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RE: Naval War Day-by-Day

 
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RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 12/22/2019 12:20:01 PM   
warspite1


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quote:

ORIGINAL: lecrop

Amazing
Subscribed forever
warspite1

Thank-you, I've just got to keep it going this time - no distractions


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Post #: 331
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 12/22/2019 1:27:23 PM   
Zorch

 

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You have saved a future game designer a lot of work. Now who will be that designer?

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RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 12/22/2019 4:30:35 PM   
ringoblood


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Wow, Glad I found this thread, amazing warspite1. If you keep it going great, If not please start another threat with new story, your awesome, now we do need a Dev to start a game after this story/thread, it would be great, wargame to play.

Josh.

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Post #: 333
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 12/24/2019 4:16:05 AM   
warspite1


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The Mediterranean (background)

The order of battle in post 329 confirms that the Italian Navy was at an immediate disadvantage in numerical terms. But things weren’t quite as bad for them as it may at first glance seem. For when trying to weigh up the pros and cons of the competing forces in the Mediterranean, one could be forgiven in quickly coming to the conclusion that it was a case of trying to work out which side was the least disadvantaged…. This is no slur on the officers and men who were tasked with making and executing orders, but on the politicians (and many senior servicemen) – both previous and current - that put them in so poor a position.

So let’s look at the Italians first. The plans for the Regia Marina was as follows:

- A defensive posture to be adopted in the western and eastern basins and an offensive or counter-offensive posture in the central Mediterranean
- The Sicilian Channel to be blocked and so stop the movement of the enemy between west and east (and vice-versa)
- Surprise attacks to be carried out against enemy bases using special forces and aircraft
- Attacks to be made against enemy lines of communication using light and special forces
- To take every opportunity to fight where strength is equal or superior
- Submarine forces to coordinate with air and surface units
- To avoid battle where a condition of inferiority exists
- To bring the enemy battlefleet to battle where the fighting is closer to Italian bases than those of the enemy
- To protect Libya and Albania
- Isolated territories to be protected locally

The plans look pretty sensible. The army would be invading Egypt and so supply and reinforcement of Libya was crucial. To do this the invasion of Malta (or at least the suppression of the island as a base from which the RN and RAF could attack) would be required.

Oil would need to be conserved as the navy had about a year’s worth of reserves, but in any case, the Regia Marina simply had no need to go looking for trouble far from home outside of aircraft range and far from its bases. If the British and French wanted to stop supply of Libya and keep Malta supplied then trouble would come to them.

The Italian navy had a number of weaknesses, but also a good many advantages – certainly once the French exited the battle less than 2-weeks after Italy entered the war; the navy was soon to be bolstered with two modern, fast, 15-inch battleships that were more than a match for anything the RN could muster. Their older battleships had been modernised and had a speed advantage over their British opponents. The Italians had a fleet of 8-inch heavy cruisers – again out-gunning the RN cruisers.

A cursory glance at the map of the Mediterranean and it was clear that the Italians had the central position and thus were able to pick their battles with a view to defeating in detail their enemy. If the British were to try and maintain Malta as a base for operations (or simply to keep the island from starvation) then they would have to poke their heads into the lion’s den.

And that is what the British intended. Before the war Admiral Dudley Pound, then commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, believed that Malta should be abandoned in the event of war with Italy. He felt that, for the reasons given above, and the fact that the RN simply didn’t have the modern weapons necessary, the Italians would be able to wear down the RN through attrition. But it was decided that maintaining Malta in the war would be of benefit in defeating the Italians.
The objectives of the RN were:

- To bring the enemy to battle wherever they were found
- To provide reinforcement and supply of fleets and garrisons in the Mediterranean
- To maintain command of the sea in the eastern basin and so protect Egypt
- Interdiction of Italian attempts to supply Libya
- Interdiction of Italian trade with the Black Sea

When trying to bring an enemy to battle it is something of a major drawback when out-gunned and slower than the enemy. Add in a shortage of proper air cover and the situation becomes almost impossible.

Whether Pound was correct in suggesting abandonment of Malta was correct is highly debateable, but he was certainly correct in terms of the attrition that the RN was to suffer. As can be seen from the main convoy routes below, there is an enormous difference in distance that each side had to travel, the Italian forces were largely within aircraft range the whole way and the tight Sicilian Channel that convoys coming from the west would have to negotiate was perfect for attack by submarines and smaller vessels.

Pound was wrong about Italian air strength – fortunately for the British the Italians simply did not have the numbers to be able to suppress Malta completely. Moreover, Mussolini declared war with indecent and criminal haste (1.2 million tons of Italy’s merchant shipping totalling 3.3m tons were in foreign ports – 212 ships out of 786) as he was worried that, with France on her knees and the British kicked off the continent, Italy would not be able to claim territorial prizes if not an active member of the Axis. This meant he passed up the opportunity to try and invade Malta in the early weeks of the war when the island was defended by five battalions of infantry and three Gladiator biplanes.

And so, as the battle for the Middle Sea was about to be joined, each side had its strengths, each had its weaknesses. Who would prevail?






Sources:
On Seas Contested (O'Hara)
Struggle for the Middle Sea (O’Hara)
The War in the Mediterranean (Ireland)


Attachment (1)

< Message edited by warspite1 -- 12/24/2019 4:27:42 AM >


_____________________________

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805



(in reply to ringoblood)
Post #: 334
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 12/24/2019 4:29:08 AM   
warspite1


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The Mediterranean and the Red Sea (June 1940)

And so, with Mussolini’s declaration, the war expands yet further and all through the Middle Sea and along its shores, there was a flurry of activity. For some things had already been under way in the days leading to the declaration.

4th June

Starting on the 4th and continuing for five days, no less than 54 Italian submarines put to sea for what would become their first wartime patrols. In addition to patrols to catch enemy shipping, some submarines were employed as minelayers. The results would be poor however, not helped by the fact that the British had adopted the pre-war decision to cease traffic through the Mediterranean in the event of war with Italy.

5th June

Two Italian subs, Finzi and Cappelini left Cagliari, Sardinia, for the Atlantic. Finzi was to make it through the straits and operated off the Canaries – albeit without any success. Cappelini was to have a more fraught time of it (see below).

6th June

In the days leading up to the declaration a number of defensive mine barrages were laid by the Regia Marina along the Italian coast. Some of these were anti-shipping and others anti-submarine; 1,960 mines were laid in the Gulf of Genoa, 433 off Naples, 2,196 mines were laid off Sardinia, 1,375 around Sicily, a further 2,335 were laid in the southern Adriatic and the Gulf of Taranto, 769 mines were laid in the northern Adriatic and 800 mines off the Dodecanese. 540 mines were laid off the North African coast and in the Red Sea a further 580.

8th June

Then from the 8th June, the laying of offensive barrages in the Sicilian Channel was begun. 1,868 mines were laid between Sicily and the Tunisian coast in order to impede the re-supply of Malta and to stop the British traversing the Mediterranean.

10th June

Following the declaration, the British sent out submarine patrols from Malta and Alexandria. Two of the Malta based boats were ordered to lay mines off Augusta and Brindisi and two ships totalling 6,537 tons were to sink on these mines.

French submarines were also ordered on patrol and minefields were laid Cagliari, Tripoli, Trapani and Masala. A defensive minefield was laid off Corsica.

In the Red Sea the Italians put their submarines to sea but, as we shall see, the results were to prove very disappointing.

11th June

The Regia Aeronautica launched two air attacks on Malta. These were the largest they felt they could muster against the island and involved, in total, 93 SM.79’s and 18 C.200 fighters. Targeting the naval docks, the seaplane base at Kalfrana and the airfield at Hal Far and bombing at 15,000 feet, the raids caused little damage. Subsequent raids that month were much smaller and little was achieved – with one exception (see 20th June).

Admiral Cunningham’s Mediterranean Fleet sorties from Alexandria. The fleet consisted of:

BB: 1st Battle Squadron (Warspite (F), Malaya)
CV: Eagle
CL: 7th Cruiser Squadron (Orion (F), Neptune, HMAS Sydney, Liverpool, Gloucester)
CL: 3rd Cruiser Squadron (Calypso, Caledon)
DD: 10th Destroyer Flotilla appears to have been involved but I don't know the identity of the other two.

The plan was to sail to the south of Crete and then head southwest, with Vice-Admiral Tovey’s cruisers in the van, toward Tobruk and Benghazi in the hope of catching Italian traffic.

Simultaneously, four French heavy cruisers of the 2nd Division - Duquesne, Suffren, Tourville and Duguay Trouin - sailed from Beirut along with the destroyers Le Fortune, Basque and Forbin in order to patrol off Crete. The patrol was to prove fruitless and they returned home on the 13th.

12th June

There was better news for the Italian submarine fleet which achieved a couple of successes. In the early hours of the morning Bagnolini sank the old cruiser Calypso which was heading toward Tobruk with Cunningham’s fleet.

Then, later that day, the Norwegian tanker Orkanger (8,029 tons) was sunk by a combination of Nereide and Naiade.

Notwithstanding the loss of Calypso, Cunningham ordered Liverpool and Gloucester, together with four destroyers, to bombard Tobruk. They failed to destroy the old cruiser San Giorgio, but sank an auxiliary minesweeper Giovanni Berta, before heading back home.

