tolsdorff
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rottmann on CVE's quote:
C.3. Marine Aircraft Carrier Units Perhaps one the Marine Corps’ major failings in World War II was its failure to aggressively demand that Marine aviation units be deployed aboard carriers. The primary mission of Marine aviation was “the support of the Fleet Marine Force in landing operations and in support of troop activities in the field.” Through 1943, land-based Marine aircraft adequately supported the infantry in the closely grouped Solomons and on New Britain, where sufficient land bases were within range. But 1944 was a different matter. The Central Pacific islands were widely separated, and airfields were at a premium. Marine units operating from carriers would have been able to support landing operations from the be- ginning. While it is true that the Navy resisted efforts to embark Marine aviation aboard carriers, it is also true that the Marines did not push the point. Marine aviation had become enamored with shooting down enemy airplanes, a principal USAAF mission, while carrier-based Navy aviation provided much of the close air support to Marine ground units. As the Fleet Marine Force battled through the Marshalls and Marianas, supported by the Navy and USAAF, much of the Marine aviation was relegated to endlessly bombing bypassed, Japanese-held eastern Marshall and Caroline Islands into coral dust. It was not until the summer of 1944 that LtGen Vandegrift, Commandant of the Marine Corps, began to aggressively lobby for Marines aboard carriers. The war was expected to last into late 1946. Ground forces needed dedicated and specialized Marine close air support from the beginning of an operation. While all this made sense, the Navy initially balked, but the truth of the matter was that by late 1944, the Navy was hard-pressed to provide squadrons to all of its almost 50 escort carriers. This resulted in Marine squadrons filling gaps aboard fleet carriers as well. The Navy’s shortages were so severe that the scheduled 20 Jan 45 Iwo Jima assault was postponed until 19 Feb 45. It had to await the deployment of eight Marine squadrons on fleet carriers in order to have sufficient aircraft to execute preemptive strikes in the Tokyo area. Marine escort carrier air units were raised in the fall of 1944, squadron training was begun, and Navy air support training units were formed to train Marine squadrons in CAS. The first units were assigned to flattops in Feb 45. Marine carrier-based units were deployed aboard two types of aircraft carriers: fleet carriers (CV) and escort carriers (CVE). Marine aviation units embarked aboard CVs were subordinate to the Navy carrier air group (CVG) but were the sole unit aboard CVEs. Other Marine aviation units frequently operated off other carriers but were not committed directly to combat or were merely transported to fly into island bases, from which they conducted land-based combat opera- tions. The first Marine unit to fly combat missions from an aircraft carrier was Detachment, Flight Echelon, VMO-155 flying in support of the Army’s May 43 Attu Landing (Operation LANDCRAB ) from the USS Nassau (ACV-16, later rede- signated CVE-16). Equipped with three F4F-3P photo recon fighters, the detach- ment was the only FMF unit to operate in the North Pacific Area. *The Essex Carrier Air Group 4 (CVG-4) was commanded by a Marine officer from Jan 45. Marine fighting and torpedo-bombing squadrons specifically organized to op- erate from escort aircraft carriers had the sole mission of direct support of ground units. They were designated “(CVS)” for carrier squadron. It was originally en- visioned that 11 CVEs would be provided to the Marine Corps, but only 6 had been made available by V-J Day. Marine squadrons operating from fleet carriers retained their standard organization and were not redesignated “(CVS).” Carrier units were controlled by three echelons of command, all of which in- cluded “group” in their designations and can be confusing. These units were subordinate to Marine Carrier Groups, Aircraft, FMFPac established on 21 Oct 44. It controlled Marine Air Support Groups (MASG) 48 and 51 (the latter never deployed aboard carriers) during unit training. The MASGs were each respon- sible for four Marine Carrier Groups (MCVG), of which 16 were formed. MASG- 48’s MCVGs were each embarked aboard four Commencement Bay–class CVEs assigned to a six-carrier division. The other two ships of Carrier Division 27 hosted Navy aviation units to fly antisubmarine and combat air patrols. Each MCVG had a VMF(CVS) with 16 FM-2 (or F4U-1) and two F6F-5P (photo recon) fighters, a VMTB(CVS) with 12 TBM torpedo-bombers, and a Marine Carrier Aircraft Service Detachment (CASD) for centralized maintenance. The latter were components of the MASG, until actually assigned to a carrier. There was no MCVG headquarters; the senior squadron commander served in this billet. The USS Block Island (CVE-106, not to be confused with CVE-21 lost earlier) was equipped with a height-finder radar and could support night fighters. Its VMF(CVS)-511 was equipped with 10 FM-2 (or F4U-1), eight F6F-3N night, and two F6F-5P photo recon fighters. MASG-51 (2d Division, Marine Carrier Groups) was not committed to combat, but MASG-48, headquartered aboard USS Block Island, was (its MCVG-3 saw only very limited combat): The two Navy aviation–staffed CVEs rounding out the division were the USS Kula Gulf (CVE-108) and USS Siboney (CVE-112). It was planned for eight CVEs with MCVGs embarked to provide CAS during the invasion of Japan. MCVG-5 and 6 were embarked on USS Salerno Bay and USS Puget Sound on V-J Day but did not see combat. MCVG-7 and 8 were not embarked aboard CVEs until Nov 45. Besides carrier operations, another shipboard aviation initiative was consid- ered. The U.S. Navy was impressed by the IJN’s use of float planes for attack and reconnaissance from undeveloped forward island bases lacking airfields. It was proposed that twin float-equipped Marine scout-bombers and fighters (pre- sumably, Curtiss XSB2C-2 Helldivers and Grumman F4F-6S Wildcats) be based on specially built seaplane tenders to support advanced base operations. Four Currituck-class seaplane tenders (AV-7, 11–13) were built between 1944 and 1945 for this role and fitted with flush-deck catapults. This plan was never imple- mented, however. *Edit : edited the layout a little
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< Message edited by tolsdorff -- 12/25/2019 3:22:10 PM >
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