bomccarthy
Posts: 414
Joined: 9/6/2013 From: L.A. Status: offline
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A good recent history of the effects of the bombing campaign can be found in Phillips Payson O-Brien, How the War was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II (Cambridge University Press, 2015). Don’t overlook the most in-depth studies in the US Strategic Bombing Survey and the official USAAF history (The Army Air Forces In World War II, Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, Eds.). Both of these sources are now in public domain and PDFs can be downloaded for free at various sites. After the war, German industrial and policy leaders told Allied interrogators (primarily those with the US Strategic Bombing Survey) that one economic sector was key - transportation, specifically railyards and inland river ports in Germany. Anything that needed to be transported in large quantities had to move by rail and/or barge. And of all those products, coal was critical. Any industrial process that required heat (steel foundries, chemical plants, electric power generation - 75% of which was supplied by coal-fired plants) required large quantities of coal, as did the locomotives that moved everything. Moreover, the synthetic fuel that replaced petroleum-based fuels was converted from coal. The Allies didn’t start the systematic and repeated bombing German railyards (as opposed to French/Belgian/Dutch railyards) until September 1944. Many recall that German industrial production peaked in September 1944; by December it had fallen off a cliff. The USSBS noted the ineffectiveness of strategic bombing of other industrial sectors; however, it did note that the transportation campaign, which lasted from September until the end of the war, was effective in halting the movement of coal throughout Germany. Denied of more than just a trickle of coal, industrial production quickly broke down. Ironically, the Allies felt during the war that the transportation campaign wasn’t working, because its primary objective, halting the rail movement of troops and ammunition at the front, didn’t seem to occur. It was only after Allied troops crossed the Rhine in March 1945 that intelligence analysts observed what had happened to German industry since October. Rail transportation was considered so vital that German workers were pulled from factories into rail repair units (slave workers were considered too risky to work on rail repair). Even so, the amount of coal shipped in the Ruhr fell by almost 60% between September and October. By November factories were reduced to operating only when there was sufficient coal for their electrical generation plants, even though they had enough raw materials to produce at September levels for another year. Within the transportation campaign, the bombing of railyards had a greater effect than shooting up railways and trains. Rail movement hinges upon railyards, where trains are put together and broken down, and where locomotives are repaired. Aside from turntables, railyards can be quickly repaired, so repeated strikes against the same yards are required over a long period of time. However, the Germans did find that some yards were hit so often that the bombs effectively “plowed” the ground, making it too soft to support repaired railbeds without the use of heavy compacting equipment, which had to be transported by rail ….
< Message edited by bomccarthy -- 3/6/2018 9:08:51 PM >
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