In response the Italians belatedly sortied with 3 cruiser divisions and four destroyer flotillas but couldn’t locate the British and Cunningham, unaware of the Italians having sailed. Both sides could but bemoan their own tardy reconnaissance/intelligence.


HMS Calypso - the first Royal Navy ship to be sunk by the Regia Marina. She was one of the un-modernised, WWI vintage C-class that remained in commission in World War II despite being long past her usefulness as a front line vessel.




The Liuzzi-class consisted of four vessels that were laid down during 1938 and 1939 with the last of the four launched in Jaunary 1940. They were enlarged and improved versions of the preceding Brin-class. With a crew of 58, these boats could travel at 18 knots (8 knots submerged) and carried 12 torpedoes for their 8 tubes (4 bow and 4 stern). Main gun was a 1 x 100mm/47 supplemented with 2 twin 13.2 MG. All four - Bagnolini, Giuliani, Liuzzi and Tarantini - were lost during the war.




Sources:
Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945 (Rohwer)
Malta 1940-42 (Noppen)
Conways All The World's Fighting Ships 1922-1946



Attachment (2)

< Message edited by warspite1 -- 1/11/2020 2:21:59 AM >


_____________________________

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805



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RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 12/24/2019 8:18:24 AM   
Pvt_Grunt

 

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Thank You for resurrecting this thread

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RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 12/24/2019 9:31:09 AM   
warspite1


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The Mediterranean and the Red Sea (June 1940)

12th June (continued)

With Mussolini increasingly likely to enter the war hand in hand with Adolf, the French deployed the Force du Raid at Oran. [Note: it is not clear to me whether the fleet was re-named at this point but will call it the Mediterranean Fleet].

Intelligence suggested that a German squadron was heading to the Mediterranean to reinforce the Regia Marina. There followed a comical and ultimately frustrating episode for the French known subsequently as “La Bataille de l’armoire a glace” – The Battle of the Wardrobe Mirror.

The fleet sailed in response to the news and formed up off Cartegena on the 13th June, whereupon they then sailed west to meet the German ships apparently seeking to force the Straits of Gibraltar….

1st Squadron (Vice-Admiral Gensoul)

BB: 1st Division de Ligne (Dunkerque (F), Strasbourg)
CL: 3rd Cruiser Squadron (Marseillaise, Jean de Vienne, La Galissoniere)
CL: 4th Cruiser Squadron (Georges Leygues, Montcalm, Gloire)
DD: 5th Destroyer Division (Brestois, Boulonnais)
DD: 7th Destroyer Division (Tornade, Tramontane, Typhon)

2nd Light Squadron

DL: 6th Large Destroyer Division (Mogador, Volta)
DL: 8th Large Destroyer Division (L’Indomptable, Le Malin)
DL: 10th Large Destroyer Division (Le Fantasque, L’Audacieux, Le Terrible)

2nd Squadron

BB: 2nd Division de Ligne (Provence (F), Bretagne)
DL: 4th Large Destroyer Division (Lynx, Tigre)

A major battle was now anticipated…..

…and when a report was received from a reconnaissance aircraft at 05:40 that a large formation was heading southwest for Gibraltar, it was assumed that an Italian fleet was sailing to link up with the German force heading east…. speed was increased and the tension must have been palpable… then at 06:00 came the realisation that the aircraft had sighted not an Italian Fleet but Gensoul’s own ships. They had literally been chasing their own tail…..

The incident could have been worse. The Italian submarine Dandolo just missed the Jean de Vienne. Fortunately for the Dandolo, she was able to make her getaway.

13th June

The following days in the Mediterranean were largely all about the submarine forces - and all three nations, British, French and Italian - were to suffer losses.

First up was the Italian Macalle-class submarine Provana (although sources range from 13th to 17th June for her loss. She was sunk at the hands of the French minesweeper La Curieuse while attempting to attack a convoy off Oran, Algeria.

On the same day, the British lost HMS Odin while on patrol off Taranto. She was attacked by the destroyers Strale and Baleno and ultimately rammed by Strale.

14th June

The Italian plan to cause mayhem in the Red Sea area started to quickly unravel. Four boats put to sea from Massawa in Eritrea: Ferraris, Galilei, Galvani and Macalle, with Archimede, Perla and Guglielmotti following a few days later. Ferraris suffered mechanical problems and had to return, and was replaced by Torricelli.

Meanwhile Cappelini, one of the two boats that set out for the Atlantic prior to the outbreak of war, was found by the ASW trawler Arctic Ranger before she was able to enter the Straits. She managed to escape attempts to sink her by both Arctic Ranger and the destroyer Vidette. She was able to reach Ceuta, Spanish Morocco. She was patched up and made it back to Italy.

Away from the submarine war, the Italians ordered the 1st Destroyer Flotilla (Turbine, Nembo and Aquilone) to bombard British troops at Sollum, Egypt. The attack achieved little.

The French 3rd Squadron, commanded by Vice-Admiral Duplat, put to sea the night before in order to bombard the Italian coast at Genoa and Vado. The operation, code-named Vado proved to be limited in its success. Duplat had two cruiser divsions, the 1st (Algerie, Foch) and the 5th (Dupleix, Colbert) and 4 large destroyer divisons, the 1st (Vauban, Lion, Aigle), 3rd (Guepard, Valmy, Verdun) 5th (Tartu, Chevalier Paul, Cassard) and 7th (Vauteur, Albatros).

The squadron split into two groups - Vado and Genoa - each with a cruiser and two large destroyer divisions. Meanwhile the Italian torpedo boat Calatafini, which was escorting minelayer Gasperi, came upon the 'Genoa' group and unsuccessfully launched her torpedoes at the French ships. She was lightly damaged by splinters and withdrew. The Italian Mameli shore battery was more successful, a shell hit Albatros and killed 12 men. Algerie was also lightly damaged by fire from the shore.

The French squadron also came under fire from four motor torpedo boats of the 13th MAS and each fired upon the other. The torpedoes of the MAS boats missed and two boats received splinter damage before withdrawing.

Both sides claimed greater success than was achieved, and subsequent review of the damage inflicted by the French against the land based targets were minimal - despite over 1,500 shells, ranging from 8-inch to 3.5-inch being expended.


Algerie. Duplat's Flagship that led Operation Vado



15th June

Back in the Red Sea, the Italian submarine Macalle was the next to hit problems. It is believed her air conditioning unit developed an issue that led to Chloromethane being released into the sub (This came from Wikipedia but I can't find a source that confirms this story). Regardless of the reason, Macalle ran onto a shoal and eventually sank.


The initial sortie of 54 Italian submarines was, in the words of Blair, a fiasco. Twenty-eight boats (over half those deployed) had to return early for one reason or another. Ten boats were lost, including Macalle (pictured at Taranto), to a combination of accident, air and surface attack.




16 June

Two more British submarines were lost on their first patrol. Grampus and Orpheus (again there is differing dates given for her loss) were lost to escort vessels. Grampus laid mines off Augusta and thereafter went on patrol. She was sunk by the torpedo boats Clio, Calliope and Polluce. Orpheus was lost to depth charges fired from the destroyer Turbine off Tobruk.

The French navy's submarine service also suffered on this date, when Morse was lost to a mine while operating off Djerba, Tunisia.

Meanwhile in the Red Sea the Italian Galilei sank a Norwegian tanker of 8,215 tons.


The Italian submarine service was not the only ones to suffer. The Mediterranean was not an ideal submarine hunting ground due to the clarity of the water. The British submarines employed were generally designed for service in the Pacific and were too large for operation in the Med. Three boats would be lost on their first patrol before June ended - and 1940 would only get worse for the RN's submariners....




Sources:
French Battleships 1922-1956 (Jordan and Dumas)
French Cruisers 1922-1956 (Jordan and Moulin)
Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-45 (Jurgen Rohwer)
Hitler's U-Boat War (Blair)
Struggle for the Middle Sea (O'Hara)


Attachment (3)

< Message edited by warspite1 -- 12/31/2019 8:49:13 AM >


_____________________________

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805



(in reply to warspite1)
Post #: 337
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 12/26/2019 10:38:41 AM   
warspite1


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The Mediterranean and the Red Sea (June 1940)

19th June

Another loss for the Italian Red Sea units. Galilei was in the Gulf of Aden when she was engaged by the ASW trawler HMT Moonstone. Attacked by depth charges, Galilei was brought to the surface. A gun duel developed which Moonstone won when a shell hit Galilei's bridge. Vital documents were obtained with the Italian submarine's surrender.


HMT Moonstone was originally a fishing trawler names Lady Madeline. She was names Moonstone after requisitioning by the Admiralty




The capture of Galilei. She was used by the British as a training vessel.




19th June (cont)

A second wave of Italian submarines departed from ports throughout Italy starting on the 19th. Submarines were ordered to both the eastern and western basins. One of these boats - Capponi - was to sink the Swedish Freighter Elgo.

HMS Parthian was ordered to sail for Tobruk to shell the San Giorgio but without success.

Sources:
www.iwm.org.uk
Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-45 (Jurgen Rohwer)
Conway’s: All The World’s Fighting Ships 1922-1946

Attachment (2)

< Message edited by warspite1 -- 1/5/2020 5:26:12 AM >


_____________________________

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805



(in reply to warspite1)
Post #: 338
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 12/27/2019 4:10:23 PM   
rommel222

 

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Greetings warspite1,
Thanks so much for your work on this.

