraft have a much higher chance of surviving battle damage from AAA).

[QUOTE]You must read some books[/QUOTE]

It's not how much you read. It's what you read. Based on your comments I'm pretty sure I've read better books (and quite possibly more books) than the ones you've read.

In other respects. USN dive bomber training was better; the USN invented dive bombing in 1936, and the Gemans and Japanese copied thereafter. Dive bombing was the principle strike emphasis of the USN. The SBD was a better weapon system than the Val, and it had better defensive armor. I'm not dissing the Val much in pointing this out. Like the Stuka (Ju-87), it was an excellent dive bomber as long as there was nothing in the way to oppose it. The same can be said of the Stringbag (Fairey Swordfish) as a torpedo bomber. The battles with Eastern Fleet are instructive primarily because of the repeated lesson (to the British) that warships that lack air cover are very vulnerable. And face it, Hermes' pathetic complement of aircraft scarcely counts as "air cover."

_____________________________

Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Didn't we have this conversation already?

(in reply to Chiteng)
Post #: 86
.... - 5/27/2003 2:48:27 AM   
Highlander

 

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From: Germany
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Here is a part of a good book for you...
But I know you think you have the only good books...

ALLIED FIGHTERS: THE F4F WILDCAT
From Pages 250 to 252



Until August 1942, except for the Battle of the Coral Sea in May, USAAF and Australian pilots flying over Australia and New Guinea bore the brunt of the air war against Japan. When the Marines invaded Guadalcanal an entirely new front opened up in the Solomons. For six months Marine pilots flying from famous Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, as well as comrades in the U.S. Navy operating from Admiral Halsey’s aircraft carriers, were in the center of the storm. Fortunately for the United States during late 1942, when the entire campaign was in the balance, navy and Marine pilots had an able fighter—the Grumman F4F Wildcat.


Grumman engineers designed the Wildcat for use on aircraft carriers, a Grumman specialty. Its F3F biplane was the standard navy fighter before the war and a design influence on the Wildcat. The Wildcat, like all carrier-based planes (including the Zero), had to be built in such a way that allowed carrier pilots to cope with the difficult challenges presented by take-offs and landings on a tiny, tossing flight deck . Knowing this the Grumman designers, like their Japanese counterparts working on the Zero, gave the Wildcat great lift by situating the large wing very far forward on the fuselage. The high lift generated by the large wing area helped the pilot take off quickly and land slowly. It also made the Wildcat the most maneuverable aircraft flown by American pilots in 1942.

Like the Zero the Wildcat paid a penalty for its high lift: slower level speed. High lift, so necessary for low-speed performance, works against pure speed. The only way to compensate for this reality is to increase the power of the engine. Eventually this is what American designers did. When Grumman produced the Wildcat, however, the 1,200-horsepower Pratt and Whitney radial engine was the best available. Note that the Zero possessed even greater lift than did the Wildcat and mounted a somewhat smaller engine. The Zero, however, was nearly 1,600 pounds lighter, giving it a better power-to-weight ratio. Consequently at most altitudes the Zero was slightly faster than the Wildcat. The USN and Grumman, however, helped to even the odds somewhat by fitting the Pratt and Whitney engine with the first of what became the standard mechanically driven two-stage two-speed supercharger, thereby allowing the engine to keep its power up to a reasonable altitude. Like all the early-war fighters, however, the Wildcat was happier below 20,000 feet than above it. Although the Wildcat was nimble for a U.S. warplane, it could not match the Zero’s outstanding flight characteristics in most spheres.

Marine and Navy pilots at the time did not, in general, hold the Wildcat in very high esteem. In the carrier engagements and early in the Guadalcanal campaign they felt outclassed when confronting the Zero. In August 1942 Lieutenant Commander John Thach, a hero at Midway and famous tactician, told his superiors:

In connection with the performance of the Zero fighter, any success we had against the Zero is not due to performance of the airplane we fly but is the result of the comparatively poor marksmanship on the part of the Japanese, stupid mistakes made by a few of their pilots and superior marksmanship and teamwork on the part of some of our pilots. This deficiency not only prevents our fighter [the F4F—EB] from properly carrying out its mission but it has had an alarming effect on the morale of the fighter pilots in the Fleet at this time and on those who are going to be sent to the Fleet.
J.A.O. Stub, a pilot with the Marine squadron VMF 121 on Guadalcanal, recalls a pep talk given by one the famous leaders of the Cactus Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Joe Bauer: “Bauer was a splendid leader and pilot. When comparing the Zero with the F4F, Bauer said, ‘A Zero can go faster than you can, it climb faster than you can, and it can outmaneuver you. Aside from those things, you’ve got a better airplane.’” Yet in time the Wildcat showed some very formidable features. For carrier use the F4F was extremely stable, thus keeping down the accidental losses that plagued carrier operations. Interesting testimony on this comes from John Herbert, a British pilot who flew off of HMS Victorious. In early 1943 the Royal Navy agreed to lend Victorious to Admiral Halsey in the South Pacific so the battle-scarred Enterprise could receive a full refit on the West Coast. By this time Fleet Air Arm was largely equipped with F4Fs, which it called the "Martlet."

