LTCMTS
Posts: 300
Joined: 1/6/2003 From: Newnan, GA Status: offline
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The COHORT experiment of raising and keeping company sized units together throughout the enlistment period of the recruits was very successful in building cohesion, until most of the recruits opted out after their first enlistment. The return on investment just wasn't there, as moving units together across the world can be expensive. The US Army has been trying to workout a program of exchanging units between CONUS and OCONUS, everything from divisions in the early '60's to battalions in the late '70s. The British Army had some of the same problems in its imperial age, where first and second battalions were to switch off regularly between home and foreign service, but requirements always outran available units, so that some units remained overseas for decades. The difference between the US and British (and German) armies, now, is that the British and Germans no longer have to man extended forces committed to multiple theaters, allowing greater stability in tours for officer and NCO cadre. I was surprised (but not much) to meet a Major in a German partnership unit who had served 15 years in the same battalion. Another difference between British (and Canadian) and US armies is the length of tour for enlisted personnel. The US Army needed (and still needs) to replace 25-33% of its junior enlisted soldiers each year in peacetime. The British and Canadians run at less than 10%. This of course must be compared to the Soviet Army which had to replace 90% of its NCOs and 30% of its junior enlisted every year and train up 30% of its junior enlisted and 90% of its NCOs from scratch on top of that. Side comment, British company commanders are junior majors. US and most other NATO companies are commanded by junior CPTs, moving on to battalion staff after there command tour. One problem with the regimental system is that the "clans" don't tend to play well together. Many of the British Army's tactical failures in WW2 came out of the inability to execute combined arms training and execute coordinated tactical ops. Compare this with the German Army's ability to create ad hoc "battle groups" which showed remarkably constant combat effectiveness. Part of this was that the soldier's loyalty was to his primary group (squad) and in his pride in his profession and the Army as a corporate group. This was also because there was a common tactical doctrine that was enforced for all arms, which allowed disparate elements to operate together. A further comment on the Norwegians. As far as tactical skill, there is a definite difference at battalion and brigade level between Brigade "Nord", Brigade "South" and 9 other mobilization brigades, though there would be little difference in morale and the difference in readiness levels would coalesce the longer the other brigades are on AD and the further along they are in executing their training plans. I can't emphasize realistic, coherent, productive training enough, as a major contributor to unit readiness, cohesion and morale. A major difference between the late '70's US Army and the late '80's US Army was task oriented, performance based training, train till you got it right, not linked to a time line.
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