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Post #: 339
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 12/27/2019 6:05:44 PM   
warspite1


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Joined: 2/2/2008
From: England
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: ringoblood

Wow, Glad I found this thread, amazing warspite1. If you keep it going great, If not please start another threat with new story, your awesome, now we do need a Dev to start a game after this story/thread, it would be great, wargame to play.

Josh.


quote:

ORIGINAL: Pvt_Grunt

Thank You for resurrecting this thread


quote:

ORIGINAL: Rommel222

Greetings warspite1,
Thanks so much for your work on this.
warspite1

Thank's guys for your support.

The intention is to finish the Med for June then go back to Norway. We'll see how that plan pans out...


_____________________________

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805



(in reply to ringoblood)
Post #: 340
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 12/28/2019 8:13:35 AM   
warspite1


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From: England
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The Mediterranean and the Red Sea (June 1940)

20th June

The Regia Aeronautica's largely ineffective attacks on Malta achieved a measure of success when the floating drydock was hit. A section broke off and sank, with the remaining dock following a few days later.


The floating dock is clearly visible to the right of the picture.



The submarine HMS Parthian, after failing to successfully shell San Giorgio, finds better luck when attacking - and sinking - the Italian submarine Diamante.

In the Eastern Mediterranean the French and British navies conducted joint operations for the last time before the French exited the war.

The old French battleship Lorraine, escorted by the cruisers Orion, Neptune and HMAS Sydney and the destroyers Hasty, Decoy, Dainty and HMAS Stuart set out to bombard Bardia. They achieved little in the way of damage before returning.

Meanwhile the French cruisers Suffren and Duguay Trouin, escorted by the destroyers Imperial, Ilex and Nubian also left Alexandria and headed north. The cruisers were engaged by the Italian submarine Sirena but without success. Sirena was damaged during the counter attack but was able to make Tobruk.

22nd June

With the end game in France fast approaching there was the chance of one last engagement between the Regia Marina and the Marine Nationale. Samsonetti and his 7th Cruiser Division, accompanied by the 13th Destroyer Flotilla, sortied to engage French convoy traffic between North Africa and France. The French ordered the 3rd Cruiser Division and 8th Large Destroyer Division to search for the Italian ships but neither found the other.

Sources:
Malta 1940-42 (Noppen)
Malta Times
Chronology of the War at Sea (Rohwer)

Attachment (1)

< Message edited by warspite1 -- 12/31/2019 9:04:19 AM >


_____________________________

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805



(in reply to warspite1)
Post #: 341
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 12/28/2019 10:56:05 AM   
warspite1


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On the 22nd June 1940 the French concluded an armistice with the Germans. This left the Commonwealth alone to face the German and Italian armed forces. The list below provides the main units of the French navy at the time of the armistice down to destroyer. I have not cross- referenced the torpedo boats of the La Melpomene class or the submarines (as at present I do not have a second reliable source for either to cross reference with).

Position of French Naval vessels at the time of the armistice

We shall look more at the detail when the events of 4 July 1940 are covered later. What should be crystal clear from the information below is why the British Government, not blessed with the benefit of hindsight, were so concerned.

Mers-el-Kebir

2 x BB: Dunkerque. Strasbourg
2 x OBB: Bretagne, Provence
6 x DL: Mogador, Volta, Tigre, Lynx, Le Terrible, Kersaint
1 x Seaplane carrier: Commandant Teste

Casablanca

1 x BB: Jean Bart
1 x CL: Primauguet
6 x DD: Fourgueux, Frondeur, Le Hardi, Epee, Lansquenet, Mameluk

Dakar

1 x BB: Richelieu
2 x DL: Milan, Epervier
1 x DD: Fleuret
2 x SS: Le Glorieux, Le Heros
1 x DS: Bougainville*

* Not certain of her starting position but she operated on the west coast of Africa

Toulon

4 x CA: Algerie, Dupleix, Foch, Colbert
14 x DL: Panthere, Guepard, Valmy, Verdun, Vauban, Lion, Albatros, Gerfaut, Vautour, Aigle, Tartu, Vauquelin, Cassard, Le Chevalier Paul
1 x DD: Le Fliebustier
6 x TB: La Pomone, L'Iphigenie, La Bayonnaise, Bombarde, L'Incomprise, La Poursuivante*
15 x SS: Venus, Iris, Aurore, Ceres, Pallas, Le Conquerant, Galatee, Le Diamante, Perle, Naiade, Archimede, L'Espoir, Argonaute, Atalante, Arethuse
1 x DS: D'Iberville

* Unsure about the location - some of these could have been in North Africa.

Port-Vendres

3 x DD: La Palme, Le Mars, Tempete

Alexandria

1 x BB: Lorraine
4 x CA: Suffren, Duguay Trouin, Duquesne, Tourville
3 x DD: Forbin, Le Fortune, Basque

Bizerte, Sfax and Sousse (Tunisia)

1 x DD: L'Alcyon
10 x SS: Nautilus, Souffleur, Requin, Marsouin, Le Tonnant, Fresnel, Pascal, Monge, Vengeur, Turquoise

Oran

9 x DD: Tramontane, Tornade, Typhon, Trombe, Brestois, Boulonnais, Bordelais, Le Corsaire, Casque
1 x DS: La Grandiere

Algiers

6 x CL: Jean de Vienne, Marseillaise, La Galissoniere, Georges Leygues, Montcalm, Gloire
4 x DL: Le Fantasque, L'Audacieux, Le Malin, L'Indomptable
1 x DD: Simoun
1 x DS: Rigault de Genouilly

Bone

1 x SS: Le Redoutable

UK Ports:

1 x OBB: Paris, Courbet
2 x DL: Leopard, Le Triomphant,
2 x DD: Ouragon, Mistral
6 x TB: La Melpomene, Branlebas, La Flore, L'Incompris, La Cordeliere, Bouclier
4 x SS: Surcouf, Rubis, Minerve, Junon
1 x DS: Savorgnan de Brazza

French West Indies

1 x CV: Bearn
2 x CL: Jeanne D'Arc, Emile Bertin

Indo-China

1 x CL: Lamotte-Piquet
2 x DS: Amiral Charner, Dumont d'Urville

Madagascar

1 x DS: D'Entrecasteaux*

* Not certain she was here in June 1940 but fought here in 1942 when the British invaded.

At Sea (sailed to Malta)

1 x SS: Narval


Sources:
England's Last War Against France (Smith)
Conways All The World's Fighting Ships 1933-1946
French Destroyers 1922-56 (Jordan & Moulin)
French Cruisers 1922-1956 (Jordan & Moulin)
www.Naval-History.net


< Message edited by warspite1 -- 12/30/2019 8:58:48 AM >


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Post #: 342
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 12/29/2019 9:51:02 PM   
Capt. Harlock


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quote:

Mers-el-Kebir

2 x BB: Dunkerque. Strasbourg
2 x OBB: Bretagne, Provence
4 x DL: Mogador, Volta, Tigre, Lynx
2 x DD: Le Terrible, Kersaint
1 x Seaplane carrier: Commandant Teste


Tragedy looms . . .

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RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 12/31/2019 9:06:33 AM   
warspite1


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The Mediterranean and the Red Sea (June 1940)

23rd June

We now move back to the Red Sea and beyond to find out how the Italian submarine operations from there continued to go from bad to worse - although they did not go without a fight.

Galvani was sunk in the Gulf of Oman by the sloop HMS Falmouth - dates for the loss range from 22nd to 24th June. Some sources also state that prior to her sinking Galvani sank the Indian sloop Pathan*. However most sources appear to dismiss this possibility due to the distances involved. The loss of Pathan is otherwise put down to striking a mine or an internal explosion.

Torricelli became the fourth Italian submarine to be lost in the Red Sea after engaging British destroyers and sloops in a firefight. Again a warship, this time the British destroyer Khartoum, is named in various sources as having been sunk as a result of a hit by Torricelli. However there are conflicting reports on this incident too. While some sources suggest a shell from Torricelli caused damage to a torpedo tube, resulting in an explosion, others indicate that Torricelli was not responsible. Instead Khartoum's loss was the result of a defective torpedo air vessel in the Mark IX torpedo.

And so, four of the eight submarines the RM employed in the Red Sea were lost within two weeks. We shall meet up with the remaining four vessels in due course.

* HMIS Pathan is described as a sloop in almost all accounts. However there is no record of her in Conways and so was unlikely to have been a sloop. However ibiblio.org has this very useful description which appears to clear up the confusion.

For strengthening the local naval defence of India in. accordance with the scheme outlined in the previous chapter, merchant ships were requisitioned at a very rapid rate and employed for local naval defence duties. The following ships were employed for local naval defence at the various parts in India on 10 October 1939:

Bombay
Pathan
Masdras
Hashemi

Loss of "Pathan"

It has been mentioned earlier that H.M.I.S. Pathan was employed in the local naval defence duties at Bombay after the declaration of war. Before the hostilities started, it was a tender to the training establishments at Bombay. Its displacement was 695 tons; S.H.P. 5,500; Guns: one 4" and two 12-Pdr. After the retubing of her boilers she resumed her duties off the coast of Bombay. On 23 May 1940 she shadowed the Italian Comte Verde into the harbour as a precaution against mining. She did not live long and was lost on 23 June 1940, while on anti-submarine patrol in the vicinity of Bombay harbour (just outside the swept channel at a distance of 26 miles from the harbour).