RETURN TO BOOK EXCERPTS ON FIGHTERS PAGE
RETURN TO THE FIRE IN THE SKY HOME PAGE

(in reply to Chiteng)
Post #: 87
re: Mdiehl - 5/27/2003 2:54:27 AM   
Chiteng

 

Posts: 7666
Joined: 2/20/2001
From: Raleigh,nc,usa
Status: offline
Most people who believe in the elite status of IJN naval pilots can only grasp air time and in-theater combat experience in China. To that I can only respond that the evidence proves that USN pilots were better, regardless of the amount of time in training, and that combat experience in China probably taught the Japanese all the wrong lessons in attempting to go up against a 1st line opposition.

*************************************************
And with the above statement Mdeihl makes it very plain
that he gives no credence whatever to ANY idea of Japanese
superiority in ANY weapon system.

So what then do we call him? An 'Allied Fanboy?'

_____________________________

“It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster.”

Voltaire

'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'

French Priest

"Statistic

(in reply to Chiteng)
Post #: 88
.... - 5/27/2003 3:06:15 AM   
Highlander

 

Posts: 50
Joined: 5/17/2002
From: Germany
Status: offline
'Allied Fanboy?' that sound´s good, but we must respect every person in this forum and his view of the great war.

But one question mdiehl: Do you think that some IJN weapon are much better then the allied ones ?

(in reply to Chiteng)
Post #: 89
- 5/27/2003 3:09:04 AM   
TIMJOT

 

Posts: 1822
Joined: 4/30/2001
Status: offline
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]Almost every word in those two sentences, save the articles and prepositions, is incorrect. Assuming that two US CVs launch a coordinated strike (which they did off the coast of New Guinea in Spring 1942, and again, twice, at Coral Sea), and times it such that the strike arrives when the IJN TF is heavily involved in plane handling (as they did at Midway), then the US would have roughly 75 strike aircraft and 30 escorts facing maybe 30 Japanese fighter in a poorly coordinated CAP. Since USN CV based wildcats shot down 1.5 Zekes per Wildcat shot down, and since US aircraft had superior team coordination, it is reasonable to assume that most of the US strike a/c would make it through the IJN CAP. It takes approximately 2x1000lb bomb hits to sink a vulnerable IJN CV, if the target is as vulnerable as the ones at Midway. Maybe 5 hits to do for one in a proper state of damage control readiness. IMO there's enough dauntlesses in the hypothetical strike to EASILY do the job.

As to "better" planes, much of that is dependent on what you mean by better. If you're talking about divebombing, the SBDs were far superior to Vals. If you're talking about fighters, it helps to know that the F4F had a greater roll rate, and could beat an A6M in a 180 degree direction change at speeds in excess of around 320 mph. Only at speeds lower than 250 knots did the A6M excel at maneuver combat. And the other vulnerabilities of Japanese a/c are well-known. [/B][/QUOTE]

Mdhiel, here we go again.

First, I believe the Lexington was euiquiped with F2A Buffalos not Wildcats on Dec 7 1941. Second you assume much. The fact is that in 3 out of the 4 carrier battles in the first year of the war the USN a/c failed to sink a single IJN CV coordinated strikes not withstanding. Midway was a brilliant success and yes the strikes were timed to *TRY* to catch the IJN carriers in the midst of recovery. However luck did play apart. The IJN had contingency plans (ie 2nd striked armed and ready for naval attack) if not for the fortuitus malfunction of a catapult, it was unlikely the CVs would have been caught in the condition they were historically.

As has been pointed out to you before, that unlike Midway the 3rd strike was planed with the expectation of USN CV intervention. Genda recomended 2 CVs held in reserve for just such a eventuality and additional CAP. It is also not reasonable to assume that under the circumstances of the PH attack that had Halsey or any other Adm. spotted the IJN CVs that he would have held back an attack with the hopes of catching them in the midts of recovery later. More likely he would have sent out an attack immediately. How could he do otherwise? Unlike Midway he would have no Idea how many CVs were out there or if some were actively hunting him at that very moment. He simply would not have the luxury of setting up a *timed* ambush.

How is it that Midway is regarded by you as the rule rather than the exception that it was , but Savo and Tassfronga are correspondingly considered exceptions?

(in reply to Chiteng)
Post #: 90
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