HMIS Pathan




The map shows the distance involved between where Galvani and Pathan each met their end. Galvani was sunk near the Straits of Hormuz. The capture of the Galilei (see above) had alerted the British to where Galvani would be operating.




Sources:
www.naval-History.net
Chronology of the War at Sea (Rohwer)
www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/India/RIN/RIN-3.html


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< Message edited by warspite1 -- 1/4/2020 8:59:07 AM >


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RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 1/1/2020 11:46:02 AM   
nicwb

 

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Glad you have revived this thread Warspite. It makes very interesting reading. I hope you can keep it going. Now if someone could only take the valuable information here and build a game around it !

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Post #: 345
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 1/4/2020 8:57:55 AM   
warspite1


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quote:

ORIGINAL: nicwb

Glad you have revived this thread Warspite. It makes very interesting reading. I hope you can keep it going. Now if someone could only take the valuable information here and build a game around it !


quote:

ORIGINAL: zorch

You have saved a future game designer a lot of work. Now who will be that designer?

warspite1

A most deserving theatre for a proper, detailed - all arms - wargame. But sadly economics makes such a project unlikely to say the least....

< Message edited by warspite1 -- 1/4/2020 8:58:08 AM >


_____________________________

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Post #: 346
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 1/4/2020 9:00:41 AM   
warspite1


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The Mediterranean and the Red Sea (June 1940)

There are lies, damned lies and statistics, as a wise man once said. As has been seen it is simply not possible to be certain of 100% accuracy. A classic example of the difficulty is found in trying to piece together the first Italian convoy operations. For example, according to O’Hara, the Italians began regular convoys to Tripoli the day after the armistice. O’Hara also states a total of two convoys, comprising three ships, delivered 3,618 tons of supplies (3,608 delivered (90%)) and 1,358 (100%) men to North Africa in June 1940.

Rohwer states that the first Italian supply convoy to Tripoli was undertaken on the 25th June, three days after the armistice was signed. The troop transports Esperia and Victoria, carried 1,727 troops, and were escorted safely to the Libyan capital by the auxiliary cruiser Ramb III and the torpedo boats Orsa and Procione.

This should mean there was a third ship that landed supplies in a separate convoy. Because O’Hara states this first convoy delivered 937 men and 2,775 tons of supplies, that would mean a further 421 men and 843 tons of supplies delivered by this vessel. I can’t see any reference to this second convoy, but if it was a straightforward run there is no reason why it should be specifically mentioned. However it’s odd that 10% of supplies would be lost if neither convoy came under attack.

Moreover, one can reasonably question what O’Hara defines as a convoy. I question this because his numbers above don’t seem to account for the ‘Espero convoy’ (of which two destroyers reached North Africa (see below)) and the two torpedo boats that sailed shortly after. While I have no idea whether all three destroyers of the ‘Espero convoy’ were carrying men and supplies (it would make sense that the cargo was split between the three in case of loss), even if not, then the numbers of ships that delivered supplies and men to North Africa in June 1940 was at least seven, not three….

Unless stated, Rohwer continues to be my default source, and will clarify where differences arise.


25th June

The first supply convoy from Italy to Tripoli took place and arrived safely.

27th June

The Mediterranean Fleet were tasked with executing Operation MA3. This was designed to get a number of merchant vessels, sitting in Malta since the Italian declaration of war, back to Alexandria. The plan was for two convoys to sail east:

- a fast, 13 knot, convoy consisting of a passenger line El Nil, Knight of Malta (cargo liner) and Rodi (an Italian Prize ship)
- a slow, 9 knot, convoy consisting of 5 cargo vessels; Zeeland, Masirah, Kirkland, Novasli and Tweed

The faster ships were to carry civilians being evacuated from Malta, while the latter ships were to be laden with naval stores from Malta dockyard that were needed at Alexandria.

To cover the two Malta convoys (plus a Piraeus – Alexandria convoy) the Mediterranean Fleet was put to sea. The old battleships Royal Sovereign and Ramillies, plus the carrier Eagle provided the heavy cover, supported by the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla (Hasty, Havock, Hereward, Hero and Hyperion). Ahead of them were the 7th Cruiser Squadron (Orion, Liverpool, Gloucester, Neptune and HMAS Sydney). Also at sea, on anti-submarine operations, were the destroyers Dainty, Decoy, Defender, Ilex, Diamond, Jervis, Juno and HMAS Voyager.

While south of Crete the destroyers Dainty, Defender and Ilex fought a battle with the Italian submarine Liuzzi, a battle won by destroyer force.

28th June

Battle of The ‘Espero Convoy’

The following morning, a Sunderland flying boat reported sighting enemy destroyers fifty miles west of Zakinthos. Vice-Admiral Tovey, commanding the 7th Cruiser Squadron, which was southwest of Crete, was ordered to intercept.

Tovey formed his ships into two columns and headed southwest following receipt of a second signal that indicated the enemy ships were about 35 miles away. In the early evening the lead cruiser, Liverpool, sighted three enemy destroyers – Espero, Zeffiro and Ostro – that were heading for North Africa loaded with men, ammunition and guns for an anti-aircraft unit.




At 18:36hrs, at 22,000 yards, Liverpool opened fire with her 6-inch guns and the Italian ships headed west-southwest in avoidance. By 18:59hrs the lead ship, Orion, of the second column of Tovey’s force opened fire from 18,000 yards.

Espero had a defective boiler which limited her to 25 knots and her captain, Enrico Baroni, knew that the British cruisers would catch her. He bravely ordered Zeffiro and Ostro to continue their journey while he would order Espero to make smoke and fight back. Espero landed the first hit, a shell damaging Liverpool just above the waterline, although a torpedo attack was evaded by the cruisers.

By 20:00hrs the fate of Espero was decided and HMAS Sydney delivered the coup de grace. But the actions of her captain had helped to save her two sisters. Moreover, the ammunition expended by the British cruisers was, in the words of Admiral Cunningham, ‘tremendous…. to sink this one 1,000 ton destroyer’. Following this action there were just 800 6-inch shells available in the entire Suez area.

Cunningham felt he had little choice but to order the cancellation of the operation – the cargos were too important to sail without proper cover.


The Espero. The British ships picked up 47 of her 225 crew (6 were also picked up by later by an Italian submarine). Thanks largely to Baroni's actions Zeffiro and Ostro reached Benghazi the following day.





Sources:
Malta Convoys (Woodman)
Struggle For The Middle Sea (O'Hara)
www.naval-History.net

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< Message edited by warspite1 -- 1/11/2020 3:05:41 AM >


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RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 1/4/2020 1:39:05 PM   
Zorch

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: nicwb

Glad you have revived this thread Warspite. It makes very interesting reading. I hope you can keep it going. Now if someone could only take the valuable information here and build a game around it !


quote:

ORIGINAL: zorch

You have saved a future game designer a lot of work. Now who will be that designer?

warspite1

A most deserving theatre for a proper, detailed - all arms - wargame. But sadly economics makes such a project unlikely to say the least....

Never say never.

(in reply to warspite1)
Post #: 348
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 1/11/2020 3:04:29 AM   
warspite1


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The Mediterranean and the Red Sea (June 1940)

28th June (continued)

Meanwhile the Italian submarines continued to suffer their painful introduction to the war. The Anfritite was found and sunk by a Sunderland as she was heading for her patrol line.

The formation of Force H

The fall of France presented the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean with a major problem. The position of superiority over the Regia Marina was now gone - or at least would be as soon as the two new Littorios came into service.

But it was considered vital that the Royal Navy respond and maintain a sizeable presence in Gibraltar. To fail to do so would potentially give the Regia Marina access to the North Atlantic. It would also send a signal to General Franco that perhaps the British were considering vacating the Mediterranean.

There was also the need to keep open the lines of communication with both ends of the Middle Sea. In addition, from Gibraltar the British could access the North Atlantic but the coastline for hundreds of miles north and south, was either Axis, or non-friendly neutral dominated. Whatever force could be spared for Gibraltar needed to contain enough power to look after itself against air, surface and submarine forces.

Command structure

Force H was a detached squadron that reported directly to the Admiralty and not Flag Officer Commanding the North Atlantic Station (who was based at Gibraltar).

Upon constituting Force H the Admiralty issued the following signal:

1. A detached squadron known as Force H under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir James Somerville has been constituted as follows: HM Ships Ark Royal, Hood, Resolution, Valiant, Arethusa, Faulknor, Foxhound, Fearless, Escapade, Forester, Foresight.

2. The following ships will join Force H when they enter the limits of the North Atlantic command: Nelson, Enterprise, Delhi, Fame, Fury, HMC Ships St Laurent, Skeena

3. Force H will for the present be based at Gibraltar.

4. Subject to any instructions which may be given by the Admiralty the tasks of Force H will be

a) to prevent units of the Italian Fleet breaking out of the Mediterranean
b) to carry out offensive operations against the Italian Fleet and Italian coast.


Obviously other tasks were to be added later, but it is perhaps interesting that there is seemingly no thought given to Malta at that time - particularly given the events that were to unfold....

Force H was in existence from June 1940 to March 1942. The core of the force for much of that time consisted of the carrier Ark Royal, the battlecruiser Renown, the cruiser Sheffield and the 8th Destroyer Flotilla. The 13th Destroyer Flotilla was based at Gibraltar and Somerville had these ships at his command at any time the destroyers of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla were insufficient for an operation.

Other ships were added or removed depending upon the operational requirements and in total some 124 ships (48 of these for just one operation) served with Force H.

The importance of Ark Royal can be evidenced by the fact she took part in 41 operations, Renown 35 and Sheffield 21 (she was replaced by Hermione and she took part in a further 17).



Vice-Admiral Sir James Somerville. He was retired due to ill-health just before the war (much to his displeasure) and then recalled one month after its outbreak. His choice for command of Force H was largely due to his availability and the need to get the force set up quickly following the collapse of France. Somerville and Cunningham were the 'Doorkeepers' tasked with keeping the doors to exit the Mediterranean firmly closed.




Ark Royal and her Stringbags.
Of all the ships associated with Force H, HMS Ark Royal is the best known. In September 1939 she was the RN's most modern carrier and, after the early loss of Courageous and Glorious, she was absolutely vital in holding the fort pending the arrival of the armoured carriers. She was sunk by a torpedo in November 1941.





The other two ships that are most closely associated with Force H are the modernised battlecruiser Renown (below), and the Town-class cruiser Sheffield (top) - although neither was present at the initial formation of the force. Renown was Somerville's favourite flagship, while Sheffield was originally chosen for Force H due to the fitting of air warning radar (the first ship to have this installed).





Sources
Somerville's Force H (Dannreuther)
Chronology of the War at Sea (Rohwer)

Attachment (3)

< Message edited by warspite1 -- 1/12/2020 2:57:36 PM >


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(in reply to Zorch)
Post #: 349
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 1/11/2020 10:37:13 AM   
warspite1


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The Mediterranean and the Red Sea (June 1940)

29th June

And so we come to the end of the first calendar month of Italy's war. But not before another three submarines were lost from the Regia Marina order of battle (and a fourth damaged). The destroyer screen Cunningham placed on anti-submarine duties, and mentioned above, were responsible once again for one, possibly two, of these. Uebi Scebeli was sunk and Salpa damaged. Argonauta was sunk either by the destroyers or a Sunderland flying boat. The latter accounted for Rubino too.


The Uebi Scebeli prior to being sunk by British and Australian destroyers after rescuing the crew and removing vital documents.




Sources:
www.awm.gov.au
Chronology of the War at Sea (Rohwer)

Attachment (1)

< Message edited by warspite1 -- 1/11/2020 12:42:03 PM >


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RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 1/11/2020 2:19:07 PM   
RangerJoe


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I see how you got your post count up, lots of posts with just dates.

HMIS Pathan

From here:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P-class_sloop

links to:

https://blog.twmuseums.org.uk/p-boats-of-the-first-world-war-william-bartram-and-p23/

https://uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/9988.html

So it was a WWI vessel, most of which where scrapped. Too bad they were not saved and stored like the US Navy's four pipers.

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(in reply to warspite1)
Post #: 351
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 1/12/2020 8:05:46 AM   
warspite1


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quote:

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

I see how you got your post count up, lots of posts with just dates.

warspite1

Yes that was the plan - and I would have gotten away with it too if it wasn't for that pesky Ranger Joe.


_____________________________

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Post #: 352
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 1/12/2020 9:10:39 AM   
warspite1


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So I am really into my Med War reading at present so, ideally, I should carry on with this. However, that makes this less the naval war day to day thread it was designed to be. I could continue with the rest of the events in June 1940 - but there needs to be comment upon the end in Norway and France - and I haven't written about the beginning yet!

So I will now go back and make a start on Weserubung, leading to Alphabet and, ultimately, the war in the west leading to Dynamo, Aerial and Cycle.

So posts will start from the top of Page 10 (Post 271).

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Post #: 353
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 1/12/2020 12:13:52 PM   
RangerJoe


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quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1


quote:

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

I see how you got your post count up, lots of posts with just dates.

warspite1

Yes that was the plan - and I would have gotten away with it too if it wasn't for that pesky Ranger Joe.



I think that it is because of my OCD (Obsessive Cat Disorder.)

Since you are now doing the Norwegian campaign, will you tell us when the Germans get to this place:

https://www.lifeinnorway.net/hell-norway/


_____________________________

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I'm not a complete idiot, some parts are missing!

“Illegitemus non carborundum est (“Don’t let the bastards grind you down”).”
― Julia Child


(in reply to warspite1)
Post #: 354
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 1/16/2020 5:37:42 AM   
warspite1


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UNDER CONSTRUCTION

The end in Norway (June 1940)

The ill-fated, barely planned, poorly resourced, mis-managed, and woefully executed Allied campaign in Norway, which began in early April, (see post 271) finally came to an ignominious end two months later.

Even in retreat there was more pain to come....

Operation Alphabet - begun on the 4th June 1940

The decision to withdraw from Norway was confirmed by the war cabinet on the 31st May 1940 (it had actually been agreed in principal on the 23rd May). Given the situation in France, the loss of ships - especially destroyers, the likely collapse of France and the need to defend the UK, the option of trying to hold on in the far North of Norway was not a remotely viable option.

As we've seen (see post xx), in order to make the withdrawal easier, it was necessary for the Allies to take the port of Narvik. The losses of naval units off Norway and France, together with intelligence from the Mediterranean stating that Italy were increasingly likely to declare war, meant that the number of ships available to the Royal Navy was far less than ideal for the purpose.

However, there had been no losses of shipping between the UK and Northern Norway and even the German u-boats had not presented a threat here. So although the Royal Navy was stretched thin, taking Narvik would help and, if the weather was on the Allied side for once, then this would likely be enough to see the operation successfully completed.....

...and this so nearly came to pass. But as ever the Germans weren't playing by the rules and a lack of communication and co-ordination (partly due to the need for secrecy about the evacuation) meant that the British failed to spot the fact that a German task force was in the Norwegian Sea....

The evacuation plan called for a withdrawal of the circa 24,500 troops remaining, over a number of days - with as much activity as possible being carried out in the few hours of darkness there was at that time of year. Activity was disguised to try and convince the Germans that the Allies were staying put. The Allies were assisted by poor weather for much of the operation, meaning that the aerial threat from the Luftwaffe was largely nullified.

Ships employed to take troops and what equipment could be carried were:
CL: Southampton
CLAA: Coventry
DD: Between 10 and 13 destroyers were available (depending on the source used) but I can only determine 11. Present were definitely Campbell, Firedrake, Vanoc, Arrow, Havelock, Echo, Walker, Veteran, Fame, Delight and Beagle.

There was communication between Lord Cork, the Flag Officer, Narvik and Admiral Forbes, C-in-C, Home Fleet. It would appear that Forbes was particularly concerned about the safe passage of laden troopships. Forbes ordered the carriers Ark Royal and Glorious (screened by the destroyers Ardent, Acasta, Acheron, Diana and Highlander) to Norway to cover the evacuation on the 2nd June. However Glorious sailed with only sufficient Gladiators (802 Sqn) and six Swordfish (823 Sqn) for her own protection. When the two carriers arrived off Norway, Ark Royal's aircraft were ordered to provide air defence (although the poor weather precluded much flying) while Glorious was kept out of harm's way and ordered to conserve fuel. Her main role was to try and take on board the RAF Gladiators that had been operating from Bardufoss. Whilst off Norway it was suggested that the Hurricanes of 46 Sqn should also try and land on Glorious (something not previously attempted) given the desperate shortage of fighters, that would no doubt be needed imminently at home. The Squadron leader picked his seven best pilots and they managed to land the Hurricanes successfully - despite the lack of arrester hooks..

4th June - 7th June

The transports and troopships were organised in three groups. Group I contained:
Monarch of Bermuda
Batory (Polish)
Sobieski (Polish)
Franconia
Lancastria
Georgic (French)

The ships embarked 14,700 troops from Andfjord over the course of three nights. The men were picked up using any vessel that could be employed and delivered to the troopships. RAF fighters from Bardufoss and FAA aircraft from Ark Royal covered the operation. On the 7th the transports then sailed to the ocean rendezvous point escorted by the destroyer Arrow and the sloop Stork and were met by the the repair ship Vindictive. Vindictive provided the escort south until the following day when the convoy met the battleship Valiant and her destroyer screen (Ashanti, Bedouin, Tartar and Mashona) which escorted the troopships between the Faroes and the Shetlands. Valiant's group then departed and five destroyers (Atherstone, Wolverine, Antelope, Witherington and Viscount) escorted them on the final leg of the journey to the Clyde.

Also sailing on the 7th June was a slow convoy of storeships that had taken on equipment from Harstad. These were:
Blackheath
Theseus
Oligarch
Acrity
Harmattan
Coxwold
Cromarty Firth
Conch

They sailed for the UK escorted by the sloop Stork and the destroyers Veteran, Arrow, Walker and Havoc.

Finally, there were some ships that made their way independently of the convoys, escorted by a trawler. The tanker Oil Pioneer and the trawler Juniper (who we shall meet shortly) were two of these.

Also sailing on the 7th - from Tromso - was the heavy cruiser Devonshire. She had on board the Norwegian King Haakon, Crown Prince Olav, Prime Minister Nygaardsvold, the Norwegian cabinet as well as various other dignitaries and members of the military. We shall be meeting HMS Devonshire and her important passenger list again, later in the story.

Group II contained the troopships:
Oronsay
Ormonde
Arandora Star
Duchess of York
Ulster Monarch
Ulster Prince
Royal Ulsterman

They were loaded up during the nights of the 7th and 8th June, with another 10,000 men, and embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 8th. Sailing with this convoy were Ark Royal, Glorious, Southampton, Coventry and eleven destroyers (Campbell, Ardent, Acasta, Havelock, Fame, Firedrake, Echo, Beagle and Delight, Diana and Highlander). This convoy too - less Glorious and the destroyers Ardent and Acasta which separated from the convoy (see post 357) - arrived safely in the UK.

At this point the only casualty had been the armed boarding vessel vandyck. She was ordered to stay behind to pick up any last minute waifs and strays, but was found, attacked and sunk by the Luftwaffe.

Norwegian ships sailing for the UK
xx

The Allies last stand in Norway. The Government and King were at Tromso at this time. Narvik was taken in order to assist the withdrawal.





Sources:
The War at Sea 1939 Volume 1 (Roskill)
The Battle for Norway (Haarr)
Carrier Glorious (Winton)

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< Message edited by warspite1 -- 1/25/2020 9:01:06 PM >


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Post #: 355
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 1/18/2020 8:03:58 PM   
warspite1


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Operation Juno 4th - 9th June

Operation Juno was launched on the 4th June 1940. It was an operation that characterised much of the wider Norwegian Campaign. The decision to employ the Kriegsmarine surface units once they were operational continued the high energy approach to the war, so lacking in the Allies. The sinking of an aircraft carrier (as well as two destroyers and other shipping) was on the outside a highly successful outcome. But the operation did not go as intended, did not achieve the results it could have, the loss of HMS Glorious was fortuitous for the Germans, the capital ships employed took damage that kept them out of the line for some time, and Juno cost Admiral Wilhelm Marschall his job.

So what was Operation Juno intended to do?

The plan, that began formulating in mid-May, was intended to provide assistance to German forces in and around Narvik by attacking Allied shipping off Bodo, Harstad and Narvik. After a meeting at the end of May the objectives were further narrowed down; the primary target would be shipping and land targets in the Andfjord-Vagsfjord area, with a sortie into Ofotfjord if necessary to ease pressure on forces around Narvik which had recently been lost to the Allies. However, it appears that the C-in-C of the Kriegsmarine Erich Raeder, told his subordinates that assisting the army that had just been ejecting from Narvik, was the main objective.....

With objectives and orders seemingly far from clear, Marshall put to sea and headed north with the following units:

BB: Gneisenau (F), Scharnhorst
CA: Admiral Hipper
DD: Karl Galster, Hans Lody, Erich Steinbrinck, Hermann Schoemann

The torpedo boats Jaguar and Falke, the trawler Sperrbrecher IV and three R-boats provided ASW and minesweeping support initially.

Support Vessels:
Tankers: Adria, Samland
Repair Ship: Huascaran
Supply Ships (at sea): Dithmarschen, Nordmark

Marschall's force, aided by poor weather, was undetected by the British, and when southeast of Jan Mayan Island, on the 6th, began refuelling from Dithmarschen (with the destroyers refuelling from the battleships). This took longer than expected and went into the following afternoon.


The ships refuel



With reconnaissance news scant, Marschall called his key officers and captains to Gneisenau for a conference on the evening of the 7th to discuss the options. Marschall was undeniably in a difficult position. He had no concrete, up to date, intel on what targets (or opponents) there were at the main objective. Furthermore the little intelligence he was receiving made him believe an Allied withdrawal may be underway. But to further complicate matters, if that were true, then the orders to help relieve Dietl's men around Narvik were perhaps no longer necessary.

It is unclear what support he received from his fellow officers, but the decision was made. Having received reports of ships to the NorthWest, Marschall decided he would attack any convoys he could find. After all, if a withdrawal was afoot, the ships would be full of men and material.


Strange but true...... 7th June 1940. Admiral Marschall calls a conference at sea! This photo is taken from Admiral Hipper. Marschall's flagship, Gneisenau is straight ahead, with Scharnhorst behind to the right.




Early the following morning, Marschall informed his superiors at Group West. The response that came back approved Hipper and the destroyers attacking the convoy, but that Harstad would remain the battleships priority... Taking his career in his hands, Marschall continued on, quietly forgetting Harstad - at least for the present. One of the great mysteries here for me is that Marschall seemingly knew there were two carriers to the north - and so given this, proceeding northwest in this fashion seems totally at odds with orders given to the surface fleet having made Atlantic breakouts.

But this was the decision Marschall made, and at 0605hrs on the morning of the 8th, his force came across the empty oil tanker Oil Pioneer and the little trawler HMT Juniper. Juniper attempted to send a message but this was jammed by Hipper. Hipper engaged and quickly overcame Juniper, which didn't appear to put up any resistance, while Gneisenau sent Oil Pioneer to the bottom of the Norwegian Sea, assisted by a torpedo from Hermann Schoemann. There were 29 survivors - only four from Juniper.

Then, at about 0925, with Hipper and Scharnhort's Arados in the air, two more ships were sighted. The battleships temporarily headed south to search for convoys while the remainder of the force continued West North West to meet the next unfortunate Allied ships. These were the troop transport Orama and the hospital ship Atlantis. Rear Admiral Schmundt, aboard Hipper, allowed the Atlantis to continue on and, recognising this, her captain refused to transmit any signal until she had met up with friendly vessels much further south. But for Orama, her attempts at getting off a message once again being blocked by Hipper, the end was quickly administered by the cruiser and Hans Lody. Hipper was lucky not to have been hit by one of Lody's torpedoes that ran off course.


The destroyer in front of Orama is the Hans Lody, that decided 'to get involved' much to the chagrin of Admiral Hipper's captain.





Sources:
The Battle For Norway (Haarr)

Attachment (3)

< Message edited by warspite1 -- 1/26/2020 5:33:03 PM >


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England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805



(in reply to warspite1)
Post #: 356
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 1/23/2020 5:28:53 PM   
warspite1


Posts: 41353
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The Loss of HMS Glorious

What should Marschall do now? Well one thing was certain; Hipper and the destroyers would need to refuel in the not too distant future and, with Marschall fearing his presence must by now be known to the Allies, he decided this wasn't going to be possible at sea without interference.

He therefore took a decision for which he has been much criticised (but its hard to see what choice he really had) and ordered Hipper and the destroyers back to Trondheim - searching en route for any Allied ships. Meanwhile his battleships would continue heading northwest in order to make a sweep into Vagsfjord.

We left HMS Glorious in post 355 as she was about to head home with Ark Royal and the convoy of ships from Group II. We will shortly pick up events in the early hours of the 8th June and the continuation of the tragic chain of events that had been in motion aboard HMS Glorious for sometime, that would claim over 1,500 British sailors and airmen, and for which, almost 80 years later, there is still no satisfactory explanation. But first it is probably appropriate to provide some backstory...

The Captain and the Air Commander

Captain Guy D'Oyly Hughes joined HMS Glorious in May 1939. By all accounts his appointment was welcomed. American born, of at least one English parent (his father), D'Oyly Hughes was an ex-submariner and highly decorated World War I hero with a DSC and two DSO's to his name. Between the wars he had learnt to fly.

Descriptions of D'Oyly Hughes by former colleagues make it difficult to reconcile the man they knew "The sort of fellow senior officers like to have at their table", with the man that took over command of Glorious, and who immediately made a bad impression with many of the officers of the carrier.

But even during his time on Glorious, there appears to be mixed reports about the man - the crew apparently thought the world of him and he was generous with shore leave for a ship that had been in commission as long as Glorious had.

But there are also tales that D'Oyly Hughes behaved contemptuously with the men of the Fleet Air Arm, disagreed with tactics and doctrine and "would brook no discussion". One man who served with the captain in 1935 and then again in 1939, believed that "something must have happened in the meantime to change him". When war broke out he placed a box on the bridge that contained revolvers. He was supposed to have said that this was for any officer that failed to do his duty...

But whatever the truth about this complex character, the fact was that by May 1940, Glorious was not a happy ship - and it was the officers of the Fleet Air Arm that seemed to be singled out to feel his wrath. The two main targets appear to have been Commander (Flying) John (JB) Heath and Staff Officer (Air) Paul Slessor. Slessor had been with Glorious since before D'Oyly Hughes' arrival, but Heath - one of the most experienced officers in the Fleet Air Arm - had joined the ship in January 1940 (his predecessor was Guy Willoughby who couldn't wait to leave the ship due to D'Oyly Hughes behaviour).

Heath appears to have been a laid back character, whom years of experience with the obsolete aircraft the Fleet Air Arm were expected to fly, made him perhaps too cautious for a man with the zeal of D'Oyly Hughes, who would not listen to what he did not want to hear. Two men working together in this sort of environment is never healthy. The executive officer aboard Glorious seems to have been ineffectual, and Vice-Admiral Wells - although he seems to have known about what was going on in Glorious - does not appear to have intervened.

The incident that brought matters to a head took place on the 26th May. At this time Glorious had only six Gladiators and six Swordfish aboard (see post xxx). But a signal was received from the Flag Officer, Narvik about the possibility of Glorious's aircraft mounting an attack against enemy troops on the Jamo-Mosjean road and of attacking the airfield at Mosjean. Note: there is no such place as Jamo and it is thought the reference was to Mo. A conference was held and Slessor and Heath went away to study what maps they had of the area. The two men returned later and discussed with the captain. Heath's concern, agreed with by Slessor, was that the proposed action was unsound due to the few aircraft available, the poor performance of the Swordfish, and the fact that intelligence was unclear as to where the airfield, let alone the enemy, were. The decision was that they would look at it again in the morning.

The following morning further discussion was held and ultimately D'Oyly Hughes insisted on an operation being carried out. He ordered that Glorious would move to within 40 miles of the coast and that five Swordfish, escorted by three Sea Gladiators would fly to Hemnes first and then fly south to Mosjean, bombing any suitable objective they could find. The strike would commence with take-off at 8pm on the 27th May. The orders were signed by the captain.

At this point the Commanding Officer of 823 Squadron, who would lead the operation, asked Heath for an audience with the captain. During this interview Stephens made clear to the captain that he believed the operation to be unsound. The captain asked Stephens to go away and come back with an alternative. Stephens, Heath and Slessor reviewed the options but at 1:40pm - while still struggling to come up with an alternative - they were ordered back to see D'Oyly Hughes by the executive officer.

During the subsequent meeting D'Oyly Hughes is alleged to have claimed he didn't know anything about the orders he'd signed and accused Heath of being reluctant to come up with a plan in response to F.O Narvik's request. He was relieved of duty. The operation - even the original one signed by the captain - was never flown. One can speculate on why the captain didn't proceed with this if he thought Heath was being unreasonable.

When Glorious returned to the UK Heath was left behind to await a court martial, and HMS Glorious left for Norway for the last time....


Commander (Flying) John (JB) Heath and Captain Guy D'Oyly Hughes.




The Battle

So we now come back to the early hours of 8th June. D'Oyly Hughes requested permission from Vice-Admiral Wells, aboard Ark Royal, for Glorious to break from the convoy and head for home with the destroyers Ardent and Acasta. This escort was less than that considered necessary by the Admiralty following the loss of Courageous' sister in September 1939, but in fairness to Wells, he had no reason to believe there was anymore danger to Glorious now than there was all the other times the carriers had sailed to and from Norway without loss (this was Glorious's fifth operation off Norway).

The official reason given for this request was that Glorious was short on fuel, although the captain of the destroyer HMS Diana, Lt. Commander E. Le Geyt, stated in an enquiry in 1968 that he saw an Aldis lamp signal from Glorious to Ark Royal that stated D'Oyly Hughes wanted permission to sail ahead in order to prepare for a forthcoming courts martial (JB Heath but also possibly Slessor).

Apparently fuel consumption tests post the war indicate that the shortage of fuel story was incorrect. Sailing home in convoy would have used up little more fuel than proceeding alone at high speed and zig-zagging. Furthermore, the amount of fuel expended by Glorious on her last operation - even allowing 15% for error - makes it unlikely that fuel was an issue.

But whatever the reason, Wells gave Glorious permission to part company with the convoy and steam ahead. But that does not explain why, with extreme visibility, no one aboard Glorious was posted in the look out tower and there was not a single aircraft overhead. Furthermore there were no aircraft ranged on deck ready to fly - but one Swordfish and three Sea Gladiators were at 10 minutes notice down below.

Meanwhile, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were sailing line ahead in a northwest direction when, at 15:46hrs, smoke was sighted in the distance. At 16:10hrs with the range was 40,000 metres, the smoke appeared to be coming from an aircraft carrier. The ships went to action stations, and increased speed to 26 knots.

With no one in the crow's nest on-board Glorious, it was not until just after 16:00hrs that mastheads were sighted. Glorious was zig-zagging, travelling at 17 knots (two thirds of her boilers) in a southwest direction, with Ardent and Acasta on either bow. HMS Ardent was ordered to break off to investigate and Acasta was ordered to switch to Glorious's starboard bow. The order went out on Glorious to range her Swordfish but D'Oyly Hughes did not alter course at this time, and only at 16:25 did Glorious turn to the southeast and Acasta was ordered to make smoke.

Marshall had ordered his ships to proceed in a southwesterly direction, and had increased speed to 29 knots when Scharnhorst opened fire at 16:27hrs. At this point Glorious was just 28,000 metres away. Fearing that aircraft would be launched, Marschall was keen to finish the aircraft carrier as quickly as possible. Secondary armament was ordered to concentrate on Ardent which was closing the battlecruisers and flashing her recognition signals.

The German guns were fired with their usual accuracy. The first salvo was long, the second straddled the carrier and the third was absolutely devastating. A shell landed on the flight deck, easily penetrated the thin armour and destroyed the aircraft about to take off. With a hole in the flight deck, Glorious would never fly off another aircraft. A massive fire began to erupt in the hangar, fuelled by the stowed Hurricanes of 46 Squadron. But the fire was contained and Glorious continued on, shielded to some extent by the smoke from Acasta which, like her 'chummy' ship Ardent, fired - although hopelessly out of range - at the battleships.

By now Ardent was around 14,000 metres away and running parallel to the battleships and preparing to launch torpedoes but this proved unsuccessful. While on Acasta, her smoke screen, being broken up by the wind, could only hold good for some time before the battleships found their target again.... and again. At some point the bridge on Glorious received a direct hit, likely killing all there. Soon her speed began to fail and the battleships pummelled the carrier.

Soon the fires became uncontrollable as the battleships closed the range down to 12,000 metres. Scharnhorst was having boiler trouble and was limited to 29 knots, so Gneisenau passed her and concentrated her fire on Glorious and Acasta. Scharnhorst stopped firing at Glorious at about 17:00hrs and her attention was fixed on Ardent. The destroyer had been hit early on and had to escape within her own smoke screen for a while, before positioning herself for a torpedo strike. Four torpedoes were launched but were evaded by both the enemy ships, although one passed close to Scharnhorst. Ardent continued to fire and one shell hit Scharnhorst, but further torpedo salvoes (she launched a total of five) failed to find the target and instead, at 17:01 Scharnhorst began to inflict serious punishment on the little ship. Her speed began to reduce and she took on a list. at 17:25hrs Ardent sank beneath the waves.

By now the conditions on-board Glorious can only be imagined. She was being hit repeatedly and was listing. One of her sides began to cave in. Acasta continued to try and shield the carrier but it was no use. Abandon ship was ordered between 17:20 and 17:30hrs and she sank at 16:10hrs. But Acasta wasn't finished. She hid in her smokescreen and then emerged to launch a salvo of torpedoes. At 17:34hrs one of her torpedoes struck Scharnhorst abreast her aft turret, killing 47 men. The battleship began taking on water and her starboard engine failed. Her magazines were flooded as a precaution and speed reduced to 20-knots. But both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau continued to hit Acasta and she was soon on fire from bow to stern. Abandon ship was ordered and she too succumbed at 16:20hrs but not before a shell landed on Scharnhorst's middle gun of Bruno turret.

And so, with all three British ships sunk, the battle was over, but the listing Scharnhorst was badly wounded, leaving Marschall with little choice but to head for Trondheim.


The end of Glorious




The Aftermath

HMS Devonshire, complete with her VIP passenger list, now re-enters the story. A message was sent by Glorious that was picked up Devonshire. The official version is that the message was garbled, although there are those on board Devonshire, including the Petty Officer Telegraphist, that testify that the message was crystal clear and confirmed that Glorious was being engaged by two battleships. What happened was that whatever form the message was received in, Vice Admiral Cunningham, aboard the cruiser, ordered speed increased, guns readied and maintained radio silence. That there is debate over whether the message was garbled or not is simply irritating and fuels the over active imagination of conspiracy theorists. Cunningham was in an impossible situation - even if the message was crystal clear. If true what was he supposed to do? He had direct and express orders to bring the Norwegian government and King Haakon to the UK. He was aware that Glorious was in trouble but knew nothing about the wider picture. It seems he was about 50 miles away from Glorious at 17:30 hrs - too late in any case to save the carrier. But a thinly armoured heavy cruiser against two battleships? We know subsequently that the Germans had to retire (and so Devonshire would have survived and been able to pick up survivors), but Cunningham didn't know that. Nor would it be fair to assume that Cunningham should have known about Glorious sailing alone or that the Home Fleet weren't 'on the case'. Imagine what history would say of Cunningham if he disobeyed ordered and got his ship sunk and his VIP's killed?

But what is tragic is the fate of many of the 1,531 sailors and airmen that were killed from the three ships. It is estimated that some 900 men escaped the sinkings. Many of these would have succumbed quickly to their wounds, shock, exposure, etc - and that is the ones that made it to a float. For others unable to do so, death would have not been long coming in those temperatures. But it is also true that a great many could have been saved - but once again the fates conspired against them. To make matters worse, and to add to the charge sheet against D'Oyly Hughes, it appears that the Carley floats were inadequately provisioned. But because of the radio silence of Devonshire and the loss of all three ships, no one knew the fate of Glorious until the following day when German broadcasts were intercepted.

It was only the next morning that the Home Fleet knew of the presence of the two battleships (from the men of the hospital ship Atlantis). Forbes ordered heavy units to sail to join Valiant but the Germans were by then back in Trondheim. Sadly for the survivors, none of the ships heading south located them. Men aboard Southampton came across dead bodies but no survivors, and nor did Ark Royal's aircraft spot them. It was in the late evening of the 10th June that a Norwegian steamer, Borgund, that was heading to the Faroes, came across some of the Carley Floats. She picked up 38 men alive and continued to the Faroes (sadly 3 men died either on board or soon after arrival). A second Norwegian vessel, Svalbard II, rescued 5 men (1 died after rescue) but the ship was forced to turn back to Norway and they became POW's. A German seaplane also rescued two men (1 died).

So in total just 40 men survived, and of these, only 1 each came from the two destroyers.

The incident attracts its fair share of conspiracy theorists. But as with most disasters, the cause can be put down to a number of errors, circumstances and actions that, if you remove one of them, the outcome may be entirely different - and not just from the British side either. With hindsight, and being able to piece together all the relevant information from the time, there are many questions raised. But as usual not everyone knew everything - there were massive gaps in intelligence, there were individual mistakes, there were specific orders applied to certain ships, and the weather was unusually fine, and there was a German commander disobeying orders.

British intelligence suspected the German heavy units had left the Baltic and suspected an operation was underway but this information does not appear to have been passed to the Home Fleet - although how 'certain' this information was is unclear. The evacuation from Norway was kept as secret as possible so those in the intelligence section didn't realise the significance of the evidence they were identifying. There is nothing to suggest VAA Wells in Ark Royal was made aware and certainly Coastal Command were not given this information.

On the 5th June a false sighting by a patrol vessel had seemed to indicate enemy ships heading for Iceland, and elements of the Home Fleet, including the battlecruisers Renown and Repulse, had been ordered to sea but found nothing. What was known by Forbes and the Home Fleet was that the Kriegsmarine had been badly hurt during Weserubung and had been necessarily quiet during late April, May and early June. With hindsight, adding Valiant and/or the battlecruisers to the convoys heading south from Norway would have been sensible just in case, but one can see why this wasn't done. This was just another example of the tragedies that happen in war.....


That Glasfurd and Barker did not receive Victoria Crosses' is, in the opinion of the author, an absolute disgrace. If it was right to award Lt. Commander Roope (HMS Glowworm) a V.C. for his action against Admiral Hipper (see post xxx), then it makes no sense not to do the same for these fine sailors who sacrificed themselves, their ships and their men in order to try and save HMS Glorious. It is also likely that their action saved a bigger disaster for the convoys following up.






Why no one has made a film about this episode is extraordinary. There are more plots and sub plots, intrigue, conspiracy theories, tales of heroism, tales of rank stupidity, tales of cover up to fill a hundred films.... who are the bad guys? Take your pick according to preference - Churchill, Wells, D'Oyly Hughes, Marschall, Saalwachter, Cunningham - but its clear who the heroes are - just ask the officers and men of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau whose admiration for the gallant little destroyers remained firm to their dying day.

Sources:
Carrier Glorious (Winton)
Secret History: HMS Glorious (Channel 4 Documentary)
The Battle for Norway (Haarr)
www.Glarac.co.uk






Attachment (3)

< Message edited by warspite1 -- 2/1/2020 1:14:02 PM >


_____________________________

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805



(in reply to warspite1)
Post #: 357
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 1/26/2020 8:53:07 AM   
warspite1


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Marschall, Gneisenau and the wounded Scharnhorst head for Trondheim

Life is so unfair sometimes..... So Admiral Marschall headed home having seemingly won a great naval victory. Yes Scharnhorst was badly damaged (even more than was first realised - and she would only become operational once more in 1941), but the Royal Navy had lost one of three remaining useful carriers, two more precious destroyers and over 1,500 sailors and experienced RAF and FAA airmen.

But Marschall was not greeted with fanfare - he was greeted with the sack. Marschall came tantalisingly close to potentially achieving an even greater victory than the sinking of an aircraft carrier. That he didn't had nothing to do with failing to execute his orders, and everything to do with German failures that were every bit as bad as the command and intelligence failures of the British (but are masked on the surface by the apparent success of the sinking of Glorious).

When Operation Juno was being put together, the situation in Norway was that Dietl was in trouble and needed assistance. One of the options for Marschall was the bizarre idea that he take his precious battleships within the tight confines of Ofotfjord. This surely would have been madness? But assisting Dietl was what Juno was all about and the main objective was an attack on Harstad.

But by the time Juno was underway, the British had begun the evacuation of Norway. Entering Ofotfjord was not necessary, but then neither was an attack on Harstad - because there would be nothing there. But German reconnaissance did not detect this. This was partly understandable as the weather was very poor while the Allies were evacuating, but the weather had cleared during the 7th and 8th (otherwise its highly likely Glorious wouldn't have been detected). Dietl informed his superiors of the situation at Narvik but this doesn't seemed to have filtered up the army chain of command and down to the navy.

Imagine had Marschall's battleships found the troop laden ships of Group II? Yes Ark Royal was there and its also possible that her Swordfish (unlike Glorious she had a full complement, and her aircraft were being deployed correctly) but we can never know for certain. On the other hand of course, the Kriegsmarine High Command, may have decided to call off Juno had they known Ark Royal was present.

But these are ifs and buts.

Fact was, Marschall's ships, met by the destroyers Lody, Steinbrink and Galster, entered Trondheimsfjorden at around 14:30hrs on the 9th June and Marschall had to face the music. But the navy high command now knew for certain that the British were evacuating Norway and wanted their ships at Trondheim to seek out the convoys. Admiral Lutjens had no time to take over from Marschall at this point and so Marschall sailed at 09:00hrs on the 10th June, with Gneisenau again as his flagship, along with Admiral Hipper and the destroyers, Lody, Galster, Schoemann and Steinbrinck. However the operation was short lived. Firstly, a submarine (it was in fact HMS Clyde) was spotted and so Marschall knew he could expect his sailing to be known to the Home Fleet, but then, having heard from his superiors that heavy British units were with the convoys, Saalwachter - true to form - ordered Marschall to return to Trondheim.

HMS Clyde was unable to get into a firing position with the German ships at 27-knots. But she was able to send a message informing the Admiralty of their return to Trondheim.

On the 11th June it was decided to send twelve Hudsons of 269 Squadron, armed with only 125kg SAP bombs, to make an attack. The attack, in the early afternoon, achieved nothing other than losing two bombers to German fighters in the process. A more concerted effort would be required and two days later it was the turn of the Fleet Air Arm to attack the German ships. It was to prove another costly and painful day for the FAA...

Fifteen Skuas of 800 and 803 Squadrons were launched - although many crews were inexperienced in dive bombing - armed with 250kg SAP (more powerful than the bombs delivered by the Hudsons, but still inadequate to penetrate the armour of the Scharnhorsts). It is not known why the torpedo-armed Swordfish of 810 and 820 Squadrons were not employed - possibly the presence of enemy fighters or possibly the geography of the fjord did not lend itself to such an attack.

The plan called for the RAF to provide Blenheims (254 Squadron) to cover the Skua's, while the RAF would also send a squadron of Beauforts (42 Squadron) to nearby Vaernes to attack the airfield there. But the plan went wrong from the start. Only three Blenheim's were actually able to support the operation and these aircraft, flying at the limit of their range and against strong winds, failed to show up on time. The Beauforts arrived at their target early and, after failing to do much damage to the airfield, headed for home chased by German fighters... and that chase led straight to the incoming Skuas.

The Skuas, hopelessly out-classed against Bf-109's were mauled before the attack although a few managed to get in an attack. However only one bomb hit Scharnhorst, and that simply bounced off and failed to explode. The surviving Skuas were then attacked again as they headed home. Each squadron lost four aircraft including the squadron commanders of each. Sixteen men (six killed and another ten captured) or just over half the attacking force. There was to be no sweet revenge for the loss of Glorious - just more pain.


The Blackburn Skua. An aircraft designed to provide fighter and dive-bombing capability - failing hopelessly at the former, although having some success at the latter (see the attack on Konigsberg (post xxx))..... provided there were no enemy fighters around. 190 aircraft were built, with the first delivered in October 1938 - a year behind schedule. They were withdrawn from service in 1941





Sources:
The Battle for Norway (Haarr)
British Aircraft of World War II (Mondey)

Attachment (1)

< Message edited by warspite1 -- 2/1/2020 1:13:26 PM >


_____________________________

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805



(in reply to warspite1)
Post #: 358
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 1/26/2020 12:37:09 PM   
RangerJoe


Posts: 13450
Joined: 11/16/2015
From: My Mother, although my Father had some small part.
Status: offline
Commander JB (John Benjamin) Heath.

https://www.hmsglorious.com/

quote:

At 18:51, communication from Scharnhorst to Gneisenau, "Scharnhorst hit by torpedo on the starboard in compartments III and IV. Turret "C" unserviceable".

Scharnhorst was on course 180°.

At 18:52, on board Scharnhorst reports were coming to Control Room.

Turret "C" magazine, water being pumped out.


http://www.scharnhorst-class.dk/scharnhorst/history/scharnjuno.html

So at least the Acasta put the Scharnhorst into the body and fender shop for awhile.

Edited for brevity. Did you want me to remove the torpedo info as well? You can always pm me if you want help with research on the internet.

< Message edited by RangerJoe -- 1/26/2020 3:31:55 PM >


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(in reply to warspite1)
Post #: 359
RE: Naval War Day-by-Day - 1/26/2020 3:22:05 PM   
warspite1


Posts: 41353
Joined: 2/2/2008
From: England
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

Commander JB (John Benjamin) Heath.

https://www.hmsglorious.com/

warspite1

Thank you for that piece of info. Could I ask you to remove the part finished text in your post please? Many thanks RJ.


_____________________________

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805



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